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S U M M A R Y 
 
This research is about illustrating the importance of commercial diplomacy – a branch of 
diplomacy that has been increasingly resorted to, as by transitional, i.e. developing, so by 
industrially developed, i.e. high-income countries, especially in the last few decades with 
acceleration of globalisation. Based on the mentioned, the focus, i.e. aim of the research is to 
test whether and to what entent engaging in commercial diplomacy by countries in transition 
towards the emerging countries/economies, otherwise also widely referred to as emerging 
markets, contributes to enhancement of internationalisation of their economies, primarily by 
means of promoting export, geographical market diversification and tourism, then attracting 
(foreign) inward and promoting outward direct investment, and securing favourable 
investment loans too. The Republic of Serbia as the Western Balkans and in broader terms 
South-East European country, i.e. its commercial diplomacy, is selected as a setting for 
verification of set theses. Its selection is justified by the fact that it is a country in transition 
(alike other former communist countries of Central and South-East Europe), whose economy 
is still relatively weak and from the perspective of internationalisation overly dependent on 
the European Union and the Central European Free Trade Agreement region, both in terms of 
trade and investment (inward and outward), what makes it very vulnerable in case of 
occurrence of regional and global economic turbulences. However, unlike other countries of 
the region and beyond, Serbia has opted for orienting and fostering its commercial diplomacy 
towards the emerging markets, especially those in the East, many of which it traditionally has 
or is trying to establish good political and/or cultural relations with. Among those are 
certainly Russia, Turkey and China, which are selected as target emerging markets, primarily 
due to being regarded as highly relevant in business terms. The rightfulness of orienting 
towards the mentioned emerging markets is thus more justifiable having that it is found that 
commercial diplomacy can be particularly beneficially exploited in the countries/markets in 
which the state has a strong impact and influence on the economy than in those self-
regulating, what is exactly the case with these (three) countries. Hence, on the three case 
studies: Serbia-Russia, Serbia-Turkey and Serbia-China, mainly by methods of analysis, 
interpretation of statistical data, deduction and induction, it is shown that by engaging in 
assertive commercial diplomacy towards the three emerging markets Serbia has indeed 
managed to enhance internationalisation of its transitional economy. 
The presented findings along with given recommendations for the Serbian authorities pose a 
good basis for further research on the applicability of commercial diplomacy for the purpose 
of enhancing national economy and its internationalisation. 
 
Key words: commercial diplomacy, emerging economies/markets, Republic of Serbia, 
(economic) transition, market diversification, economic internationalisation, economic 
growth, economic development 
 
 
  
  P O V Z E T E K 
 
Pričujoča analiza prikazuje pomen gospodarske diplomacije na trgih tranzicijskih držav in 
držav v razvoju. Gospodarska diplomacija je postala aktualna predvsem po zlomu 
dvopolnega sistema. Četudi se je njeno preučevanje začelo po drugi svetovni vojni, pa je 
slednje doživelo razmah v zadnjih dveh desetletjih. Širitev delovanja gospodarske 
diplomacije v praksi se je odrazila tudi v teoriji. Tako so se avtorji začeli ukvarjati z 
vprašanjem odnosa in učinkov aktivnosti gospodarske diplomacije in mednarodnega 
razvojnega sodelovanja, vprašanji lobiranja in/ali zbiranja obveščevalnih podatkov, zaščito 
pravic do intelektualne lastnine, reševanjem konfliktov, promocijo turizma, spodbujanjem 
sodelovanja na področju znanosti in  tehnologije, kot tudi  z vprašanjem prenosa tehnologije. 
V večini navedenih primerov so študije pokazale pozitiven vpliv gospodarske diplomacije na 
nacionalna gospodarstva, pa tudi na pospeševanje internacionalizacije, ki služi kot orodje za 
razvoj nacionalnih gospodarstev. 
V doktorski disertaciji nas zanima, ali je, in v kolikšni meri, delovanje gospodarske 
diplomacije tranzicijskih držav na trgih t. i. vznikajočih državah prispevalo h krepitvi 
internacionalizacije (promoviranje izvoza, geografska diverzifikacija trgov in turizma, 
pritegovanje neposrednih tujih investicij, promocija domačih investicij zunaj meja države, 
zagotavljanje ugodnih investicijskih kreditov idr.) gospodarstev teh tranzicijskih držav. Kot 
empirični primer smo izbrali Republiko Srbijo in analizirali njeno gospodarsko diplomacijo 
do treh vzpenjajočih se gospodarskih velesil: Rusko federacijo, Turčijo in Ljudsko republiko 
Kitajsko. V empirični analizi smo ugotovili, da je Srbija z angažiranjem gospodarske 
diplomacije uspela okrepiti internacionalizacijo svojega gospodarstva, porasle so tuje 
neposredne investicije in število prihajajočih turistov iz teh držav. Poleg tega je Srbija uspela 
izpogajati Sporazum o prosti trgovini z Rusko federacijo (in njemu pripadajoče protokole), ki 
spodbuja tudi investitorje iz evropskih držav, da prenesejo svojo proizvodnjo v Srbijo, saj se s 
tem ognejo carinam, sočasno pa ceneje dostopajo do ruskega, beloruskega in kazahstanskega 
trga. Na drugi strani pa je Sporazum o gospodarskem in tehničnem sodelovanju s Kitajsko, ki 
omogoča Srbiji pridobivanje ugodnih kreditov s strani kitajske izvozne banke, Srbiji 
omogočil financiranje velikih infrastrukturnih projektov po vsej državi, zlasti investicij v 
transportno infrastrukturo. Poleg naštetega velja omeniti še eno zadevo, ki se je pokazala pri 
raziskovanju, in sicer da deluje gospodarska diplomacija veliko boljše med državami, ki 
imajo dobre družbeno-politično-kulturne odnose, kot med tistimi državami, ki teh odnosov 
nimajo tako razvitih.  
 
Ključne besede: gospodarska diplomacija, vznikajoča gospodarstva/trgi, Republika Srbija, 
(gospodarska) tranzicija, diverzifikacija trga, internacionalizacija gospodarstva, ekonomska  
rast, ekonomski  razvoj. 
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1 Research framework and problem 
1.1 Introduction 
This dissertation aims to test whether engaging in commercial diplomacy [as an important 
foreign policy instrument (Naray 2008; Udovič 2011)] by countries in transition towards the 
emerging countries/economies, otherwise also widely referred to as emerging markets,1 
contributes to the enhancement of internationalisation of their economies. Commercial 
diplomacy of the Republic of Serbia (hereinafter: Serbia) as the Western Balkans,2 and in 
broader terms South-East European country (in transition), towards the Russian Federation 
(hereinafter: Russia), Republic of Turkey (hereinafter: Turkey) and the People’s Republic of 
China (hereinafter: China), being the selected emerging countries/markets, is taken to make a 
(research) setting that would serve for verification/testing of a research model. Why Serbia? 
It is because it shares many economic, political and other features with other region 
countries: it is in transition, small in territory, with its economy being largely dependent on 
the European Union (EU) and the Central European Free Trade Agreement (CEFTA) region, 
both in terms of trade and investment, what makes it more susceptible and vulnerable to 
eventual regional and global economic crises (Cerović 2012; Uvalić 2012). However, unlike 
many other transitional countries, those of the region and beyond, it has strongly engaged in 
commercial diplomacy towards the emerging markets in recent years, especially those in the 
East, some of which it traditionally has or is trying to establish good political and/or cultural 
relations with. Some of those are Russia, Turkey, China, Azerbaijan and the United Arab 
Emirates. Furthermore, another argument which justifies the selection of Serbia, but in part 
also of the three emerging countries, is the fact that it has traditionally good political and 
close cultural and religious relations with Russia and good political relations with China, 
stemming yet from the times of the former Yugoslavia. Serbia has also successfully 
established and maintains good political relations with Turkey, due to its influence in the 
                                                          
1 “Broadly defined, an emerging market is a country making an effort to change and improve its economy with 
the goal of raising its performance to that of the world’s more advanced nations“ (Czinkota et al. 2011, 257). 
However, the notion of emerging market/economy vastly differs among various sources in the sense of what 
countries it refers to. Nevertheless, all of them include Russia, Turkey and China. 
2 Solioz (2008, 3) defined the term “Western Balkans” as a Brussels neologism emerged in 1998, which refers to 
“the countries that once belonged to the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (minus Slovenia, plus 
Albania) and are included in the EU’s Stabilisation and Association Process.” The term is often used 
interchangeably with the term South-East Europe (SEE), which became common in 1999 in the context of the 
Stability Pact for South-East Europe. Some authors use the two terms as synonyms. Todorova (2009, 3) argues 
that the term “Balkans”, and from it “balkanisation”, has been decontextualised and came to be paradigmatically 
used as a synonym for a variety of problems, the backward and primitive, as well as for parcelisation of large 
political units. 
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region (historical Ottoman legacy) and political and economic interests.3 This fact alone 
makes Serbia a suitable and interesting case (not only for the region countries but in general) 
on which can be tested whether and to what extent good political and/or cultural bilateral 
relations impact the effectiveness of commercial diplomacy. All the mentioned makes it a 
suitable case country on which can be tested whether and to what extent engaging in active 
commercial diplomacy towards the emerging markets (of the East) can contribute to the 
enhancement of internationalisation of national economies of countries in transition in 
general (primarily by means of promoting export, geographical market diversification and 
tourism, then attracting inward and promoting outward (foreign) direct investment (FDI), as 
well as securing favourable investment loans). 
1.2 Commercial diplomacy and emerging markets 
Commercial diplomacy has proved to be a useful foreign policy instrument for enhancing 
internationalisation of national economy (Potter 2004; Mercier 2007), in particular via 
improving export performance, geographical market diversification, attracting inward and 
promoting outward investment (Naray 2008; Udovič 2011), as well as by securing favourable 
investment loans (Petrović 2009). Its importance, especially nowadays in the era of 
globalisation and intertwined economic relations, is immense (Saner and Yiu 2003). Carron 
de la Carrière (1998), a prominent representative of the French school of commercial 
diplomacy, argues that as countries become more and more open to the outside world, 
especially amid intensification of internationalisation of labour, the role of economic (i.e. 
                                                          
3 This largely enabled and helped Serbia to conclude the free trade agreements with Russia and Turkey, and the 
strategic agreement with China, as the basis for multi-level economic cooperation. The agreement with Russia 
(2000) and the amending protocols  (in 2009 and 2011) have enabled Serbia to export to the large Russian 
market around 99 % of its domestic products tax free, under the ad valorem condition, i.e. that 51 % of a 
product is made in Serbia (Chamber of Commerce and Industry of Serbia 2017a). They are also important in 
terms of attracting foreign companies, particularly from the EU, which by investing in Serbia get an opportunity 
to export to Russia (tax free), but also to Belarus and Kazakhstan, another two large countries which Serbia also 
has the free trade agreements with. The agreement with Turkey (2009) based on the model of asymmetrical 
liberalisation has been highly favourable for Serbia, as it allowed it to export all its products tax free from the 
day the agreement entered into force, while complete tax exemption for the Turkish products would happen in 
2015 (Ministry of Foreign and Internal Trade and Telecommunications of the Republic of Serbia 2013a). As in 
case with Russia, the agreement with Turkey is hoped to contribute to a larger inflow of FDI into Serbia, 
especially from the EU (Ministry of Foreign and Internal Trade and Telecommunications of the Republic of 
Serbia 2013b). The investment-related agreement with China (2009), in its economic section has two 
components: (1) participation of the Chinese side in infrastructural projects in Serbia through projecting, 
carrying out of field works, and supply of material and equipment by the Chinese firms. The Chinese 
Government supports the projects by financing them through favourable (investment) loans under concessional 
terms by the Export-Import Bank of China (broadly referred to as the Exim Bank), (2) understanding the 
possibilities of investing in new and existing production facilities in Serbia (greenfield and brownfield 
investments) on the basis of its good geographical position, market capacity and export potential based on free 
trade with Russia, Turkey, EU and CEFTA region (Ministry of Foreign and Internal Trade and 
Telecommunications of the Republic of Serbia 2013c).  
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commercial) diplomacy, which has become an important supplement of political economy, 
will inevitably grow. In terms of the effectiveness of commercial diplomacy in the emerging 
markets, Udovič (2011) found that commercial diplomacy gives much more beneficial effect 
in the countries/markets in which the state has a strong influence on the economy than in so-
to-say “classic” open market economies. This feature characterises many of today’s emerging 
markets, among which are Russia (as a semi-presidential system in which the President via its 
political and economic decisions has a traditionally strong influence on the economy) and 
China (as a single party system, in which the ruling elite has a strong impact on decisions of 
large state-owned financial and economic institutions and companies). They, along with 
Turkey (traditionally a parliamentary democracy, which after the April 2017 referendum4 
became a semi-presidential system, in which the President is vested with strong powers in 
terms of decision-making, and hence has, or at least is expected to have a strong influence on 
the economy), make the selected emerging markets. 
However, what is of highest relevance in terms of selection of these emerging markets, is the 
fact that they are large and fast-growing economies, offering excellent business prospects, as 
will be shown in detail. In general, emerging markets have stable growth rates and 
demonstrated strong resilience to global economic turbulences. As such, they are widely 
believed to be the engine of global economic growth in the coming decades (Garten 1997; 
Gupta and Wang in Gupta et al. 2012; Guillen and Garcia-Cannal 2013). In addition, they are 
mostly large, both territorially and in terms of population, and have excellent consumption 
capacity (Czinkota et al. 2011, 257–259). Likewise, they also represent a rich source of 
investment (Globerman and Shapiro in Sauvant 2008, 229; Sauvant et al. 2009, 1).  
1.3 Research questions, theses and methodology 
As already suggested, the main purpose of the research is to test whether and to what extent 
engaging in commercial diplomacy by the countries in transition towards the emerging 
countries/markets contributes to the enhancement of internationalisation of their economies. 
It made the basis for the main research questions to be answered in the dissertation. Answers 
                                                          
4 In the referendum it was voted on the total of 18 amendments which related both to executive and legislative 
powers. Among other things they included the following: (1) abolition of the position of Prime Minister and 
deprivation of the Parliament from the power to vote on distrust on the ministers and the government (whereby 
the President would take over authorities of the Prime Minister and have the right to nominate the Cabinet and 
elect ministers himself/herself; (2) the President could be affiliated to a political party, what was previously not 
the case; (3) the President would be vested with the power to revoke the Parliament; (4) abolition of the military 
courts, and (5) the President would have the power to nominate 4 of 13 judges for the Supreme Court (Telegram 
2017). 
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to the presented questions at the same time represent the aims of the research. They (meaning 
questions) are as follows: 
1. Can commercial diplomacy be a beneficial foreign policy instrument for stimulating 
and enhancing national economy internationalisation of the countries in transition, 
particularly those that are small territorially and in terms of population?  
2. What kind of economic benefits can countries in transition gain by engaging in 
commercial diplomacy towards the emerging markets, particularly those in the East, 
especially in times of global economic crises? 
3. How can Serbia enhance market diversification and internationalisation of its 
economy by actively engaging in active commercial diplomacy towards the emerging 
markets of Russia, Turkey and China?  
4. How can good political and/or cultural home-host country relations influence the 
effectiveness of the home country’s commercial diplomacy in the host market? 
5. How can Serbia take advantage of good political and/or cultural relations with Russia, 
Turkey and China with the aim to achieve economic benefits? 
The stipulated research questions make the framework for the two main research theses, 
being: 
H1: Engaging in commercial diplomacy towards the emerging markets contributes to the 
enhancement of national economy internationalisation of countries in transition. 
H1a: Engaging in commercial diplomacy towards the emerging markets contributes to the 
increase of export of the home country and the overall trade volume. 
H1b: Engaging in commercial diplomacy towards the emerging markets contributes to the 
increase of investment flows, both inward and outward. 
H1c: Engaging in commercial diplomacy towards the emerging markets helps the home 
country achieve agreement on favourable investment loans. 
H1d: Engaging in commercial diplomacy towards the emerging markets contributes to the 
development of tourism of the home country and the increase of revenues from tourism. 
H2: Political and socio-cultural home-host country relations influence the effectiveness of the 
home country’s commercial diplomacy in the host market. 
In terms of methodology, there are different methods to be used for testing the research 
theses. They are primarily the following ones: (a) description – the method used for 
describing or outlining facts, processes and subjects being empirically confirmed. This 
methodology is used in the initial stage of a research, and gains in importance if simple 
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description of facts happens along with their explanation (Zelenika 2000, 109; Churchill and 
Iacobucci 2005, 107; Kukić and Markić 2006, 318); (b) induction – the method by which on 
the basis of concrete, individual cases is/are drawn general conclusion/s, new scientific facts 
or legalities (Zelenika 2000, 325; Kukić and Markić 2006, 118); (c) deduction – the method 
by which on the basis of general statement/s or truths is/are drawn specific, individual 
conclusion/s (Zelenika 2000, 325; Kukić and Markić 2006, 121; Saunders et al. 2009, 500); 
(d) analysis – the method used for anatomising complex notions, judgements and 
conclusions into their more simple component parts, which are then examined individually 
and one in relation to others (Zelenika 2000, 327; Kukić and Markić 2006, 122–5; Saunders 
et al. 2009, 502); (e) synthesis – The method of synthesis is used for creating a coherent 
whole of notions, judgements and conclusions out of two or more separate ones; just opposite 
to analysis (Zelenika 2000, 329; Kukić and Markić 125–126); (f) statistical method 
(interpretation of statistical data) – the method is one of the most commonly used methods, 
especially in social sciences and humanities, by which data are statistically processed, and 
obtained results represent a certain conclusion (Zelenika 2000, 341; Kukić and Markić 2006, 
318; Saunders et al. 2009, 444–467); (g) historical method – the method by which on the 
basis of various documents and other materials can precisely be found what (has) happened in 
the past, and possibly for what reasons. This method is most commonly used in social 
sciences and humanities, but also, though rarely, in combination with other scientific methods 
and fields, for the purpose of unriddling causal relationships (Zelenika 2000, 358; Goddard 
and Melville 2004, 10); (h) case study – the method by which some particular case from a 
particular field is examined and elaborated in detail. Specific general conclusions can be 
drawn out only on the basis of a study of more individual cases (Zelenika 2000, 366; 
Goddard and Melville 2004, 122, Yin 2014, 3); (i) empirical method – the method used for 
finding answers by which can be explained facts, judgements and conclusions, based on 
experience solely. Experiments conducted by this method are considered preliminary, on 
which basis can be set new working hypotheses and conducted a new research to prove the 
existing hypotheses (Zelenika 2000, 366, Goddard and Melville 2004, 8); (j) individual 
interview – the method used to obtain data from only one interviewee, and as such has many 
advantages in relation to group-targeted interviews, as by them are obtained better in quality 
answers (Zelenika 2000, 378; Kukić and Markić 2006, 146–147; Saunders et al. 2009, 353), 
and (k) questionnaire – the method for obtaining information and facts, composed of a set of 
questions in relation to the research (Zelenika 2000, 336; Kukić and Markić 2006, 151). 
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In the theoretical part of the research, in the chapter which deals with conceptualisation of 
commercial diplomacy, the methods of description and analysis in the first place, 
supplemented with the statistical and the empirical method, will be used to help explain the 
concept of diplomacy as a foreign policy instrument, then origin and definitions of 
commercial diplomacy, its role, main objectives and various classifications, as well as 
similarities and differences between commercial and economic, and other forms of 
diplomacy, but also current trends and developments with reference to it. Apart from the 
mentioned will also be given a summary, i.e. main findings of a number of empirical (case) 
studies found available, which will serve for illustration of the importance of commercial 
diplomacy, especially nowadays in the era characterised by intensified global economic 
relations. For that purpose, the methods of deduction and induction will be used. In the 
chapter (of the theoretical part) which deals with the relationship between export, its 
geographical diversification, and foreign direct investment, on one side, and economic 
growth, on the other, by the method of deduction will be drawn out main findings out of a 
large number of empirical (case) studies found available. Then, by the method of induction 
will be singled out main conclusion(s), which will enable to be shown the importance of (the 
promotion of) export, its geographical diversification and foreign direct investment (both 
inward and outward) for economic growth of especially countries in transition and 
developing countries in general. The last mentioned subchapters will be preceded by a short 
survey of main theories of and approaches to economic growth, what is to serve as a sort of 
introduction to the chapter (for which will be used the method of description and the 
historical-critical method). Lastly, the end of this chapter will deal with the emerging 
markets, in the sense of their classification, general attractiveness for doing business and 
rising global importance. For that the method of description and interpretation of statistical 
data will primarily be used. Moreover, it is also important to note that each of the three 
mentioned emerging markets will be separately elaborated in the empirical part of the 
research from the perspective of their attractiveness businesswise. 
In the empirical part, in the chapter which deals with Serbia in transition, the descriptive 
method will be complemented with the statistical method (interpretation of statistical data) 
and the historical-critical method, to enable describe the course of main political events in a 
chronological order, and analyse main economic and social factors which preceded and are 
still hindering the transition in Serbia. The obtained information and statistical data will help 
explain why Serbia is still overburdened by remnants from the past, which have been 
obstructing the transition process, especially from the economic point of view. After that, by 
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means of description and interpretation of statistical data, supplemented with the historical-
critical method, a survey of Serbian commercial diplomacy will be made, especially in terms 
of organisation. Then, on the three case studies (Serbia-Russia, Serbia-Turkey and Serbia-
China), by means of collection of empirical data, and in relation to it interpretation of 
statistical data, then description, and applying the method of deduction, a framework will be 
created to test that engaging in commercial diplomacy towards those three emerging markets 
has helped Serbia enhance its economic transition and overall well-being, primarily by means 
of facilitating and stimulating export and its market diversification, attracting inward and 
promoting outward investment, promoting tourism, as well as securing favourable investment 
loans. This chapter will be followed by a short survey, i.e. comparison of the main findings 
from the three case studies, for what will primarily by used the methods of description and 
synthesis. At the end, by the method of deduction I will summarise the tested research results 
from the case studies, and thereupon using the method of induction a conclusion will be 
drawn (out)/made that the tested results confirm the set theses and the research goal. In that 
way, this research will contribute to the development of commercial diplomacy as a scientific 
discipline and a practical instrument for enhancing internationalisation of national economy 
and indirectly economic growth, primarily of developing countries in transition.  
More specifically, the thesis H1 will be tested mainly by means of: 
(a) analysing and comparing annual and periodical values of bilateral trade exchange (at 
the level of the overall trade exchange, and of sectoral, divisional and/or individual 
export goods) between Serbia, on one side, and Russia, Turkey and China, on the 
other, for the selected period, 
(b) analysing and comparing annual and periodical values of foreign direct investment 
(both inward and outward) between Serbia, on one side, and Russia, Turkey and 
China, on the other, for the selected period, 
(c) presenting available data in relation to inward (foreign) investments from Russia, 
Turkey and China (in)to Serbia, and Serbia’s outward investments (in)to one or more 
of these three emerging countries (depending on when such data are found available), 
including value of investment, type of investment, number of new working places 
created and/or planned (if an investment is still not realised or in cases of planned 
expansion of existing investment), location of investment and branch of industry 
invested in, 
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(d) analysing and comparing annual and periodical values in relation to Serbia’s tourism 
(development) based on a number of country entries and overnight stays of citizens of 
the three emerging markets in Serbia, for the selected period, 
(e) presenting available data and information obtained in relation to main Chinese 
(infrastructural) investments (in)to Serbia, realised via the strategic agreement with 
China, based on favourable loans of the China Export-Import Bank. 
Obtained results under (a) will primarily enable to be tested whether Serbia via its 
commercial diplomacy has benefited from the free trade agreements with Russia and Turkey, 
but also from export-supportive commercial diplomacy (policies and measures) towards 
China. The primary data source will be the Statistical Office of Serbia and the Chamber of 
Commerce and Industry of Serbia. 
Obtained results under (b) and (c) will enable to be tested whether Serbia via its commercial 
diplomacy has benefited from intensified investment-related (both inward and outward) 
commercial diplomacy activities at various levels - from the state level to the level of 
economic counsellors (while stationed in Russia, Turkey and China) and other diplomatic 
staff. The primary data source will be the National Bank of Serbia, Chamber of Commerce 
and Industry of Serbia, Development Agency of Serbia (former Serbia Investment and Export 
Promotion Agency), and the Ministry of Trade, Tourism and Telecommunications in the 
Government of Serbia.  
Obtained results under (d) will enable to be tested whether and to what extent Serbia has 
benefited from its commercial diplomacy activities geared at promoting tourism, i.e. Serbia 
as a tourist destination among/in the three emerging countries. The primary data source will 
be the Statistical Office of the Republic of Serbia. 
Obtained results under (e) will enable to be tested whether Serbia via its commercial 
diplomacy has benefited from favourable investment loans of the China Export-Import Bank; 
in other words whether it found them favourable and beneficial. The primary data source will 
be the Government of Serbia, primarily the Ministry of Trade, Tourism and 
Telecommunications. 
The thesis H2 will be tested mainly by means of: 
(a) presenting available information on whether good political and/or cultural relations 
with Russia, Turkey and China contributed to the conclusion of the free trade 
agreements with Russia and Turkey, and the strategic agreement with China; 
(b) presenting available information about whether the strong role of the state on the 
economy in Russia, Turkey and China facilitated Serbian diplomatic efforts to 
28 
 
conclude the free trade agreements with Russia and Turkey and the strategic 
agreement with China. The primary data source for both (a) and (b) will be 
information obtained from questionnaire and/or semi-structured, individual interviews 
with the main government officials in charge of commercial diplomacy and bilateral 
economic cooperation with the three emerging countries. 
1.4 Contribution of the research to the scientific field of diplomacy 
The research will have a threefold contribution to the scientific field of diplomacy: for the 
theory, business, and for policy-makers. 
The theoretical contribution will consist of: 
- strengthening the theory that commercial diplomacy can contribute to the 
enhancement of national economy internationalisation of countries in transition, 
especially those that are small territorially and in terms of population (primarily by 
means of helping agree on/conclude lucrative free or preferential trade agreements, 
investment agreements, tourism-related agreements and/or arrangements, and 
favourable investment loans); 
- strengthening the theory that (small) transitional countries can benefit from engaging 
in commercial diplomacy towards politically and/or economically influential and 
powerful emerging markets (primarily by means of agreeing on/concluding lucrative 
free or preferential trade agreements, investment agreements, tourism-related 
agreements and/or arrangements, and favourable investment loans);  
- presenting a novel contribution to the theory (on commercial diplomacy) that 
commercial diplomacy of the territorially and in terms of population small countries 
of the Western Balkans towards the emerging economies/markets in the East is found 
to be highly beneficial in the sense of improving geographical market diversification 
and enhancing national economy internationalisation;  
- strengthening the theory that (small) transition countries can take advantage of, i.e. 
exploit good political and/or cultural relations with the host (target) countries, 
especially those that are politically and economically much more influential and 
powerful, with the aim to increase the successfulness of their commercial diplomacy 
in the markets of the latter; 
- presenting a novel contribution to the theory (on commercial diplomacy) that good 
political and/or cultural relations between the the territorially and in terms of 
population small countries of the Western Balkans and the emerging 
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economies/markets in the East is found to increase the successfulness of their 
commercial diplomacy in the markets of the latter;  
- strengthening the theory that commercial diplomacy is/can be much more effective 
when applied by developing towards developed countries or vice versa, than between 
developing or developed countries themselves. 
The contribution for the business (community) will consist of: 
- presenting the three case studies that will show that Serbia as a country in transition 
has managed to enhance internationalisation of its economy (primarily by means of 
helping agree on/conclude lucrative free or preferential trade agreements, investment 
agreements, tourism-related agreements and/or arrangements, and favourable 
investment loans) by engaging in assertive commercial diplomacy towards the 
emerging markets of Russia, Turkey and China; 
- demonstrating to what extent Serbia as a country in transition can rely on the 
emerging markets in the sense of searching for lucrative business opportunities. 
The contribution for the policy-makers will consist of: 
- showing the danger of Serbia being overly dependent on a limited number of markets 
within the EU and CEFTA region in terms of trade and investment, especially in times 
of global economic crises; 
- demonstrating that Serbia needs to change its predominantly import- and 
consumption-oriented growth model into more production-driven and export-oriented, 
based on research and development, and innovations (supply-side economics). 
- creating a diagnostic instrumentary for helping the development of Serbia’s 
commercial diplomacy, especially in the emerging markets, by exposing its strengths 
and weaknesses, and providing a toolbox for future development of commercial 
diplomacy activities. 
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2 Conceptualisation of commercial diplomacy 
2.1 Introductory notes 
In this chapter will first be given a short survey on diplomacy (in general) as a foreign policy 
instrument. It will be followed by introduction of the notion of commercial diplomacy, which 
will then be elaborated in detail as an academic field and a practical foreign policy tool which 
has gained in importance in the era of globalisation and especially since outbreak of the 
recent world economic crisis. Special emphasis will be given to explaining its origin, 
definition, main role and objectives, then differences between commercial and other forms of 
diplomacy that are often used interchangeably, such as economic and business diplomacy, as 
well as to current trends with reference to it. Since the scope of commercial diplomacy 
encompasses various activities, from business advocacy and representation both in the home 
and the targeted country, to various market analyses and dispute settlement, in order to 
examine whether commercial diplomacy has found to be beneficial, main findings of a total 
of 33 (case) studies found available are presented. They will eventually show high 
importance of this policy tool, as for high-income, so for developing and/or transitional 
countries. In addition, it is important to note that the term commercial diplomacy is still not 
broadly accepted as the only term in use when it comes to promotion of trade, investment and 
tourism, especially in the business community, and is often used interchangeably with 
especially economic, but also business diplomacy, though much less frequently in terms of 
the latter (term). Hence, in this chapter all these terms will be used, though referring to the 
same thing – commercial diplomacy, whose focus, as mentioned, is mainly on the promotion 
of trade, investment and tourism, depending on the preference of authors being cited.  
2.2 On diplomacy as foreign policy instrument, and commercial diplomacy as a notion 
In general terms diplomacy can be regarded as a main instrument via which countries, that is, 
their governments implement foreign policy by peaceful means. Dimitrijević and Stojanović 
(1979), Holsti (1988) and Vukadinovic (1989) are only some of those who argue(d) that 
diplomacy is one of three instruments by means of which foreign policy is, i.e. can be 
implemented. According to Vukadinović (2004, 82) diplomacy and international relations as 
notions are often treated the same, as they refer to the same thing. Vukadinović (2004, 81) 
further outlines four approaches to diplomacy: 
1. The first approach equalises diplomacy with foreign policy. Hans Morgenthau, one of 
the founders of international relations as a scientific discipline [in his influential book 
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“Politics Among Nations”, originally published in 1948] defined diplomacy as 
“formulation and implementation of foreign policy”. 
2. The second approach equalises diplomacy with foreign policy techniques and 
activities. Jacques Chazelle defines it as all means and activities which the state 
employs in order to realise its foreign policy objectives. 
3. The third approach equalises diplomacy and negotiating. Callieres and Martens argue 
that diplomacy is, in essence, international negotiating. 
4. The fourth approach equalises diplomacy with personal ability of diplomats to 
accomplish set tasks. Oxford English Dictionary defines diplomacy as “skills of 
diplomats.” 
Similar view is also shared by Ruël (2013, 16) who sees diplomacy as a concept stemming 
from the field of diplomatic studies, but also in the broader context of international relations 
and political science too. The author defines diplomacy as follows:  
Diplomacy is the dialogue via representation and communication between parties (nation-
states, business, NGOs, supranational organizations, multilateral organizations, interest 
groups) that acknowledge each other’s existence and accept each other’s sovereignty and 
control over a territory (either in a physical sense or in non-material sense such as a 
knowledge domain, an interest domain or market) in order to achieve common objectives in 
a peaceful and sustainable way (Ruël 2013, 17). 
Over time many other scholars offered their own interpretation of what diplomacy is, that is, 
represents. According to Barston (2006, 1) „Diplomacy is [generally] concerned with the 
management of relations between states and between states and other actors.“ Berridge and 
James (2001, 62) define diplomacy as “the conduct of relations between sovereign states 
through the medium of officials based at home or abroad, the latter being either members of 
their state’s diplomatic service or temporary diplomats.” Bull (1995, 156) comprehends 
diplomacy as „the conduct of relations between states and other entities with standing in 
world politics by official agents and by peaceful means.“ Kostecki and Naray (2007, 1) note 
that diplomacy is usually described as the main foreign policy instrument which enables 
external relations with foreign country authorities and the public by means of 
communication, negotiation and networking. According to them diplomatic activities are 
conducted at two levels: (1) at the international level (through bilateralism, regionalism or 
multilateralism) and (2) in the host states (through establishing relations with the government, 
parliament, civil sector, business organisations, corporations, etc.). Saner and Yiu (2003, 11) 
regard that in their opinion Melissen’s definition of diplomacy is the most succinct and at the 
same time contemporary, who defines it as “the mechanism of representation, communication 
and negotiation through which states and other international actors conduct their business.” 
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Rana (2011b, 16) defines diplomacy as “a system of the interstate communication and issue 
resolution.” Vukadinović (2004, 81) notes that the American historian of diplomacy Bailey 
views diplomacy as the process of accomplishing national interests in relations with other 
states by means of negotiating. Vukadinović (2004, 83) offers his interpretation of diplomacy 
being “a social activity and a political process in which political players, most often the 
states, enter international relations in the international environment.” In his understanding, 
the main features of diplomacy are: (a) it is an evolutionary process; (b) in bettering its 
usability, it is becoming increasingly connected to science and scientific instruments; (c) it is 
closely related to personal skills of diplomats; and (d) negotiating and representation are its 
main functions.  
Nowadays, when globalisation is seen to increase economic vulnerability, but at the same 
time open up opportunities for trade and investment (Lee and Hocking in Denemark 2010, 
11), the use of diplomacy in cross country relations can represent a helpful tool for achieving 
set objectives (Reuvers and Ruël in Ruël 2012, 2). Under such circumstances, the traditional 
perception of what diplomacy is and how it should be conducted has changed profoundly in 
recent decades due to growing importance and influence of firms, mainly multinationals. This 
change has brough about that diplomacy is not only used as a means of communication 
between governments, but also, and yet more and more frequently, between governments and 
firms (Stopford and Strange 1991, 1–18; Strange 1992, 1–2;). For the reasons quoted, 
diplomacy is developing much quicker than in the second half of the 20th century (Melissen 
2011, 2), as it had to adapt in order to respond to new opportunities (Rana 2011b, 16).5 Doing 
business outside national borders in a successful way demands strong, assertive and 
professional diplomacy. Its main task will be to facilitate access to new markets and 
subsequent business expansion, then promote home country as a suitable location to invest in, 
and cope with challenges of foreign market environment (Ruël 2013, 14). According to the 
author, “[d]iplomacy may be a key word and the additional explanation for international 
business success or failure.” Therefrom, the branch of diplomacy which deals with the 
promotion of trade, investment and business in general is called commercial diplomacy, the 
term often being used interchangeably with economic and business diplomacy. Ruël also 
argues that commercial diplomacy (in addition to business diplomacy, as the author sees the 
two as separate entities referring to different set of activities) as foreign policy instrument 
                                                          
5 In modern diplomacy the ministry of foreign affairs still holds the primacy over foreign issues, but it no longer 
has monopoly over decision-making, as it has to cooperate and consult with other government departments. Its 
role is mainly one of a coordinator (Rana 2011b, 16). 
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needs to be [prioritised], and professionalised and modernised, what implies innovative 
policies and practices, and new organisational framework at all levels.6   
2.3 Origins of and defining commercial diplomacy 
Application of commercial diplomacy as a political instrument for realisation of economic 
and/or more specifically commercial objectives is very old. As a matter of fact, as Dašić 
(2013, 379) argues, it is one of the oldest forms of diplomacy.7 First traces of it have been 
found to date back as early as to Ancient Greece and the Roman Empire, whereas the 
foundations of modern commercial diplomacy primarily based on information gathering and 
intelligence were laid down in the late 19th century (de la Carriere 1998, 124), when famous 
British economist Ricardo, in his seminal work “Principles of Political Economy and 
Taxation” from 1817, indirectly revealed a clear link between politics and economy (in the 
context of international trade). Ricardo argued that “[u]nder a system of perfectly free 
commerce, each country naturally devotes its capital and labour to such employments as are 
most beneficial to each. This pursuit of individual advantage is admirably connected with the 
universal good of the whole.” (van Bergeijk 2009, 1). 
In its contemporary form commercial diplomacy8 emerged after the World War II, when 
governments and foreign ministries across the world started to give special attention to 
external economic relations (Rana in Bayne and Woolcock 2011a, 95–96).9 Since then, 
economic diplomacy [the term most often being used interchangeably with commercial 
diplomacy] has become increasingly popular (Dašić 2013, 384). Being a relatively new 
academic discipline (Abbink 2014, 2), numerous research studies on it have been written in 
                                                          
6 In this context, it is important to note that many governments around the world recognise that diplomatic skills 
and expertise are best achieved through experience. Diplomacy is a profession; and hence the people who 
conduct it need to possess good skills in negotiating, communication, persuasion, reporting, analysis and 
management, to speak foreign languages and be familiar with different cultures, as well as to know policy-
making procedures in the country they serve in. Cooperation with the military and intelligence can also be part 
of what they do (Kopp and Gillespie 2008, 7). 
7 In this context, Dašić (2013, 379) is using terms economic and trade diplomacy. He notes that actual origin of 
it could be said to date back as early as to the first exchanges of goods. 
8 In this context the author used the term economic diplomacy instead, but under which he also implies 
commercial diplomacy - to be explained later in this chapter. 
9 The author notes the case of the United Kingdom, and the 1964 Plowden Report, which identified export 
promotion [as one of the main activities falling under the scope of commercial diplomacy] as the primary 
activity that British diplomatic missions abroad needed to be occupied with, as well as the 1969 Duncan Report, 
which gave even more pertinence to economic diplomacy. Also, in India, the 1966 Pillai Report, which analysed 
the work of the Indian Ministry of External Relations (MEA), stressed the role of trade. India fully realised the 
importance and the necessity of economic diplomacy only in 1973 when the first big oil shock happened and the 
price of oil quadrupled following the formation of the OPEC cartel. Being a developing country with no 
significant oil reserves India was forced to look up for ways to increase its foreign trade exchange to 
compensate for the incurred losses (Rana in Bayne and Woolcock 2011a, 95–96). 
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international economics, international political economy and international relations alike 
(Moons and van Bergeijk 2013, 6), what tells of its growing significance. Reuvers and Ruël 
in Ruël (2012, 3–4) reviewed the existing literature on commercial (and economic 
diplomacy), and found that number of research publications during the last years has notably 
increased in comparison to the 1990s. 
One of the first who described commercial diplomacy in its contemporary sense was Axel 
Herbst, former head of Department for Foreign Trade at the German Foreign Office in Bonn, 
in the late 1960s. According to him, the main task of commercial counsellors (meaning 
diplomats) consists of: promoting export, matchmaking, facilitating contacts between 
(German) businesses and public authorities of the host country, providing information on 
trade fairs, making press releases on (German) businesses, reporting on the host country 
economic development and legal and administrative regulations that may impact bilateral 
trade relations, facilitating negotiations on trade agreements and multilateral trade policies, as 
well as doing analysis on development aid (Herbst 1969, 323–324). Since then, many other 
scholars and diplomats offered their own vision and interpretation of what commercial 
diplomacy and its main task is. In the following lines I will quote some of them, yet in a 
chronological order, to provide better understanding of how various authors came to 
apprehend the topic over time and how commercial diplomacy has actually evolved in terms 
of activity scope. Berridge and James (2001, 38–39) in their Dictionary of Diplomacy 
describe commercial diplomacy as „the work of diplomatic missions in support of the home 
country’s business and finance sectors.” Its scope of activity includes: promotion of trade and 
investment (inward and outward), providing information on export and investment 
opportunities, and helping to organise and host trade missions from the home country. Lee 
(2004b, 51), from the perspective of the United Kingdom, regards that commercial diplomacy 
deals with the promotion of inward and outward investment and export (also Lee 2004a, 2). 
The author outlines three major categories of commercial diplomacy activities: (1) gathering 
and dissemination of market information, and market analysis, (2) establishing contacts with 
the host country government and the business community, and transferring these contacts to 
the business sector in the home country, and (3) trade promotion (of UK goods) in the host 
country by means of organising seminars, trade fairs, lobbying and (business) intelligence. 
Potter (2004, 55), in his paper on the renaissance of Canada’s diplomacy, defines commercial 
diplomacy as “the application of the tools and diplomacy to help bring about specific 
commercial gains through promoting exports, attracting inward investment and preserving 
outward investment opportunities, and encouraging the benefits of technological transfer.” He 
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further argues that “commercial diplomacy aims to exploit comparative advantages and 
capitalize on the international opportunities created by economic diplomacy and the evolution 
of markets.” Commercial diplomacy is being regarded as part of, as the author calls, “new 
diplomacy”, whereat governments of both developed and developing countries increasingly 
focus their foreign policy on their country branding and advocacy for business interests. Lee 
and Hudson (2004, 343) define commercial diplomacy as the „work of public officials from 
Foreign Ministries and overseas missions and officials from other government departments 
such as Trade/Commerce as well as private economic actors in support of the business and 
finance sectors of the economy.“, which deals with the promotion of investment (both inward 
and outward) and trade. Mercier (2007, 25) argues that commercial diplomacy is about 
helping the home country's enterprises in their export ambitions, and presenting foreign 
investors the advantages of investing in the home country. In practising commercial 
diplomacy are included both public and private actors, from government staff, chambers of 
commerce and associations, to businessmen. Naray (2008, 2) defines commercial diplomacy 
as „an activity conducted by state representatives with diplomatic status in view of business 
promotion between the home and the host country.“ He further notes that commercial 
diplomacy „aims at encouraging business development through a series of business 
promotion and facilitation activities.“ Van Bergeijk (2009, 1) argues that commercial 
diplomacy (policy) is a subcategory of economic diplomacy, which aims “to influence 
decisions about cross-border economic activities (export, import, investment, lending, aid and 
migration) pursued by governments and non-state actors.” Ozdem (2009, 8) defines 
commercial diplomacy as (diplomatic) activities conducted with the aim to intensify trade 
and investment flows (both inward and outward). Lee and Hocking in Denemark (2010, 4) 
argue that commercial diplomacy deals with the promotion of export and inward and outward 
investment, and aims to help achieve competitive advantage in the international business 
environment. Naray (2011, 122) argues that „commercial diplomacy aims at encouraging 
bilateral business through a series of roles that commercial diplomats perform in various 
activity areas, such as trade promotion, investment promotion, and cooperation in science and 
technology.“ Non-diplomatic institutions such as trade promotion organisations and chambers 
of commerce also perform commercial diplomacy activities. The author views commercial 
diplomats as „state representatives with diplomatic status who are working for business 
promotion in a broad sense between a home and a host country.“ Commercial diplomats' 
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scope of activity encompasses trade and investment promotion, including tourism, then 
cooperation in science and technology, and the protection of intellectual property rights.10 
Van Bergeijk et al. (2011, 105–106) see economic diplomacy as the work of public, 
government agencies, such as: embassies, consulates, foreign ministries, ministries of 
economic affairs and trade, and private actors such as trade and support offices, geared 
toward providing assistance to domestic firms in foreign markets, and in that way supporting 
business in general. More specifically, it refers to: (a) trade (export and import) and 
investment (inward and outward) promotion, (b) information gathering and offering 
expertise, (c) securing property rights, and (d) exerting influence on policy-making in foreign 
countries with the aim to support interests of domestic firms in their conducting business 
abroad. Kostecki and Naray (2007) define commercial diplomacy as „a government service 
to the business community, which aims at the development of socially beneficial international 
business ventures.“ (Kostecki and Naray 2007, 1). The authors further note that the term 
commercial diplomacy is commonly used among foreign diplomatic missions and the related 
agencies to designate all business support activities (Kostecki and Naray 2007, 2).11 Most 
commercial diplomacy activities take place in the host country, and the main actors 
performing commercial diplomacy are usually the staff of the home country's diplomatic 
mission abroad, as well as trade promotion organisations (TPOs) and investment promotion 
organisations (IPAs) (Kostecki and Naray 2007, 1). Woolcock in van Bergeijk et al. (2011a, 
85) defines commercial diplomacy as „non-binding cooperation between the private and 
public sectors in the promotion of commercial interests.“ [with the aim] ... „to assist national 
firms in a target market through the provision of information and representation, or trade 
missions acompanying visits by heads of state or government to trading partners.“ According 
to Okano-Heijmans (2011, 17) “[e]conomic diplomacy is understood as the use of political 
means as leverage in international negotiations, with the aim of enhancing national economic 
prosperity, and the use of economic leverage to increase the political stability of the nation.” 
Verhagen and Bleker (2011, 173) define economic diplomacy as “a government activity that 
supports economic transactions and trade by negotiating with governments, international 
                                                          
10 The 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations and subsequent amendments mention activities 
directly or indirectly related to commercial diplomacy, such as: (a) protection of the home country national 
interests in the host country, as well as their nationals, property and company shares, (b) information gathering, 
and (c) general promotion of economic and scientific bilateral relations, including trade and investment issues 
(Naray 2011, 130–131; Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations 1961).   
11 The authors also note that the term commercial diplomat has many different denominations, some of which 
are: commercial counsellor, commercial attaché, trade representative and commercial representative (Kostecki 
and Naray 2007, 1). 
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bodies or in multilateral organizations.” Jiang (2011, 64) sees economic diplomacy as the use 
of economic means for accomplishment of foreign policy objectives, and diplomacy for 
economic benefits. Based on available literature and concepts synthesis, Ruel and Visser 
(2012, 44) gave the following definition of commercial diplomacy: “Commercial diplomacy 
is an activity conducted by state representatives which is aimed at generating commercial 
gain in the form of trade and inward and outward investment for the home country by means 
of business and entrepreneurship promotion and facilitation activities in the host country 
based on supplying information about export and investment opportunities, keeping contact 
with key actors and maintaining networks in relevant areas.” Feketekuty (2012) describes 
commercial diplomacy as “diplomacy designed to influence foreign government policy and 
regulatory decisions that affect global trade and investment.” (Feketekuty 2012, 1–2). The 
author views a commercial diplomat as “a professional skilled in advancing the interests of an 
organization on international trade and investment-related policy issues, in developing 
agreements on international commercial issues, and in resolving policy conflicts among 
nations over commercial issues.” A commercial diplomat may represent the government, 
business community and the civil sector (Feketekuty 2012, 2).12 Ruël (2013, 14) describes 
commercial diplomacy as “predominantly a government-driven approach to use the network 
of government and business representatives to promote home country business abroad using 
diplomatic channels and processes.” Bilandžić and Barun (2013,77–78) perceive economic 
diplomacy as (diplomatic) activities aimed at increasing export, attracting foreign direct 
investment and taking part in the work of international economic organisations. In addition, it 
(economic diplomacy) also relates to promoting domestic economy and firms in foreign 
markets, protecting national economic interests, but also includes identification of 
mechanisms for its enhancement. Dašić (2013, 376–377) defines economic diplomacy as a 
scientific discipline belonging both to the fields of political science and economy, which, in 
practical terms, offers to the business actors in their relations with abroad best available 
instructions and solutions with the goal of increasing profit, volume of trade exchange and 
investment flows, as well as the transfer of advanced technology. Moons and de Boer (2014, 
3) see economic diplomacy as „the use of government relations and government influence to 
stimulate international trade and investment.“ They showed that economic (meaning 
                                                          
12 In that way in practising commercial diplomacy become involved many vocations: lawyers, economists, 
political analysts and accountants (Feketekuty 2012, 2). A commercial diplomat needs to be well knowledgeable 
about trade and foreign investment issues, national and global trade rules and regulations, and to have good 
marketing skills (Feketekuty 2012, 3). 
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commercial) diplomacy is an effective trade-stimulating instrument in the following cases: 
(a) when trade between two countries involves more complex products, (b) when trading 
countries are of different levels of development, (c) when enterprises from the developing 
countries strive to win markets of the developed countries with complex products, and (d) 
when enterprises from the developed countries strive to win markets of the emerging (lower 
developed) economies (Moons and de Boer 2014, 2).  
Table 2.1: Tabular display/summary of various authors’ understanding regarding what commercial diplomacy 
(activities) encompass/imply 
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Herbst +         + +       +               
Berridge and 
James 
+ +         + +                     
Lee + +       + +   + +   + +           
Potter + +                           +     
Lee and 
Hudson 
        +                 +         
Mercier + +                                 
Naray + + + + +                   +   +   
Van Bergeijk + +                       +         
Ozdem + +                                 
Lee and 
Hocking in 
Denemark 
+ +   +                             
Van Bergeijk 
et al. 
+ +   +     +           +       +   
Kostecki and 
Naray 
      + +                           
Woolcock +                                   
Okano-
Heijmans 
      +                             
Verhagen 
and Bleker 
      + +                           
Jiang       +                             
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Ruel and 
Visser 
+ +   + +                           
Feketekuty + +   +                           + 
Ruël       +                             
Bilandžić 
and Barun 
+ +   + +                           
Moons and 
de Boer 
+ +                                 
Dašić + +                           +     
Source: Author’s own elaboration 
A summary of the above mentioned authors’ interpretation as to what commercial diplomacy 
(activities) encompass, that is, imply is given in Table 2.1 above. It shows that the total of 22 
author(s) identified what could be summarised into 18 different sets of (commercial 
diplomacy) activities. Export and/or trade promotion, investment promotion, and business 
promotion and/or advocacy are identified by far the largest number of author(s), and as such 
stand as the most frequently referred to set(s) of (commercial diplomacy) activities. 
Furthermore, all presented set(s) of activities could be classified into 2 main subgroups, the 
first referring to more general activities (export and /or trade promotion, bussiness promotion 
and/or advocacy, business facilitation (including support in negotiations), investment 
promotion, lending and finance promotion, promotion of tourism, encouraging cooperation in 
science and technology, and encouraging transfer of technology) and the second to more 
specific, i.e. concrete ones (matchmaking (contact establishment and/or facilitation), 
information gathering, organising visits, organising seminars, organising representation at 
trade fairs, market analysis, analysis on development aid, lobbying and/or intelligence, 
protection of intellectual property rights, and conflict resolution). Interestingly, in terms of 
temporal evolution, it could be said either general or more specific activities that relate to 
trade/business and investment promotion, and the related encouraging (of) cooperation in 
science and technology happened to precede other ones. 
2.4 Commercial versus economic and other forms of diplomacy: similarities and 
differences 
In the following lines will be illustrated similarities and differences primarily between the 
notions commercial and economic diplomacy, since they are often used interchangeably 
designating the same thing, but also of other forms of diplomacy, such as business 
diplomacy, that are economy-related in broader terms. 
Berridge and James (2001) view commercial and economic diplomacy as closely related 
concepts which do share some features, but, still, their scope of activity mainly differs 
(Berridge and James 2001, 38, 81). It has already been stated earlier in the dissertation that 
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these authors describe commercial diplomacy as „the work of diplomatic missions in support 
of the home country’s business and finance sectors”, and that its scope of activity includes 
promotion of trade and investment (both inward and outward), as well as providing 
information on export and investment opportunities, and helping to organise and host trade 
missions from the home country (Berridge and James 2001, 38–39). On the other side, they 
define economic diplomacy as “[d]iplomacy concerned with economic policy questions, 
including the work of delegations to conferences sponsored by bodies such as the World 
Trade Organization.” Its scope encompasses monitoring and reporting on economic policies 
in the host country, offering advice on how to influence them in the most appropriate way, 
and usage of economic rewards or sanctions as a means of accomplishing foreign policy 
objectives. The authors stipulate that another term in usage is economic statecraft (Berridge 
and James 2001, 81).13 Potter (2004, 55) and van Bergeijk and Moons (2009, 2) share this 
view, and see economic and commercial diplomacy not as separate, but interrelated entities. 
The latter (van Bergeijk and Moons 2009) see commercial diplomacy as part of economic 
diplomacy (also Dašić 2013, 377). They state that economic diplomacy consists of three 
elements: 
1. the application of political means for the promotion of international trade and 
investment, removal of barriers to trade, reduction of business risk and tackling 
various market failures; This subfield of economic diplomacy closely relates to 
commercial policy; 
2. the application of economic means with the aim of raising the awareness about the 
magnitude of cost of potential conflict and the importance of cooperative behaviour - 
in other words economic security; This subfield of economic diplomacy relates to 
bilateral trade and investment agreements, and also includes methods of coercion, 
such as boycotts and embargoes; 
3. creating businesswise stimulant international political climate and economic 
environment as a precondition for development of trade and business; This subfield 
includes multilateral agreements within the framework of international institutions 
such as the World Trade Organisation (WTO) and the Organisation for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD), and supranational organisations such as the 
European Union (van Bergeijk and Moons 2009, 2). 
                                                          
13 The term economic statecraft was used and theoretically elaborated by Baldwin (1985). 
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Similar reasoning is also shared by Rana in Bayne and Woolcock (2011a), who gave an 
interesting illustration which classifies commercial diplomacy as a subcategory of economic 
diplomacy, whose scope of activity encompasses: trade and FDI promotion, free trade, 
regional trade and other trade agreements, as well as multilateral trade issues under the 
auspices of the WTO, as presented in Figure 2.1 below. 
Figure 2.1: Economic and commercial diplomacy activity scope 
Source: Rana in Bayne and Woolcock (2011a, 95; also (in) Rana and Chatterjee in Rana and Chatterjee 2011,4) 
 
Rana in Bayne and Woolcock (2007, 201) defines economic diplomacy as „the process 
through which countries tackle the outside world, to maximize their national gain in all the 
fields of activity including trade, investment and other forms of economically beneficial 
exchanges, where they enjoy comparative advantage; it has bilateral, regional and multilateral 
dimensions, each of which is important“. Rana and Chatterjee in Rana and Chatterjee (2011) 
mainly follow up on Rana in Bayne and Woolcock (2011a), and generally conclude that 
opinion as to whether commercial diplomacy is a subcategory of economic diplomacy differs 
among authors. They present in a chronological order four stages in/of development of 
economic diplomacy: 
1. trade and investment promotion – promotion of trade that first developed was 
followed by investment promotion which became a dominant economic diplomacy 
activity in the course of the 1970s; The 1973 oil shock which quadrupled oil price 
prompted many developing countries such as India to engage in much more active 
economic diplomacy, especially towards the Gulf region, in which India decided to 
open new embassies headed by young ambassadors; 
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2. networking – activities aimed at gaining support from the business community, 
chamber of commerce, think-tanks and academic institutions for the promotion of 
trade and investment, and facilitating approach to new technologies; Networking 
became intensified since the 1980s; 
3. country branding – comprises all activities aimed at promoting one's country as a 
business and tourist destination; Country branding started to be used in the 1980s and 
1990s. Diplomatic missions of a country abroad take part in this activity; 
4. establishing international trade regulations – in the frame of international institutions 
like the GATT/WTO (Rana and Chatterjee in Rana and Chatterjee 2011, 6–10). 
Another division is offered by Kostecki and Naray (2007), Ruël (2013) and Udovič (2011) 
who differentiate between commercial and business diplomacy. Udovič (2011) sees the 
difference between commercial and business diplomacy in the location where diplomatic 
activities are conducted, in the sense that while commercial diplomacy relates to “trans-
border state-to-state and state-to-firm relations”, business diplomacy “concerns actors in the 
same market, within a state”. He also notes that enterprises primarily tend to use business 
diplomacy services (Udovič 2011, 359). Kostecki and Naray (2007, 2) argue that the term 
commercial diplomacy is commonly used among foreign diplomatic missions and the related 
agencies to designate all business support activities. On the contrary, the alternatively used 
term business diplomacy relates more to corporate activities such as public relations, public 
affairs or corporate-government affairs. Ruël (2013) describes commercial diplomacy as 
“predominantly a government-driven approach to use the network of government and 
business representatives to promote home country business abroad using diplomatic channels 
and processes.” (Ruël 2013, 14). On the other side, he defines business diplomacy as “an 
international business-driven approach to build and maintain positive relationships with 
foreign government representatives and non-government stakeholders” (Ruël 2013, 14–15).14 
In this line, Saner et al. (2000) argue that global companies can substantially improve their 
performance by means of business diplomacy. 
                                                          
14 The author also recognises international business diplomacy, which he defines as “the representation and 
communication activities deployed by international businesses with host government representatives and non-
governmental representatives in order to establish and sustain a positive relationship to maintain legitimacy and 
a ‘licence to operate’.” The author presented how president of a large Dutch multinational company described 
business diplomacy: “Business diplomacy is the bridging of the gap between the core business activities and 
having an understanding of the political social elements in all places within which the multinational company 
operates. The more global you get as a firm, the more important it is to tighten the relationships with 
governments and non-governmental stakeholders. Business diplomacy, at its best, safeguards corporate image 
and reputation.” (Ruël 2013, 14). 
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Apart from the mentioned, there are also authors who distinguish between several types of 
(economic) diplomacy. Udovič (2016) argues that economic diplomacy (which he regards as 
a more general term) has three subcategories: (1) multilateral state economic diplomacy, 
whose task is to create a framework for cooperation between countries and companies 
(with)in the international community”, (2) bilateral state economic diplomacy (otherwise also 
referred to as commercial diplomacy), whose primary task is related to the promotion of 
economic cooperation between countries and companies from different countries”, and (3) 
bilateral non-state economic diplomacy (otherwise also referred to as business diplomacy), 
which deals with the non-state actors, such as entrepreneurs, trade unions, various interest 
groups, and so on, at local and regional level. On the other side, Lee and Hocking in 
Denemark (2010, 12–19) argue that diplomacy can be:  
 commercial – includes promotion of trade, investment and tourism;15 it has become 
increasingly applied since the 1990s, when numerous governments across the world 
started to pay more attention to trade and investment promotion; 
 trade – relates to policy making and bargaining in the frame of international trade 
institutions such as the WTO (former GATT); 
 financial – relates to policy making and bargaining in the frame of international 
financial and global power institutions such as the G7,16 G8,17 International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) and the World Bank; 
 consular – relates to consular affairs. 
According to Saner and Yiu (2003, 16–22), diplomacy can be classified into: commercial, 
economic, business, corporate, and NGO, whereby 
 commercial diplomacy – in general terms relates to advocacy for national economic 
interests, with focus on trade and investment promotion;18 
 economic diplomacy – mainly relates to taking part at and bargaining in international 
multilateral economic organisations where global economic policies are shaped, but 
                                                          
15 Stringer (2007, 19–20) links trade, tourism and investment promotion with consular diplomacy.  
16 Relates to the so-called Group of Seven, which is an informal summit of most of the world’s major 
economies: the United States, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, and the United Kingdom. They meet 
annually to discuss various global current issues, such as global economy, international security and energy 
policy. 
17 The Group of Seven plus Russia. 
18 The authors describe commercial diplomat as a “[d]iplomat who represents interests of his country, provides 
services to enterprises (safeguards interests of national companies abroad and attracts FDI to his country) and 
reports to MOFA or MOEA, who might be stationed at embassies abroad or operate out of National Capital.” 
(Saner and Yiu 2003, 21). 
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also includes some activities falling under the commercial diplomacy scope, such as 
advocacy for national business interests;19  
 business diplomacy – generally relates to activities driven towards creating conducive 
(business) environment for the firms;20  
 corporate diplomacy – mainly interfaces with business diplomacy, with which it has 
much in common;21  
 national NGO diplomacy – relates to representation of interests on the part of NGOs 
in various spheres of a national economy, from consumer protection, anti-corruption 
to environmental protection;22  
 transnational NGO diplomacy – shares many features with economic diplomacy, such 
as working to influence policy making at international economic institutions23 (Saner 
and Yiu 2003, 23).  
Saner and Yiu (2003, 12) note that economic and commercial diplomacy are responsibility of 
state actors, whereas corporate diplomacy, business diplomacy, national NGO diplomacy and 
transnational NGO diplomacy are executed by the non-state actors. Common features which 
all given types of diplomacy have in common are: 
 negotiating global economic issues, 
 setting standards at multilateral organisations, 
 managing multi-stakeholder coalitions and alliances, 
 shaping socio-economic and ecological development policies (Saner and Yiu 2003, 
25). 
Asquer (2012, 12) differentiates (between) public, economic, commercial and corporate 
diplomacy. Public, economic and commercial diplomacy are instrumented to help improve 
                                                          
19 The authors describe economic diplomat as a “[d]iplomat who represents his country in other countries 
(Embassy, Consulate) or at economic and financial UN organisations (WTO, IMF, WB), follows/influences 
other countries’ economic policies, and reports to MOFA, MOBA or Presidency.” (Saner and Yiu 2003, 21). 
20 The authors define business diplomat as a diplomat “who manages interfaces between TNC and external non-
business constituencies like Labour Unions, Tribal Groups, NGO’s, UN Agencies and various civil society 
groups in foreign countries.” (Saner and Yiu 2003, 22). 
21 The authors describe corporate diplomat as a “[m]anager who interfaces between TNC and its foreign 
subsidiaries either from national Headquarters to subsidiaries or from main subsidiaries to HQs.” (Saner and Yiu 
2003, 22). 
22 The authors describe national NGO diplomat as a diplomat “who builds coalitions with other NGOs and civil 
society representatives, uses media and direct political action to lobby government and transnational companies 
at the national level.” (Saner and Yiu 2003, 23). 
23 The authors describe transnational NGO diplomat as a “[p]olitical [a]dvocate who is politically astute, often 
with academic background and industry expertise, strong moral convictions, can coordinate cross-border 
boycotts against [t]ransnational companies, media campaigns to influence public opinion or organize 
international fora to influence negotiations at WTO, Kyoto Protocol, ILO, World Bank etc…” (Saner and Yiu 
2003, 23). 
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relations between countries with the aim to promote exports, attract investment and stimulate 
economic activity (Asquer 2012, 10). He argues that corporate diplomacy differs in its 
function from commercial diplomacy, negotiation and public relations. Unlike corporate 
diplomacy which is of utmost importance for firms to manage and facilitate their relations 
with other domestic and foreign firms, and public authorities too, commercial diplomacy 
activities do not relate to specific firms, negotiation is generally confined to bargaining, while 
public relations address public opinion more than business matters (Asquer 2012, 12).24 
However, what differs corporate diplomats from the mentioned is their scope of action which 
is more strictly confined to firm-to-firm relations, including looking for business 
opportunities, improving firms reputation, affecting decision-making and preventing conflicts 
(Asquer 2012, 10). Furthermore, Okano-Heijmans (2011, 17) defines economic diplomacy as 
“…the use of political means as leverage in international negotiations, with the aim of 
enhancing national economic prosperity, and the use of economic leverage to increase the 
political stability of the nation.” The author argues that economic diplomacy has five 
subcategories: 
 commercial diplomacy – mainly relates to the promotion of trade, investment, 
tourism, socially responsible investing, and business advocacy; 
 trade diplomacy – mainly relates to bilateral trade agreements, taking part in the work 
of international economic (i.e. trade) institutions, such as the WTO, anti-dumping 
tariffs, and elimination of barriers to trade and investment; 
 financial diplomacy – mainly relates to currency agreements, exchange rate policy, 
purchasing and selling of bonds, and withholding payments; 
 inducements – mainly comprise: bilateral aid (grants, loans and debt relief), 
humanitarian aid, and granting access to technology; 
 sanctions – mainly encompass: embargo (of export), boycott (of import), aid 
suspension, and blacklists (Okano-Heijmans 2011, 20; also Okano-Heijmans 2012, 
63–64). 
Lastly, it is also important to note that when it strictly comes to economic (not commercial) 
diplomacy, in contemporary literature and academic circles it has become almost unavoidable 
to mention the reasoning of Bayne and Woolcock. Bayne in Bayne and Woolcock (2011a, 
57) argues that the task of economic diplomacy is to look for ways how agreed government 
                                                          
24 Skills which effective corporate diplomats need to master may overlap with or be shared by (public or 
commercial) diplomats and public relations experts – gathering and analysing data and information, providing 
expertise and establishing and maintaining connections with other firms and institutions (Asquer 2012, 13). 
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position on certain international issues can be most effectively represented and advocated. 
The negotiators, on behalf of their governments, need to seek mutually acceptable solutions 
with their foreign counterparts, and in that process to try to exploit given opportunities to 
their advantage. In line with the noted, Bayne and Woolcock in Bayne and Woolcock (2011, 
3) argue that economic diplomacy tackles international economic issues. According to them, 
the post World War II institutionalised international economic system created in Bretton 
Woods made the basis for economic relations between states. Since then, with the gradual 
increase of economic interdependence between states in the process of globalisation, the 
distinction between what is domestic and what international economic policy became more 
blurred.25 This meant that economic diplomacy came to deeply affect domestic decision-
making. The example of this is the outbreak of the 2007 international financial crisis, which 
was triggered by housing market policies in the United States.  
Bayne in Bayne and Woolcock (2011b, 62) argues that the number of countries (including 
former communist countries) and new subjects-stakeholders participating in economic 
diplomacy on the international arena has increased notably, as has its scope of activity. 
Likewise, the number of summits at different levels where economic diplomacy issues are 
discussed have grown over time (also Bayne in Bayne and Woolcock 2011a, 45). The 
European Union and other regional groupings have had their own; the United Nations has 
hosted summits dedicated to specific economic topics, like the environment or caring for the 
poor (Bayne in Bayne and Woolcock 2011b, 64). According to Bayne and Woolcock in 
Bayne and Woolcock (2011, 3–4), in conducting economic diplomacy take part: all 
government bodies with economic responsibilities which operate internationally, then 
parliaments, independent public agencies and subnational bodies, as well as non-state actors, 
such as civil society non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and business firms. In this 
process, economic diplomacy came to be characterised by the following: (a) involvement of 
ministerial level officials, (b) bringing in non-state actors, (c) improved transparency, and (d) 
use of international institutions as stage for discussion (Bayne in Bayne and Woolcock 
2011b, 63). In relation to the mentioned, one of economic diplomacy strategies was to make 
the non-governmental subjects stakeholders in negotiation and decision-making, primarily in 
order to ease the tension between them and the governments, and to make all in the policy-
                                                          
25 Bayne in Bayne and Woolcock (2011b, 62) argued that development of globalisation made economic 
diplomacy more complex as governments started to look for ways how to improve decision-making and 
negotiation in addressing international issues, which, on the other side, touched upon their domestic interests. 
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making process liable (Bayne in Bayne and Woolcock 2011b, 64).26 In this context, it is also 
important to note that within the frame of economic diplomacy, international negotiations 
happen at bilateral,27 regional,28 plurilateral,29 and multilateral level. Unilateralism30 also 
counts as a separate level, the so-called „zero option“ (Bayne and Woolcock in Bayne and 
Woolcock 2011, 8).  
Economic diplomacy is found to be shaped by six factors and characterised by three tensions. 
In terms of the first, these factors are divided into three systemic, two domestic and one idea-
based. The systemic factors include: (a) relative economic power – in the sense that power as 
the medium can determine the outcome of negotiations; (b) international organisations and 
regimes – in the sense that cooperative environment of their international networks can help 
states reach agreement by cooperation rather than coercion; and (c) markets – in the sense 
that economic diplomacy negotiations involve discussion on global markets. The domestic 
factors include: (a) interests and bargaining – in the sense that various interests can impact 
the national position in international negotiations on economic issues, and (b) institutions and 
the two-level game – in the sense that (government) institutions can act an mediators in 
reconciling conflicting attitudes of different pressure groups. The remaining ideational factor 
                                                          
26 The main issues addressed by economic diplomacy are related more to international trade than to finance. 
This is because countries strongly focus their diplomacy on export promotion. International trade issues are on 
the agenda at all levels – bilateral, regional and multilateral. In contrast, issues concerning finance are mainly 
discussed at multilateral level, except in the EU, at the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the Bank for 
International Settlements (BIS) (Bayne 2011c, 187). 
27 Bilateralism – bilateral relations are the most common and at the same time the simpliest form of economic 
diplomacy. However, it can give relative leverage to a more powerful party and even become confrontational. 
Bilateral relations are also helpful in reaching complex agreements and interpretation of multilateral rules, as in 
the case of a dispute between Brazil and the United States over cotton tariffs (Bayne and Woolcock in Bayne 
and Woolcock 2011, 8). 
28 Regionalism – regional relations tend to be politically motivated and to bring about trade liberalisation to 
stimulate economic development of regional partners (Bayne and Woolcock in Bayne and Woolcock 2011, 8). 
The examples of them are: in North America NAFTA (the North American Free Trade Area), in South America 
Mercosur, in South-East Asia AFTA (the ASEAN Free Trade Area), in the Pacific APEC, in Europe EMU 
(Economic and Monetary Union) and comparable groupings in South Asia, Southern Africa and the Caribbean 
(Bayne in Bayne and Woolcock 2011b, 66). 
29 In terms of plurilateral institutions, Bayne in Bayne and Woolcock (2011b, 64) gives the example of the 
OECD, and Woolcock in Bayne and Woolcock (2011b, 21) of the WTO and the IMF. The first author also notes 
that the formation of global institutions such as the World Trade Organisation (WTO) mostly occurred in the 
1990s. Over time, the number of plurilateral institutions has increased. At the global level, developed countries 
gathered together with important developing countries within the G20; the rich club’s gathering - G8 added 
Russia to become G8; the Commonwealth dedicated its activity to helping small and poor member countries 
(Bayne in Bayne and Woolcock 2011b, 67).  
30 Unilateralism – a unilateral action is a domestic policy decision which does not involve negotiation, but still 
can have an impact on other economies. For example, a unilateral action in trade liberalisation or protectionism 
might have serious implications for foreign investors and exporters, what then can result in political 
countermeasures or actions in the form of imitation or retaliation. A unilateral action is also resorted to in case 
one country is trying to influence policy-making in/of another country by exerting certain pressure on it, as in 
case when the United States put pressure on China to try to discourage it from keeping its curency deppreciated 
(Bayne and Woolcock in Bayne and Woolcock 2011, 8). 
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influences economic diplomacy in the sense that apart from the mentioned factors, the 
negotiators' personal views and convictions too may influence the outcome of negotiations 
(Bayne and Woolcock in Bayne and Woolcock 2011, 6). In terms of the latter, those three 
tenstions are: (1) between economics and politics, in the sense that states as political entities 
tend to influence economic policies in order to achieve designated international goals; (2) 
between international and domestic pressures, and (3) between governments and other forces 
(Bayne and Woolcock in Bayne and Woolcock 2011, 10; also Bayne 2011c, 194–198). In this 
context, it is also important to add that until the 1980s the crises mainly occurred due to 
governments policy failures; however, at the turn of the 21st century, the private sector turned 
out to be the main culprit. In relation to that, the consequences of the 2007 financial crisis 
dominate economic diplomacy today. Under new circumstances, amid the need to reconcile 
politics and economis, and given growing power of the emerging markets, decision-making 
has become complex and came to include more stakeholders through the G20. Therefore, the 
success of economic diplomacy has been [and will be] in managing to achieve adequate 
consistency among national, European and international financial reforms (Bayne 2011c, 
188). 
2.5 Role, main objectives and various classifications of commercial diplomacy 
The nature of commercial diplomacy and its role have evolved during the last two decades in 
response to the rise of neoliberalism and changes in government priorities, global trading 
system and technology. Such developments prompted governments to prioritise business-
promoting commercial diplomacy and take an active approach especially towards attracting 
foreign direct investment (FDI), but also to engage in the promotion of research and 
development, country image and tourism (Kostecki and Naray 2007, 29). 
According to Kostecki and Naray (2007, 3), commercial diplomacy takes place at two levels: 
(a) high-policy level (head of state, prime minister, minister or member of parliament), and 
(b) ambassador and specialised diplomatic envoy (trade representative, commercial attaché, 
commercial diplomat). The authors also distinguish two types of commercial diplomacy 
activities: (a) primary activities – relating to trade and FDI, research and technology, tourism 
and business advocacy, and (b) support activities to the primary activities – intelligence, 
networking, “made in” image improvement campaign, support to business negotiations, 
contract implementation and problem solving (Kostecki and Naray 2007, 7). With reference 
to the first (meaning the primary activities), in essence, they relate to marketing. Trade 
promotion encompasses activities at trade fairs and exhibitions, then trade missions and 
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“made in” image improvement campaign, as well as at conferences and seminars. Promotion 
of tourism and other services too, such as banking and education, also fall under the scope of 
commercial diplomats’ activities. In their work commercial diplomats often cooperate with 
trade promotion organisations (TPOs), investment promotion organisations (IPAs) and 
chambers of commerce from both the home and the host country. In some cases, commercial 
diplomats have double mandate, meaning that they head TPOs and IPAs, and at the same 
time act as commercial counsellors in the embassy of their home country (Kostecki and 
Naray 2007, 7).31  
Kostecki and Naray (2007, 8) further classify commercial diplomacy in terms of value chain; 
namely they distinguish (1) government objectives, which includes (a) intelligence, (b) 
networking and public relations, (c) contract negotiator of implementation, and (d) problem 
solving, and (2) business objectives, relating to (a) trade promotion, (b) promotion of FDI, (c) 
cooperation in science and technology, (d) promotion of tourism, and (e) advocacy for 
national business community. Since the second category, meaning business objectives has 
already been explained to some extent, in the following lines attention will be given to 
government objectives. The main business support-related activity of commercial diplomacy 
is intelligence. It primarily includes search for information and dealing with business 
enquiries from both the home and the host country. Intelligence done by commercial 
diplomats mostly includes reporting on calls for tenders, development projects, needs of 
major industrial customers, changes in export-related legal regulation, and others (Kostecki 
and Naray 2007, 8).32 Networking is valuable for making and facilitating contacts between 
high tech start-up firms and venture capital funds (Kostecki and Naray 2007, 9). Public 
relations are of special importance for FDI promotion, and also include ambassador level 
engagement with large firms and attendance at business fora in the host country (Kostecki 
and Naray 2007, 9–10). The so-called „match making“, which particularly refers to trade 
issues and FDI, is especially the task of commercial diplomats from the United Kingdom, 
Brazil, Canada, China and Switzerland (Kostecki and Naray 2007, 10). Another important 
aspect of commercial diplomacy services is providing support to domestic firms in 
negotiations with the authorities or firms from the host country. In terms of commercial 
diplomats' public relations activities, the authors note that they comprise maintenance of good 
                                                          
31 In countries like South Korea, Taiwan and Japan, commercial diplomacy is entrusted to TPOs offices in 
foreign countries (Kostecki and Naray 2007, 7). 
32 The authors give the example of a commercial diplomat from Central America who said that  about 95 % of 
clients asking for commercial diplomacy services demand basic information about legal and political issues 
(Kostecki and Naray 2007, 8). 
50 
 
contacts with business managers and authorities of the host country, and exerting influence in 
its legislative process with the aim to making conditions for the protection of national 
business interests.33 The commercial diplomats also act as advisors in contract negotiations 
and are involved in dispute settlement, as in case of Asian commercial diplomats' efforts to 
deal with export ban on certain food products imposed by the European health authorities 
(Kostecki and Naray 2007, 10). After all, the authors conclude that the value chain results 
indicate that trade promotion and FDI-related activities are the most important commercial 
diplomacy activities. The secondary in importance are finding and analysis of information 
(Kostecki and Naray 2007, 29). 
Another classification is given by Naray (2011, 121). The author identifies three main groups 
of roles of commercial diplomacy: (a) facilitation (whose subfields are referral, coordination, 
and logistics), (b) advisory (whose subfields are intelligence gathering and analysis, and 
internal communication) and (c) representation (whose subfields are advocacy, and external 
communication) – FAR. These roles intersect with defined activity areas: trade promotion, 
investments, made-in and corporate image, cooperation in science and technology, and the 
protection of intellectual property. The „FAR“ framework presented in Table 2.2 below was 
devised on the basis of information collected by the author during his work in an embassy, 
then in research interviews and from relevant literature (Naray 2011, 134). 
Table 2.2: FAR framework 
          Activity 
               
 
Role  
Trade 
promotion  
Protection of 
intellectual 
property rights 
Cooperation in 
science and 
technology 
Promotion of 
country and 
corporate 
image 
Promotion of 
FDI 
Facilitation  
Referral Presenting 
potential 
exporters 
Finding lawyers 
specialised for 
the matter 
Contact 
facilitation 
Advocacy for 
big contracts 
where country 
image could 
matter 
Presenting 
investment 
opportunities 
for potential 
investors  
Coordination Organisation of 
meetings 
Coordination in 
the matter-
related legal 
processes 
Facilitating 
contacts 
between 
prospective 
parties 
interested in 
joint ventures 
Coordination of 
activities aimed 
at image 
building 
Facilitating 
participation of 
high 
government 
officials in 
investment-
related fora 
Logistics Tasking 
embassy staff 
Tasking 
embassy staff 
Hosting 
promotion 
Translation of 
campaign 
Allowing 
investment 
                                                          
33 The commercial diplomats from the Anglo-Saxon countries noted that they are engaged in such activities in 
the case of the Fortune 500 firms to facilitate their doing business. In case of the Unied Kingdom, Australia, 
Canada and the European Union, ambassadors are actively involved in the promotion of FDI (Kostecki and 
Naray 2007, 10). 
 
51 
 
for organising 
and facilitating 
trade promotion 
events  
for issuing 
relevant matter 
materials 
events by the 
ambassador or 
(a) commercial 
diplomat(s)  
materials by the 
CD unit 
promotion 
events to take 
place in 
embassy 
premises 
Advisory  
Intelligence 
gathering and 
analysis 
Collecting trade 
and marketing-
related 
information 
Looking if there 
are cases of 
eventual 
violation 
Keeping track 
of concrete 
results of 
cooperation 
Looking for 
how to improve 
image 
Identifying 
potential 
investors 
Internal 
communication 
Reporting on 
new export 
opportunities in 
the host country 
Looking if there 
are cases of 
counterfeiting, 
and reporting on 
it, and advising 
on adequate 
action 
Advising the 
home country 
government on 
taking part in 
joint projects 
Reporting on 
successful 
image-building 
campaigns 
Timely 
informing on 
current 
international 
tenders 
Representation  
Advocacy Offering 
support to 
domestic firms 
in dispute 
settlement 
Advocacy for 
improvement of 
IPR protection 
in the home 
country 
Advocacy for 
joint projects 
Advocacy for 
key domestic 
firms 
Advocacy for 
the home 
country 
investors in the 
host country 
External 
communication 
Tourism 
promotion 
events 
Holding 
presentations on 
the importance 
of the matter 
Preparing news 
articles on the 
achievements 
made 
Taking part in 
image-building 
events 
Presenting to 
prospective 
investors 
Source: Naray (2011, 135)  
Naray (2011) also offered another classification, this time from the perspective of how 
commercial diplomacy was organised across countries (see Table 2.3 below). 
Table 2.3: Types of organisation and commercial diplomat(s)’ position 
Type of organisation Organisation between Ministry of Trade and 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
Trade promotion done independently of the 
embassy. There is no special CD unit tasked for 
business promotion within the embassy (except in 
Germany). Embassy only deals with policy-making.  
 
Corporatist type (Japan, Korea, Italy, Germany, 
Austria) 
Trade promotion mostly done by the Ministry of 
Trade 
Trade promotion done by a specialised agency. 
 
Pragmatist type: UK, Singapore, Switzerland 
Joint oversight by both ministries 
Commercial diplomat coordinates the work of the 
trade promotion office, which is integrated with 
either MFA or MT. 
 
Northern Europe – Scandinavian type (Sweden, 
Norway, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Ireland) 
Trade promotion harmonised between the two 
ministries 
 
 
Trade promotion done by a specialised agency. 
Commercial diplomat coordinates the work of the 
trade promotion office. 
 
“Commonwealth” type (Australia, New Zealand, 
Canada) 
Trade promotion and trade policy-making separated.  
 
 
Trade promotion office usually done by the Trade promotion falls under the scope of trade policy-
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Source: Naray (2011, 144–145) 
Arrangement 1: Corporatist type – independent trade-promotion structures: 
commercial diplomacy is under the auspices of public or semi-private/subsidised agencies. Its 
activities are performed independently of an embassy. The embassy only deals with political 
affairs and political aspects of trade. Germany delegates trade-promotion to the network of 
bi-national chambers of commerce. Japan, South Korea and Italy have established strong and 
relatively independent commercial diplomacy structures: JETRO – the Japan External Trade 
Organisation in case of Japan, KOTRA – the Korea Trade and Investment Promotion Agency 
in case of South Korea, and IIFT – the Italian Institute for Foreign Trade in case of Italy 
(Naray 2011, 142). 
Arrangement 2: The pragmatist type – coordination mechanisms: commercial diplomacy 
structure is centralised, as in the case of the United Kingdom. The UK Trade and Investment 
– UKTI is subordinate both to the British Foreign Office and the Department of Trade and 
Industry. Most of UK diplomatic resources are engaged in commercial diplomacy activities 
which dominate the agenda. Three-quarters of employed staff are recruited citizens of the 
host country. In case of Switzerland, which in terms of commercial diplomacy makes a 
special case, in strategic markets the government cooperates with the Swiss Business Hubs, 
whereas in other markets the MFA has the leading role (Naray 2011, 142). 
Arrangement 3 and 4: The Northern Europe type; and Arrangement 4: The 
Commonwealth type – combination of foreign affairs and trade: Scandinavian countries 
integrated foreign affairs and trade in a single ministry/department. They established and 
maintain representative offices independently of country diplomatic missions, with the head 
of a diplomatic mission being responsible also for the representative office. However, 
Australia, Canada and New Zealand separate trade policy and trade promotion (Naray 2011, 
142). 
Arrangement 5: The classical type – trade promotion as part of trade policy and 
ministry of trade: In case of China, the MFA is not directly engaged in commercial 
diplomacy, though its embassies are involved in commercial diplomacy-related activities. In 
embassy. Commercial diplomats work with the 
trade promotion office and report to the ambassador. 
 
Classical type (US, China, Taiwan, Poland, France, 
Russia, Spain, Hungary) 
making. 
MFA and MT work separately. 
 
 
Trade promotion agency integrated with MFA and 
embassy. Commercial diplomat deals with both 
economic and political issues. 
 
Developing country type 
MFA and MT work separately. 
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the United States, the Department of Commerce is responsible for commercial diplomacy. 
The U.S. Department for State, through its diplomatic missions, is also engaged in 
commercial diplomacy. In the case of the South African Republic, the Ministry of Trade is in 
charge of commercial diplomacy (Naray 2011, 142–143). 
Arrangement 6: The developing country type – trade promotion in the MFA: The MFA 
is fully in charge of organisation and carrying out of commercial diplomacy. There may 
occur a rivarly between the MFA and MT in terms of competency for the matter, which tend 
to happen in large and medium-sized countries (Naray 2011, 143). 
On the other side, Reuvers and Ruël in Ruël (2012), based on a detailed review of the 
existing literature on commercial diplomacy, summarised subsets of commercial diplomacy 
activities, as presented in Table 2.4 below. 
Table 2.4: Subsets of commercial diplomacy activities 
Networking Intelligence Image campaigns Support business 
Making business and 
government contacts 
Collecting and 
disseminating trade-
related information 
Promoting goods and 
services 
In negotiations and 
during contract 
implementation and 
settling disputes 
State/delegation visits Market research Taking part at trade fairs 
and introducing potential 
exporters 
Collecting data on export 
marketing 
Buyer-seller meetings Reporting to home 
country  
Making potential foreign 
investors interested 
Monitoring of possible 
breach of contract terms 
and intellectual property 
rights 
Match-making Consulting both parties Collecting export 
marketing data 
Advocacy 
Search for business 
partners, distributors, 
investors and lawyers 
Country and/or firm 
image studies and joint 
scientific research 
Tourism promotion Legal actions 
coordination 
Source: Reuvers and Ruël in Ruël (2012, 8) 
Furthermore, Kostecki and Naray (2007, 35) argue that commercial diplomacy service 
(activity profile, business orientation and performance) is influenced by the following factors:  
 commercial diplomacy characteristics: (i) terms of reference, (ii) organisational 
matrix, (iii) business involvement, (iv) service profile, and (v) skills and experience; 
 client characteristics: (i) compliance with the (government) filtering criteria, (ii) 
willingness to pay, and (iii) loyalty and the use of referrals; 
 home country features: (i) level of development, (ii) attitude towards business, and 
(iii) relationship with the host country; 
 host country features: (i) market size and potential, (ii) centre of gravity, and (iii) 
business style and governance; 
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 global business environment: (i) IT and Internet and (ii) increased mobility. 
The same authors also gave an interesting illustration of the client-provider gap with 
reference to commercial diplomacy services, identifying, on one side, service offers, and real 
needs of beneficiery companies, on the other (see Table 2.5 below) (Kostecki and Naray 
2007). 
Table 2.5: The client-provider gap in commercial diplomacy services 
 Commercial diplomacy offers Companies needs 
Partner search Lists of importers and distributors and 
information from the Internet; 
Relatively slow responsiveness to enquiries; 
Inadequate understanding of the market and 
its forces; 
Lack of pro-active approach in partner search. 
Insight information on 
importers/distributors and potential 
clients, with a focus on priority 
ones; 
Timely responses to enquiries; 
Pragmatic assessment of who 
needs the product and how it 
should be adapted. 
Market information 
search 
Emphasis on macro-economic statistics and 
reports; 
General information on trade barriers and 
agreements. 
Presenting tender opportunities and 
attractive projects; 
Objective analysis of market access 
and potential threats; 
Decision-making affecting 
regulatory framework. 
Investment facilitation Branding the country among the host country 
authorities and large corporations to build 
trust and reputation in order to attract 
investors. 
Guidance on investment 
conditions; 
Comparison to offered conditions 
elsewhere; 
Support commitments given by the 
authorities. 
Trade fairs National stand for country presentation; 
Providing support to national firms 
participating in the events; 
Patronage over diplomatic mission 
(ambassador's visits). 
Finding distributors or business 
partners for joint ventures; 
Targeted approach with defined 
follow-up;  
A fair does have sense only in a 
broader context.  
Contract negotiation Introducing potential business partners, but 
lack of involvement in contract negotiations 
or providing technical support. 
Preparing the ground for 
negotiations and technical support 
locally (e.g. legal and tax 
consulting and bank contracts); 
Public relations to ensure proper 
advocacy for national firms. 
Problem-solving and 
trade disputes 
List of local lawyers. Addressing local authorities when 
needed. Pro-active approach in 
problem-solving. 
Note: Results are obtained in 40 interviews with commercial diplomats, government officials, experts and 
managers. 
Source: Kostecki and Naray (2007, 27–28) 
In addition, Kostecki and Naray (2007) also stipulated the reasons why public administration 
can offer better efficiency in delivering commercial diplomacy services over private business 
representation abroad: 
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 economic intelligence – embassy's contacts enable gathering of quality information; 
diplomatic immunity under legati iure gentium sancti sunt encourages diplomats to 
take risk in obtaining relevant information; 
 visibility in the mass media – high-ranked diplomats, especially the ambassadors, are 
better exposed in public and attract more attention from/in the media than 
businessmen; Also, the ambassadors have an opportunity to organise various 
promotional events at relatively low cost; 
 access to decision-makers – high-ranked diplomats have better access to executive 
management of large corporations, decision-makers and bureaucracy in the host 
country; 
 credibility – diplomats enjoy greater credibility than businessmen in the host country's 
administration and state-owned firms when negotiating and making promises about 
attracting FDI; 
 economies of scale and scope – making business support centralised in the host 
country reduces the promotional costs for national enterprises and helps them reach 
economies of scale and scope up to the level no private business promotion 
organisation could accomplish; 
 instrument of government policy – commercial diplomacy is part of state-sponsored 
export promotion activities, as it is believed that the state should act as a catalyst and 
facilitator of business (Kostecki and Naray 2007, 17–18). 
2.5.1 Types of commercial diplomats 
Kostecki and Naray (2007, 21) argue that there are three basic types of commercial diplomats 
from the perspective of their role:  
1. business promoter – described as a business-oriented, pro-active diplomat whose 
work is devoted to meet the requests of client firms; They work mainly as consultants, 
and have entrepreneurial approach to business, possess good technical know-how and 
cherish close relations with managers. They are usually located in economic capital of 
the host country;  
2. civil servant – described as possessing work attitude of an official employed at the 
ministry of trade; They are reactive rather than proactive, meaning they focus on 
policy implementation and government instructions, and do not directly deal with 
business deals and client needs; and 
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3. generalist – described as a career diplomat who performs commercial diplomacy 
support activities on ad hoc basis, in addition to other duties; The generalist 
commercial diplomats, especially the ambassadors, may create good contacts.  
The illustration of different types of commercial diplomats given by Kostecki and Naray 
(2007) by countries is presented in Table 2.6 below. 
Table 2.6: Prevailing features of a commercial diplomat, by country 
Type of commercial 
diplomat 
Business promoter Civil servant Generalist 
Approach Commercial issues are 
perceived mainly as 
business issues 
Commercial issues are 
seen as part of 
international relations 
Commercial issues are 
seen through the prism of 
a broader diplomatic and 
political perspective 
Leading concern Focus on client 
satisfaction 
Focus on satisfaction of 
the Ministry of Trade 
Focus on satisfaction of 
the Foreign Affairs 
Ministry 
Country ranking 
according to the 
commercial diplomat 
type 
Ireland, Canada, United 
States, Sweden, Finland,  
New Zealand, Austria, 
Portugal, UK, 
Switzerland, Hungary, 
Japan, Korea 
Germany, France, Poland,  
China, Cuba 
Brazil, El Salvador, and 
Venezuela 
Note: The results are obtained in 35 interviews with commercial diplomats, government officials, experts and 
managers. 
Source: Kostecki and Naray (2007, 23). 
The authors stress that the conducted research showed that the business promoter type of a 
commercial diplomat is the most desirable for the business community. This implies 
business-oriented and pro-active, deal-making entrepreneurial approach by commercial 
diplomats (Kostecki and Naray 2007, 27). According to them „[t]he business promoter type 
of commercial diplomat is gaining in popularity and this shift has important implications for 
human resource management, organizational structure and the use of the modern techniques 
of performance enhancement.“ Being a successful diplomat requires rich managerial 
experience and excellent communication skills (Kostecki and Naray 2007, 29).  
In relation to the classification previously given by Kostecki and Naray (2007), and aiming to 
offer better understanding of the perception of each of the three above mentioned types of 
commercial diplomats in terms of how active they are, Ruel and Visser (2012) conducted the 
study34 to examine different types of commercial diplomats from the perspective of their 
proactivity. The findings of the study indicate the following: 
                                                          
34 The sample consisted of: interviews with 23 participants from Europe (14) and non-European countries (9) 
serving in Helsinki, Finland, at the time of the interviews (G01 Argentina, G02 Belgium, G03 Anonymous, G04 
Chile, G05 Czech Republic, G06 Denmark, G07 Estonia, G08 Germany, G09 Hungary, G10 Italy, G11 Japan, 
G12 Korea, G13 Mexico, G14 Spain, G15 Sweden, G16 Switzerland, G17 Turkey, G18 UK, G19 USA, P01 
Austria, P02 Germany, P03 Korea, P04 Norway). Nine (9) interviewees are business promoters (P01, G02, G06, 
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1. Business promoters see their role as mainly proactive. The only reactive function is 
confined to partner search. Their educational background is in (international) business 
or economics. They put a strong emphasis on practical knowledge and regard 
psychological element and language skills as very important in dealing with people. 
They prefer longer post stays, as gained experience at one post helps them do the job 
in a proactive and more efficient way. 
2. Civil servants’ role in dealing with commercial issues is largely reactive as they have 
little personal contact with the business community and are not directly involved in 
business deals. Despite that, their work also includes some aspects of proactive 
behaviour, like seeking business opportunities. Civil servants also carry out non-
commercial duties, and they are positioned higher than business promoters in terms of 
the level of involvement with commercial issues. Their educational background varies 
from political science to business. They see cultural differences as the main 
impediment to adapting to the host country environment. 
3. Generalists rarely deal with commercial issues and their role is mostly reactive. They 
usually respond to enquiries in a standardised manner. Their usual educational 
background is in political science and they seem to be more (diplomatic) career-
oriented. Hence their business knowledge is often limited (Ruel and Visser 2012, 70–
72). 
Furthermore, with reference to the generalist type (of a commercial diplomat), examining the 
ambassadors’ view, an important study35 was done by Abbink (2014), who demonstrated that: 
 ambassadors are mostly involved in business promotion, less in cooperation in science 
and technology and the protection of intellectual rights; 
 the interviewed ambassadors responded that they deem commercial diplomacy very 
important, and that they spend 43 % of their time dealing with issues related to it; 
 in case of the ambassadors, (business) experience in the private sector seems highly 
relevant for dealing with commercial diplomacy issues; 
 background of ambassadors seems to have no relevance for the quality of work spent 
on commercial diplomacy; 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
P02, P03, G13, P04, G18 and G19), 9 are civil servants (G03, G04, G05, G07, G09, G10, G11, G14 and G17) 
and 5 belong to the generalist type (G01, G08, G12, G15 and G16). 
35 Answers obtained from 41 questionnaires (out of 104 that were sent out) filled in by ambassadors stationed in 
the Netherlands. Trade figures from 2008 to 2012 were used. 
58 
 
 time spent on commercial diplomacy improves efficiency of the embassy economic 
department (Abbink 2014, 2). 
In terms of recruitment, it is challenging for the governments to attract suitable professional 
commercial diplomats. The private sector offers higher wages, and is thus more attractive, but 
diplomatic service also has its advantages: satisfying work conditions, tax free salaries, job 
security, high reputation and contacts (Naray 2008, 8; Naray 2011, 146). Kostecki and Naray 
(2007, 29) think that the most appropriate solution would be to hire business persons on a 
temporary basis (3–5 years), after which they would be able to return to the private sector. 
Business knowledge (predominantly in marketing) and business experience are thought of as 
the two most dominant features a commercial diplomat needs to possess (Naray 2008, 8; 
Naray 2011, 146). 
It is also interesting to mention the findings of Naray in Ruël (2012, 175),36 who studied the 
positive and negative sides of service for fees and service free of charge. His results are the 
following: 
 Favourable and unfavourable aspects of service for fees:  
 favourable aspects: reliable and better quality service, 
 unfavourable aspects: (a) commercial diplomacy is already publicly financed, 
(b) the service fee may be a discouraging factor, especially for small and 
medium enterprises (SMEs);  
 Favourable and unfavourable aspects of service free of charge:  
 favourable aspects: (a) good quality of basic service, (b) accessible to all 
firms, (c) makes part of improving country image, 
 unfavourable aspects: service quality may not be as good as when paid for.  
In the sense of a growing need for quality commercial diplomats, Rana (2004, 66–67) argues 
that there is a strong need that foreign ministries closely cooperate with diplomatic training 
centres to:  
 offer their diplomatic staff adequate knowledge and skills especially in economics,37 
 concentrate on practical economics, getting acquainted with national and international 
economy, and distance learning opportunities and advantages,  
                                                          
36 Obtained in interviews with 25 export managers and commercial diplomats. 
37 In Germany, for instance, there is a growing tendency of recruiting economists in the MFA diplomatic service 
(also in Naray 2008, 9) which is at current about 10 % only. 
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 second ministry of foreign affairs (MFA) (diplomatic) officials to other ministries 
dealing mainly with economic issues, such as trade, finance, industry and energy, then 
chamber of commerce and public enterprises, 
 contract (in MFA) experts for providing economic advisory and policy analysis, and 
ensure proficient mastery on multilateral economics issues, such as on regional trade 
agreements, anti-dumping, etc.  
Lastly, in order to disclose which factors influence the quality of commercial diplomacy from 
the perspective of commercial diplomats, Ruël and Zuidema (2012) did the study38 which 
involved face-to-face semi-structured interviews with 140 staff members at over 65 Dutch 
foreign posts. They found the following:  
 Commercial diplomats foreign post experience positively correlates with the quality 
of commercial diplomacy. However, experience obtained in private firms seems to be 
of less relevance for the quality of commercial diplomacy; 
 Level of education and field of study do not determine the quality of commercial 
diplomacy; 
 Established business network at a foreign post and client firms’ resoluteness for doing 
business in foreign markets are positively correlated with the quality of commercial 
diplomacy; 
 Lack of relevant information in/on the host country does raise the importance of 
commercial diplomacy; 
 Regulatory environment in the host country does not seem to influence the relevance 
of commercial diplomacy; 
 Commercial diplomats acting as business promoters seem to exhibit a higher degree 
of empathy than civil servants or generalists; 
 The quality of work of locally hired commercial diplomats is statistically significant 
(Ruël and Zuidema 2012, 14–21). 
2.6 Some empirical evidence on the importance of commercial diplomacy 
Numerous researchers and scholars for the last couple of decades, using various samples, 
found that commercial diplomacy through various forms of export and investment promotion, 
                                                          
38 Near 53 % of respondents, i.e. commercial diplomats included in the study are Dutch nationals. The number 
of Indian and Chinese nationals represented is also significant. Five interviews were conducted with embassy 
staff, Foreign Ministry, Ministry of Economy, Innovation and Agriculture, the Network of International 
Entrepreneurship, and the Netherlands Institute of International Relations “Clingendael”. 
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especially seconding trade missions, working on concluding trade agreements, and organising 
trade shows and state visits, have had a highly beneficial effect on the increase of export and 
investment, and trade flows in general. Hereby, I will mention just some of them: 
 Van Bergeijk (1994, 163) found that intensification of diplomatic activities by 50 % 
can bring about the increase of export by approximately 25 %;  
 Nitch (2005, 22) found a positive correlation between diplomatic visits and export 
increase, in the sense that a trade mission increases export by 8–10 %. The same 
author (2007, 1816) also found that state visits too have a beneficial effect on the rise 
of export (an individual visit results in the increase of export by 8–10 %);  
 Coughlin and Cartwright (1987) disclosed that each dollar (USD) invested in export 
promotion programmes outputs the increase of export in the amount of 432 USD;  
 Lederman et al. (2006, 19) found that each dollar (USD) invested in export promotion 
generates about 40 dollars of export in the full sample covering both developed and 
developing countries, and even 60 dollars in the sub-sample encompassing only 
developing countries; 
 Rose (2007, 23, 35) showed that each additional consulate (abroad) makes for the rise 
of export between 6–10 %; 
 Gil, Llorca and Martínez Serrano (2008, 142) illustrated that an export promotion 
agency helps increase export by 74 %; 
 Afman and Maurel in van Bergeijk and Brakman (2010, 290) found that foreign 
diplomatic missions performing export facilitation activities help bring about the 
increase of export between 22 % and 67 %;  
 Head and Ries (2010, 772) showed that, on the case of Canada, trade missions 
(abroad) stimulated export by 14 %, and trade in general; 
 Morisset (2003, 18–19) found that investment promotion agencies (IPAs) positively 
influence decisions of investors to invest; 
 Wilkinson and Brouthers (2006, 243) found that participation in state-sponsored trade 
shows is positively correlated with satisfaction of firms with their export performance. 
The empirical evidence shows, among other things, that commercial diplomacy has the best 
welfare enhancement effect if used by developed countries towards developing countries, or 
among developing countries themselves (Van Veenstra et al. 2010; Creusen and Lejour 
2013). This is largely because market entry costs in developing countries are often notably 
higher due to weak institutions, but also cultural differences (Creusen and Lejour 2013, 507). 
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Appendix A contains main findings of the above mentioned and many other research studies 
which clearly illustrate highly beneficial effects of commercial diplomacy, both in developed 
and developing countries. 
2.7 Current trends and developments with respect to commercial diplomacy 
Economic, [that is commercial] diplomacy, primarily in the sense of promoting export and 
FDI, started to dominate foreign policy agenda of many countries across the world yet in the 
1970s (Rana 2011b, 13–14). However, it became especially relevant upon the end of the Cold 
War (de la Carriere 1998, 124; Coolsaet 2004, 61), with the emergence of economic security 
challenges (van Bergeijk 2009, 2; Reuvers and Ruël in Ruël 2012, 2) amid reconfiguration of 
international order and changes in global balance of power (accompanied with an increasing 
number of state and non-state actors) (Abbink 2014, 2; Amariei 2014, 28), as well as regional 
trade initiatives (Soobramanien in Bayne and Woolcock 2011, 187) in the form of free trade39 
and customs unions and other trade arrangements, which encompass both developed and 
developing countries, such as the EU (between developed countries), ASEAN (developing 
countries) and NAFTA (developed and developing countries) (Soobramanien in Bayne and 
Woolcock 2011, 192).40 Under those circumstances, supporting companies became essential 
for national economies (Czinkota in Czinkota et al. 2010, 67). Since then, foreign ministries 
started to be engaged very intensively in commercial activities, especially at the bilateral 
level, and diplomats from many countries openly stated that pursuance of economic goals is 
in the prime focus of their attention (Coolsaet 2004, 61). In other words, “economisation” of 
diplomacy or “diplomatisation” of economy has become a global trend (Dašić 2013, 386).  
Sudden emergence of the global [economic and] financial crisis (Hocking et al. 2012, 11) 
only reawakened and broadened the interest for commercial diplomacy (Hocking et al. 2012, 
11), and raised the awareness of a need for prioritising it among foreign policy objectives 
(Abbink 2014, 2; Amariei 2014, 28), as among the world's most developed countries like the 
                                                          
39 Despite prevalent belief that free trade agreements (FTAs) have a strong beneficial effect on trade and export, 
still there are also authors such as Rodrik who made critical remarks regarding FTAs. In his recent paper he 
argues that apart from having beneficial effects in the form of facilitating trade by bettering regulatory 
framework and making access to markets more easier, FTAs could also bring about negative effects in a way 
that may empower multinational companies that are “politically well-connected” to pursue [selfish] interests. 
This is because FTAs have become more and more less about so-to-say traditional aspects of trade, i.e. tariffs 
and other cross border barriers to trade (Rodrik 2018, 88–89). 
40 It is worth noting that since then, the character of diplomacy in general has changed profoundly. Diplomacy 
has ceased to be strictly confined to inter-state relations concerned predominantly with security issues, and over 
time gradually came to include social, cultural, political and especially economic factors and issues both 
domestically and at the international level. It also came to include non-state actors (Lee and Hocking in 
Denemark 2010, 2–3). Similar view is also shared by Dašić (2013, 385) who argued that evolution of diplomacy 
especially concurs with and at the same time adapts to the advance of globalisation and internationalisation of 
trade. 
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United States, United Kingdom, Germany and France, so among developing ones such as 
China, India and Brazil (Abbink 2014, 2; Amariei 2014, 28).41 It did also deepen the relations 
between diplomats and the business community (Hocking et al. 2012, 11).  
Hence, the importance of commercial (i.e. economic) diplomacy nowadays is constantly 
increasing (Petrović 2009, 102; Verhagen and Bleker 2011, 172–173; Busschers and Ruël in 
Ruël 2012). It is expected that governments will continue to put a strong emphasis on 
commercial diplomacy in the coming years (Hocking et al. 2012, 6). One of main reasons 
why commercial diplomacy has become so much popular is because governments seek 
instruments and solutions to increase competitiveness of their economies in international 
markets, and effectively cope with existing challenges and threaths (Naray 2008, 2), in that 
way stimulating their internationalisation (Moons and de Boer 2014, 3). How much 
commercial diplomacy has become important testifies the fact that the countries which 
account for about half of the global trade had 1356 commercial diplomacy offices abroad yet 
more than a decade ago (Kostecki and Naray 2007, 39).  
The main direct beneficiaries of commercial diplomacy are private business firms (Naray 
2008, 4). Because of the fact that business entry in one market can induce firms to enter other 
markets too, governments can play a positive role in encouraging domestic firms to explore 
export potentials in new markets, especially if they dispose of better instruments for 
collecting and disseminating information than the private sector (Albornoz et al. 2010, 39). 
However, governments too can also indirectly benefit from commercial diplomacy in the way 
that assisting and facilitating firms doing business, in other words, making them successful, 
may improve the image of the country and the government, and vice versa – the economically 
successful government and country may positively affect image of firms abroad. 
Furthermore, facilitating and promoting business beyond national boundaries can bring 
benefits to both partner countries (Naray 2008, 4). In relation to that, foreign ministries 
should reorient consular work of diplomatic missions to be in service of economic diplomacy 
(Hocking et al. 2012, 7). 
In the years to come, commercial diplomacy will be targeting more the countries with large 
and fast growing markets such as China, Brazil, India, Russia and those of Central and 
Eastern Europe than countries with small markets and limited growth. Therefore, where 
                                                          
41 Rana in Bayne and Woolcock (2011a, 110) argues that economic diplomacy offers a vast potential for 
economic advancement and poverty alleviation [in developing countries]. 
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commercial diplomacy activity will be directed towards depends on the size of a market and 
its business potential (Kostecki and Naray 2007, 13).42 
Furthermore, Moons and de Boer (2014, 15) argue that economic diplomacy is the most 
effective in case firms from low-income countries want to export to high-income countries, 
and vice versa. This is mainly because the knowledge gap is the most conspicuous between 
the two set of countries.43 In that regard Rana (2013) argues that developing countries should 
use primarily bilateral economic diplomacy as from home, so via diplomatic mission(s) in the 
host country as a means to promote export and tourism and stimulate FDI. Aid management 
is another issue for developing countries their economic diplomacy may help tackle. The 
author also stresses the importance of providing adequate training for diplomatic staff.  
In addition, trading states tend to promote peace among other countries, as mutual interests 
are likely to preclude the outbreak of war (de Montesquieu 1748, reprinted 1979). The same 
opinion is shared by Gartzke (2007, 166) who said that economic cooperation and 
development between states diminish prospects for conflict resolution by military means – “If 
war is a product of incompatible interests and failed or abortive bargaining, peace ensues 
when states lack differences worthy of costly conflict, or when circumstances favour 
successful diplomacy” (Gartzke 2007, 166). The author further adds that economic 
development, capital market integration and compatibility of foreign policy objectives seem 
to account for peaceful resolution of conflicts. In this context, van Bergeijk and Moons 
(2009, 15) are also among those who analysed the impact of economic diplomacy on 
international (economic) security, and found positive causality; in other words they found 
that effective application of economic diplomacy contributes to economic security by means 
of building stronger bilateral economic relations based on shared interests. More concretely, 
they found that:  
 expansion of conflict negatively affects bilateral trade to a significant degree; 
 (economic and political) cooperation positively affects bilateral trade; and 
                                                          
42 In terms of effectiveness of commercial diplomacy, location matters too. For instance, the Basel watch 
exhibition is attractive for foreign watch producers, as is Paris, Milan or London for textile producers. The 
authors stipulate that several interviewed European and U.S. managers stressed the importance commercial 
diplomacy has in facilitating interaction in China, Japan and elsewhere in Asia where cultural differences may 
inhibit doing business. Interviewed businessmen from Switzerland and Sweden emphasise that commercial 
diplomacy is more needed in distant than neighbouring markets (Kostecki and Naray 2007, 13). 
43 In countries characterised by weak rule of law or widespread corruption, commercial diplomacy activities are 
mostly directed towards assisting domestic firms affected by acts contrary to law, slow judiciary and similar 
(Kostecki and Naray 2007, 13). 
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 increase of international trade, investment and aid flows diminishes probability of 
conflict (van Bergeijk 2009, 7; van Bergeijk and Moons 2009, 4–5). 
Likewise, Pollins (1989) found that conflict or unstable political and security situation that 
might lead to conflict indirectly negatively influences trade. 
2.8 Own conceptualisation of commercial diplomacy 
From the presented it is evident that commercial diplomacy is a relatively new academic 
discipline and a very useful foreign policy instrument whose importance has continually 
grown over the course of the last few decades, mainly due to intensification of globalisation 
and regional trade initiatives. However, it started to be emphasisingly advocated especially 
following the 2007/’08 world economic crisis, when many countries across the world, 
regardless of how developed they are, realised that amid contraction of global economic 
activity, followed by a notable decrease in demand and (international) investment flows, what 
directly negatively reflected on their economies, there is a strong need for intensification of 
diplomatic efforts geared at, from the perspective of business, lucrative and prosperous 
markets. Of those notable attention started to be given to emerging economies, which are 
widely recognised as engines of global economic growth in the future. Moreover, more 
current events which relate to rising economic nationalism globally, a tendency of the United 
States (under administration of President Donald Trump) to move away from multilateral 
institutions towards more bilateral trade agreements, then increase in number of regional 
trade agreements, and more intensive advocacy against globalization, only make the need for 
addressing and putting in practical context commercial diplomacy be magnified.  
First and foremost as a practical foreign policy instrument, but also as an academic discipline, 
it (meaning commercial diplomacy) primarily deals with, that is, helps promoting trade 
(primarily export), investment (both inward and outward, each of which dominates over the 
other depending on economic and geographical specificities of a country) and tourism. 
However, it does also include some legal tasks, especially in relation to the protection of 
intellectual property rights and dispute settlement over controversial issues, most commonly 
those relating to trade. 
Going more in detail, with reference to trade, main commercial diplomacy activities can be 
summed up as follows: 
 supporting existing exporters by offering advice or matchmaking with those who can 
offer adequate and professional expertise in the sense of consolidating position(s) at 
current and/or finding new prospective markets, and settling arising disputes, 
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 encouraging new-in-business or interested prospective exporters by offering advice on 
means of financing (for starting new business in case of newcomers or looking for 
incentives for exporters for those already in business), providing information and/or 
analysis prosperity (in terms of business) of “traditional” markets, as well as on 
prospective markets, lobbying and fostering marketing techniques, 
 finding suitable importers in case when the home and the host country have suitable 
trade agreements/arrangements that are especially preferential for the home country, 
so that (certain) imported good(s) can be further processed industrially and sold in 
existing and new markets.  
With reference to investment, main commercial diplomacy activities include the following: 
 finding prospective investors abroad and presenting them advantages of investing in 
the home country and incentives being available, 
 supporting and encouraging existing and prospective domestic investors willing to 
invest abroad, by means of matchmaking with relevant stakeholders from the other 
side, presenting information and making analysis on advantages and risks of such 
investment. 
With reference to tourism, main commercial diplomacy activities are as follows: 
 helping organise home country’s representation at tourism fairs and related 
promotional events, 
 promoting and advertising home country as a suitable tourist destination.  
Lastly, but nothing less importantly is the indirectly (found) fact that the level of 
successfulness of commercial diplomacy largely depends on the political arrangement(s) in/of 
a targeted country, in the sense that the more centralised (and/or authoritarian) the state in 
terms of decision-making, the more likely that good political and cultural relations between 
the home and the targeted country will positively reflect on successfulness of commercial 
diplomacy activities. 
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3 Factors of economic growth 
3.1 Introductory notes 
This chapter deals with theorisation of the relationship between export, its geographical 
diversification, then foreign direct investment, and emerging markets, on one side, and 
economic growth, on the other. Reviewing that, i.e. examining whether and to what extent the 
mentioned notions are positively correlated with economic growth, is of high relevance 
having that this research is about testing whether engaging commercial diplomacy towards 
the emerging markets has a beneficial effect on economic growth primarily via promoting 
export and foreign direct investment (both inward and outward). Prior to elaborating these 
issues a short overview of main theories of and approaches to economic growth will be given. 
3.2 Short overview of main theories of and approaches to economic growth and 
development 
Theorisation of economic growth within the field of international political economy 
commenced with the appearance of some remarkable works on how to achieve economic 
growth and development. The founding father of modern economic thought is Adam Smith, 
who in his magnum opus „An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations“ 
(1776) established the basis for future development of economic theory (Ekelund and Hebert 
2007, 102–108). His theory on absolute advantage in trade (countries achieve/have absolute 
advantage in trading with another country if they have capacity to produce some particular 
good with fewer resources than other countries) was elaborated and complemented by his two 
contemporaries, namely, by Thomas Malthus, who in his „An Essay on the Principle of 
Population“ (1798) linked economic production and growth with the issue of population 
increase (Ekelend and Hebert 2007, 131; Šoškić 1970, 139;) and by David Ricardo, whose 
correction of Smith’s absolute advantages with comparative advantages still dominates (in) 
modern economic theory (Šoškić 1970, 104).44 The ideas of Smith, Ricardo and Malthus45 
can be (ideologically) summarised in the doctrine of laissez faire (laissez passer), which 
opposes government regulation and interference in business and commercial affairs. It 
introduced liberalisation of economic exchange as a precondition for growth of GDP, 
                                                          
44 David Ricardo elaborated the theory of comparative advantage in his book „Principles of Political Economy 
and Taxation“ (1817). 
45 To be correct, the ideas of Smith, Ricardo and Malthus were approached and supported also by two less 
known political economists, namely, Jean Baptiste Say and John Stuart Mill. 
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development of a state and increase of national welfare (Ekelund and Hebert 2007, 193).46 
Thus, a state can achieve economic growth only if and when it liberalises its economic 
exchange (trade) and replaces state activities47 in the field of economics with the activities of 
business units. Even though the liberal approach to economic growth permeated economic 
thought for almost 150 years, the everyday practice did not follow its axioms. There was only 
one short period, between 1860 and 1880, when the theory of liberalisation was translated 
into practice. Even though that period gave beneficial results, the economic crisis which 
started in the late 1870s convinced states to abandon the liberal approach in economic 
performance, and replace it with the interventionist one (Udovič 2009). 
The historical memory of “good old days” after the World War I brought some attempts to 
restore the liberal model of the 1860s, but the developments terminated with the spring of the 
1929 crisis, after which states opted for a strong mercantilist and interventionist politics based 
on the approach of John Maynard Keynes, according to which state activities can and should 
generate economic growth (Davidson 2009, 7; Ekelund and Hebert 2007, 471–472). The 
Keynes’ interventionist logic has fluxed also in a growth theory, resulting in the Harrod-
Domar model, based on the works of Roy Harrod and his “An Essay in Dynamic Theory” 
(1939) and Evsey Domar and his “Capital Expansion, Rate of Growth and Employment” 
(1946). The Harrod-Domar model is based on the hypothesis that the rate of economic 
growth depends on the level of savings and the productivity of investment. According to the 
model, in order to grow, the economies must save and invest a certain proportion of GDP. 
This means that states have an important role in defining their growth – the more they save, 
the more money they have for investing. Therefore, the acceleration of national economic 
growth is based on the level of capital formation and effectiveness (Besomi 2001, 81; Todaro 
and Smith 2009, 112). Despite the fact that the Harrod-Domar model had some deficiencies 
(Todaro and Smith 2009, 114), its development reversed the stream of economic theory, 
asking for higher state intervention in order to achieve GDP growth, instead of lowering it, as 
was “required” by the classical (liberal) model of economic theory. 
Robert Solow and Trevor Swan tried to overcome imperfections of the Harrod-Dommar 
model. Their model, known as the Solow-Swan model,48 developed on the basis of 
independent works of Solow and his “A contribution to the Theory of Economic Growth” 
(1956) and Swan and his “Economic Growth and Capital Accumulation” (1956), broadened 
                                                          
46 Even though the three mentioned approaches framed the development of economic theory for almost 150 
years, it is necessary to expose that these theories are in some parts opposing each other. 
47 Being adequate only as “invisible hand”, rare and short-run. 
48 Sometimes also called as the neoclassical growth model. 
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the Harrod-Dommar model in two ways – firstly, labour was added as a factor of production, 
and secondly, capital/labour ratio is not fixed as in Harrod-Domar model, but it changes in 
accordance to the changes in capital and labour productivity. According to the model, 
economic growth can be achieved in short- and long-run. In a short-run, GDP growth can be 
made through various state interventions at the market, such as tax subsidies (or tax cuts), 
increase/decrease of population and changes in saving rates, which can be determined or 
influenced by state activities at the market. The value-added of Solow-Swan model also 
consists of defining long-run effects on GDP growth. As pointed out by Harrod and Domar, 
GDP growth in the long-run is determined by external variables (exogenous model), which 
can change progressively or ad hoc. According to Solow, “growth is exogenous in the sense 
that the behaviour of economic agents does not alter the steady-state growth rate of the 
economy” (Ferrara and Guerrini 2008, 1–2), while Swan stressed the importance of technical, 
i.e. technological progress for long-term growth, deeming it necessary to prevent population 
pressure on the economy (Dimand and Spencer 2009). 
However, as during the 1960s happened rapid development in science and technological 
research, which through profit-based innovations had notable positive spill-over effect on 
economic growth and development of many countries which highly invested in the know-
how sector, many economists came to view that economic growth depends on endogenous, 
that is, internal or the forces within the market, and not external factors. That showed 
shortcomings of the Harrod-Domar and Solow model, and gave wind to the development of 
the endogenous theory of economic growth, developed in the late 1980s and early 1990s. In 
essence, this theory holds that long-term economic growth and development can be achieved 
through knowledge-based economy (technological advancement and profit-based 
innovations) and policy measures (subsidies for research and education) which increase 
incentives for innovation (Kibritciogly and Diboogly 2001). Its main proponents were 
Romer, Lucas and Baro. Romer (1986) and Lucas (1988)49 were the first to demonstrate that 
long-term growth can be directly explained by agents’ decision. According to Romer (1994, 
3), endogenous growth differs from neoclassical growth in the way that “economic growth is 
an endogenous outcome of an economic system, not the result of forces that impinge from 
outside”. In his 1990 work, Romer stressed the importance of human capital for the research 
sector, which generates new products and ideas, and in that way underpins technological 
progress (Barro 1991, 408–409). It is interesting to mention that this theory was built after the 
                                                          
49 The model developed on the basis of the work of Lucas “On the Mechanics of Economic Development“ 
(1988) and Romer “Increasing Returns and Long-Run Growth“ (1986). 
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spring of neoclassical synthesis in the mid-1970s, at that time the mainstream economics, 
which merged the John Maynard Keynes’s concept of macroeconomics with neoclassical 
school. This stream of economic thought was largely Keynesian in macroeconomics and 
neoclassical in microeconomics (Clark 1998). 
Thus, the predominance of the endogenous approach to GDP growth was short. Neoclassical 
synthesis redirected the path of growth theories back to the classical postulates of founding 
fathers of political economy (Smith, Ricardo, Malthus and Marx), where cross-border 
activities and trade liberalisation were seen as generators of economic growth. This approach 
found its application in practice in the late 1970s and 1980s through the emergence of the so-
called “Thatcherism” (in Great Britain, named after the then Prime Minister Margaret 
Thatcher) and “Reaganomics” (in the United States, named after the then U.S. President 
Ronald Reagan), and was characterised by insistence on free markets, privatisation, small 
state budget and tight control of money supply (restrictive monetary policy) (Udovič 2009). 
In this spirit, in 1989 a set of recipes for economic development of Latin America countries 
was prepared, today known as the Washington Consensus (Williamson 2004, 195), which, 
because of the dissolution of Eastern bloc became relevant for all transitional countries 
coping with challenges of market economy.50 The basic idea of the Washington consensus 
consisted in four premises, i.e. (a) financial liberalisation, (b) cuts in public expenditure, (c) 
competition-restrictive deregulation, and (d) privatisation of state enterprises. Next to these, 
the Washington consensus also dealt with the issues of property rights liberalisation, abolition 
of barriers hindering FDI, and tax reform (Williamson 2004, 195).51 Such model of economic 
growth was predominant for almost two decades, until the emergence of the 2007/’08 
                                                          
50 In terms of implications of the Washington Consensus on the transitional countries of post-communist 
Europe, Kolodko (1999) asserted that as abrupt change in economic structure that happened was done without 
strengthening institutional framework that would serve as a supporting base for the free-market economy. As a 
result of negative experience, the lesson learned is that the free market requires strong institutions. “Only with 
strong institutions can liberalization and privatization put emerging post-socialist markets on the path of 
sustainable growth” (Kolodko (1999, 233). 
51 More precisely, Williamson wrote that the following 10 policy actions were “desirable” to be applied in 
almost all Latin American countries: “1. Budget deficits . . . should be small enough to be financed without 
recourse to the inflation tax. 2. Public expenditure should be redirected from politically sensitive areas that 
receive more resources than their economic return can justify . . . toward neglected fields with high economic 
returns and the potential to improve income distribution, such as primary education and health, and 
infrastructure. 3. Tax reform . . . so as to broaden the tax base and cut marginal tax rates. 4. Financial 
liberalization, involving an ultimate objective of market-determined interest rates. 5. A unified exchange rate at 
a level sufficiently competitive to induce a rapid growth in nontraditional exports. 6. Quantitative trade 
restrictions to be rapidly replaced by tariffs, which would be progressively reduced until a uniform low rate in 
the range of 10 to 20 percent was achieved. 7. Abolition of barriers impeding the entry of FDI (foreign direct 
investment). 8. Privatization of state enterprises. 9. Abolition of regulations that impede the entry of new firms 
or restrict competition. 10. The provision of secure property rights, especially to the informal sector.” 
(Williamson 2004, 196–197). 
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economic crisis, which revealed that liberalisation as a trend setter for economic growth was 
in a way effective, but has not provided sustainable growth.  
The result of these occurrences is a debate on how sustainable economic growth can be 
achieved. Even though there are different proposals as to how such growth can be achieved, it 
is clear that states in the post-crisis time will combine different approaches presented above, 
trying to find the best solution for permanent, sustainable and efficient GDP growth, leading 
to their citizens’ welfare. One such attempt is the European Union programme Horizon 2020, 
within which research- and development-driven investments and efficiency are understood as 
preconditions for sustainable and permanent GDP growth and welfare (European 
Commission – Horizon 2020). The Horizon 2020 Strategy combines variables presented by 
different growth theories, trying to achieve as much synergies as possible.52 
However, in the last years it is possible to see that there is a new pattern on how economic 
growth and welfare can be achieved, i. e. via the access to natural resources. Natural 
resources, which are implicitly included in the exogenous growth model, became an 
important means for economic growth (particularly in poorer countries) (Sachs and Warner 
1999a, 43), especially in the new millennium. Though, empirical evidence shows a surprising 
fact that economies abundant in natural resources tended to achieve less rapid growth than 
natural-resource-scarce economies (Sachs and Warner in Mayer et al. 1999b, 13).53 Economic 
growth predominantly based on exploitation of natural resources also has its limitations – 
natural resources are mostly non-renewable, and thus economic growth via GDP growth is 
not sustainable and is usually short-term. To what extent the countries will rely on the 
resource-based growth in the future, and combine it with postulates of other theories 
mentioned above remains to be seen. 
It this context, it is also important to mention the importance of institutions for economic 
growth and development. In that context, Acemoglu and Robinson (2012, 409–410) argue 
that one of the most common reasons behind “failed” states is “extractive” institutions, which 
(can) cause severe economic and social consequences. They claim that “nations fail today 
because their extractive economic institutions do not create the incentives needed for people 
                                                          
52 The predecessors of the Horizon 2020 were the Lisbon Strategy I and II (2000, 2005). 
53 With reference to the noted, it is important to note that this “phenomenon” was already known earlier as the 
so-called Dutch disease - a broadly used term in development economics which originates yet from the 1960s, 
and relates to a state in economy when a sharp inflow of foreign currency (most commonly as a consequence of 
discovery of natural resources such as oil and gas) causes appreciation of domestic currency which then leads to 
a decrease of export competitiveness and stimulates import (Investopedia 2018). On causes and effects of the 
Dutch disease, among others, wrote Corden (1984), Krugman (1987) and Rajan and Subramaniam (2011). 
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to save, invest and innovate. Extractive political institutions support these economic 
institutions by cementing the power of those who benefit from the extraction.” As perhaps the 
most illustrative case of what a difference in institutional set-up can make on overall 
economic development and prosperity, the authors give an example of North Korea and 
South Korea after the end of the World War II. As an indicative proof, the authors, among 
other things, gave a satellite picture of the Korean peninsula illustrating intensity of light at 
night which clearly shows the difference between the two countries, the North part being in 
almost complete dark in comparison to Southern, dazzling in light (Acemoglu and Robinson 
2012, 85). As other examples of “failed” states due to “failed” institutions they quote: 
Zimbabwe, Sierra Leone, Angola, Cameroon, Chad, the Democratic Republic of Congo, 
Haiti, Liberia, Nepal, and Sudan (Acemoglu and Robinson 2012, 413–414). The authors also 
claim that institutions can change, i.e. “ripe” through political conflict. Examples are many, 
and England stands as one of the most conspicuous. Political revolution in the 17th century 
which, expectedly, had brought about a serious change in institutions happened to be a 
turning point for the country’s economic development and prosperity (Acemoglu and 
Robinson 2012, 117–118). In the same tone, Acemoglu and Robinson (2015, 24–25) argue 
that root of any inequality originally lies in political and economic institutions, and that the 
level of economic development generally depends on the quality and functionality of 
institutions. 
In addition, when it is about theories of economic growth, in modern economic thought it has 
become almost unavoidable to note Porter’s four stages of economic development: factor-
driven (based on low-cost labour and exploitation of natural resources), investment-driven, 
innovation-driven, and wealth-driven (Porter 1998). Porter noted that the first three stages are 
successively connected, i.e. follow each other, with a country’s economic prosperity and its 
competitive position, while the last one (wealth-driven) does the opposite; in other words, it 
causes its decline. The author gave a special emphasis to innovations, technological progress 
and forward-looking way of thinking, about what he said: 
National prosperity is created, not inherited. It does not grow out of a country’s natural 
endowments, its labor pool, its interest rates, or its currency’s value, as classical economics 
insists. A nation’s competitiveness depends on the capacity of its industry to innovate and 
upgrade.” … “Ultimately, nations succeed in particular industries because their home 
environment is the most forward-looking, dynamic, and challenging (Porter 1990, 73). 
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3.3 Export and economic growth 
3.3.1 Introduction 
In this chapter will be examined whether export has a beneficial effect on economic growth. 
The basis for the research will make main findings of the total of 168 case studies found 
available, covering all possible country and time span combinations (see Appendix B). It is 
worth noting that not all case studies examine a causal link between export and economic 
growth directly, but also between export (on one side) and GDP growth and/or (industrial) 
output growth and/or productivity growth (on the other). Still, given that all of them (meaning 
case studies) deal with correlation between export and economic growth, directly or 
indirectly, for easier understanding, in the sub-chapters - summary of the case studies’ main 
findings, and - summary of the case studies’ additional and other findings, (only) the term 
economic growth will be used.   
3.3.2 Literature review 
The presented findings can be summarised as follows: 
 The number of case studies which found that export generally positively affects 
economic growth is 45. They are of the following authors: Abhayaratne (1996), 
Abou-Stait (2005), Ahmad and Harnhirun (1996), Alam et al. (2014), Al-Yousif 
(1997), Amavilah (2002), Bahmani-Oskooee et al. (1991), Balassa (1978b), Balassa 
(1985), Begum and Shamsuddin (1998), Bilgin and Şahbaz (2009), Boltho (1996), 
Clarke and Ralhan (2005), Fajana (1979), Falvey et al. (2004), Feder (1983), Federici 
and Marconi (2002), Fosu (1990), Greenaway et al. (1999), Guariglia and Santos-
Paulino (2008), Heller and Porter (1978), Hye and Siddiqui (2011), Ibrahim and 
MacPhee (2003), Jin (2002), Kavoussi (1984), Kristjanpoller and Olson (2014), Marin 
(1992), Martins and Yang (2007), McCarville and Nnadozie (1995), Mehdi and 
Shahryar (2012), Muhammad et al. (2011), Onafowora et al. (2006), Paul and 
Chowdhury (1995), Ram (1985), Ram (2003), Sahni and Atri (2012), Samad (2011), 
Santos et al. (2013), Seabra and Galimberti (2012), Soukiazis and Madaleno (2007), 
Thornton (1996), Tyler (1980), van den Berg and Schmidt (1994), Vohra (2001), and 
Williamson (1978); 
 The number of case studies which found bi-directional positive causality between 
export and economic growth is 24, of which 20 in general of the following authors: 
Agrawal (2014), Awokuse (2006), Balaguer and Cantavella-Jordá (2002), Biswal and 
Dhawan (1998), Chen (2007), Chow (1987), Ciftcioglu and Nekhili (2005), Devi 
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(2013), Emery (2007), Hatemi (2002), Holman and Graves (1995), Jun (2007), Khan 
et al. (1995), Kwan and Cotsomitis (1991), Mah (2005), Mehrara and Firouzjaee 
(2011), Michalopoulos and Jay (1973), Ramos (2001), and Shan and Sun (1998), 3 in 
the long-term of the following authors: Bahmani-Oskooee and Alse (1993), Doraisami 
(1996), and Omisakin (2009), and 1 in the short-term of the following author: Tang 
(2006); 
 The number of case studies which found uni-directional positive causality from export 
to economic growth is 25, of which 5 in general of the following authors: Abu Al-
Foul (2004), Bilas et al. (2015), Dumitriu et al. (2010), Saad (2012), and Siliverstovs 
and Herzer (2005), 15 in the long-term of the following authors:  Andraz and 
Rodrigues (2010), Bahmani-Oksooee et al. (2005), Constant (2010), Dritsaki et al. 
(2004), Esfahani (1991), Henriques and Sadorsky (1996), Herrerias and Orts (2010), 
Herzer et al. (2004), Islam and Hossain (2015), Khalid and Cheng (1997), Mamun and 
Nath (2005), Medina-Smith (2000), Chandra Parida and Sahoo (2007), Quddus and 
Saeed (2005), and Zeren and Kilinç Savrul (2013), and 5 in the short-term of the 
following authors: Ahmed and Uddin (2009), Doyle (1998), Jin and Shih (1995), 
Lorde (2011), and Waithe et al. (2011); 
 The number of case studies which found uni-directional positive causality from 
economic growth to export is 12, of which 9 in general of the following authors: 
Aydin and Sari (2014), Christopoulos and Reppas (2005), Furuoka (2007), Iqbal et al. 
(2012), Oxley (1993), Ronit and Divya (2014), Shihab et al. (2014), Siddique and 
Selvanathan (1998), and Siddique and Selvanathan (1999), and 3 in the long-term of 
the following authors: Mishra (2011), Pal and Ashwani (2011), and Panas and 
Vamvoukas (2002); 
 The number of case studies which found mixed results as to whether export positively 
affects economic growth is 37. They are of the following authors: Ajmi et al. (2015), 
Aka (2008), Anwer and Sampath (1997), Bahmani-Oskooee and Economidou (2009), 
Bahmani-Oskooee and Oyolola (2007), Bajo-Rubio and Díaz-Roldán (2011), Bernard 
and Jensen (2000), Choong et al. (2007), Daoud and Basha (2015), Dar et al. (2013), 
Din (2004), Dutt and Ghosh (1996), Ekanayake (1999), El-Sakka and Al-Mutairi 
(2000), Ghatak et al. (1997), Gonçalves and Richtering (1987), Hatemi-J and 
Irandoust (2000), Islam (1998), Ismail and Harjito (2003), Husein (2010), Kónya 
(2000), Kugler (1991), Lim et al. (2011), Love and Chandra (2004), Mbaku (1989), 
Nasreen (2011), Pop Silaghi (2009), Rahman and Mustafa (1997), Riezman et al. 
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(1995), Serletis and Afxentiou (1991), Sharma and Dhakal (1994), Shirazi and Manap 
(2005), Sprout and Weaver (1993), Tang et al. (2015), Thornton (1997), Xu (1996), 
and Zang and Baimbridge (2011); 
 The number of case studies which found conditionally positive causality between 
export and economic growth is 1. It is of the following author: Balaguer and 
Cantavella-Jordá (2001);54  
 The number of case studies which found no positive causality between export and 
economic growth is 4. They are of the following authors: Afzal and Hussain (2010), 
Kim and Lim (2009), Kunst and Marin (1989), and Tahir et al. (2015); 
 The number of case studies which found no statistically significant positive (but 
neither negative) causality between export and economic growth is 5. They are of the 
following authors:  Fugarolas et al. (2007), Gokmenoglu et al. (2015), Jin and Jin 
(2015), Jung and Marshall (1985), and Shan and Tian (1998). 
In other words, it can be seen that of the entire number of case studies found available which 
disclose some kind of causality between export and economic growth (which is 153), be it 
either positive or negative, the largest (number) relates to those which show that export 
generally positively affects economic growth, whose share in the total is 29,4 %, followed by 
those which show mixed results (24,2 %), and those which point to uni-directional positive 
causality from export to economic growth (16,3 %). On the contrary, the share of studies 
which found no significantly positive (but neither negative) causality between the two 
variables in the total number of studies is 3,3 %, whereas the share of studies which disclosed 
no positive causality at all is only 2,6 %. Overall, as much as 69,3 % of studies (excluding 
those which show mixed results, no significantly positive, no positive at all, or conditionaly 
positive) demonstrate clearly positive causality between export and economic growth in 
either of direction, what is a plausible enough indicator that export is strongly positively 
correlated with economic growth, especially in developing countries.  
Apart from the mentioned, and having examined the matter more specifically in terms of 
beneficial effects that export has/exerts on the economy in general, be it directly or indirectly, 
it was also found that: 
 export is especially important for developing countries - Export has shown to have a 
particularly positive impact on economic growth in developing, i.e. newly 
                                                          
54 The author found that export exerted a positive impact on economic growth when the country was liberalised 
in economic terms. In contrast, during the periods of protectionism and autarky, the authors did not find positive 
correlation between the two variables either in the short or the long-term (Balaguer and Cantavella-Jordá  2001). 
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industrialised countries (NICs) (Tyler 1980, 12; Bahmani-Oskooee et al. 1991). 
Moreover, the positive growth-enhancement effect of export is stronger in developing 
than in developed countries, and is more conspicuous in the initial stage than after 
(Martins and Yang 2007, 10).55  
 export stimulates technological development and innovation - Export is found to be an 
important catalyst of technological diffusion, innovation and efficiency (Soukiazis 
and Madaleno 2007, 7), contributing to capital accumulation and absorption of know-
how (Ghatak et al. 1997, 214).  
 export brings about product specialisation - Export is found to have a positive impact 
on product specialisation (Balaguer and Cantavella-Jordá 2002, 11–12) and vice versa 
(Balaguer and Cantavella-Jordá 2002, 11–12; Sannassee et al. 2014, 381).  
 exporting enterprises tend to grow faster and increase productivity - Export helps 
firms, especially new entrants, increase their productivity (Ghatak et al. 1997, 214; 
Falvey et al. 2004, 20). The positive impact of export on productivity growth is due to 
the fact that high productivity firms tend to be more export-oriented. Export also 
positively affects employment (Bernard and Jensen 2000, 23; Jarra 2013, 368–369), 
foreign currency deposits (Jarra 2013, 368–369) and overall output growth (Bernard 
and Jensen 2000, 23). Feder (1983, 59) argues that one of solutions to achieve better 
productivity is to reallocate the resources from the non-export to the export sector. 
Resource allocation to the most lucrative and potentially prosperous export sectors is 
fundamental for the success in terms of exporting and its beneficial effect on 
economic growth (Balaguer and Cantavella-Jordá 2002 , 11–12). The focus should be 
more on manufactured export (Balassa 1985, 34). Furthermore, exporting enterprises 
tend to grow at a much faster pace than those that are not export-oriented (Bernard 
and Jensen 2000, 23);56 they tend to grow larger, be substantially more productive and 
offer higher wages (Bernard et al. 2007, 105, 110–111).  
 export positively contributes to the enhancement of competitiveness - Export brings 
about the increase of the volume of investment in more efficient and productive 
sectors, technological upgrading and improved management, what indirectly leads to 
enhanced competitiveness (Emery 2007). 
                                                          
55 The authors stress the importance of trade internationalisation, especially for developing countries (Martins 
and Yang 2007, 10). 
56 Trade has a positive impact on productivity and efficiency of firms, and hence indirectly on economic growth 
(Bernard and Jensen 2000, 16). 
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 growth of export is contingent on other determinants - Export alone, despite being 
necessary, is not a sufficient condition for output growth; other growth determinants 
matter too (Amavilah 2002, 16–17). It is found that the extent to which export will 
positively affect economic growth is contingent on the size of population, degree of 
outward-orientedness, strength of the manufacturing sector (Ibrahim and MacPhee 
2003, 257), human capital (Seabra and Galimberti 2012, 20)57 and a minimum 
sufficient level of economic growth and development (Vohra 2001, 345; Pal and 
Ashwani 2011, 188–189; Saad 2012, 142), especially based on domestic investment 
(Sahni and Atri 2012, 294). In addition, the extent to which a country will benefit 
from export depends on its ability to cope with and adapt to external fluctuation in 
demand and other factors, as much as on its internal policies (Michalopoulos and Jay 
1973, 22–23). 
In line with the mentioned, it is also worth noting that it was found that export generates new 
output value without negatively affecting balance of payment, generates saving through 
reinvestment of profit (in new technologies and product improvement), and increasing 
returns. Likewise, export [most commonly, but not necessarily] goods contain a relatively 
low level of import content, but also stimulate import (when) necessary for increasing the 
value-added of (export) goods (Soukiazis and Madaleno 2007, 7). Interestingly, some authors 
such as Kristjanpoller and Olson (2014, 6) found that export-led and import-led economic 
growth cannot exert a positive effect on economic growth at the same time; in other words, 
they are mutually exclusive.  
In terms of conditions that are highly relevant or thus necessary for development of the 
export sector(s) or (for) facilitating export(ing), by insight into the available literature it was 
found that the following factors are of high relevance for boosting export(ing): 
 export-friendly economic policies and reform - Export-friendly economic policies and 
reform (Fajana 1979; Esfahani 1991, 114; Begum and Shamsuddin 1998;58 Biswal 
and Dhawan 1998; Ram 2003, 22; Abou-Stait 2005, 14; Jun 2007, 163–165; 
Chigusiwa et al. 2011, 124;59 Sannassee et al. 2014, 380; Shihab et al. 2014, 307), 
especially in developing countries (Chow 1987) are found to be of immense 
importance for development of the export sectors; 
                                                          
57 The authors note that the strongest positive impact of export on economic growth is found in the transitional 
(mostly middle-income) countries (Seabra and Galimberti 2012, 20). 
58 They also found that political instability negatively affects export growth (Begum and Shamsuddin 1998). 
59 Export of primary products has had a special contribution to economic growth in case of Zimbabwe 
(Chigusiwa et al. 2011, 124). 
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 export-friendly macroeconomic environment - Some authors such as Choong et al. 
(2005, 22) and Zang and Baimbridge (2011, 10) stress the importance of export-
friendly macroeconomic environment for the export sectors; 
 quality of institutions and infrastructure - It is found that the quality of institutions and 
infrastructure positively contributes to the success of export (Constant 2010, 10; Zang 
and Baimbridge 2011, 10; Sannassee et al. 2014, 380); 
 openness to trade - Openness to trade is found to positively affect economic growth 
(Balassa 1978a, 54;60 Balassa 1985, 34; Begum and Shamsuddin 1998;61 Doyle 1998, 
157; Vohra 2001, 345; Abou-Stait 2005, 14; Chen 2007, 7;62 Babalola et al. 2012, 
100; Bilas et al. 2015, 28). Furthermore, competitiveness of export is positively 
correlated with the level of economic openness, in the sense that the more open the 
economy, the more competitive the export (Michalopoulos and Jay 1973, 22–23); 
 export promotion - Export-promotion (policies) have a significant role in stimulating 
export (Balassa 1978a, 54–55; Paul and Chowdhury 1995, 179; Vohra 2001, 345; 
Quddus and Saeed 2005, 934; Awokuse 2006, 595; Choong et al. 2007, 145; Pop 
Silaghi 2009, 109; Ray 2011, 33), especially in developing countries (Bahmani-
Oskooee and Alse 1993, 541; Bahmani-Oskooee and Economidou 2009, 206; 
Balaguer and Cantavella-Jordá 2002, 11–12; Mohsen 2015, 257);63 
 investing in human capital and innovations - Investing in human capital and 
technological development (Federici and Marconi 2002, 329; Soukiazis and Madaleno 
2007, 2, 21; Constant 2010, 10; Mehrara and Firouzjaee 2011, 229; Ajmi et al. 2015, 
175),64 then innovations (Soukiazis and Madaleno 2007, 2, 21; Udah 2012, 46) and 
R&D (Jun 2007, 163–165) positively affects growth of export and overall output 
growth. In that regard, it is also important to stimulate development of technologically 
sophisticated export. It is found that export goods with higher value-added contribute 
                                                          
60 They also found a positive causal link between establishing free trade and export performance, in the sense 
that the first stimulated the latter, especially in manufacturing (the most evident in Korea, Singapore and 
Taiwan) (Balassa 1978a, 54–55). In contrast, the countries (Brazil, Colombia and Mexico) which did not take 
measures to promote and stimulate export had far less pace of growth (Balassa 1978a, 56). Developing countries 
should focus on manufacturing component parts of industrial durable products, and even take over comparative 
advantage over developed countries which refocused on making technologically more advanced goods (Balassa 
1978a, 55). 
61 They also found that political instability negatively affects export growth (Begum and Shamsuddin 1998). 
62 Export growth also exerts a positive effect on labour productivity (Chen 2007, 7). 
63 There is also positive bi-directional causality between import and GDP growth in both short- and long-term 
(Mohsen 2015, 257). 
64 Economic openness and outward-orientation contribute to long-term economic growth (Federici and Marconi 
2002, 329). 
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more to export productivity and hence economic growth (Guariglia and Santos-
Paulino 2008, 18; Santos et al. 2013, 24). In other words, those countries whose 
export is mostly comprised of primary goods that contain low value added benefit the 
least from export, and those whose export products are of high value added benefit the 
most from export (Sprout and Weaver 1993, 298). In addition, it is important to 
enable quality educational system and well devised export strategy (Sannassee et al. 
2014, 380); 
 increasing (export) diversification, both in terms of structure and market - It is 
important to diversify export in terms of structure. It is found that that the more 
diversified the export structure, the greater positive effect of export on economic 
performance (in developing countries) (Kavoussi 1984; also in Greenaway, Morgan 
and Wright 1999), especially in the manufacturing sector (Balassa 1978a, 54–55). 
Likewise, it is also found that greater market diversification is needed, especially 
towards prosperous Eastern markets, such as those of China, Russia and Poland 
(Santos et al. 2013, 25);  
 attracting export-oriented FDI - It is also found that attracting export-oriented FDI is 
positively correlated with export development and growth (Dritsaki et al. 2004, 78; 
Choong et al. 2005, 22; Jun 2007, 163–165). 
In line with the mentioned, Nasreen (2011, 11) found that efficiency of the export sector 
highly depends on stability and efficiency of the judicial system, level of development of the 
financial system, quality of education and infrastructure, respect for quality standards, 
political stability, degree of corruption, among others. 
To summarise, export stimulates development of (high) technology and innovation, brings 
about product specialisation, increase productivity, and hence positively contributes to 
enhancement of competitiveness. Exporting enterprises tend to grow faster and offer 
generally higher wages than those that are non-exporting. In order to enable faster 
development of export, countries need to create export-friendly economic policies and 
macroeconomic environment, increase quality of institutions and infrastructure, increase 
openness to trade, intensify export promotion, invest in human capital and innovations, 
increase its diversification, both in terms of structure and market, and attract export-oriented 
FDI. 
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3.4 Impact of geographical diversification of export on its performance and indirectly 
on economic growth, with focus on emerging markets 
3.4.1 Introductory notes and literature review 
The aim of this chapter is to present empirical evidence on the impact of geographical 
diversification of export on its performance and hence (on) economic growth based on 
findings of several case studies (the only literature found available), and thus to test whether a 
positive correlation is found between them. Findings of a total of 7 studies will serve as a 
sample (see Appendix C). Based on the presented (despite the fact that exporting over large 
distances substantially increases transaction cost, especially in case of small countries 
exporting small volume of goods), it can be seen that findings of all given studies point to 
highly positive correlation between geographical diversification of export and its 
performance, and indirectly economic growth. More concretely, it was found that 
geographical diversification (of export) is especially important for developing countries as it 
reduces the level of risk their export companies (and vulnerable economies) are exposed to, 
especially in times of economic crises, having that it is exactly them (meaning developing 
countries) whose economies happen to be highly concentrated on a very limited number of 
markets in terms of export, and thus very vulnerable to external shocks. Another highly 
important fact found is that positive correlation is also found in terms of diversification of a 
number of goods being exported, whereat geographical diversification of export has 
happened to be more beneficial in terms of export performance than diversification of a range 
of goods in offer. In relation to the mentioned, it was also emphasised that export-oriented 
enterprises should seek ways to further enhance the quality of those goods which are found to 
be most productive in terms of sales; in other words, those with strongest comparative 
advantage. Despite relatively limited number of studies found, these results offer a sufficient 
level of credibility, as all except one of presented studies cover a large number of countries 
and companies too. 
3.5 Foreign direct investment (FDI) and economic growth  
3.5.1 Introduction 
In this chapter will be examined whether foreign direct investment positively affects 
economic growth. The basis for the research will make main findings of 89 case studies 
found available, covering a plethora of country and time span combinations (see Appendix 
D). The overall sample covers majority of the most relevant studies available in the literature 
about this field worldwide, that is, those being most commonly referred to. As is the case 
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with the previous chapter which dealt with the relationship between export and economic 
growth, it is worth noting that herein too not all case studies examine a causal link between 
FDI and economic growth directly (although a large majority do), but also between FDI (on 
one side) and productivity growth and/or employment and/or reform impact (on the other). 
Still, the summary of these findings is done in such a way to provide easy understanding 
about correlation between these variables. 
Also, with reference to FDI, it has become almost unavoidable to mention the name of John 
Dunning, who was the first who explained and elaborated (on) the causal linkage between 
foreign direct investment (both inward and outward) and economic development, yet in 
1979.65 The FDI-driven development theory argues that countries go through five main 
development phases, depending on their (meaning of the countries') inclination to be either 
inward or outward oriented in terms of investment. It (meaning the inclination), on the other 
side, depends on (a) the level of competitiveness of firms from one country vis-a-vis firms 
in/of other countries, then on (b) overall resources and capabilities of countries concerned, 
and (c) the ability of the firms from both countries to utilise their comparative advantages 
(Dunning and Narula in Dunning and Narula 2003, 1–2). 
3.5.2 Literature review 
The presented findings (for both inward and outward FDI) can be summarised as follows: 
 The number of case studies which found bi-directional positive causality between FDI 
and economic growth is 4. They are of the following authors: Hudea and Stancu 
(2012), Liu et al. (2002), Sen (2011), and Türkcan and Yetkiner (2008). 
 The number of case studies which found uni-directional positive causality from FDI 
to economic growth is 6, of which 3 in general of the following authors: Afşar (2008), 
Dash and Parida (2012), and Hansen and Rand (2006), of which 2 relate to outward 
FDI of the following authors: Jaklič (2011) and Svetlicic (2007), and 1 in the long-
term of the following author: Singh (2013). 
 The number of case studies which found uni-directional positive causality from 
economic growth to FDI is 1. It is of the following author: Stylianou (2014).  
 The number of case studies which found generally positive causality from FDI to 
economic growth is 29. They are of the following authors: Bajo-Rubio et al. (2007), 
                                                          
65 At a conference on multinational enterprises from developing countries, held in Honolulu, Hawaii, the United 
States. Since then, Dunning further elaborated (on) the issue of the FDI-driven economic growth and 
development on several occasions, throughout the 1980s and the early 1990s, namely in 1981, 1986, 1988 and 
1993 (Dunning and Narula in Dunning and Narula 2003, 1). 
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Balasubramanyam et al. (1996), Blomström et al. (1996), Campos and Kinoshita 
(2002), Carp (2014), Djankov and Hoekman (2000), Domanski (2003), Fidrmuc and 
Martin (2011), Fillat and Woerz (2011), Gallova and Stavárek (2010), Gocer et al. 
(2012), Görg and Greenaway (2004), Haddad and Harrison (1993), Hunya (2004), 
King (2000), Kornecki and Raghavan (2011), Leitão and Rasekhi (2013), Lensink and 
Morrissey (2001), Lipsey and Sjöholm (2010), Misztal (2010), Monastiriotis (2014), 
Mottaleb (2007), Neuhaus (2006), Pelinescu and Râdulescu (2009), Soleimani and 
Behname (2012), Vadlamannati and Tamazian (2009), Wacker (2011), Yao (2006), 
and Zhang (1999). 
 The number of case studies which found positive, but not significant causality from 
FDI to economic growth is 2. They are of the following authors: Marasco (2007) and 
Temiz and Gökmen (2013). 
 The number of case studies which found mixed results as to whether FDI positively 
affects economic growth is 18. They are of the following authors: Acaravci and 
Ozturk (2012), Aitken and Harrison (1999), Angelopoulou and Liargovas (2014), 
Apergis et al. (2004), Basu et al. (2003), Bayar (2014), Bruno and Campos (2013), 
Calderón et al. (2004), Christie (2003), Ďurčová and Mirdala (2011), Fons-Rosen et 
al. (2013), Johnson (2006), Ledyaeva and Linden (2006), Mani (2013), Monastiriotis 
and Jordaan (2011), Moudatsou and Kyrkilis (2011), Ozturk and Acaravci (2010), and 
Sapienza (2010). 
 The number of case studies which found that positive effect of FDI on economic 
growth is contingent on other growth determinants is 23. They are of the following 
authors: Alfaro et al. (2002), Alfaro et al. (2007), Azman-Saini et al. (2010), 
Berthélemy and Démurger (2000), Bijsterbosch and Kolasa (2009), Borensztein et al. 
(1995), Carkovic and Levine in Moran et al. (2005), De Mello (1997), De Mello 
(1999), Eller et al. (2005), Eller et al. (2006), Farkas (2012), Fortanier (2007), Forte 
and Moura (2013), Hermes and Lensink (2003), Jude and Levieuge (2013), Kotrajaras 
et al. (2011), Mehic et al. (2013), Moudatsou (2003), Sghaier and Abida (2013), 
Wang (2009), Wijeweera et al. (2010), and Xu (2000). 
 The number of case studies which found no positive causality between FDI and 
economic growth is 1. It is of the following author(s): Curwin and Mahutga (2014). 
The illustrated shows that of the entire number of case studies found available which disclose 
some kind of causality between (both inward and outward) FDI and economic growth (which 
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is 84), be it either positive or negative, the largest (number) relates to those which show that 
FDI generally positively affects economic growth, whose share in the total (of 84) is 34,5 %, 
followed by those which show that a positive impact of FDI on economic growth is 
contingent on other growth determinants (27,4 %), and those which point to mixed results 
(21,4 %). On the contrary, the share of studies which found no significantly positive (but 
neither negative) causality between the two variables in the total number of studies is 2,4 %, 
whereas the share of studies which disclosed no positive causality at all is only 1,2 %. It is 
evident that a notably large number of studies found that positive effect of FDI on economic 
growth is contingent on other growth determinants, which when summarised, are the 
following: (a) overall macroeconomic stability, (b) economic openness, (c) level of economic 
freedom in the host country, (d) investment-friendly business environment, (e) level of 
development of the host country financial market, (f) trade policies, (g) sufficient level of 
human capital (in the host country), (h) host country's level of institutional development, (i) 
sufficient level of human capital, (j) (foreign) investors' interest to transfer advanced 
technology, (k) sufficient level of technological development, (l) political risk, (m) 
democratic governance, (n) sufficient level of skilled labour, and (o) degree of inflation. 
Moreover, a relatively large number of studies disclosing mixed results as to whether FDI 
positively affects economic growth can be explained by a variety of countries (both sending 
and receiving) used as sample, in terms of level of development, FDI-conducive 
environment, political stability and other factors, as well as by a research model used and a 
number of variables selected too. Overall, despite that the largest number of studies point to a 
clearly positive impact that FDI exerts on economic growth, still, it can be concluded that the 
level of usefulness that receiving countries will have from FDI is very likely to depend on a 
variety of factors (already mentioned) relating to their overall absorptive capacity.66 
Apart from the mentioned, it was also found that positive (spill-over) effects of (inward) FDI 
are mainly reflected through:  
 providing new capital/investment (Borensztein et al. 1995, 19; Domanski 2003, 105; 
Johnson 2006, 44; Bajo-Rubio et al. 2007, 10–11; Fons-Rosen et al. 2013, 29), 
 raising employment67 (Hunya and Geishecker 2005, 25; Fons-Rosen et al. 2013, 29),68 
                                                          
66 In relation to the mentioned, it is important to mention Damijan et al. (2008, 25) who investigated the benefits 
of FDI in transitional countries of post-communist Europe in the form of transfer of technology and know-how, 
and found that those benefits are highly contingent on the absorptive capacity and the level of productivity of 
host country firms. 
67 FDI has a positive impact on raising employment by means of cooperation with the host country supplier 
firms (Hunya and Geishecker 2005, 25) and industrial restructuring (Hunya and Geishecker 2005, 4). This opens 
up prospects for creating new business opportunities, what in turn may lead to more foreign investment (Hunya 
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 enabling transfer of technology and business know-how (Balasubramanyam et al. 
1996, 98; Zhang 1999; Campos and Kinoshita 2002, 4; Görg and Greenaway 2004, 
189–190; Hunya 2004, 109; Johnson 2006, 44; Neuhaus 2006, 154; Yao 2006, 348–
349; Bajo-Rubio et al. 2007, 10–11; Mottaleb 2007, 1; Bijsterbosch and Kolasa 2009, 
13; Lipsey and Sjöholm 2010, 30; Hudea and Stancu 2012, 100; Josifidis et al. 2012, 
170; Leitão and Rasekhi 2013, 59; Carp 2014, 39), 
 enabling sophisticated management (Borensztein et al. 1995, 18; De Mello 1997, 9; 
Campos and Kinoshita 2002, 4; Görg and Greenaway 2004, 189–190; Mottaleb 2007, 
1; Bijsterbosch and Kolasa 2009, 13; Leitão and Rasekhi 2013, 59; Carp 2014, 39), 
 improving labour skills (Balasubramanyam et al. 1996, 98; De Mello 1997, 9; 
Domanski 2003, 105), 
 helping stimulate industrial restructuring and development (Hunya 2004, 109; Hunya 
and Geishecker 2005, 4; Mottaleb 2007, 9–10) and overall economic restructuring 
(Hunya 2004, 109; Bijsterbosch and Kolasa 2009, 14), 
 stimulating development of the supplier firms (from the host country) and their 
international engagement (Pelinescu and Râdulescu 2009, 160), 
 stimulating structural policies in the host country (Fons-Rosen et al. 2013, 29), 
 enabling direct access to new markets (Borensztein et al. 1995, 18), 
 improving balance of payment (Domanski 2003, 105; Mencinger 2009, 15; Josifidis 
et al. 2012, 170), 
 enhancing internal competition and overall competitiveness (Domanski 2003, 105; 
Fons-Rosen et al. 2013, 29; Leitão and Rasekhi 2013, 59;), 
 exerting a positive impact on economic reform69 (Malesky 2009, 62), and 
 positively influencing the overall transition process (Neuhaus 2006, 151).  
FDI has proved to be of immense importance especially for developing and transition 
countries.70 Its beneficial effect is mainly achieved through the spill-over effect comprising 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
and Geishecker 2005, 25), enhancing the private entrepreneurship in the host country in general (Hunya and 
Geishecker 2005, 4).  
68 By means of cooperation with the host country supplier firms (Hunya and Geishecker 2005, 25). 
69 Malesky (2009, 62) found that 1 % increase in the volume of inward FDI exerts a positive effect on intensity 
of economic reform by 6,3 % in the year after. Reform policies mainly include: price liberalisation, foreign 
exchange and trade liberalisation, privatisation of small state-owned enterprises, privatisation of large state-
owned enterprises, enterprise reform, competition policy, bank reform, and the reform of non-bank financial 
institutions (Malesky 2009, 62). 
70 It was found that the beneficiary effect of FDI is substantially higher when the source countries are 
industrially advanced, and the recipient countries are developing countries (Borensztein et al. 1995, 19). Foreign 
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transfer of advanced technology,71 know-how and management skills (Görg and Greenaway 
2004, 189–190), as well as via improved productivity and higher labour cost, i.e. improved 
living standard of domestic population (Görg and Greenaway 2004, 182). There is evidence 
that FDI has also positively contributed to fostering international integration of the transition 
economies (Radosevic et al. 2003, 83–86). Moreover, importance of FDI for developing 
countries is thus greater having that it is found that it (meaning FDI) exerts better growth-
enhancement effect on the economy of the host country than domestic investment 
(Balasubramanyam et al. 1996, 101; Neuhaus 2006, 154; Wang 2009, 996). FDI is also found 
to have highly contributed to economic growth in the „emerging European countries“ after 
they became member states of the EU (Josifidis et al. 2012, 174). EU-origin FDI happened to 
be more productive than FDI originating from outside the EU, in the sense that the first offers 
more beneficial effects for domestic firms of the host country. In part, this may be explained 
by the process of EU integration, which grants firms from the EU a preferential status in the 
acceding countries over the others, non-EU firms (Monastiriotis 2014, 30). Hence, prospects 
of EU membership seem to have had a positive impact on economic growth of the acceding 
countries. Nonetheless, the EU integration process brings about greater economic openness, 
which is an important factor for foreign investors (Josifidis et al. 2012, 173–174). In addition, 
it was also found that FDI is positively correlated with the increase of export (Yao 2006, 
348–349; Pelinescu and Râdulescu 2009, 160; Gallova and Stavárek 2010, 497) via 
enhancing its structure, whereat adding more high-added value to it, making it more 
technologically advanced and therefore competitive (Pelinescu and Râdulescu 2009, 160).  
Furthermore, in terms of determinants that FDI (inflows) are to a more or less degree 
contingent on, it was found to be influenced by the following factors: 
 quality of institutions and democratic governance72 (Jude and Levieuge 2013,16–17; 
Hunya and Geishecker 2005, 1), 
 functional market economy (Hunya and Geishecker 2005, 1), 
 macroeconomic stability (Görg and Greenaway 2004, 189–190; Neuhaus 2006, 151; 
Josifidis et al. 2012, 170), 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
(investing) firms are also expected to have better productivity and efficiency than domestic firms (in a host 
country) due to being superior in technology and management (Borensztein et al. 1995, 18). 
71 However, the authors also found that technological transfer from the source to the recipient country enabled 
by FDI does not imply that the latter will surely take advantage of it. This is because developing countries are 
less efficient in absorbing new technologies (De Mello 1997, 30). Developed recipient countries benefit far 
more from the transfer of technology enabled by FDI spill-overs than developing countries (Xu 2000, 491). 
72 The authors stress the quality of institutions and democratic governance as determining factors for enabling 
positive spill-overs of FDI, such as transfer of technology and improved productivity (Jude and Levieuge 2013, 
16–17). 
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 overall investment environment73 (Neuhaus 2006, 151), 
 FDI-friendly economic policies74 (Balasubramanyam et al. 1996; Fidrmuc and Martin 
2011; Acaravci and Ozturk 2012), 
 FDI incentives (Blomström and Kokko 2003; Angelopoulou and Liargovas 2014),75 
 economic openness76 (Fillat and Woerz 2011, 321–322; Angelopoulou and Liargovas 
2014, 491; Curwin and Mahutga 2014, 1170)77  and integration (Marasco 2007, 10),78 
 level of development of the financial system (Hermes and Lensink 2003, 21; 
Kotrajaras et al. 2011, 198), 
 successfulness of privatisation (Apergis et al. 2004, 11), 
 level of productivity of domestic enterprises79 (Djankov and Hoekman 2000, 61), 
 openness to trade (Kotrajaras et al. 2011, 198), 
 market size (Neuhaus 2006 ,151; Mottaleb 2007, 9–10), 
 political system and stability80 (Neuhaus 2006, 151; Josifidis et al. 2012, 170; Jude 
and Levieuge 2013, 16–17), 
 regional stability81 (Hunya and Geishecker 2005, 1; Bajo-Rubio et al. 2007, 11), 
 quality of legislation (Josifidis et al. 2012, 170), 
 quality of infrastructure (Görg and Greenaway 2004, 189–190; Mottaleb 2007, 9–10; 
Hudea and Stancu 2012, 100; Josifidis et al. 2012, 170), 
 level of corruption82 (Hunya and Geishecker 2005, 1; Kotrajaras et al. 2011, 198), 
                                                          
73 The larger the market and the better the investment-friendly environment, the more likely the foreign 
investors will come to invest (Neuhaus 2006, 151). 
74 Based on the obtained results, it is very much important for countries to devise policies that would help attract 
FDI (Acaravci and Ozturk 2012, 64) and create the investment-friendly and export-promoting business 
environment (Balasubramanyam et al. 1996, 95–96; Fidrmuc and Martin 2011, 79). In that sense, the focus 
should be on: free trade, tax incentives, human capital, financial system, market regulations and infrastructure 
(Acaravci and Ozturk 2012, 64).  
75 Angelopoulou and Liargovas (2014, 492) suggest that in order to be more successful in attracting FDI, the 
transitional countries need to provide various incentives to stimulate attraction of inward FDI, and overall 
enhance their integration with economically advanced European countries. 
76 Carkovic and Levine in Moran et al. (2005, 211) argue that economic openness is relevant but still not a 
necessary precondition for enabling positive spill-overs from FDI.  
77 Curwin and Mahutga (2014, 1170) use the term trade openness (instead of economic openness) in explaining 
its positive effect on economic growth. 
78 Marasco (2007, 10) found that the higher level of economic integration, the more likely it is that FDI will 
have a positive impact on economic growth (of a host country).  
79 Djankov and Hoekman (2000, 61) found that foreign investors rather choose to invest in firms with higher 
productivity.  
80 Possibility of outbreak of a military conflict, ethnical tensions or a notable influence of the military in politics 
are the factors that dissuade potential foreign investors from investing (Jude and Levieuge 2013, 16–17). The 
authors further argue that not all types of FDI equally response to political or economic instability (Lensink and 
Morrissey 2001, 24). For instance, FDI in manufacturing sector is more crisis-sensitive than in natural resource 
extraction sector (Lensink and Morrissey 2001, 25). 
81 The more stable the regions, the more FDI they are likely to attract (Bajo-Rubio et al. 2007, 11). 
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 investment in education (Kotrajaras et al. 2011, 198; Hudea and Stancu 2012, 100), 
 labour cost (Görg and Greenaway 2004, 189–190; Hunya and Geishecker 2005, 1; 
Neuhaus 2006, 151), 
 geographical proximity to the country of origin of FDI (Görg and Greenaway 2004, 
186), 
 domestic investment83 (Angelopoulou and Liargovas 2014, 491; Fillat and Woerz 
2011, 321–322), and 
 level of inflation (Angelopoulou and Liargovas 2014).84 
Still, Soleimani and Behname (2012, 71, 72) argue that human capital, stock capital, 
infrastructure and openness to trade are the most significant determinants of FDI.85 However, 
it needs to be noted that most studies investigating whether there is a linkage between FDI 
and economic growth point to the fact that positive effect of FDI on economic growth in 
mainly contingent on the absorptive capacity of the host countries (Farkas 2012, 4). Apart 
from the noted, it is also worth mentioning that Fillat and Woerz (2011, 321–322) found that 
the beneficial effect does not so depend on the volume of attracted FDI alone, as on which 
specific industrial sectors receive FDI. In this regard, the authors argue that FDI would give 
the best growth-enhancement effect in industries that are labour and resource intensive. 
Hence, the policy-makers should equally concentrate on creating favourable conditions for 
enhancing domestic, inasmuch as foreign investment (Fillat and Woerz 2011, 321–322). 
To conclude, the most beneficial effects of (inward) FDI are: providing new capital, raising 
employment, enabling transfer of technology, business know-how and modern management, 
improving labour force skills, and positively contributing to industrial restructuring and 
development and the overall economic restructuring. In addition, FDI has shown beneficial in 
stimulating structural policies in the host country, enabling direct access to new markets, 
improving balance of payment, enhancing internal competition and overall competitiveness, 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
82 Middle-income countries with relatively high prevalence of corruption, despite a satisfying level of financial 
development and openness to trade, will not attract as much FDI as they otherwise would (Kotrajaras et al. 
2011, 198). 
83 Angelopoulou and Liargovas (2014, 491) and Fillat and Woerz (2011, 321–322) found that domestic 
investment is positively associated with the attraction of FDI, especially in developing and the transitional 
countries. Johnson (2006, 44), Sapienza (2010, 133) and Curwin and Mahutga (2014, 1160, 1179) additionally 
found that the level of domestic investment is too positively correlated with the overall economic growth (in 
developing countries). 
84 The authors found that a decrease of inflation is also positively correlated with FDI (Angelopoulou and 
Liargovas 2014, 491). 
85 Blomström et al. (1996, 275–276) argue that apart from FDI, economic growth is also influenced by: the level 
of institutional development, overall political and economic stability, the number of population and its growth 
prospects, share of secondary school graduates in the total working-age population, and geographical distance 
between the countries. 
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and positively influencing the overall transition process. In order to attract as higher volume 
of FDI as possible, countries need to: improve the quality of institutions and overall 
democratic governance, then macroeconomic stability, overall investment environment, level 
of development of the financial system, openness to trade, political stability, quality of 
infrastructure, quality of regulatory framework, and increase incentives and investing in 
education, among other things. 
In terms of outward FDI, it was found that it has a highly positive impact on economic 
growth too (Svetlicic 2007, 80; Jaklič 2011, 6). Outward FDI has produced a strong 
beneficial effect on industrial restructuring86 (Jaklič 2011, 6), helped enhance domestic 
competitiveness, diversify product line-up and generate employment both at home as well as 
in the host country (Svetlicic 2007, 80).87 
3.6 Emerging markets and economic growth 
3.6.1 Introductory notes 
In this chapter will be presented the origin of the term – emerging market(s), and then the 
importance of emerging markets primarily from the perspective of their fast growing 
economies, rising global role, and most importantly business opportunities they offer, many 
of which being vast markets, with huge populations whose purchasing power is on a constant 
rise, and looking for lucrative investment opportunities abroad. Rising attention about them 
(both in academia and in world of business) in the sense of what they offer and mean in 
business terms mainly coincided with the emergence of the 2007/’08 world economic and 
financial crisis, when many demonstrated surprisingly strong resilience to the crisis, what has 
become equally important both for developing and high-income countries too, especially 
amid global shrinkage of economic activity and the related fallen demand for export goods, 
and decreased inflow of foreign investment too.88 Since in the available literature although 
the term emerging market(s) is generally accepted and most commonly used, other terms are 
in use too, such as emerging economies or countries; so in this research all these terms will be 
used interchangeably, despite referring to the same thing. 
  
                                                          
86 In case of Slovenia, of both large firms and SMEs alike (Jaklič 2011, 6). 
87 Also in terms of Slovenia. 
88 A detailed elaboration on Russia, Turkey and China, as relevant emerging markets for this research will be 
given in the empirical part of the dissertation. 
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3.6.2 On emerging markets, their attractiveness and growing global importance 
The term “emerging market” was initially coined at the end of the 1980s by Antoine van 
Agtmeal, a World Bank economist (Cavusgil et al. 2013, 3). He argued that what 
differentiates emerging from all developing countries in general is striving of the first to 
reach and sustain the level of development of the high-income countries (Cavusgil et al. 
2013, 5). Similar reasoning is also shared by Cavusgil et al. (2013, 5) who define emerging 
economies as “countries which are in a transition phase from developing to developed 
markets due to rapid growth and industrialization.” They further note that what characterises 
emerging economies is primarily their resoluteness to conduct economic reform and achieve 
sustainable economic growth, decrease poverty, develop and improve infrastructure,89 as well 
as to foster international economic integration (Cavusgil et al. 2013, 5). 
In terms of what countries/markets can be classified as emerging, opinion on that generally 
differs among authors (Czinkota et al. 2011, 258). In Table 3.1 below is given illustration of 
various authors/sources’ comprehension as to what countries are regarded (as) emerging 
markets. 
Table 3.1: Comprehension of various authors/sources as to what countries are regarded (as) emerging markets 
Garten 1997 
Czinkota, 
Ronkainen 
and Moffett 
2011 
IMF 2015 MSCI 
FTSE Russell  
Advanced Secondary 
Argentina Argentina Argentina Brazil Brazil Chile 
Brazil Brazil Bangladesh Chile 
Czech 
Republic China 
China China Brazil China Greece Colombia 
India India Bulgaria Colombia Hungary Egypt 
Indonesia Indonesia Chile Czech R. Malaysia India 
Mexico   China Egypt Mexico Indonesia 
Poland   Colombia Greece Poland Pakistan 
SAR   Hungary Hungary SAR Peru 
South Korea   India India Taiwan Phillipines 
Turkey   Indonesia Indonesia Thailand Qatar 
    Malaysia Korea Turkey Russia 
    Mexico Malaysia   UAE 
    Pakistan Mexico     
    Peru Peru     
                                                          
89 Poor infrastructure in the emerging markets is regarded an impediment to business development (Czinkota et 
al. 2011, 265). In addition, other areas that need to be arranged in terms of creating better business environment 
in the emerging markets are: intellectual property rights, bureaucracy and distribution channels (Khanna and 
Palepu 2010, 5), among others. 
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    Philippines Philippines     
    Poland Poland     
    Romania Qatar     
    Russia Russia     
    SAR SAR     
    Thailand Taiwan     
    Turkey Thailand     
    Ukraine Turkey     
    Venezuela UAE     
Source: Garten (1997, 3); Czinkota et al. (2011, 258); International Monetary Fund (2015, 149–151); Morgan 
Stanley Capital International 
Note 1: SAR stands for South African Republic 
Note 2: UAE stands for United Arab Emirates 
One of first classifications was given by Garten (1997, 3), who in 1997 classified the 
following ten as big emerging economies: Mexico, Brazil, Argentina, South African 
Republic, Poland, Turkey, India, Indonesia, China, and South Korea. Another classification 
was offered by Czinkota et al. (2011, 258), who (at the time) classified China, India, Brazil, 
Argentina, and Indonesia as large emerging countries.90 Furthermore, the International 
Monetary Fund’s list encompasses the following twenty-three countries/economies as 
emerging: Argentina, Bangladesh, Brazil, Bulgaria, Chile, China, Colombia, Hungary, India, 
Indonesia, Malaysia, Mexico, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Romania, Russia, South 
Africa, Thailand, Turkey, Ukraine, and Venezuela (International Monetary Fund 2015). 
Likewise, Morgan Stanley Capital International (MSCI) list also includes twenty-three: In 
Americas: Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, and Peru; In Europe and the Middle East: Czech 
Republic, Egypt, Greece, Hungary, Poland, Qatar, Russia, South Africa, Turkey, and United 
Arab Emirates; In Asia: China, India, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Philippines, Taiwan and 
Thailand (MSCI). On the other side, FTSE Russell list distinguishes between advanced 
emerging markets (Brazil, Czech Republic, Greece, Hungary, Malaysia, Mexico, Poland, 
South Africa, Taiwan, Thailand, and Turkey) and secondary emerging markets (Chile, China, 
Colombia, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Qatar, Russia, and United 
Arab Emirates) (FTSE Annual Country Classification Review 2016). 
[Over time and especially in years following the 2007/’08 world economic and financial 
crisis], the emerging markets have become very attractive in terms of doing business (Khanna 
and Palepu 2010, 1; Cavusgil et al. 2013, 1). Number of enterprises [of which vast majority is 
                                                          
90 They also note that Russia, as well as other countries of the former Soviet bloc are often regarded as 
transitional, implying they are in transition from being centrally planned to becoming market economies 
(Czinkota et al. 2011, 258). However, the authors do not specify whether the countries they mark as 
„transitional“ are at the same time regarded as „emerging“ or not. 
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Western] which are orienting towards the emerging markets in quest for new business 
(Czinkota et al. 2011, 258) and investment opportunities alike is constantly increasing 
(Ciravegna et al. (2014, 1). Especially attractive are those (emerging markets) which have 
large populations whose purchasing power is constantly increasing, such as China, Russia, 
India, Brazil and Indonesia, and those with good business prospects overall (Czinkota et al. 
2011, 258). It is estimated that more than 20,000 companies from all over the world are 
involved in doing business in/with the emerging economies/markets (Eyring et al. 2011, 1). 
Famous global companies such as Nestlé, McDonald’s and General Electric are just some of 
many which managed to spread out their business network by exploiting great consumer 
potential in the emerging markets (Ciravegna et al. 2014, 2). [It is widely regarded] that doing 
business in/with the emerging economies is likely to positively affect enterprise 
competitiveness (Gupta and Wang in Gupta et al. 2012, 3).  
Likewise, emerging countries are increasingly investing abroad (Ciravegna et al. 2014, 2), 
especially Brazil, China, India and Russia (Globerman and Shapiro in Sauvant 2008, 229),91 
in that way stimulating global economic activity. Large Western automobile manufacturers 
such as Volvo and Land Rover still exist today largely thanks to the investors from the 
emerging countries/markets (Ciravegna et al. 2014, 2). In line with that, it is also worth 
noting the acquisition of American IT company IBM by Chinese Lenovo in 2004, and of the 
UK’s famous automobile brands Jaguar and Land Rover by Indian Tata Motors in 2008 
(Khanna and Palepu 2010, 5). By insight into the available literature, it was found that the 
following factors determine successfulness of internationalisation of the emerging markets 
multinational companies: 
 managerial ability (Kotabe and Kothari 2016; Luo and Zhang 2016; Luo and Tung 
2018), 
 outward FDI strategy (Luo and Zhang 2016), 
 quality of human resources (Luo and Zhang 2016; Luo and Tung 2018), 
 marketing (Luo and Zhang 2016), 
 quality of institutions (Gaur et al. 2014, Li and Oh 2016, Luo and Zhang 2016; 
Buckley and Tian 2017), 
 ability to be innovative (Kumar et al. 2013; Kotabe and Kothari 2016, Buckley and 
Tian 2017), 
                                                          
91 Many researches made disclosed a positive causality between outward FDI and economic growth of the 
investing country (Globerman and Shapiro in Sauvant 2008, 229). 
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 ability to overcome cultural differences (Luo and Zhang 2016; Luo and Tung 2018), 
 choice of location (Hernandez and Guillén 2018), 
 market entry modes (Hernandez and Guillén 2018), 
 pace of international expansion (Hernandez and Guillén 2018), and 
 ability to take advantage of available assistance of the home country's institutions 
(Gaur et al. 2014). 
Cavusgil et al. (2013, 2–3) argue that businesswise advantageous characteristics of the 
emerging economies/markets are the following: (1) large populations (more than two-thirds 
of the world’s total population live in the emerging countries), (2) rapid GDP growth that is 
generally higher than that of developed countries, (3) increasing purchasing power of the 
population, (4) low-cost work force, (5) intense investment in transport and communication 
infrastructure, (6) simplified legal framework for business and inward FDI-friendly business 
environment, (7) growing number of highly educated professionals, many of whom obtained 
education abroad and possess knowledge of foreign languages, (8) access to sophisticated 
technology and contemporary management, and (9) manageable risk. Overall, both developed 
and emerging economies benefit from their mutual cooperation (Khanna and Palepu 2010, 8). 
The latter primarily benefit from the inflow of FDI (from the first), what is likely to result in 
the increase of export and indirectly economic growth, whereas the main benefit of the first 
lies in fostering and expansion of business and trade internationally (Czinkota et al. 2011, 
257–258). 
There is a general consensus that in the coming years the centre of gravity in economic terms 
will shift from developed (on)to the emerging countries/markets (Gupta and Wang in Gupta 
et al. 2012, 3), and that the latter will be the main drivers of global economic growth (Garten 
1997, 3; Khanna and Palepu 2010, 1; Kose and Prasad 2010, xiii, 1; Cavusgil et al. 2013, 1; 
Ciravegna et al. 2014, 1), especially those from Asia (Gupta and Wang in Gupta et al. 2012, 
3). This is largely so because of a deteriorating global influence of, so to say, “old” industrial 
countries such as the United Kingdom, France and Italy, while at the same time the emerging 
economies’ stature on the world stage is growing (Ciravegna et al. 2014, 2).92 Facts that go in 
favour of an argument like this is that in the period 2008–2013 [which, by the way, coincides 
with the world economic crisis] the emerging economies have contributed to 80 % of global 
                                                          
92 It is especially the BRIICS emerging economies (Brazil, Russia, India, Indonesia and China) which have 
gained in prominence on the global stage and in negotiations at international trade organisations such as the 
WTO (Reyes et al. in OECD 2008, 13). 
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economic growth and global foreign monetary reserves as well (Ciravegna et al. 2014, 2). 
Hence a widespread belief that emerging markets will have a particularly important say when 
it comes to global financial issues (Czinkota et al. 2011, 644). Even prior to the eruption of 
the 2007/’08 world economic and financial crisis, many were firm in their belief that 
emerging economies would buffer well consequences of potential economic disturbances 
originating in the developed countries (Kose and Prasad 2010, xiii). When the crisis indeed 
happened, many companies from high-income countries started to increasingly orient towards 
the emerging markets, looking for business opportunities (Ciravegna et al. 2014, 9), as 
forecasts that emerging economies would prove more resilient to the effects of the crisis than 
developed countries turned out to be true (Kose and Prasad 2010, 4). Some authors like 
Khanna and Palepu (2010, 5) argue that the 2007/’08 global economic crisis only speeded up 
the rise of new emerging economies as new dominant players in the world economy. 
According to the Economist magazine, many Western companies predict that in the coming 
years 70 % of their growth will be made thanks to spreading out business into the emerging 
markets (Eyring, Johnson and Nair in Harvard Business Review 2011, 1). [Needless to say 
that in carrying out their business endeavours they will actively exploit (advantages of) 
commercial diplomacy services]. In this way the emerging markets are helping expedite 
globalisation (Kose and Prasad 2010, 1), which (meaning globalisation) reversely is being 
contributing to gradual elimination of barriers to trade and investment (Khanna and Palepu 
2010, 3). 
In addition, in light of current globalisation pushback and trade war between the United 
States and China, the relationship between the emerging economies, on one side, and the 
United States alone and other developed countries, on the other, and between the emerging 
economies themselves, will shape new trends in global economy and certainly bring about 
new balance of power and change in policy priorities. From the perspective of a researcher, it 
remains to be seen how big those changes will be both for emerging, i.e. developing and 
developed countries, and how large impact they will produce. 
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4 Serbia in transition – obstacles and challenges  
4.1 Introductory notes  
In this chapter will be outlined main obstacles and challenges that Serbia has been facing 
during its transition into a stable democracy and a functional market economy.93 Special 
emphasis will be on examining whether Serbia is overly contingent, and hence exposed to 
high risk in times of economic crises, on the markets of EU and CEFTA, both in terms of 
export and investment.  
The first part of the chapter will cover the period of the 1990s. Initially will be described the 
events and state of affairs which preceded Milošević's coming into power, then his 
authoritarian rule throughout the entire decade (1990–2000) during which he managed to 
maintain power mainly by resorting to intimidation, manipulation and electoral fraud, as well 
as consequences of international sanctions imposed on Serbia yet in the early 1990s, with 
emphasis on raging inflation, at that time being the 2nd largest in economic history. Attempts 
of curbing the (hyper)inflation and setting the basis for privatisation after the Avramović's 
programme, then Kosovo crisis followed by NATO bombing, as well as social stratification 
and break up of truncated Yugoslavia, are the topics that will be touched upon too.  
The second part will deal with the core of the issue in relation to the research. It starts with a 
short reminder of the October 5th (2000) revolution which designated Milošević's final fall, 
touches upon normalisation of relations with the EU, then focuses on main economic 
obstacles and issues. Special emphasis is put on testing whether and to what degree Serbia is 
really contingent on the EU and CEFTA markets in terms of export and investment, both 
inward and outward. All that will help explain the factors which impeded Serbia's 
internationalisation.     
4.2 The period of the 1990s 
4.2.1 Milošević's coming/rise (in)to power 
Djilas (1993, 81) described Milošević as of limited intellectual capacities and eloquence, 
whose politics was primarily based on fear and oratory dominated by belligerent tone and 
“ritual formulas”. The “banality triumphant” as the author otherwise dubbed [the tyrant] also 
                                                          
93 In essence, transition in economic terms implies a complete change of economic system from centrally-
planned, state-owned to market economy, with guaranteed rights to private ownership (Cerović 2012, 27). Main 
objectives that countries in transition are expected to do are: (1) macroeconomic stabilisation, (2) establishment 
of institutional framework for normal functioning of the market economy, (3) restructuring of enterprises and 
firms, (4) liberalisation and deregulation (Cerović 2012, 40). Transitional countries generally have problems 
with curbing large budget deficit due to inherited policy from the socialist times of giving substantial subsidies 
to enterprises (Cerović 2012, 37). 
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noted that his (meaning of Milošević) collection of speeches and interviews published yet in 
1989 [prior to the onset of a series of tragic events in the former Yugoslavia] is strongly 
reminiscent of the so-called Red Book of the former China’s leader Mao Zedong, in terms of 
arrogance, simplicity and relativisation [shallowness in other words] being expressed 
(Stojiljković 2011, 44). [In the manner of a typical dictator Milošević resorted to populist 
nationalistic rhetoric to amass broad public support, what will eventually bring him into 
power a few years later]. Paving his road to power, in September 1990, only a few months 
before first democratic multi-party elections, Milošević found way to purposely bypass the 
opposition by adopting a new constitution of Serbia (Antonić in Goati 1995, 27). [Taking 
advantage of the momentum of dissolution of the former Yugoslavia and awoken 
ethnocentric sentiments, diligently orchestrated and purposely fueled nationalistic hysteria] in 
the early 1990s enabled Milošević victory at literally all levels (federal, republic and local) 
and consolidation of absolute power across the entire truncated new country.94 The then 
opposition stayed mainly fragmented (Antonić in Goati 1995, 34) and disunited (Uvalić 2012, 
67), what only went in favour of Milošević to boost his power even more.95 [Hoping to gain 
broad public support and, so to say, legitimise the autocratic regime] Milošević went on to 
position some of the most imminent Serbian intellectuals and businessmen at the time, like 
Dobrica Ćosić, a famous writer, who became the first President of the truncated FR 
Yugoslavia,96 and Milan Panić, a businessman, who became the new federal prime minister. 
However, when both Ćosić and Panić showed open discord with Milošević's politics, not 
much time passed until they were forced to resign (Thomas 1999, 123, 130; Uvalić 2012, 68). 
The generally known tragic sequence of events that consequently followed brought about 
growing massive country-wide pauperisation and injustice that the regime was responsible 
for. In 1996–1997 public demonstrations broke out which lasted exactly 100 days. It 
happened several times that Milošević resorted to force to disperse the protests (Uvalić 2012, 
97–98). [In all his brutality], Milošević did not hesitate to apply hard force (by sending police 
and military forces on protesting people) in order to curb the demonstrations (Uvalić 2012, 
67). Moreover, his regime liquidated those political opponents who were regarded (as) a 
                                                          
94 Milošević came to power in December 1990 when the Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS) won the elections. He 
was effectively in power from 1990 to 2000. A detailed description of his rise to power was given by Doder and 
Branson (1999) and Gordy (1999) who also elaborated the culture of power in Serbia, then Morus (2007) who 
also wrote about his nationalist rhetoric, Vladisavljevic (2004), et al. In addition, Silber (1996) wrote about 
Milošević’s politics and the role he played during the construction of the Dayton Peace Agreement in 1995. 
95 In further consolidation of Milošević's power actively took part his wife Mirjana Marković, who in 1994 
established a new political party „JUL“, whose narrowest leadership was composed of immensely wealthy 
plutocrats, who developed a „client-patron relationship“ with the political authorities (Thomas 1999, 230). 
96 The Constitution of the (truncated) FR Yugoslavia was adopted on 27 April 1992. 
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threat to the regime, including even very members of the regime who were believed to be 
disobedient (Babić in Zucconi 2000). The scope of crime and general injustice was so 
prevalent in the country that people generally became indifferent to it (Dinkić 1995, 249–
250). After two mandates of being President of Serbia, in 1997 Milošević was elected as 
President of the FR Yugoslavia.97 
4.2.2 Imposition of sanctions on FR Yugoslavia by the international community  
In 1992 and 1993, due to being accused for taking part in the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
the United Nations (Security Council) voted for imposition of economic sanctions on the FR 
Yugoslavia that were expanded, i.e. broadened several times.98 The sanctions made that 
international land, air99 and water (trade) transport across the territory of the FR Yugoslavia 
be banned and financial assets in banks and companies abroad frozen. Even payment of 
foreign pensions was stalled (Uvalić 2012, 71–73). Membership of the country in main 
international organisations, such as the United Nations, International Monetary Fund, World 
Bank, Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (forerunner of the OSCE – 
Organisation on Security and Cooperation in Europe), and the General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade (forerunner of the World Trade Organisation) was either frozen or ended. In 
November 1991 the European Community suspended the trade preferential agreement it 
concluded with the former Yugoslavia yet in 1980100 (Uvalić 2012, 72). The country was also 
excluded from the EU-funded PHARE programme of financial assistance aimed for 
development in transition of the post-communist countries of Central and Eastern Europe 
(Uvalić 2012, 281). Autonomous trade measures granted to the Western Balkans did not 
apply for the FR Yugoslavia, the only exception being aluminum – Montenegro's main export 
product (Uvalić 2012, 162).101 
                                                          
97 Prior to running for the President of FR Yugoslavia Milošević changed the electoral law so that it enable his 
victory more easily (Thomas 1999, 275). 
98 By Resolutions 752 and 757, and subsequently by Resolution 777 from September 1992, Resolution 787 from 
November 1992, and Resolution 820 from April 1993. Scharf and Dorosin (1993, 825–826) argued that the case 
of Yugoslavia, i.e. its UN-based Sanctions Committee was one in a row which served to be shown that the 
United Nations Sanctions Committees (generally) have an influential role in defining and interpreting sanctions 
resolutions. 
99 The Belgrade international airport was closed for almost three years (Uvalić 2012, 21–22). 
100 While the sanctions were in force, the FR Yugoslavia did receive humanitarian aid aimed for the refugees 
from Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia (about 500,000 of them) and internally displaced persons from 
Kosovo (about 200,000 of them). The European Union approved limited funds for the local communities where 
democratic opposition was in power under the energy- and education-related projects (Uvalić 2012, 108). 
101 By this act the EU rewarded Montenegro for voting against the Milošević's regime in the 1997 elections 
(Uvalić 2012, 162). 
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4.2.3 Emergence of hyperinflation 
Since under sanctions the country did not have access to external sources of financing, it 
resorted to uncontrolled money emmission to neutralise budgetary deficit, what only led to 
inflation, which resultantly further decreased state revenues, what again required further 
(monetary) emmission, opening the vicious circle102 (Uvalić 2012, 77). In line with this 
reasoning, Petrović et al. (1999, 335, 350) argues that the Yugoslav hyperinflation happened 
as a consequence of excessive money supply/growth to cover various deficits which occurred 
amid various processes related to dissolution of the former country. Increased money supply 
and currency/exchange rate depreciation [between 1991 and 1993/4]  resulted in inflation 
which eventually turned into one of the highest and longest hyperinflations ever recorded 
(also in Petrović and Vujošević 1996103).  In combination with stagnation it turned into 
hyperstagflation, at that time being the second largest and longest in duration ever recorded in 
economic history104 (Petrović et al. 1999). In 1991 a monthly inflation rate was about 10 %; 
in early 1992 it surpassed 50 %; in 1993 in increased from 200 % in the first months to 
180,000 % in December, reaching the record high of 313,000,000 % in January 1994. 
(Petrović in Crnobrnja and Papić 1996, 174). Hyperinflation devalued citizens' savings (in 
dinar) and caused that domestic currency generally ceased to be used as means of payment. 
The then German mark (DEM) had become the predominantly used currency in the country. 
Black exchange market flourished105 (Uvalić 2012, 80).  
It (meaning hyperinflation) was finally put under control by the stabilisation programme in 
January 1994 (the so-called „24 January programme“), devised by Dragoslav Avramović, 
which stopped further emmission of the old dinar. One of the most laudable programme 
measures was creation of the „superdinar“, with the new exchange rate of 1 dinar = 1 DEM106 
(Avramović 1995). The programme was successful in the short-term. Hyperinflation started 
to decrease, as did fall of industrial production (Avramović 1995, 9). Only three months after 
the programme was launched, the country's foreign reserves increased to 600 million DEM 
                                                          
102 This is known as the Olivera-Tanzi effect (Uvalić 2012, 77).  
103 Petrović and Vujošević (1996) also elaborated on monetary dynamics during the time of hyperinflation, as 
well as did Petrović and Mladenović (2000) who investigated money demand and exchange rate determination. 
104 The largest hyperinflation was in Hungary in 1945–1946. In 2008 hyperinflation in Zimbabwe reached a new 
record high, having officially become the largest ever (Petrović et al 1999).  
105 Dinkić (1995, 82–83) even argues that as people lost trust in banks and authorities in general yet in the early 
1990s, in order to get into possession of the citizens' home-kept foreign savings, the state purposely resorted to 
uncontrolled emmission of money to get the citizens' savings in dinar devalued, whereby forcing them to 
exchange their foreign currency reserves for dinars at the black market.  
106 The new exchange rate was backed by 350 million DEM worth foreign reserves and the Currency Board 
(Avramović 1995). The old dinars remained in circulation simply because there was not enough foreign 
currency available at the exchange market for exchange of the old dinars (Uvalić 2012, 83). 
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(Uvalić 2012, 84). However, positive effects of the stabilisation programme did not last long, 
as the pace of monetary emmission and hence the volume of money in circulation exceeded 
the volume of stocked foreign currency reserves it could be backed with, and the Currency 
Board was disolved too (Uvalić 2012, 84; Petrović in Crnobrnja and Papić 1996). So, less 
than three years since the former Yugoslav Prime Minister Ante Marković brought his 
stabilisation programme, which, among other things, made that the exchange rate of dinar 
relative to German mark be 1 to 7 (1 DEM = 7 dinars), dinar depreciated so that 1 DEM 
could be exchanged for 1200 dinars (or in percentages, depreciation of dinar was 99,4 %) 
(Uvalić 1993). 
4.2.4 Emergence of a new class of „war entrepreneurs“  
Throughout the course of the 1990s a whole new class of immensely wealthy entrepreneurs 
emerged. This new, quasi economic elite, predominantly composed of directors of large 
public companies and banks, got immensely wealthy especially during early privatisation 
(Bošnjak 2005, 146–147), primarily thanks to close relations with the regime, which gave 
it/them monopoly status in trading with abroad through illegal channels in return for part of 
acquired wealth (Miljković and Hoare in Ramet and Pavlaković 2005, 195, 196; Pavlaković 
in Ramet and Pavlaković 2005, 22; Mladenovic 2014, 11–12). They were generally called 
„war profiteers“ (Babić in Zucconi 2000). It is worth noting that about two-thirds of this new 
economic elite came from the top of the former socialist/communist nomenclature (Lazić 
2011, 131; Mladenovic 2014,11–12). 
[Another way by which a tiny minority connected with the regime got extremely rich was by 
means of establishing (quasi) private banks which in times of raging hyperinflation offered 
unrealistically high interest rates to frivolous and uninformed citizens. The most conspicuous 
examples of those are Karić Bank, Jugoskandik Bank and Dafiment Bank.] In 1991 a newly 
established Karić Bank started selling securities with maturity term of 30 days, at the annual 
interest rate of 45 %. Despite raging inflation, many frivilous citizens bought the securities 
(in dinars) and soon after lost the invested money, as inflation grew at the rate much higher 
than the interest rate, while the bank [by exchanging dinars for foreign currency] got the 
profit (Dinkić 1995, 70–73). In early 1991 Jezdimir Vasiljević established Jugoskandik bank 
offering a 10 % monthly interest rate on foreign currency savings (Dinkić 1995, 31). In late 
1991 Dafina Milanović established Dafiment bank offering monthly interest rate for dinar 
savings in the amount of 100–120 % and 15–17 % for savings in foreign currency. The bank 
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was closed a few months after and a large number of frivilous citizens got deprived of their 
savings (Dinkić 1995). 
There are credible indications to believe that the establishment of these banks was purposely 
orchestrated by the state authorities with the aim to dispossess the people of their remaining 
foreign currency savings (Miljković and Hoare in Ramet and Pavlaković 2005, 197), the 
country was desperately in need of. 
4.2.5 Abolition of the sanctions and normalisation of relations with the EU  
Following signing of the Dayton Peace Agreement, which ended the civil war in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, the UN Security Council107 brought about partial abolishion of the sanctions, 
conditioned on respect for the agreement. Final abolishment of all sanctions eventually 
happened on 1 October 1996.108 Overall, the country was under sanctions from 30 May 1992 
to 1 October 1996 (Uvalić 2012 ,73). However, given that some countries like the United 
States were still unwilling to normalise relations with the FR Yugoslavia entirely because of 
still unsolved succession issue with other former Yugoslav republics, now independent states, 
despite official removal of the sanctions by the UN, the so-called „external wall“ still 
remained in force, meaning that Serbia was banned access to main international (financial) 
organisations109 (Uvalić 2012, 73–74). 
The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) was the first financial 
institution that allowed the FR Yugoslavia to enter into its membership110 (Uvalić 2012, 175). 
In November 2000, on the occasion of a visit of the then President of the European 
Commission Romano Prodi to Belgrade, a framework agreement between the FR Yugoslavia 
and the EU was signed, which served as the basis for further relations between the two 
parties. The country was eventually granted a trade preferential status, and in 2001 was 
officially included in the Stabilisation and Association Process (Uvalić 2012, 175–176).111 
                                                          
107 By Resolution 1022. 
108 When the UN (Security Council) passed the Resolution 1027. 
109 Removal of the „external wall“ was conditioned by getting the succession issue solved, respect for the 
Dayton Peace Agreement which brought peace to Bosnia and Herzegovina, and cooperation with the 
International Criminal Tribunal for War Crimes in the Hague, the Netherlands (Uvalić 2012, 73–74). 
110 Membership was accepted in December 2000 and came into force in January 2001, followed by the 
membership approval by the International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Bank and the European Investment 
Bank (EIB) soon after (Uvalić 2012, 175). 
111 EU integration of Serbia is described in detail in Ristić (2009), Andrejevic and Vucenov (2011), Beraha et al. 
in Radović-Marković et al. (2011), Redžepagić and Đukić in Teixeira et al. (2012), Uvalić (2012, 281–316), 
Stahl (2013), etc.  
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4.2.6 Consequences of the sanctions  
The sanctions of the United Nations and the European Union that remained in force 
throughout most of the 1990s brought about complete isolation of the country, what only 
further undermined the process of democratisation, particularly institutional building. The 
country was prohibited from taking part in financial assistance programmes of the EU (unlike 
other European former communist countries which were granted preferential access to a large 
EU market, and took advantage of other numerous privileges under the Association 
Agreements which the EU concluded with them yet in the early phase of their European 
integration process) and other international financial institutions and organisations, such as 
the World Bank and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) 
(Uvalić 2012, 22). The sanctions were not only detrimental for trade flows, but they also 
brought down to zero the volume of inward foreign investment (Uvalić 2012, 21). 
Consequently, whole export industries were destroyed, prohibition to get into possession of 
spare machine parts from abroad made industrial modernisation impossible, amid which 
output goods became obsolete and uncompetitive (Uvalić 2005; Cerović 2012, 504). 
Domestic revenues decreased rapidly, being additionally depreciated by raging inflation 
(Uvalić 2012, 76–77). In addition, ordinary citizens of the FR Yugoslavia (what was not the 
case with the countries of Central and Eastern Europe), could not travel abroad freely due to 
highly restrictive visa regime introduced yet in late 1991 (Uvalić 2012, 21). Isolation they 
were exposed to left a deep imprint on the way they perceived the country and the outside 
world. They were constantly exposed to selective information by the controlled media 
purposely geared at heating up strong nationalistic feelings in people. Instead of celebrating 
freedom and openess to the outside world like did people in other former communist 
countries of Central and Eastern Europe, people in Serbia were kept in poverty and isolation, 
what had a particularly detrimental impact on young generations (Miljković and Hoare in 
Ramet and Pavlaković 2005, 194). 
To conclude, the events during the course of the 1990s resulted in deep social stratification in 
Serbia. Society was divided between a small number of immensely wealthy quasi-elite, on 
one side, and large masses of  impoverished people, on the other (Uvalić 2012, 127). The 
middle class almost disappeared (Filipović 2012, 146–147). At the end of 1999 63 % of total 
population was considered poor112 (Economist Intelligence Unit 2000). To massive 
pauperisation of the people also contributed the fact that yet in early 1991 the federal 
                                                          
112 Those with per capita monthly income of 60 USD or less are considered poor. 
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government opted for freezing the citizens' savings in banks deposited in foreign currency, 
estimated to be worth about 8,7 billion USD, under the excuse of deficiency of foreign 
reserves (Dinkić 1995, 70). Having been deprived of their own banking deposits, the citizens 
had difficulties to repossess their money for the next decade or so (Uvalić 2012, 92). Overall, 
during the 1990s about 600,000 people immigrated in pursuit for a better life abroad (among 
whom about 30,000 highly educated) (Miljković and Hoare in Ramet and Pavlaković 2005, 
194). 
4.2.7 Avramović's reform and privatisation programme 
 [Having become aware of unsustainability of the regime-led economic policy, which if 
continued would lead to annihilation of the entire economic system of the FR Yugoslavia], in 
November 1995 the then governor of the National Bank of the FR Yugoslavia Dragoslav 
Avramović113 put forward a proposal of economic measures based on market liberalisation, 
return to convertible dinar and new privatisation solutions, aimed at enhancing 
competitiveness and economic recovery (Uvalić 2012, 89). In terms of a proposed federal law 
on privatisation Avramović envisioned that all state-owned enterprises in the country be 
privatisated114 (Uvalić 2012, 113). [Unfortunately and expectedly, as selfish political interests 
of the regime prevalied over professional expertise], the proposed measures came to strong 
disagreement by the government authorities, amid what Avramović had to resign in May 
1996 (Uvalić 2012, 89). Before resignation, on 14–15 May 1996, Avramović held a speech in 
the Parliament whereat he pointed out that unless strict recovery-driven measures are 
immediatelly taken, Serbia would soon become a new Angola in terms of economic 
backwardness and living standard. He also called on some of highly ranked politicians for 
their myopia and lack of competence, and told about being manipulated with115 (Uvalić 2012, 
115–116).116 
                                                          
113 In his influential book, Avramović (1995) himself wrote about reconstruction of the monetary system and 
economic recovery of the FR Yugoslavia. 
114 Avramović proposed that new privatisation be based on the following: ¼ of a state company would belong to 
the employees of that company, ¼ would be owned by the state pension fund, ¼ would be given to all adult 
citizens, and ¼ would be put on sale (Cerović 2012, 339). For comparison, it is worth noting that the Serbia's 
(new) privatisation law adopted in 1991 provided that workers in public enterprises and firms be offered a 
possibility of purchasing ownership shares. The law itself was deemed more restrictive than the law adopted at 
the time of the Marković government, prior to dissolution of the former country (Uvalić 2012, 86). 
115 He said that his signatures were falsified, delivered letters were kept hidden from him, as did large bonuses 
(in foreign currency) that were paid out to external cooperatives without his knowledge (Uvalić 2012, 115–116). 
116 Mladjan Dinkić, a former renowned Serbian politician argues that probably the primary reason for removal 
of Avramović from position lies in the fact that he disclosed to the public that in the early 1990s (1992 and 
1993) the Government of the FR Yugoslavia bought treasury (debt) securities of Croatia and Slovenia for 530 
million USD, what largely discredited the then authorities (TOL 1996). 
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After Avramović resigned, the federal Parliament passed a new privatisation law (in 1997), 
which made that enterprises could freely decide whether to get privatised or not117 (Uvalić 
2012, 116). The new law was vague in terms of ownership structure of public companies. It 
provided that decision on privatisation (in/of public companies) could only be brought by the 
employees of a particular company, not (by) the state, as the employees were their 
(companies') actual owners, being in charge of corporate management and having property 
rights too. But in reality they could not sell their (property) share or dispose of revenues in 
case the company was sold off (revenues went into the state budget). Hence, it remained 
uncertain who had rights over public property – the state, companies themselves, or the 
employees, as neither of them had entire control over it (Uvalić 2012, 124–125). 
4.2.8 Kosovo crisis and NATO bombing  
In 1996 the Albanian leadership of Kosovo formed the Liberation Army of Kosovo (OVK) 
which soon after started attacks on the Serbian security forces and the civilians.118 In early 
1998 the Serbian security forces launched the offensive against the OVK. Following failed 
talks on the Kosovo issue in Rambouillet, France, in 1999, NATO launched military air 
campaign against Serbian military and police forces across Serbia and in Kosovo which 
lasted 11 weeks119 (Uvalić 2012, 20). The NATO military campaign against Serbia was the 
first sustained use of force by the Alliance in its 50 years of existence. Likewise, it happened 
for the first time that a military intervention against a third state was carried out without the 
approval by the United Nations Security Council (Roberts 1999, 102).120 Wedgwood (1999, 
828) claims that the Kosovo crisis in the context of decision-making in the United Nations 
(especially intervening for alleged humanitarian reasons) only disclosed full deficiencies of 
the system with regard to legal procedures. Radojičić (1999), who wrote about legal and 
                                                          
117 In an interview that the author (Uvalić) did with Avramović, he (Avramović) told that he withdrew from 
politics because of being deeply disappointed with how he was treated by the authorities (Uvalić 2012, 97). 
118 The actual origins of the Kosovo crisis could be said to date back to the beginning of 1989 when Milošević 
abolished the province autonomy, followed by the miners’ protests in Trepča mine, what resulted in widespread 
outrage among resident majority Albanians. 
119 NATO military campaign against FR Yugoslavia decreased public support for joining the alliance (NATO), 
but also the EU too (Stojiljković 2011, 71). In addition, in this context it is worth noting that recognition of 
independence of Kosovo in 2008 by majority of the world's leading countries only revived the negative feelings 
of injustice and frustration in people (Stojiljković 2011, 69). When the Serbian forces withrew from Kosovo, the 
majority Albanians took revenge against the Kosovo Serbs (Uvalić 2012, 100). Ethnic tensions between the 
Serbs and the Albanians in Kosovo which occasionally erupted in  physical violance have continued to burden 
relations between the two peoples ever since. 
120 With reference to the (air military) campaign, Collon (2007) is only one of a number of authors who wrote 
about the „real“ reasons of NATO military intervention against Serbia in the context of inability to solve the 
Kosovo issue in a peaceful manner. The author generally argues that the primary reason behind the intervention 
was profit-based, and that humanitarianism was wisely taken to serve as an excuse for intervention and to get 
broad public support for it (in the West).  
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ethical aspects of NATO intervention against the FR Yugoslavia, argues that the NATO 
aggression against a sovereign state meant violation of main principles of legality and ethics, 
and reflected selfish interests primarily of American foreign policy (Radojičić 1999, 156–
157).121 
As a response to what they perceived as disobedience, the international community led by 
leading Western countries imposed political and economic sanctions on the FR Yugoslavia 
again122 (Uvalić 2012, 20). Furthermore, when the European Union launched the Process of 
Stabilisation and Association in 1999 [as an official EU platform for the Western Balkans 
region], the FR Yugoslavia was left out, as it was on the occasion of the signing of the 
Stability Pact for South-Eastern Europe in Cologne, Germany, in June 1999. When the 
NATO military campaign in Kosovo ended, it was decided that the sanctions would remain in 
force until Milošević is in power (Uvalić 2012, 107–108). 
[The happening in relation to NATO's bombing of the building of the Serbian public 
broadcasting service (on 23 April 1999) disclosed all brutality of the Milošević's regime]. It 
was subsequently revealed that the company management was told that the building would be 
bombed, the information they kept hidden from the employees, so that casualties could serve 
for the purpose of launching even stronger anti-Western propaganda (Uvalić 2012, 100). 
However, contrary to the regime's expectations, NATO bombing made that people turn 
against Milošević even stronger (Uvalić 2012, 100).123 
  
                                                          
121 Mandelbaum (1999) elaborated on the American doctrine in relation to the intervention, often paraphrasing 
statements of the then United States President Clinton and State Secretary Albright that were highly pro-
inteventionist. 
122 In March 1998 the United Nations Security Council passed a Resolution 1160 by which it imposed sanctions 
on FR Yugoslavia. The sanctions banned import of weapons. In March 1999 the scope of the sanctions was 
broadened to include prohibition of international trade and air traffic and import of oil. 
123 Kritsiotis (2000) described the sequence of events related to the Kosovo crisis and NATO military 
intervention against FR Yugoslavia. 
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Table 4.1: Serbia and Montenegro/FR Yugoslavia - main macroeconomic indicators, for the period 1989–2000 
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1989 1,269 1.3 1 N/A N/A 2,790 607 N/A 5,348 6,195 N/A 
1990 593 -7.9 -12 N/A -3 2,707 663 N/A 5,815 7,460 -1.8 
1991 121 -11.6 -18 N/A -13 2,625 714 N/A 4,704 5,548 -2.1 
1992 9,237 -27.9 -22 N/A -21 2,536 748 N/A 2,479 3,638 -5 
1993 116.5* -30.8 -37 N/A -34 2,464 739 23.1 N/A N/A N/A 
1994 3.3 2.5 1 N/A N/A 2,413 726 23.1 N/A N/A N/A 
1995 78.6 6.1 4 4.1 -4.3 2,379 775 24.6 N/A N/A N/A 
1996 94.3 7.8 7.6 1.5 -3.8 2,367 819 25.4 N/A N/A N/A 
1997 21.3 10.1 9.5 7.3 -7.6 2,507 814 24.1 N/A N/A N/A 
1998 29.5 1.9 4.4 -3.2 -5.4 2,504 838 24.6 N/A N/A N/A 
1999 37.1 -19 -24.4 -2 -8.4 2,298 811 25.5 N/A N/A N/A 
2000 60.4 10.7 11.1 -13.7 -3.7 2,238 806 25.6 N/A N/A N/A 
*in trillion 
Source: Uvalić (2012, 76, 102) 
4.2.9 Break up of the FR Yugoslavia  
After the 1997 elections and Milo Đukanović's victory over pro-Milošević's candidate Momir 
Bulatović of Socialist National Party of Montenegro, the inter-state relations between the two 
federal republics worsened. Montenegro established its own Central Bank and introduced the 
then German mark (DEM) as a means of payment in parallel with dinar (replaced by euro 
since its introduction in January 2002). Further dissolution of the FR Yugoslavia continued in 
2001 when Montenegro installed five border crossings with Serbia. These events practically 
meant the end of the customs and monetary union of the federation (Uvalić 2012, 168–169). 
In this context, it is important to note that complex federal (political) relations between Serbia 
and Montenegro [as they continued to exist as truncated Yugoslavia after other republics of 
the former country declared independence] additionally contributed to tardiness in transition 
(of both) (Uvalić 2012, 21). 
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4.3 The period from 2000 onward 
4.3.1 The October 5th revolution 
In the federal presidential elections held in 2000 Milošević was finally defeated by the 
oppositionist candidate Vojislav Koštunica (Uvalić 2012, 160). After rejecting the defeat, 
Milošević's attempt of the election theft in the eyes of the people was „the straw that broke 
the camel“, fully disclosing real intentions of undemocratic regime (Stojiljković 2011, 52). 
He (meaning Milošević) lost the last piece of credibility he still might have had within Serbia 
and abroad (due to final settlement of the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina a few years before) 
(Vladisavljević 2016, 47–48).124 On 5 October 2000 strong public demonstrations broke out 
(Vladisavljević 2016, 47) [as a consequence of long in duration and huge public 
disappointment and widespread pauperisation which the regime was responsible for].125 
Prevailed optimism about the „positive“ outcome of the October 2000 demonstrations 
overpowered feelings of fear and indifference in people (Stojiljković 2011, 53) that prevailed 
for the whole decade. Only two days after, confronting the massiveness of the protests and 
being aware of his inability to do anything to claim back the power, Milošević had no option 
but to accept final defeat (Uvalić 2012 ,160; Vladisavljević 2016, 47). By chance, Milošević 
happened to be the last authoritarian leader of the 20th century to be overthrown by large 
public protests (Spoerri 2014, 172). 
Following the October changes democratic forces consolidated power and took over all main 
strains of governance, while independence of broadcasters and position of civil society 
organisations and associations substantially improved (Vladisavljević 2016, 48). The changes 
enabled the beginning of deep social changes and opened up a possibility for Serbia of 
catching up with other former socialist European countries (Gordy 2000, 88). New 
                                                          
124 Evidence of cases when stolen elections were followed by wide scale democratic protests is not limited to 
Serbia only. It happened in other places too, such as in the Philippines in 1986 (when dictator Ferdinand Marcos 
was toppled), Madagascar in 2002 (when the then president Didier Ratsiraka was toppled), and Georgia in 2003 
(when the then president Eduard Shevarnadze was brought down). However, it needs to be noted that there are 
also cases when stolen elections did not lead to overthrow of the standing regime, as was in Burma in 1990, 
Algeria in 1992 and Nigeria in 1993. This is explained by the fact that in the latter cases the regimes were fully 
authoritarian, what happened to be a strong enough obstacle to lead to the regime change. In other words 
„[h]ard-line regimes are more willing and able to kill or injure demonstrators, thus repressing or deterring 
popular demonstrations.“ (Thompson and Kuntz 2004,170). Hence, the Serbian case with reference to the 
October 2000 changes explains how vulnerable authoritarian system can be(come) after evident election fraud 
(Thompson and Kuntz 2004, 170–171). 
125 The October 5th demonstrations were also referred to as „small October revolution“, mainly organised by 
leading oppositionist parties - Democratic Party and Democratic Party of Serbia, and a number of civil sector 
organisations (Uvalić 2012, 163–164). The international community strongly supported the demonstrations 
(Stojiljković 2011, 53).  
105 
 
democratic authorities started comprehensive economic reforms126 (Cerović 2012, 617–618; 
Uvalić 2012, 19). The country was in such a bad economic situation that it had to strongly 
rely on foreign assistance (Uvalić 2012, 184; Spoerri 2014, 11),127 which carry a large portion 
of credentials for the successfulness of the event (Jennings 2009, 32). [The latter author does 
not question the likeness that the revolution would occur sometime, but stresses the 
importance of foreign aid to the then oppositionist forces]. However, in this initial phase the 
reforms did not bring satisfying results (Uvalić 2012, 19), what will be elaborated further in 
the chapter.128  
In this context, it is also important to note that Serbia's transition ever since the early 2000s 
was largely (positively) influenced by its European integration process, which enabled the 
country taking part in EU assistance programmes and harmonisation of its predominantly 
socialist legal system with contemporary European standards and norms. As part of the EU 
integration process Serbia got the visa free regime in December 2009 which was immensely 
helpful both for the country's economy and unobstructed movement of people. Since January 
2014 Serbia officially started negotiations on the accession, the process it has been 
successfully conducting since then. It goes without saying that ever since the beginning of its 
European path Serbia's commercial diplomacy was mainly oriented towards the EU market, 
both in terms of trade and investment. However, especially with the emergence of the world 
economic crisis in 2007/8, it rightfully opted for more engagement towards businesswise 
prosperous (eastern) emerging markets.  
4.3.2 Economic restructuring and privatisation  
The new democratic authorities removed redundant administrative barriers for international 
trade for both domestic and foreign firms, and offset comprehensive reforms (Uvalić 2012, 
183–184), mostly in line with the EU integration context. Restructuring of the banking sector 
which started in 2001 enabled that citizens finally get access to their foreign currency 
savings129 that were frozen yet in the early 1990s (Uvalić 2012, 183–184). As of 1 January 
2001 the course of dinar was made fluctuated and devalued, so that a new exchange rate was 
                                                          
126 Research of the World Bank on transitional countries shows that reforms have a positive long-term impact on 
economic growth (Cerović 2012,145–147). 
127 The International Monetary Fund (IMF) assistance was conditioned by reduction of fiscal deficit, reform of 
public administration and the banking sector, price liberalisation and development of the private sector. In that 
way the IMF asked from the FR Yugoslavia to fulfil everything what the Washington Consensus proclamates 
(Uvalić 2012, 185). 
128 The happenings which immediately preceded and followed the October revolution were elaborated in detail 
by Goati in Spasić and Subotić (2001), Pešić in Spasić and Subotić (2001), Bujosevic and Radovanovic (2003), 
Stojanović (2003), Bilic (2008), et al.  
129 The citizens had a right to choose between being paid out in cash or to be given treasury bonds. 
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introduced at the course 1 DEM = 30 RSD. The new authorities did manage to achieve 
monetary stability (Uvalić 2012, 201). 
The new law on privatisation was adopted in mid 2001. It envisaged privatisation  primarily 
via public tenders and auctions (Uvalić 2012, 216), modelled upon positive experience of 
other transitional countries in Europe130 (Cerović 2012, 345–349). The Privatisation Agency 
was entrusted with leading privatisation of enterprises and firms of strategic importance for 
the country (Uvalić 2012, 216). In other words, the main goal of this new privatisation was to 
find strategic investors who could revive economic activity of enterprises. Potential new 
investors could become owners of  maximum 70 % of enterprises' total capital (Uvalić 2012, 
218). 
However, the achieved results in industrial restructuring throughout most of the 2000s were 
not satisfying at all (Uvalić 2012, 228). Uvalić (2012, 240) points out that this has been so 
mainly for the following reasons: (1) unsatisfying level of implementation of the law on 
privatisation (from 2001),131 (2) numerous cases of flawed privatisations, (3) lagged reform 
of the public (economic) sector, especially in terms of corporate governance, (4) 
unrealistically high positive expectations from foreign investors [and their inefficient sectoral 
distribution (Uvalić 2012, 275)], [(5) attraction of non-export contributing FDI – since 2000 
onward about 2/3 of the total attracted FDI is invested in the service sector (banks, 
telecommunication companies, real estate and trade) (Uvalic 2012, 94)] (6) slow reform of 
businesswise regulatory framework, especially in terms of competition, [(7) postponed 
adoption of the law on bankruptcy procedures (Uvalić 2012, 275)], (8) inefficient fiscal 
policy, and (9) inadequate employment policy. In addition, it is important to add that by 
insight into the literature, it was found that Serbia's (economic) transition has been hampered 
by the following factors: 
 inefficient administration (Filipović 2006, 107; Adžić 2007, 143; Baranenko and 
Đukić in Andrade et al.  2012, 530; Maksimović 2012, 107; Veselinović et al. in 
Leković 2012, 209–210), 
 inefficient legal system (Domazet and Stošić 2013, 121), 
                                                          
130 200 large companies were planned to be privatised this way; 70 % of their capital would go on sale, 15 % 
would go to the employees (of a privatised company), and 15 % to the citizens. During the period 2002-2005 
1494 companies were privatised, of which only 2 % via tenders, 82 % via auctions and 16 % at/via the stock 
exchange (Cerović 2012, 345–349). 
131 The 2001 privatisation strategy excluded about 550 important state-owned companies (Uvalic 2012, 94). 
Needless to say that slow privatisation was largely responsible for unsatisfying growth of the private (economic) 
sector (Uvalić 2012, 240). The law did not precisely relate to public (monopoly) enterprises and firms that were 
nationalised during the 1990s, most of which are utility and construction firms, whose effective restructuring 
started only since 2006 (Uvalić 2012, 244–245). 
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 lack of adequate antimonopoly legislation (Domazet and Stošić 2013, 121), 
 low quality of infrastructure (Domazet and Stošić 2013, 121), 
 quasi-market institutions (Adžić 2007, 143), 
 low transparency (Bazin and Danon in Berthomieu et al. 2009, 117), 
 prevalent corruption (Bazin and Danon in Berthomieu et al. 2009, 117; Baranenko 
and Đukić in Andrade et al.  2012, 530; Domazet and Stošić 2013, 121), 
 large number of independent specialised agencies (Acimovic 2012, 296–307), 
 macroeconomic imbalances (Prascevic 2013, 19), 
 unfavourable business environment (Bazin and Danon in Berthomieu et al. 2009, 117; 
Veselinović et al. in Leković 2012, 209–210), 
 channeling of privatisation revenues mainly into consumption (Djuričin and 
Vuksanović 2012, 23), 
 uneven geographical distribution of FDI (World Bank 2010, 27), 
 high level of eurisation of the economy (Chailloux et al. 2010, 16–17), 
 strong appreciation of domestic currency which negatively reflected on 
competitiveness (Bošnjak 2008, 47; Djuričin and Vuksanović 2012, 19), 
 low competitiveness (Kovačević in Hanić et al. 2010, 45), 
 illegal activities during privatisation (crime) (Vujačić and Petrović Vujačić 2011, 98), 
 loss of human capital during restructuring (Pržulj and Hanić in Šalej et al. 2011, 351), 
 inability of the private sector to absorb redundant workers from the public sector 
(Veselinović 2008, 68–69; Kovačević in Hanić et al. 2010; Đukić 2012, 14), 
 unproductive/unadaptive educational system (Gligorov et al. 2011, 33; Baranenko and 
Đukić in Andrade et al.  2012, 534), 
 social stratification (Balunović 2013, 3), and 
 brain drain (Baranenko and Đukić in Andrade et al. 2012, 534). 
In order to best illustrate tardiness and backwardness of Serbia's transitional economy, values 
of 19 selected macroeconomic indicators132 (presented in Figures and Tables in Appendix E), 
                                                          
132 GDP growth rate; GDP per capita (current US$); GDP per capita growth (annual %); Exports of goods and 
services (% of GDP); Exports of goods and services (billion USD); Foreign direct investment, net inflows (% of 
GDP); Foreign direct investment, net inflows (BoP, current US$); Current account balance (%); Savings (% of 
GDP); Investment (% of GDP); Agriculture, value-added (% of GDP); Research and development expenditure 
(% of GDP); High-technology exports (% of manufactured exports); Inflation - consumer prices; 
Unemployment rate (%); Ease of doing business rank; Rank and score (by perceived level of corruption in the 
public sector); Global competitiveness position; Worldwide Governance Indicators. 
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covering the period 2000–2016133 are used for Serbia and 10 Central and Eastern European 
(transitional) countries.134  The mentioned hindering factors ever since the early 1990s, 
especially those which relate to weak institutions, prevalent corruption and crime, absence of 
a merit-based system both in public administration and in society in general, then faulty 
economic policies based on strong promotion of import and neglect of/for export-oriented 
industries, as well as isolationist politics altogether made internationalisation of Serbia's 
economy weak. 
However, apart from the noted, still the most relevant indicators for this research are those 
which point to excessive dependence of Serbia on the EU and CEFTA markets, both in terms 
of export and investment, as presented in Tables below. First, in terms of export, as shown in 
Table 4.2 (subtables of Table 4.2 are given in Appendix F), despite noticeable improvement 
during the observed period, from 67,1 % in 2004 to 60,4 % in 2016, for what the largest 
credits has active commercial diplomacy, Serbia is still too dependent on the markets of the 
EU and CEFTA. Secondly, in terms of investment, the available data disclose a slightly 
positive, but still far from satisfying trend in the sense of diversification, as illustrated in 
Tables 4.3–4.6. More concretely, concerning inward FDI, the presented data in Table 4.3 
show that a share of the EU in Serbia's total FDI has decreased from 67,3 % in 2010 to 63 % 
in 2016. Likewise, a share of Europe (EU+other non-EU European countries) has decreased 
from 90,1 % in 2010 to 80,1 % in 2016. Going more in detail, Table 4.4 shows that the 
number of non-EU countries in Serbia's top 20 inward FDI source countries has gone from 5 
in 2010 to 9 in 2016. Or, in terms of value, during the observed period, a share of non-EU in 
Serbia's total attracted FDI has increased from 27,1 % to 33,9 %, whereas a share of non-
European (attracted) FDI has increased from 4,7 % to 17,2 %. 
  
                                                          
133 Although the observed period is 2000–2016 (the year 2000 is taken as the starting year of “real” transition in 
Serbia after Milošević’s fall following the October 5th revolution), for most indicators data are available for the 
period 2000-2015, and for some (indicators) shorter periods in between the period 2000–2016. In few cases, 
where data for Serbia are available for a period that is shorter in comparison to other countries, the last year for 
which data for Serbia are available is taken. This methodology is chosen as calculation of percentual change 
(increase or decrease) of selected indicators over the observed period would not be plausible, given that Serbia 
in the year 2000 had low starting base, which means high probability of significant growth (by the last year of 
the observed period), and the fact that „real“ transition in other 10 CEEC had already started around the year 
1990. 
134 Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovak Republic, and 
Slovenia. 
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Table 4.2: Share of CEFTA and EU countries (combined) that belong to the top 10 Serbian export partners in 
Serbia's total export, for the period 2004–2016 
Year Share 
2004 67,1% 
2005 64,9% 
2006 65,2% 
2007 65,7% 
2008 65,4% 
2009 64,3% 
2010 63,5% 
2011 63,0% 
2012 62,0% 
2013 57,7% 
2014 62% 
2015 61,5% 
2016 60,4% 
Source: Own elaboration based on data of the Statistical Office of the Republic of Serbia – online database 
Table 4.3: Share of inward FDI from Europe and EU in total inward FDI into Serbia, in mil. EUR, for the period 
2010–2016 
 
Year 
Inward FDI value 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
Total 1.278,4 3.544,5 1.008,8 1.547,9 1.500,5 2.114,2 2.080,2 
Europe 1.151,4 3.384,7 959,8 1.442,8 1.344,2 1.818,6 1.666,3 
Share of Europe in 
total 90,1% 95,5% 95,1% 93,2% 89,6% 86,0% 80,1% 
EU 860,7 2.794,4 624,4 1.145,0 1.109,3 1.530,1 1.310,3 
Share of the EU in 
total 67,3% 78,8% 61,9% 74,0% 73,9% 72,4% 63,0% 
Source: Own elaboration based on data of the National Bank of Serbia – online database 
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Table 4.4: Top 20 inward FDI source countries for Serbia, with (FDI) values in mil. EUR, for the period 2010–2016 
 
Year 
 
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
No. Country Value Country Value Country Value Country Value Country Value Country Value Country Value 
1 Russian Fed. 216,2 Luxembourg 885,0 Russian Fed.  232,5 Netherlands 379,8 Netherlands 372,7 Netherlands 361,7 Netherlands 276,1 
2 Slovenia 180,4 Austria 613,2 Austria 169,0 Russian Fed. 189,7 Switzerland 139,1 Austria 352,5 Austria 257,9 
3 Cyprus 108,7 Russian Fed. 488,5 Netherlands 153,5 Austria 151,8 Austria 119,2 Luxembourg 172,3 Luxembourg 233,2 
4 France 107,7 Netherlands 215,5 Luxembourg 134,5 Luxembourg 102,7 Italy 101,1 Italy 144,9 Switzerland 216,6 
5 Germany 103,5 Germany 198,7 France 131,4 France 99,3 Greece 89,7 U.A.E. 120,5 Germany 166,1 
6 Italy 65,3 France 179,7 Croatia 126,7 Switzerland 97,9 Luxembourg 85,5 Russian Fed. 96,4 Hong Kong 122,4 
7 U.S.A. 59,9 Cyprus 166,1 Germany 93,1 Germany 83,5 China 82,5 Switzerland 96,0 Slovenia 112,9 
8 Great Britain 58,9 Italy 135,9 Switzerland 82,4 Great Britain 80,1 Russian Fed. 73,5 France 76,5 France 85,8 
9 Luxembourg 51,0 Switzerland 74,1 Italy 78,8 Romania 67,8 Great Britain 57,6 Germany 72,4 Russian Fed. 81,2 
10 Switzerland 49,9 Great Britain 69,9 Bulgaria 39,5 Italy 67,4 Hungary 55,8 Denmark 71,9 U.A.E. 81,1 
11 Netherlands 40,7 Hungary 62,6 U.S.A. 31,5 Greece 37,4 France 51,5 Croatia 70,3 China 70,0 
12 Greece 37,6 Croatia 56,8 Slovenia 30,0 Bulgaria 36,4 Denmark 49,8 Cyprus 51,0 Greece 52,7 
13 Austria 26,7 Denmark 56,3 Spain 20,2 Hungary 34,6 Germany 36,5 Montenegro 45,1 Montenegro 49,5 
14 Denmark 24,5 Spain 51,7 BiH* 12,7 U.A.E** 31,5 Slovenia 30,5 Hong Kong 42,4 Great Britain 45,7 
15 Spain 14,7 U.S.A. 37,0 Slovakia 10,0 Cyprus 25,9 Bulgaria 22,5 U.S.A. 38,5 Hungary 34,1 
16 BiH* 11,7 Greece 30,6 Montenegro 9,5 Hong Kong 22,6 Montenegro 19,4 Korea, Re, 33,1 Cyprus 30,1 
17 Slovakia 11,6 Slovenia 23,9 Great Britain 6,8 U.S.A. 22,1 Sweden 16,2 Hungary 31,8 Korea, Re, 29,2 
18 Bulgaria 10,3 Finland 16,1 Poland 5,0 Denmark 18,4 India 11,4 Turkey 27,8 Taiwan*** 27,6 
19 Sweden 9,3 BiH* 14,7 Norway 4,5 Poland 13,9 Cyprus 10,0 China 24,1 Denmark 27,6 
20 Macedonia, R. 9,2 Hong Kong 13,0 Cyprus 4,4 Belgium 11,6 Virgin Islands  9,3 Virgin Islands  21,9 U.S.A. 26,6 
 
5**** 346,9 6**** 684,0 7**** 499,6 5**** 363,9 6**** 335,3 10**** 545,7 9**** 704,2 
Non-EU share in total 27,1%   19,3%   49,5%   23,5%   22,3%   25,8%   33,9% 
Non-Europe share in 
tot. 4,7% 
 
1,4% 
 
3,1% 
 
4,9% 
 
6,9% 
 
13,3% 
 
17,2% 
*Bosnia and Herzegovina 
**United Arab Emirates 
***Taiwan, Chinese province 
****Number of non-EU countries in top 20 
Source: Own elaboration based on data of the National Bank of Serbia – online database 
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In terms of outward FDI, mixed results are evidenced, as expected to some degree. As 
presented in Table 4.5, during the period 2010–2016, a share of Serbia's EU-based FDI has 
gone to worse, in other words it has increased from 25,8 % to 45,5 %, whereas European-
based (FDI) has decreased, from 98,5 % to 87,5 %, meaning (that) noticeable diversification 
has been achieved. Furthermore, the number of non-EU countries which hosted FDI from 
Serbia has decreased from 10 to 8 in the same period. Or, in terms of value, a share of non-
EU based FDI in Serbia's total has decreased from 79 % in 2010 to 50,6 % in 2016. On the 
contrary, a share of Serbia's non-European based FDI has gone to better, from 0,8 % in 2010 
to 5,7 % in 2016, implying achieved diversification in European countries other than 
(of/from) the EU (see Table 4.6). 
Table 4.5: Share of outward FDI from Serbia to Europe and EU in total Serbia's outward FDI, in mil. EUR, for 
the period 2010–2016 
 
Year 
Outward FDI value 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
Total 145,0 224,9 256,0 249,7 264,2 310,4 219,4 
Europe 142,8 219,9 247,0 246,7 257,6 307,6 191,9 
Share of Europe in 
total 98,5% 97,8% 96,5% 98,8% 97,5% 99,1% 87,5% 
EU 37,5 113,8 73,1 70,7 35,4 49,7 99,9 
Share of the EU in 
total 25,8% 50,6% 28,6% 28,3% 13,4% 16,0% 45,5% 
Source: Own elaboration based on data of the National Bank of Serbia – online database 
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Table 4.6: Top 20 Serbia's outward FDI destination countries, with (FDI) values in mil. EUR, for the period 2010–2016 
 
Year 
 
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
No. Country Value Country Value Country Value Country Value Country Value Country Value Country Value 
1 Montenegro 57,3 BiH 62,2 Montenegro 92,0 BiH 102,6 Montenegro 146,3 Montenegro 191,9 BiH 72,7 
2 BiH 33,8 Slovenia 39,1 BiH 89,9 Montenegro 77,1 BiH 64,4 BiH 51,8 Great Britain 42,8 
3 Slovenia 15,6 Montenegro 38,8 Bulgaria 40,9 Romania 44,9 Ireland 33,8 Croatia 11,6 Russian Fed. 21,1 
4 Switzerland 10,2 Great Britain 36,1 Slovenia 22,9 Switzerland 11,1 Bulgaria 23,2 Hungary 10,0 Hungary 19,4 
5 Cyprus 8,0 Bulgaria 18,4 Romania 10,3 Hungary 9,1 Switzerland 12,9 Switzerland 9,9 Slovenia 17,6 
6 Netherlands 6,2 Croatia 15,4 Hungary 8,7 Bulgaria 5,1 Ukraine 10,6 Cyprus 8,4 Croatia 12,4 
7 Turkey 4,8 Switzerland 12,4 Virgin Islands 8,6 Croatia 4,7 Hong Kong 5,9 Slovenia 8,1 Romania 11,5 
8 Croatia 4,5 Albania 6,0 Ghana 3,1 Ukraine 3,1 Romania 5,0 Russian Fed. 8,0 Cyprus 6,4 
9 Albania 2,7 Turkey 5,9 Germany 3,0 Macedonia, R. 2,0 Germany 5,0 Romania 7,6 Macedonia, R. 4,9 
10 Great Britain 1,3 Angola 4,7 Kazakhstan 2,7 Slovenia 2,0 Russian Fed. 3,7 Ghana 4,3 Angola 4,9 
11 Germany 1,3 Ukraine 3,7 Netherlands 2,0 Ghana 1,8 Austria 3,0 Macedonia, R. 2,9 Greece 2,8 
12 Romania 0,8 Italy 2,7 Greece 1,7 Greece 1,6 Greece 2,4 Luxembourg 2,7 Germany 2,5 
13 Congo 0,7 Macedonia, R. 1,6 Ireland 1,1 Oman 1,5 Ghana 1,4 Bulgaria 2,4 U.S.A. 2,4 
14 Austria 0,5 Austria 1,5 Luxembourg 1,0 France 1,2 Angola 1,0 Ukraine 1,6 Virgin Islands  2,0 
15 Greece 0,5 Seychelles 1,5 Zambia 0,9 Mozambique 0,8 U.A.E.*** 0,5 Albania 1,2 Ghana 1,8 
16 Poland 0,5 Belgium 1,3 Lichtenstein 0,7 Czech R. 0,8 Czech R. 0,5 Ireland 1,0 Bulgaria 1,7 
17 Angola 0,2 Netherlands 1,1 Portugal 0,5 Germany 0,7 Lebanon 0,5 Austria 0,9 Austria 1,6 
18 Luxembourg 0,2 Cyprus 1,0 Nigeria 0,4 Italy 0,7 Nigeria 0,4 Great Britain 0,9 China 1,4 
19 Virgin Islands 0,1 Congo 0,6 Spain 0,2 Nigeria 0,6 Great Britain 0,4 Italy 0,8 Italy 0,7 
20 Libya** 0,1 Belize 0,5 Hong Kong 0,2 Brazil 0,6 Zambia 0,2 Germany 0,7 Sweden 0,6 
 
10**** 114,6 12**** 153,4 8**** 194,8 10**** 201,2 12**** 247,8 8**** 271,6 8**** 111,0 
Non-EU share in total 79,0%   68,2%   76,1%   80,6%   93,8%   87,5%   50,6% 
Non-Europe share in tot. 0,8% 
 
3,3% 
 
5,2% 
 
2,1% 
 
3,8% 
 
1,4% 
 
5,7% 
*Bosnia and Herzegovina 
**Libyan Arab Jamahiriya 
***United Arab Emirates 
****Number of non-EU countries in top 20 
Source: Own elaboration based on data of the National Bank of Serbia – online database 
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Despite presented improvement, dependence on the EU and Europe overall is still too large. 
The only way to achieve/bring this (diversification) to a more satisfying level is by means of 
assertive commercial diplomacy towards the emerging markets. 
4.3.2.1 „Faulty“ economic model 
The 2007/'08 world economic crisis135 disclosed all weaknesses and unsustainability of 
Serbia's current development model (Uvalić 2012, 317), which in essense favoures and 
encourages import at the expense of export, what has negatively reflected on increasing 
current account deficit (Cerović 2012, 478–479). Cerović (2012, 3) as well as many other 
scholars and economic experts136 rightfully questions why Serbia waited so long to start 
disputing long-term sustainability of its current model of economic growth [that it has 
resorted to ever since the beginning of transition] only after being severely affected by the 
world economic crisis. Instead of relying on principles of the Washington Consensus,137 
about which he said:   
... nothing – from the Communist Manifesto to the Washington Consensus – cannot resist 
certain, but still not insignificant degree of ideologisation when someone wishes to 
popularise or explain some complex problem in short. Hence, it is no wonder that that 
document has become a source of many vulgarisations, schematisms and absence of 
confronting the reality and real facts during transition. Luckily, but still gradually and with 
tardiness, that simplified guidebook for the creators of transitional policies became 
abandoned, although with insufficiently lucid perspective in terms of further steps [that need 
to be taken] Cerović (2012, 2),  
Serbia should apply the „social“ model of market economy that exists in most European 
countries, sometimes referred to as „humane capitalism“. It comprises that the state should 
enable fair social and health protection system, free education (to some degree), well devised 
employment policy and environmental protection (Cerović 2012, 66). Or perhaps the model 
of South-East Asian economies would be an option for consideration, such as of: Japan, 
                                                          
135 Negative consequences of the world economic crisis on Serbia was, among others, studied by: Stošić et al. in 
Berthomieu et al. (2009), Antevski (2010), Đukić (2010), Hanić in Hanić et al. (2010), Arandarenko (2011), 
Bošnjak (2011), Savić and Bošković (2011), Prascevic (2012) and Prica in Bartlett and Uvalić (2013).  
136 Some of them are: Economic Institute and Faculty of Economics (2010, 8), Jovanović Gavrilović in Hanić et 
al. (2010, 94), Savić (2010, 325–326), Penev and Marušić (2011, 86), Cvetanović and Mladenović in Leković 
(2012, 80–81), Skulić (2012), Uvalic (2012, 97–98), Domazet and Stošić (2013, 121), Prascevic (2013, 31), etc. 
137 As already noted before, the basic idea of the Washington Consensus (originally created in 1989 as a set of 
economic measures aimed for economic recovery, that is, development of Latin American countries, in belief 
that liberalisation is the only warrant for future economic growth, development and citizens’ welfare, which, 
because of the dissolution of Eastern bloc, became relevant not only for Latin American countries, but for all 
transitional countries coping with challenges of the market economy. Such model of economic growth was 
predominant for almost two decades, until the emergence of the current economic crisis, which revealed that 
liberalisation as a trend setter for economic growth was to a certain extent effective, but has not provided 
sustainable growth. In that context, many prominent economists, such as Stiglitz (2002) (also Stiglitz in Serra 
and Stiglitz 2008) harshly criticised the Washington Consensus.  
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Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, Hong Kong, and Malesia, whereat the state takes, so to say, a 
parental role in relationship with domestic enterprises, offering them short-term support when 
and where it deems necessary. The importance of the state is thus greater as it also 
encourages saving at both individual and company level, and investment in technological 
upgrade of companies, what is likely to positively affect their productivity [and 
competitiveness] (Cerović 2012, 70–71). In line with the noted, Penev and Marušić (2011, 
87) argue that (Serbia’s) economic growth in the future should be based on: (1) institutional 
and structural reforms, (2) business-friendly environment, (3) decreased private consumption, 
(4) higher level of domestic savings, (5) better management of public expenditure, (6) 
fostering regional cooperation, (7) political stability, and (8) EU integration.  
In the context of economic recovery in general and a need for a new growth model that would 
help enhance country's internationalisation, while reviewing the available literature it was 
found that there are many (other) authors who offered their vision of what is important for 
Serbia. Most of them emphasise: continuation of institutional reform, creation of a business-
friendly environment, stimulation of attraction of FDI, and increase of economic 
competitiveness. For better understanding, I will outline the main factors and processes as 
follows: 
 continuation of institutional reform (Bošnjak 2004, 80–81; Bošnjak 2005, 145 – 
Serbia made some progress; Bošnjak in Hanić et al. 2010, 142; Baranenko and Đukić 
in Andrade et al. 2012, 534; Vujošević et al. 2012, 1725; Adžić and Davidović 2013, 
21; Domazet and Stošić 2013, 121; Prascevic 2013, 31; Veselinović 2014, 157), 
 continuation of reform of the legal system (Bošnjak 2004, 80; Bošnjak 2005, 145 – 
Serbia made some progress; Bošnjak in Hanić et al. 2010, 141), 
 improvement of regulatory framework (Adžić 2007, 143; Roskić 2007, 41; Bošnjak 
2011, 54; Penev and Marušić 2011, 147), 
 macroeconomic stability (Bošnjak in Hanić et al. 2010, 136), 
 structural reforms (Bošnjak 2004, 80; Adžić 2007, 143 - integrated market system; 
Prascevic 2013, 31), 
o enterprise restructuring (Pržulj and Hanić in Šalej et al. 2011, 351), 
o termination of subsidising loss-making companies (Bartlett 2007, 32), 
o further economic liberalization (Bartlett 2007, 32; Djukić and Nikolić in 
Teixeira et al. 2012, 527), 
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 creation of business-friendly environment (Bošnjak 2004, 82–83; Bartlett 2007, 30; 
Kovačević 2009, 84; Luković 2009, 216; Mićić 2009, 185; Bošnjak in Hanić et al. 
2010, 141; Baranenko and Đukić in Andrade et al. 2012, 521; Maksimović 2012, 
107), 
 reindustrialisation (Adžić 2007, 143; Savić 2009, 16), 
o development of the private sector (Bošnjak 2004, 81; Goldberg et al. 2005, 17; 
Bošnjak 2011, 54; Vujošević et al. 2012, 1725), 
o development of entrepreneurship (Mićić 2009, 185; Kovačević 2009, 86; 
Bošnjak in Hanić et al. 2010, 141; Jovanović Gavrilović in Hanić et al. 2010, 
95–96; Baranenko and Đukić in Andrade et al.  2012, 534), 
o promotion of development of public-private partnership (Veselinović 2014, 
157), 
o development of small and medium enterprise (SMEs) (Bartlett 2007, 30; 
Kovačević 2009, 84; Stojadinović Jovanović in Leković 2012, 245; 
Veselinović et al. in Leković 2012, 210), 
o development of stimulation of export-oriented industries (Goldberg et al. 
2005, 17; Baranenko and Đukić in Andrade et al.  2012, 521), 
 privatisation of public enterprises (Mićić and Zeremski 2011, 56; Veselinović 2014, 
157); 
 making of investment-friendly environment (Roskić 2007, 41; Domazet and Stošić 
2013, 121; Marjanović and Radojević in Hanić et al. 2013, 363), 
 stimulation of attracting FDI (Goldberg et al. 2005, 17; Roskić 2007, 41; Kovačević 
2009, 84; Stošić et al. in Radović-Marković et al. 2011, 58; Baranenko and Đukić in 
Andrade et al.  2012, 521), 
o important to enable efficient geographical distribution of FDI to provide for 
reduction of regional disparity in terms of development (Dašić 2011, 40), 
 increase of economic competitiveness (Bošnjak 2004, 82; Bošnjak 2005, 131 – to 
enhance competitiveness based on innovation; Banićević and Vasić 2006, 27; Bartlett 
2007, 32; Kovačević 2009, 86; Mićić 2009, 185; Domazet and Stošić 2013, 121), 
o increase of expenditure on education (Bartlett 2007, 32), 
o creation of knowledge-based economy (Đukić 2012, 16), 
o investing in research and development (R&D) (Bošnjak 2005, 132; Kovačević 
2009, 86), 
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o technological upgrade (Baranenko and Đukić in Andrade et al. 2012, 534; 
Leković and Mićić 2013, 28–29), 
o increase of investment in innovation (Bartlett 2007, 32; Veselinović et al. in 
Leković 2012, 210; Domazet and Stošić 2013, 122; Slavković and Babić 2013, 
99–100), 
o focus on sectors where Serbia could have comparative advantage (Marjanović 
and Radojević in Hanić et al. 2013, 363), 
o encouragement of the formation of industrial clusters (in order to enable better 
competitiveness of export goods) (Baranenko and Đukić in Andrade et al.  
2012, 532; Domazet and Stošić 2013, 122), 
o development of the banking sector as the basis for investment (Bošnjak 2004 
,81), 
 enabling independent work of the National Bank of Serbia (Bošnjak in Hanić et al. 
2010, 136), 
 strengthening of legal framework and effective monitoring over the banking system 
(Todorović and Vuksanović in Leković 2012, 276), 
 lowering of tax burden (Bošnjak 2004, 81; Cvetanović and Mladenović in Leković 
2012, 83; Radović-Marković in Andrade et al. 2012, 272–273), lowering taxes on 
labour, increasing taxes on consumption (Luković 2009, 216), 
 making of proactive labour policies (Bartlett 2007, 32), 
o creation of more flexible labour market (Domazet and Stošić 2013, 122), 
o making of social programmes for redundant labourers (Bartlett 2007, 32), 
 growth-driven monetary policy (Bošnjak 2004, 81; Đukić and Hanić in Teixeira et al. 
2012, 296), 
 fiscal consolidation (Prascevic 2013, 31; Mićić 2009, 185), 
 increase of domestic saving (Bošnjak 2004, 82; Jovanović Gavrilović in Hanić et al. 
2010, 95–96; Cvetanović and Mladenović in Leković 2012, 83; Adžić and Davidović 
2013, 21), 
 lowering of public expenditure: public expenditures should not exceed 43 % of GDP, 
public revenues 41 % of GDP and fiscal deficit 3 % of GDP (Bošnjak 2004, 82), 
 political stability (Bošnjak 2004, 80), 
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 more advanced progress in the process of European integration (Bošnjak 2004, 80, 82; 
Bošnjak 2005, 146 – need to harmonise the legal framework with the EU Acquis; 
Bartlett 2007, 32; Domazet and Stošić 2013, 121), 
 fight against corruption (Veselinović 2014, 157), 
 development of infrastructure (Bošnjak 2011, 54; Domazet and Stošić 2013, 121), 
 antimonopoly policy (Domazet and Stošić 2013, 122), and 
 improvement of corporate governance (Dencic-Mihajlov 2009, 205; Todorović and 
Vuksanović in Leković 2012, 276). 
4.3.3 Turning towards the emerging markets acknowledged as a necessity 
Based on the experience of the 2007/'08 world economic crisis, having seen how detrimental 
global economic turbulences can be for Serbia's vulnerable transitional economy, in recent 
years there is a growing number of economic experts and policy makers, domestic and 
foreign, who outspokenly advocate that Serbia needs to turn towards the emerging markets, 
with the aim to decrease/alleviate high dependency on the EU and CEFTA markets, and 
hence high risk exposure especially in times of economic crises, both in terms of export and 
investment. One of those, Olivera Kiro, secretary of the International Committee on 
Economic Relations of the Chamber of Commerce and Industry of Serbia, explained the 
problem nicely yet in 2011, having said that: 
It is the fact that Serbia exports more than 80 % of its total export into the markets of the 
European Union and in countries, members of CEFTA. Half of total export goes to the 
markets of Italy, Germany and Romania, and when it is about CEFTA countries, 80 % of 
export products end up in the markets of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegto and 
Macedonia. Such high concentration of export in only a few countries represents a risk for 
domestic economy, as we are practically dependent on changes of demand in those markets. 
And that is being confirmed now when there is a threat of a new wave of economic crisis, 
especially in countries which are our most important trading partners. In other words, a fall 
of import demand in Italy and Germany will imminently result in a decrease of Serbian 
export. When to this is added expected lesser inflow of investments from these countries, 
negative effects will be even stronger (Stevanović 2011). 
In the same way, Kori Udovički, former governor of the National Bank of Serbia and 
(former) Deputy Prime Minister of Serbia, yet in the first years following the outbreak of the 
crisis, stressed that Serbia would need to turn towards the fast-growing markets, especially 
those of Asia, as they are expected to be the drivers of global economic growth in the coming 
years (B92 2011a). About this, Lu Brefora, former head of the World Bank Office in Serbia, 
said that: 
In terms of trade, Serbia is very dependent on Europe, what is logical, given that it is about 
large, rich and geographically close market, but if it [the European market] slows down, a 
chance should be sought in the East, especially in countries with which Serbia has 
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agreements on free trade, such as Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan...“. „Their economies are fast 
growing, and the percentage of export of Serbia in those countries is very low and leaves a 
large space for placement of Serbian products. Serbia certainly needs to continue to export 
into Europe, and in parallel to seek for ways to increase presence in Russia, Kazakhstan, 
China, Brazil and other countries that are high growing (B92 2011b). 
Another outspoken advocator of a geographically more diversified approach is Serbian 
economist Miroslav Zdravković, who is of opinion that emerging markets represent a big 
chance that Serbia needs to exploit. Referring to those markets, whereby having stressed a 
need for a cluster-based approach, he said the following: 
It is about fast growing and large markets at which could be sold anything produced in 
Serbia. However, in order to increase export substantially, especially in China, Kazakhstan 
and Brazil, a cluster, joint approach is needed. That means that there is a need for joining of 
same or similar producers [same or similar in terms of economic activity], so to act jointly 
and in that way decrease costs of marketing and transport. Grouped via, for example, 
chamber of commerce, producers of furniture, specified-purpose industry, fruit-growers, as 
well as food industry would have a brighter future (B92 2011b). 
Among many other highly ranked officials of Serbian administration who have assertively 
been raising awareness of a need for achieving better economic (geographical) diversification 
outside the markets of the EU and/or the neighbourhood region are: Božidar Laganin, former 
director of the Serbia Investment and Export Promotion Agency (B92 2012), Željko Sertić, 
former minister of economy of Serbia (B92 2014a), Rasim Ljajić, current minister of trade, 
tourism and telecommunications (formerly minister of foreign and domestic trade and 
telecommunications) (B92 2014b), and Mladjen Kovačević, member of the Academy of 
Economic Sciences (Stevanović 2013). 
4.4 Concluding notes  
As Uvalić (2012, 19) points out, various scholars still find difficult to agree on what year 
concretely - 1989 or 2001 marked the beginning of Serbia's transition. At the same time, there 
also exists a certain degree of disagreement when it comes to general assessment of how big 
progress Serbia has done so far. In terms of this, Uvalić (2012, 25) disagrees with those who 
take the year 2000 as the zero point when transition in Serbia really started. She argues that in 
comparison to other post-communist European countries which started their transition in 
1989 from the scratch immediately upon proclaiming independence, in 2000 Serbia was in 
much worse position, having had to face the legacy from the time of Milošević in the form of 
almost completely annihilated economy, and other obstacles of political and social nature, 
which altogether made transitional changes more difficult. 
With reference to the 1990s, it is without any doubt that undemocratic, authoritarian and 
antireformist (Milošević's) political regime bears full responsibility for drawing Serbia into 
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four military conflicts in the region (of the former SFR Yugoslavia): in Slovenia (June 1991), 
Croatia (1991–1992), Bosnia and Herzegovina (1992–1995) and Kosovo (1998–1999), and 
gradual collapse of its whole economic system. The regime openly gave primacy to political 
over economic issues, without any consideration for drastic worsening of living standard 
(Uvalić 2012, 20). Furthermore, many political and economic decisions of the then 
authorities proved to be counterproductive in the sense of economic progress. Sometimes 
they meant abolishment of progressive reform measures that were taken shortly prior to the 
dissolution of the former Yugoslavia, or even worse, a return to abandoned practices and 
solutions yet from the time of the former country (Uvalić 2012, 21). Another factor that 
contributed to slow progress in transition in that period was the fact that Serbia had to change 
much of its legal system inherited from the former country (Uvalić 2012, 21). Unwillingness 
of the then authorities to conduct reforms in the strategic areas, such as judiciary and internal 
security affairs only undermined very functioning of the legal system, and gave wind to the 
outbreak of corruption and crime (Uvalić 2012, 21). 
In terms of the period following the October 5th (2000) revolution, improvements in many 
fields have been achieved. However, they could and should have been much better than the 
achieved. What is important for this period is that Serbia was readmitted to main international 
financial organisations, and started EU integration path, what enabled it access to capital for 
economic recovery and necessary (transitional) reforms. Overall, major factors which 
negatively affected Serbia's transition are the following: (1) dissolution of the former 
Yugoslavia followed by breaking of economic relations with the former federal republics, 
now independent states, which caused loss of markets and sharp shrinkage of trade volume; 
(2) inability to rely on taking use of less costly production factors from other former federal 
republics, (3) lesser inflow of customs revenues, (4) lack of foreign investors' interest as a 
result of shrinked domestic market and high political risk, and (e) rapidly increasing inflation 
(Teokarević in Samardžić et al. 1998, 330). Furthermore, slow and ineffective restructuring 
brought about decreased competitiveness of domestic firms in foreign markets and hence 
rising unemployment (Uvalić 2012, 334–338). Likewise, slow development of institutions 
has negatively reflected on the process of privatisation and liberalisation (Cerović 2012, 638). 
Moreover, it seems that some remnants of the Milošević's authoritarian rule are still present 
in the Serbian society (Uvalić 2012, 20), in the form of persistently backward political and 
economic system, deeply rooted crime and untransparent administration and judiciary (Uvalić 
2012, 341). To conclude, transition should certainly have been done with better preparation 
and especially analysis of potential consequences of chosen policies (Cerović 2012, 482). 
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However, of highest relevance for this research are the presented indicators which clearly 
point to excessive dependence of Serbia on the EU and CEFTA markets, both in terms of 
export and investment. Such high concentration on a limited number of markets makes its 
economy very vulnerable in times of global economic fluctuations. As presented, in terms of 
export, despite noticeable improvement during the observed period, from 67,1 % in 2004 to 
60,4 % in 2016, for what the largest credits has active commercial diplomacy, Serbia is still 
too dependent on the markets of the EU and CEFTA. In terms of investment, the presented 
data disclose a slightly positive, but still far from satisfying trend in the sense of 
(geographical) diversification. More concretely, concerning inward FDI, a share of the EU in 
Serbia's total FDI has decreased from 67,3 % in 2010 to 63 % in 2016. Likewise, a share of 
Europe (EU + other non-EU European countries) has decreased from 90,1 % in 2010 to 80,1 
% in 2016. Going more in detail, illustrated facts show that the number of non-EU countries 
in Serbia's top 20 inward FDI source countries has gone from 5 in 2010 to 9 in 2016. Or, in 
terms of value, during the observed period, a share of non-EU in Serbia's total attracted FDI 
has increased from 27,1 % to 33,9 %, whereas a share of non-European (attracted) FDI has 
increased from 4,7 % to 17,2 %. In terms of outward FDI, mixed results are evidenced. 
During the period 2010–2016, a share of Serbia's EU-based FDI has gone to worse, in other 
words it has increased from 25,8 % to 45,5 %, whereas European-based (FDI) has decreased, 
from 98,5 % to 87,5 %, meaning (that) noticeable diversification has been achieved. 
Furthermore, the number of non-EU countries which hosted FDI from Serbia has decreased 
from 10 to 8 in the same period. Or, in terms of value, a share of non-EU based FDI in 
Serbia's total has decreased from 79 % in 2010 to 50,6 % in 2016. However, on the contrary, 
a share of Serbia's non-European based FDI has increased, from 0,8 % in 2010 to 5,7 % in 
2016, implying achieved diversification in European countries other than (of/from) the EU.  
Taught by bad experience of the world economic crisis in 2007/'08, having seen how 
detrimental global economic turbulences can be for Serbia's vulnerable transitional economy, 
many experts and policy makers in recent years started to outspokenly advocate that Serbia 
needs to orient towards the emerging markets with the aim to enhance economy 
internationalisation, and in that way decrease being overly contingent on the EU and CEFTA 
markets, both in terms of export and investment. To this end, commercial diplomacy stands 
as the most important instrument by means of which this can be accomplished.  
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5 Serbia's commercial diplomacy: general overview 
5.1 Institutional framework 
Commercial diplomacy of Serbia is a joint responsibility of and is executed by the institution 
of the President of the Republic, the ministries in the national Government, of which the main 
role have the Ministry of Trade, Tourism and Telecommunications (formerly Ministry of 
Foreign and Internal Trade and Telecommunications), Ministry of Economy (formerly 
Ministry of Economy and Regional Development) and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 
Nonetheless, the Prime Minister himself/herself does have an important role in conducting 
commercial diplomacy, what has particularly been the case in recent years. In addition, in 
carrying out commercial diplomacy tasks a notably important role also have the Chamber of 
Commerce and Industry of Serbia, and the Development Agency of Serbia (which recently 
took over responsibility from now already former Serbia Investment and Export Promotion 
Agency – SIEPA), primarily by means of offering assistance, expertise and training for 
current and prospective exporters, and helping promote Serbia as a suitable location for 
foreign investors, but also encourage domestic entrepreneurs to invest abroad. Moreover, 
though more indirectly, commercial diplomacy is also performed by regional and local 
export, investment and tourism promotion agencies, which all together are contributing to 
making Serbia a better place to work, rest and reside in. 
Furthermore, it is important to note that in 2007 the Serbian Government commenced the 
process of establishing the network of professional commercial diplomats (officially called 
economic counsellors). Institutional mechanism for the network was finalised in 2008 
following an agreement on transfer of responsibility from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
onto the then Ministry of Economy and Regional Development. Another transfer of 
responsibility was done in 2012 when the then Ministry of Foreign and Internal Trade and 
Telecommunications took over.138 The counsellors were seconded to Serbian diplomatic 
representative offices abroad during 2010 in 24 countries: 17 in the European Union, 6 across 
the neighbourhood region, and 5 in the countries deemed prosperous in business terms, 
namely: Russia, China, United States of America, Canada, and Japan. They were mainly 
tasked with facilitating prospective investors, both inward and outward, in some or all phases 
of investment realisation, what mainly included establishing contacts, providing information 
about conditions for investing, and organising visits for prospective investors in a partner 
                                                          
138 Open competition and subsequent selection of 28 counsellors was done in the second half of 2009. Training 
and preparation preceding their positioning took place in the first half of 2010.  
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country, be in Serbia (in case of inward investment) or a foreign country (in case of outward 
investment). Alike, their job also consisted of assisting domestic exporters by means of 
providing useful market-related information, organising visits at business fora, trade fairs and 
various business-related presentations, and working on finding suitable trade partners too. 
The network was gradually contracted over time, mainly as a consequence of budgetary cuts 
and rationalisation, especially in the neighbourhood region where there is no emphasised 
linguistic and cultural barriers for development of business and trade, but also due to poor 
results in some cities and countries, especially those overseas (Ministry of Foreign and 
Internal Trade and Telecommunications 2014). In this regard, it needs to be stressed that in 
order to ensure quality of delivered services, whether some kind of network be established in 
the future or not, diplomatic staff in Serbia's embassies needs to be well trained before their 
deployment and selected on the basis of merit exclusively. In addition, home-stationed staff 
in charge of commercial diplomacy needs to provide adequate and timely response to the 
business community, entrepreneurs in particular. In addition, it is important to emphasise that 
quality of delivered services is indeed hard to measure and quantify, and therefore there are 
insufficient information on it. 
In Table 5.1 is presented a summary of results of economic counsellors during their 
engagement abroad in between May 2010 and August 2012.139 
Table 5.1: Quantification of activities of economic counsellors during their deployment in Serbia's diplomatic 
and consular representative offices abroad, in numbers, in the period May 2010-August 2012 
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Beijing 170 3 3 20 15 20 21 12 36 145 
Berlin 237 3 1 17 4 20 16 11 12 89 
Bratislava 135 5 10 70 19 22 15 4 12 275 
Brussels 161 4 9 20 7 18 7 1 12 275 
Bucharest 500 2 6 71 71 39 7 3 5 209 
Budapest 110 / / 90 50 30 1 1 2 105 
Chicago 151 7 17 47 39 18 3 3 9 65 
Istanbul 219 1 2 97 35 21 8 2 12 247 
London 450 1 3 150 90 50 40 2 30 113 
                                                          
139 Data for other periods are not available. 
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Ljubljana 150 / / 60 40 25 6 2 7 200 
Ljubljana* 
250 1 5 200 54 23 12 4 6 168 
Skopje** 
Milan 600 9 18 33 30 44 12 2 85 132 
Moscow 28 / 2 38 27 41 2 22 18 244 
Munich 650 2 2 50 20 18 5 / 8 35 
Paris 350 2 8 75 30 23 13 2 16 151 
Podgorica 235 1 1 130 75 52 12 2 10 185 
Prague 90 1 5 40 14 26 4 2 5 110 
Rome 450 4 18 21 21 60 10 3 60 180 
Sarajevo 21 / / 86 49 13 5 2 11 247 
Sofia 180 1 1 85 38 17 6 3 10 72 
Stockholm 22 / 1 23 1 16 / / / 112 
Stuttgart 85 1 1 20 10 30 20 1 10 40 
Tokyo 240 1 9 45 30 52 15 4 22 110 
Vienna 500 11 19 100 50 150 56 17 45 150 
Zagreb 86 / / 45 21 33 8 12 5 350 
Аthens 322 3 6 92 75 56 6 3 16 287 
Кiev 80 / / 65 55 20 12 9 5 235 
Тоronto 200 2 6 40 19 23 2 5 / 50 
Total 6.672 65 153 1.83 988 944 324 134 469 4.581 
*Until April 2012 
Note: Ljubljana* and Skopje** were served by one economic counselor. There are no separate data available for 
the two cities. 
Note: From the perspective of an economic counsellors, a decision on investment in brought if some kind of a 
contractual document is signed, be it a memorandum, contract or an agreement. 
Source: Ministry of Foreign and Internal Trade and Telecommunications of the Republic of Serbia (2013d) 
In terms of organisational arrangement, in accordance to classification offered by Naray 
(2011) (see Table 3), Serbia's commercial diplomacy is closest to the corporatist type. It 
means that currently majority of its trade promotion activities is mostly done independently 
of the embassy, i.e. by the ministry in charge of trade (Ministry of Trade, Tourism and 
Telecommunications). However, as in case with Germany, the exception to this type is the 
fact that trade promotion is also done by the country's diplomatic representations. Moreover, 
trade promotion is also done by the country's (specialised) development agency, what gives it 
features of a pragmatist type too. In addition, it needs to be mentioned that in the past Serbia's 
commercial diplomacy was mostly of a developing country type in the sense that most of its 
commercial diplomacy activities was conducted by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, but by 
embassies too, though to a lesser extent. 
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5.2 Export promotion 
The Serbian Government, mainly via its Development Agency, helps to facilitate and 
encourage current and prospective domestic export-oriented enterprises in their business 
endeavours abroad, primarily by means of offering expertise, enabling contacts, providing 
market information, finance opportunities, and representing them at many fairs and other 
promotion-related events across the world, such as:  
 PRODEXPO in Moscow, Russia 
 HANNOVER MESSE in Hannover, Germany 
 PLMA in Amsterdam, the Netherlands 
 WORLD FOOD MOSCOW in Moscow, Russia 
 SIAL in Paris, France. 
Furthermore, the Development Agency of Serbia is keeping an online database which enables 
domestic supplier companies to present their raw, semi-finished or finished products to 
prospective international trade partners or investors. The database currently includes the 
following fields/industries: aircraft industry, automobile industry, services, chemical industry, 
leather and textile industry, civil engineering, electrical engineering and electronics, industry 
of food and beverages, machine industry and metallurgy, packaging, pharmaceutical industry, 
plastics and rubber industry, software and IT industry, and lumber industry. Moreover, in 
order to enable as larger market outreach for export-oriented industries as possible, the 
Serbian Government has provided conditions for strong compliance with main international 
standards that are currently available: 
 CE (Conformité Européenne) standard – related to security of products, 
 ISO (International Organisation for Standardisation) standard(s) – In Serbia 4 main 
ISO standards are implemented: (1) ISO 9001 – related to quality management 
system, (2) ISO 14001 – related to ecological management, (3) ISO 22000 – related to 
food security, and (4) OHSAS 18001 – related to protection and security of 
employees,  
 HACCP (Hazard Analysis Critical Control Points) – related to food security, 
 BIO – Organic Certification – related to food security, 
 BRC (British Retail Consortium) – related to food security, 
 KOSHER – related to food security for the Jewish people, 
 HALAL – related to food security for the Muslim people, 
 GLOBAL GAP – related to food security, 
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 FSC COC – related to ecological and socially acceptable exploitation of forests, 
 FIDIC (Fédération International Des Ingénieurs - Conseils) – related to investment 
standards mainly in the field of civil engineering (Development Agency of Serbia 
2018). 
5.3 Investment promotion 
Concerning investment promotion, it is worth noting that Serbia is the leading country in the 
world in terms of a share of working places opened by foreign companies relative to total 
population. Since 2007 Serbia has managed to attract over 21 billion EUR of FDI. Planned 
inward investments in the coming years are estimated to be worth around 5 billion EUR, and 
they should create about 38,000 new working places. Favourable conditions of Serbia that are 
highly conducive for foreign investors are: (1) high-quality work force, (2) suitable 
geographical location, (3) generous financial stimuli, (4) tax free export in the market of 1.1 
billion people, and (4) the lowest corporate tax in Europe in the amount of 15 %. In terms of 
financial stimuli, Serbia offers highly generous incentives. Investment projects eligible for 
subsidies are the following: 
 Investment in the amount of 100,000 EUR or more, and creation of at least 10 new 
working places in areas (cities or municipalities) classified as devastated, 
 Investment in the amount of 200,000 EUR or more, and creation of at least 20 new 
working places in areas (cities or municipalities) falling within the 4th group of 
development,140 
 Investment in the amount of 300,000 EUR or more, and creation of at least 30 new 
working places in areas (cities or municipalities) falling within the 3th group of 
development,141 
 Investment in the amount of 400,000 EUR or more, and creation of at least 40 new 
working places in areas (cities or municipalities) falling within the 2nd group of 
development,142 
                                                          
140 4th group: Aleksinac, Babušnica, Bela Palanka, Blace, Bojnik, Bosilegrad, Brus, Bujanovac, Varvarin, 
Vladičin Han, Vlasotince, Gadžin Han, Golubac, Dimitrovgrad, Doljevac, Žabari, Žagubica, Žitorađa, 
Knjaževac, Krupanj, Kuršumlija, Kučevo, Lebane, Ljig, Mali Zvornik, MaloCrniće, Medveđa, Merošina, 
Mionica, Nova Varoš, Opovo, Petrovac na Mlavi, Preševo, Priboj, Prijepolje, Ražanj, Raška, Rekovac, Svrljig, 
Sjenica, Surdulica, Trgovište, Tutin, Crna Trava. 
141 3rd group: Alibunar, Bajina Bašta, Batočina, Bač, Bela Crkva, Bogatić, Boljevac, Velika Plana, Veliko 
Gradište, Vladimirci, Despotovac, Žabalj, Žitište, Ivanjica, Irig, Kladovo, Knić, Kovačica, Kovin, Koceljeva, 
Kraljevo, Leskovac, Loznica, Lučani, Ljubovija, Mali Iđoš, Negotin, Nova Crnja, Novi Bečej, Novi Pazar, 
Osečina, Odžaci, Paraćin, Plandište, Prokuplje, Svilajnac, Sečanj, Smederevska Palanka, Sokobanja, Srbobran, 
Titel, Trstenik, Ćićevac, Ub, Čoka, Šid. 
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 Investment in the amount of 500,000 EUR or more, and creation of at least 50 new 
working places in areas (cities or municipalities) falling within the 1st group of 
development,143 
 Investment in the service sector in the amount of 150,000 EUR or more, whose 
business scope is also to include international trade, and creation of at least 15 new 
working places, 
 Investment in the sector of agriculture and fisheries in the amount of 2,000,000 EUR 
or more, and creation of at least 25 new working places (Development Agency of 
Serbia 2018). 
Types of incentives offered are: 
 subsidising (costs of) gross salaries of new working places: (a) 20 % of the (costs of) 
gross salaries for the 1st group of municipalities (up to 3,000 EUR for a new working 
place); (b) 25 % respectively for the 2nd group (up to 4,000 EUR for a new working 
place), (c) 30 % for the 3rd group (5,000 EUR for a new working place), (d) 35 % for 
the 4th group (6,000 EUR for a new working place), and (e) 40 % for highly 
undeveloped/economically devastated localities (up to 7,000 EUR for a new working 
place);  
 additional incentives for labour-intensive projects: (a) 10 % of gross salary (cost) for 
each new working place over 200 already opened working places by a foreign 
investor, (b) 15 % for each new working place over 500 already opened working 
places by a foreign investor, and (c) 20 % for each new working place over 1,000 
already opened working places by a foreign investor;  
 incentives for investment (costs) in fixed assets: (a) up to 10 % for the 1st group of 
municipalities, (b) up to 15 % for the 2nd group, (c) up to 20 % for the 3rd group, (d) up 
to 25 % for the 4th group, and (e) up to 30 % for economically highly 
undeveloped/devastated areas. 
Deadline for implementation of investments and creation of new working places is: 
 up to 3 years from the date of applying for subsidies (exceptionally can be extended to 
5 years), 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
142 2nd group: Ada, Aleksandrovac, Apatin, Aranđelovac, Arilje, Bačka Topola, Bački Petrovac, Bečej, Vranje, 
Vrnjačka Banja, Gornji Milanovac, Zaječar, Zrenjanin, Inđija, Jagodina, Kikinda, Kosjerić, Kruševac, Kula, 
Lapovo, Majdanpek, Novi Kneževac, Pirot, Požega, Rača, Ruma, Smederevo, Sombor, Sremska Mitrovica, 
Sremski Karlovci, Temerin, Topola, Čajetina, Šabac. 
143 1st group: Bačka Palanka, Belgrade, Beočin, Bor, Valjevo, Vrbas, Vršac, Kanjiža, Kragujevac, Lajkovac, Niš, 
Novi Sad, Pančevo, Pećinci, Požarevac, Senta, Stara Pazova, Subotica, Užice, Čačak. 
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 up to 10 years from the date of applying for subsidies for investments that are 
regarded as being of special importance (for economic development of local areas or 
country as a whole). 
Subsidies are also offered by the National Employment Service for the Employment 
Subsidies Programme, Apprentice Programme and the Re-training Programme (Development 
Agency of Serbia 2018). Given that a vast majority of foreign investors in Serbia are 
beneficiaries of these subsidies, it is widely regarded that they have certainly been one of key 
factors in attracting the investors.144 
5.3.1 Free business zones  
With the aim to make Serbia an attractive investment location, the government went on to 
establish free business zones, modelled upon good practice in other countries worldwide.145 
Free business zones offer business- and investment-friendly conditions, such as exemption 
from VAT and customs on import of materials for the export-oriented production, then 
machines, equipment and construction material. Profit obtained in free business zones is tax 
free and can be transferred into any country, including Serbia, without any permission. 
Currently there are 14 free business zones in Serbia, in: Pirot,146 Subotica,147 Zrenjanin,148 
Novi Sad,149 Kragujevac,150 Šabac,151 Užice,152 Smederevo,153 Kruševac,154 Svilajnac,155 
                                                          
144 In line with the noted, Blomström and Kokko (2003) argue that in order to attract as much foreign investment 
as possible and in that way stimulate domestic economic development, more and more countries worldwide 
resort to giving incentives in various forms, such as lower taxes, grants, preferential loans, market preferences, 
infrastructure and even monopoly rights. In addition, in this context it is important to mention Laffont and 
Martimort (2002) who wrote about the theory of incentives and their importance for economy from the time of 
Adam Smith until contemporary age. 
145 In terms of the impact of free/special business zones in general, Aggarwal (2007) notes that despite the fact 
that such zones are generally regarded as strongly beneficial for industrialisation, employment and regional 
development [especially in developing countries], their positive impact (at least in case of India) on the home 
country economic development remains controversial, especially in terms of labour standards, technology 
upgrade and human capital formation. Gopalakrishnan (2007) shares a similar view in terms of negative effects 
of the zones in China. 
146 ,,TIGAR TYRES” - production of automobile tyres; ,,TIGAR OBUĆA” - production of footwear made of 
rubber; ,,TIGAR TEHNIČKA GUMA” - production of rubber products; ,,ELISA PRO” - herbal and cosmetic 
products; “TERI Engineering” - solutions based on the “key in hand” principle; “Best Tobaco” - production of 
filter cigarette; “D Company” - tool factory for the rubber industry. 
147 ,,SIEMENS Loher Elektro” - production of wind turbines; ,,Dunkermotoren GmbH” - production of motors 
for mobile shutters; ,,NORMA GROUP” - products for industrial purposes and distribution; „CONTITECH 
FLUID SERBIA” d.о.о. - production of components for the automobile industry; „Swarovski“ - jewelry 
production. 
148 ,,KOLPA”- production of shower cabins, baths and hydromassage devices; ,,LK Armature” - production of 
steel tubes; ,,DRAEXLMAIER” - production of parts/components for the automobile industry. 
149 ,,BELARUS-AGROPANONKA” - assembly and storing of tractors; ,,NIS Gasprom Njeft” - Oil Refinery 
Novi Sad (part of the complex); ,,CONQUEST SRB” - production of utility equipment, production of 
equipment for landscaping and maintenance of green areas, equipment for summer and winter maintenance of 
roads, urban mobiles and equipment for playgrounds; ,,FROBAS GMBH/FROBAS” D.O.O. - design, 
development and production of electronic devices. 
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Apatin, Vranje, Priboj and Belgrade. More than 200 foreign companies are doing business in 
the business zones across Serbia, which in total employ more than 20,000 people 
(Development Agency of Serbia 2018). Having that Serbia has a very favourable 
geographical position, being at the crossroads between the Eastern, Western and Northern 
part of Europe, doing business in its free zones makes the companies have earier access to 
many markets, of which the most important is the market of the European Union. Import and 
export of goods and raws is unlimited. The goods being exported onto the Serbian domestic 
market are classified as foreign. The companies operating within the zones get more 
favourable conditions for doing business in terms of rental fee. Just for illustration, in 2015 
the free zones had a turnover of approximately 5 billion EUR, what is almost double (97 % 
precisely) in comparison to the year before. Export from the free zones makes for 1/5 of 
Serbia's total export. The free business zones are responsibility of the Administration for Free 
Zones (of the Ministry of Finance of Serbia), established in 2008 (Ministry of Finance of the 
Republic of Serbia – Free Zones Administration 2018). The Development Agency of Serbia 
also keeps the base of investment locations in Serbia, and is working to encourage local 
communities across Serbia to participate in programmes of the National Alliance for Local 
Economic Development (NALED) and the Regional Council for Business-Conducive 
Environment in South-East Europe, to get business-friendly certificate, and in that way 
increase prospects to attract interested investors (Development Agency of Serbia 2018). 
In Tables 5.2 and 5.3 are presented main indicators which point to strong justification of 
establishing free business zones in Serbia. Among other things, it can be seen that in the 
period 2009–2016 (for which data are available), their number almost quadrupled, the volume 
of (attracted) investment went up by well more than 1000 %, the number of employees 
increased by over 400 %, as well as did the number of users/beneficiaries which rose by 
almost 50 %. Certainly one of the most significant indicators is the one which shows that the 
share of the free zones' (total) export in Serbia's total export increased from 3,3 % to 14,8 %. 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
150 ,,FIAT AUTOMOBILI SRBIJA”  - automobile industry; ,,MAGNETI MARELLI” - automobile industry; 
,,MAGNETI MARELLI AUTOMOTIVE” - automobile industry; ,,SIGIT” - car industry; ,,JOHNSON 
CONTROLS AUTOMOTIVE” - automobile industry; ,,JCMM AUTOMOTIVE” - automobile industry; ,,PMC 
AUTOMOTIVE” - automobile industry. 
151 ,,SBE SRBIJA” ( MEMBER OF VESCOVINI GROUP) - production of parts/components for the automobile 
industry. 
152 ,,Valjaonica bakra Sevojno” - production of copper and copper alloys; ,,Impol Seval Valjaonica aluminijuma 
a.d.Sevojno” - aluminum production; ,,ATLAS” - furniture production; ,,COPPER COM” - trade and production 
of copper. 
153 ,,METECH” - sheet metal products; „PKC Group“- production of cable sets for commercial vehicles. 
154 ,,Trajal korporacija”а.d. - manufacture of rubber and chemical products. 
155 ,,Panasonic” - production of electronic devices (Ministry of Finance of the Republic of Serbia - Free Zones 
Administration 2018). 
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Based on positive experience with the business zones and strong pro-business government 
policies and measures, it is very likely to expect that the trend of opening, i.e. establishing 
new free business zones, as well as expansion of those already in operation will continue in 
the years to come.  
Table 5.2: Main business indicators with reference to free (business) zones in Serbia 
Year 
Number of 
free zones 
Volume of 
investment* 
Number of 
employed 
Number of 
users 
Number of 
foreign users 
Share** 
2009 4 19.038 4.915 181 101 55.8% 
2010 7 71.212 7.853 211 105 49.8% 
2011 7 387.284 7.929 161 67 41.6% 
2012 9 755.605 14.579 173 84 48.6% 
2013 9 197.885 18.313 226 100 44.2% 
2014 12 208.709 19.255 262 98 37.4% 
2015 13 155.763 22.242 240 86 35.8% 
2016 14 236.410 25.175 265 95 35.8% 
Change*** 250.0% 1141.8% 412.2% 46.4% 
  *In million EUR 
**Share of a number of foreign users in the total number of users 
***Change for the period 2009–2016 (the period for which data are available) 
Source: Ministry of Finance of the Republic of Serbia - Free Zones Administration - Reports on Doing Business 
of Free Zones in the Republic of Serbia (2009, 5, 10; 2010, 6, 12; 2011, 11, 21; 2012–2013, 11, 26; 2014, 12, 
30; 2015, 11, 30; 2016, 12, 33) 
Table 5.3: Main indicators with reference to free (business) zones in Serbia, in million EUR 
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2009 557.2   278.6   225.9   52.6   226.0 81.10% 3.30% 
2010 973.2 74.70% 368.4 32.20% 432.5 91.50% 172.4 227.40% 196.0 53.20% 3.80% 
2011 1280.3 31.60% 554.5 50.50% 568.5 31.40% 153.4 -11.00% 401.2 72.30% 4.70% 
2012 2499.6 95.20% 890.2 60.50% 1445.0 154.20% 159.9 4.30% 730.3 82.00% 7.90% 
2013 4935.1 97.40% 2164.6 143.20% 2247.8 55.60% 513.8 221.30% 1650.7 76.30% 14.80% 
2014 4794.9 -2.80% 2119.9 -2.10% 2174.9 -3.20% 482.1 -6.20% 1637.9 77.30% 14.30% 
2015 4625.2 -3.50% 2123.3 0.20% 2038.2 -6.30% 445.9 -7.50% 1677.4 79.00% 15.90% 
2016 4822.1 4.30% 2207.3 4.00% 2137.7 4.90% 449.4 0.80% 1757.9 79.60% 14.80% 
 
765.5% 
 
692.2% 
 
846.4% 
 
753.7% 
 
677.8% 
   
*Value of realised turnover of goods and services 
**Share of exported abroad (from the free zones) in the free zones' total export 
***Share of the free zones' (total) export in Serbia's total export 
Note: Data before 2009 are not available. 
Source: Ministry of Finance of the Republic of Serbia - Free Zones Administration - Reports on Doing Business 
of Free Zones in the Republic of Serbia (2009–2010, 2; 2011, 3; 2012, 4; 2013, 3; 2014–2016, 4) 
 
However, since the profit obtained in the zones can be taken out tax free, and therefore the 
country has little benefit from them in that regard, it is highly important that in this phase the 
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Serbian authorities find ways to take maximum advantage of the transfer of technology and 
know-how, and stimulate domestic investment based on innovations and sophisticated 
technology, in order to create conditions for GDP growth and economic development at the 
same time. On the contrary, Serbia's GDP growth will not follow the growth of employment, 
what means a risk of falling into a permanent medium development phase, and becoming 
totally dependent on foreign investors in terms of employment.  
5.4 Tourism promotion 
The Serbia Tourism Organisation, in joint cooperation with regional and local tourism 
organisations and agencies are actively working on promoting Serbia as a worth visiting 
destination to explore and enjoy in, with special focus on mountain and spa tourism.156 They 
regularly take part at numerous regional and international tourism promotional events and 
initiatives in order to advertise Serbia. The core of tourist offer of Serbia makes the 
following: 
 nature: national parks (4), nature parks (5), protected landscapes (7), nature reserves 
(2), wetlands (5), natural monuments (5), caves (7) and river and lakes (7), 
 destinations: cities and municipalities, villages, spas and health resorts (28) and 
mountain resorts (10), 
 culture: cultural routes (3), UNESCO list sites (monasteries and monuments), 
archaeological sites (9), monasteries (other than those on the UNESCO list), religious 
buildings, museums and galleries, folk architecture, manor houses, and fortresses and 
fortifications (5), 
 activities: sport and recreation (bicycling, horse riding, walking and hiking, skiing, 
sailing and rowing), adventure (free climbing, flying, log rafting, caving, and 
orienteering) and fauna (fishing, hunting, bird watching) (National Tourism 
Organisation of Serbia 2018a). 
Apart from the national tourism organisation which is (mainly) in charge of carrying out 
promotional activities, the main, so to say, administrative body in charge of tourism 
                                                          
156 Places of special focus are: cities of Belgrade and Novi Sad with all their cultural heritage, Lepenski Vir – 
the archeological site in the Djerdap Gorge, Gamzigrad – a native town of Roman emperor Galerius Felix 
Romuliana, Viminacium – a Roman town, Djerdap National Park, Tara National Park, Kopaonik National Park 
(National Tourism Organisation of Serbia 2018a). 
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promotion is the Ministry of Trade, Tourism and Telecommunications, i.e. its sector for 
tourism,157 whose activity scope generally encompasses the following: 
 implementation of the national Law on Tourism and the countrywide Strategy for the 
Development of Tourism,  
 monitoring over and/or doing analysis of the impact of (existing) legal framework and 
economic policies on the development of tourism in Serbia, and giving proactive 
proposals with the aim to overcome eventual shortcomings and/or further enhance 
development of tourism countrywide, 
 analysing the current state of affairs with regard to tourist offer of Serbia in general, 
and giving adequate proposals for its improvement,  
 implementation of master plans, 
 promoting tourism as a field of economy and educating staff working in the sector of 
tourism at all levels of the authority in Serbia, with the aim to stimulate employment, 
 analysing planned investment projects in the field of tourism, and giving proactive 
proposals, 
 proclaiming tourist sites and areas, and helping create sustainable development in 
those areas, and 
 monitoring over and/or analysing current state of affairs at the tourism market 
(situation with regard to formation of tourist clusters and availability of tourism 
products) (Ministry of Trade, Tourism and Telecommunications of the Republic of 
Serbia 2018). 
                                                          
157 In the Sector there are four departments: Department for Market Research and Development of Tourism 
Products, Department for Competitiveness in Tourism, Department for Plan and Analysis, and Department for 
Quality Management in Tourism (Ministry of Trade, Tourism and Telecommunications of the Republic of 
Serbia 2018). 
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6 Case studies  
In this chapter, which represents the empirical core of the research, will be presented three 
case studies: Serbia-Russia, Serbia-Turkey and Serbia-China. They are divided into two main 
parts. The first part (of each of the case studies) will deal with the three mentioned emerging 
markets in focus of the research, first from the perspective of their importance for developing 
and/or transitional countries such as Serbia, and then from the perspective of their rising 
global role and promising business prospects in the future.  
With reference to the first (i.e. their importance for developing and/or transitional countries), 
in order to best demonstrate how important orienting towards those markets is, especially for 
developing countries in transition like Serbia, a comparison will be made of Russia, Turkey 
and China separately, either with other BRICS economies (in case of China and Russia, since 
they belong to this group of countries), or all BRICS economies (in case of Turkey, which is 
not part of this group), or thus with the world’s 10 largest economies in terms of nominal 
GDP value (China will be compared with other 9, since it itself belongs to the top 10). In 
some cases, that is, with some indicators, when comparison with other countries, be it either 
of the two mentioned groups, so to say, makes visual confusion amid strongly discontinuous 
and overlapping annual values, only a target country (of the three is focus), will be presented 
with the aim to provide clearer understanding of presented illustration. On the other side, with 
reference to the latter (i.e. their rising global role and promising business prospects in the 
future), a list of indicators will be used, whose number varies between the three countries, as 
they are selected in accordance with specificities of each of the countries which best reflect 
their position in areas that matter, though a large number of them (meaning indicators) is 
nevertheless the same for all the three countries.  
On the basis of strong theoretical background (given in the theoretical part of the research), 
i.e. illustrated evidence on the highly positive causality between export, its geographical 
diversification and FDI, on one side, and economic growth and/or development, on the other, 
the second part of them (meaning of each of the case studies) will deal with the core issue(s). 
More concretely, it tends to explore whether and to what extent Serbia’s commercial 
diplomacy towards the three emerging markets has contributed to internationalisation of its 
economy, primarily by means of enhancing trade (with focus on export), investment (both 
inward and outward, with focus on the first) and tourism. 
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From a methodological point of view, the three case studies will be conducted pursuant to the 
stipulated in subchapter 1.3. In accordance to reasoning of Welch et al. (2011)158 and Tsang 
(2013),159 the focus will be on contextual explanation of natural, i.e. empirical 
experiment/investigation, what will make the basis for theoretical building.160 
6.1 Case study 1: Serbia–Russia  
6.1.1 Russia as emerging market: advantages and challenges  
6.1.1.1 Early stages of transition  
In its early stage, Russian transition into a market economy was marked by large scale 
privatisation, liberalisation of prices and decentralisation (Ghosh et al. 2009, 19–20).161 
However, it turned out that conducted measures were unsuccessful in reviving vulnerable 
domestic economy. Baranov (2014, 6–7) argues that failure to achieve economic progress in 
the first stage of transition in Russia was mainly due to the following factors: (1) ruined 
economic relations with newly independent countries (formerly Soviet republics) as a 
consequence of the dissolution of the Soviet Union; (2) fallacious and myopic fiscal and 
taxation policy that resulted in discouraging the business sector to operate under fully legal 
conditions; (3) reforms were done in a wrong order - poorly controlled price liberalisation led 
to inflation and loss of personal savings of the population as well as of enterprises’ assets; 
resultantly, vast majority of population could not take part in privatisation; (4) overly 
military-oriented economic structure inherited from the Soviet time could not make the basis 
for economic development in transition, causing economic downturn; hence, a number of 
                                                          
158 Welch et al. (2011, 755–756) made a typology of theorising in international business, which consists of 
causal explanation and contextualisation, based on which they distinguish (between) four methods of it 
(meaning theorising), namely: inductive theory-building, interpretive sense-making, natural experiment and 
contextualised explanation. Of those, the authors especially stressed the importance of contextualised 
explanation which they did not find in many of conducted case studies served as sample for their research. 
159 Based on the (mentioned) typology of Welch et al. (2011), Tsang (2013, 195) constructed his own 
alternation, namely: interpretive sense-making, contextualised explanation, empirical regularity, and theory 
building and testing. 
160 With reference to the selection of the case study method, Fletcher et al. (2018) and Siggelkow (2007) argue 
that it is highly suitable for studying/researching the field of international business. Fletcher et al. (2018) 
distinguish between the theory- and phenomenon-driven (case study) approaches in applying this method, and 
stress the need for clearer explanation in case when it (meaning the case study method) is selected. On the other 
side, Siggelkow (2007, 21) argues that case study method „helps sharpen existing theory by pointing to gaps and 
beginning to fill them.“ As general weakness of this method the author points out „lack of selectivity and 
presentation of only those details that relate to the conceptual arguments“ Siggelkow (2007, 23). In addition, in 
this context it is also important to mention the reasoning of Poulis et al. (2013) who wrote in favour of a 
sampling framework which gives importance to contextualisation and sampling decisions in researching 
international issues. The authors further emphasise the importance of population taken as sample in conducting 
a case study and the related cross-cultural differences which may prove to be a hindering factor for the 
researcher, especially if the observed population is relatively unknown to him/her. Likewise, importance is also 
given to contextual appropriateness of case selection. 
161 Soon after Putin came into power, transition based on postulates of liberalisation was stalled to a large extent 
(Ghosh et al. 2009, 19–20). 
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new economic sectors needed to be developed; (5) lack of experience among managers to 
operate under new circumstances, what resulted in a high level of inefficacy. The already 
poor transitional restructuring and unsatisfying economic performance during the first decade 
of transition were additionally aggravated by the 1998 economic crisis which primarily 
occurred due to heavy macroeconomic imbalances, such as flawed privatisation and price 
liberalisation, then low oil prices at the world market during the 1997–1998 period, and 
negative effects of the Asian crisis, which altogether made the Russian economy extremely 
vulnerable to external economic shocks (de Souza 2008, 14). In order to offer better 
understanding about the causes of the crisis, the author said about it the following: “The 
Russian crisis itself was part of a long series of similar crises throughout the 1990s,162 linked 
to the fundamentally unsustainable nature of a hard(er) exchange rate regime without a 
consistent policy mix in an environment of liberalised capital flows.” However, the author 
argues that overall the initial reforms during the 1990s cannot be regarded as fully inefficient, 
since they, among other things, enabled establishment of institutions necessary for normal 
functioning of the market economy system, and opened up Russia to the world (de Souza 
2008, 14).  
Economic reforms that were conducted following the economic crisis in 1998 and 
particularly rising global demand for fuels have substantially contributed to Russia’s rapid 
economic growth since 1998 (Baranov 2014, 7). The post 1998 crisis period was also marked 
by a notable improvement of labour productivity, which level increased primarily thanks to: 
(1) institutional reform and, in relation to that, establishment of the market economy, (2) 
development of human resources,163 and (3) increase of capital investment (Baranov 2014, 9–
10). 
6.1.1.2 Putin’s era – Russia consolidating power 
Russia's economic recovery and growth coincided with Vladimir Putin's coming into power 
(Voigt and Hockmann 2008), who strongly advocated the need to change the then current 
development model (Bodrova and Ogneva 2013, 140). Having won his first mandate as 
President, Putin started conducting economic reforms (Sally in OECD 2008, 129). He 
invested intense efforts primarily to strengthen the rule of law and curb the influence of the 
                                                          
162 “These crises included the 1992–1993 travails of the Exchange Rate Mechanism I (ERM-I) in the EU, the 
1994 Mexican collapse, the 1997 Asian crisis, the 1999 Brazilian turmoil, and 2001 Argentinian experience.” 
(de Souza 2008, 14). 
163 Russia heavily invested in higher education. An interesting fact is that 50 % of revenues invested in higher 
education come from the private sector. The number of university degree graduates increased from 16 % in 
1992 to 28 % in 2008 (Baranov 2014, 10). 
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mighty oligarchs at the time (Ghosh et al. 2009, 20). In July 2000 the Russian Government 
brought the Social and Economic Policy Programme 2000–2010”, publicly known as the 
“Gref Plan”, named after Herman Gref, the then Russian minister for economic development 
and trade.164 The plan itself encompassed social and economic measures deemed necessary 
for economic recovery of the country. The social policy included the following measures: (a) 
improving protection of socially vulnerable households, (b) providing basic social benefits 
for the population, especially health care and education, (c) increasing the purchasing power 
of the population, (d) attracting financial means from households and enterprises into funds 
aimed for functioning and operation of social institutions, and (e) reforming labour legislation 
to enable better mobility of the labour force and balance the interests between the workers, 
employers and the state. The economic policy included the following measures: (a) adopting 
business- and investment-friendly legal framework (with focus on improving various 
property rights), (b) lowering tax burden (with focus on lowering average customs rates, 
abolishment of customs privileges and modernisation of customs service) and providing 
financial stability (with focus on the reform of the banking system, including liquidation of 
insolvent banks and introduction of deposit guarantees), and (c) conducting structural 
changes, reforming the monopolies, developing the financial system and investing in research 
and development, especially in the area of technical sciences (with focus on privatisation of 
state-owned enterprises and improvement of management in existing state-owned enterprises, 
then on more public investment in the area of research and development and joint venture 
investment, as well as on demonopolisation in the fields of power supply, 
telecommunications and transport infrastructure) (de Souza 2008, 43–44).  
Still, Russia’s rapid economic recovery and growth owes special credit primarily to export of 
fuels165 (Ahrend 2006, 2) and their rising global demand and prices (Ghosh et al. 2009, 22), 
especially since the year 2000 onward (de Souza 2008, 38). In the period 1999–2008, high 
price of oil in the world market made that Russia double its GDP and average household 
income (Ershov 2013, 85). As a result, Russia managed to achieve macroeconomic 
stabilisation (Ahrend 2006, 15) and improve living standard, as will be demonstrated later in 
this chapter. Accumulated budget surplus and well devised fiscal policy were key in 
stimulating investment flows (Ahrend 2006, 14). 
                                                          
164 Gref drafted most of the document in cooperation with the Bureau of Economic Analysis, a think tank 
associated with the Ministry of Finance (de Souza 2008, 43–44). 
165 Russia is very rich in energy resources – it possesses the world’s largest gas reserves, second largest coal, 
and eight largest oil reserves (Sally in OECD 2008, 130). 
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Attraction of inward FDI has been recognised as a priority for national economic 
development, assumed being a generator of production and employment, and contributing to 
modernisation and advancement of management and know-how in general (Bodrova and 
Ogneva 2013, 140). Furthermore, under Putin, the public-private partnership was introduced 
as a new form of investing, and the new Industrial Policy was introduced too, which, in 
essence, gave the state primacy over liberal, open market economic principles [that most 
transitional post-communist countries of Central and Eastern Europe at the time adopted as 
the new, primary economic principle]. In practice, the new policy implied greater interference 
of the state in the economy (Ghosh et al. 2009, 20). The state interference in strategic sectors 
of the economy was occasionally so emphasised that it took the elements of oligopoly and 
even monopoly (Sally in OECD 2008, 132).166 Large state-owned enterprises (such as 
Gazprom, Rosneft and Transneft) were given advantageous status over their private 
counterparts (Sally in OECD 2008, 129).  
In line with the mentioned, it is also worth noting that accumulated reserves prompted the 
Russian authorities to establish the Stabilisation Fund in 2004, subsequently transformed into 
the Reserve Fund and the National Welfare Fund in 2008. The primary idea behind 
establishing the Stabilisation Fund was to avoid negative effects on the domestic economy of 
any future fluctuations of world fuels prices, based on negative experience from the 1980s 
and 1990s (Baranov 2014, 14). The upper level of the Reserve Fund was set at 10 % of 
planned GDP for the coming fiscal year. The Ministry of Finance claimed the Reserve Fund 
would be able to cover losses from a decrease of oil prices in the world market for the period 
of three years. The Fund proved as a good solution, as it was resorted to covering up 
budgetary deficit during the 2008/2010 economic crisis (Baranov 2014, 15). Russia’s 
economic recovery at the time was so vigorous that it enabled the country to strengthen 
military defence capacities with success, and even to invest in space programmes (Ghosh et 
al. 2009, 19). 
6.1.1.3 Advantages of Russia as an emerging market  
As illustrated in Figure G1 (see Appendix G), in the first decade of transition, GDP growth 
rate in Russia went through several sharp ups and downs. In 1991 it reached the lowest rate of 
-14,5 %, after which started to move up scale to reach the record high of 10 % in 2000. 
                                                          
166 Other authors too such as Ghosh et al. (2009, 19) argue that Russia still seems to be burdened by the 
communist legacy in the sense of the role and interference of the state in the economy, sometimes resembling 
central planning. 
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Growth was maintained stable through much of the second decade of transition, to fall 
sharply during the 2007/’08 world economic crisis, after what it recovered well, to start to 
move down scale again, having negative value in the last couple of years, what is mainly due 
to being imposed international sanctions for alleged military involvement in the civil war in 
eastern Ukraine. It can also be seen that of all the BRICS countries, until the emergence of 
the 2007/’08 world economic crisis, overall, Russia managed to keep the pace of growth with 
much success, with only China and India being ahead of it. In addition, Russia’s GDP in 
terms of monetary value is one of the world’s largest. In 2016 it took the 12th position 
(globally), being worth 1,283 billion (see the Appendix). GDP per capita growth rate has 
largely been a reflection of GDP growth rate, as illustrated in Figure G2 (see Appendix G). 
As Figure G3 (see Appendix G) shows, in terms of GDP per capita expressed in hard 
currency, of all the BRICS countries Russia has recorded the highest growth over the 
observed period. Its GDP per capita has increased from 1,330 USD in 1999 to 9,057 USD in 
2015. That value would probably have been much higher, around 15,000 USD (in 2013 it was 
15,544 USD), had international sanctions not been imposed on Russia, impact of which, 
among other things) had also negatively affected Russia’s GDP per capita value. In terms of 
household consumption per capita growth expressed in hard currency, it has increased from 
2,535 USD in 1990 to 6,518 USD in 2014, as shown in Figure G4 (see Appendix G), which 
also shows that given the intensity of household consumption growth in Russia, it is likely 
that its per capita value surpass that of Brazil in near future. Another indicators where Russia 
stands well is in terms of outward FDI relative to GDP, whose rate increased from 1,2 % in 
1993 (it was 0 % in 1990–1992) to 19,1 % in 2015. The record high rate was in 2007 prior to 
the break out of the world economic crisis when it reached the figure of 26,2 %. The 
presented values are given in Figure G5 (see Appendix G). The related volume of outward 
FDI stock has increased from 2,3 billion USD in 1993 to 251,9 billion USD in 2015.The 
record high value in the amount of 363,4 billion was reached in 2007 prior to the world 
economic crisis, as shown in Figure G6 (see Appendix G). Furthermore, Russia has invested 
intense efforts in making the business environment conducive for doing business. If one 
would to register property in Russia, that would require the least number of procedures of all 
the world’s top ten largest economies. Although statistics for Russia for this particular 
indicator has become available only recently, Figure G7 (see Appendix G) shows that number 
of those procedures has decreased from 4 in 2013 to 3 in 2015. In all other presented 
countries that number varies in the range between 4 and 8. As given in Figure G8 (see 
Appendix G), Russia has also progressed in terms of time required to start a business. As is 
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the case with the previous indicator, statistics for this indicator too has become available only 
a few years ago, and it shows that the country has made notable progress in reducing time 
during which one could start doing business, bringing it in line with some of the world’s most 
entrepreneurial countries like Germany and Japan. Another indicator that shows that Russia is 
working to attract foreign companies and stimulate development of domestic 
entrepreneurship is one that points to taxes on income, profits and capital gains. As shown in 
Figure G9 (see Appendix G), of the world’s top economies Russia has kept the lowest tax 
rate ever since the end of the 1990s, managing to decrease them from 18,9 % in 1999 to 3,9 
% in 2014. Given that the country is facing international sanctions, it is very likely that the 
authorities will further decrease taxes in order to ease conditions for revival of the economy. 
Lastly, as it the case with many other transitional countries, Russia had to invest strong 
efforts to put under control inflationary pressures, as illustrated in Figure G10 (see Appendix 
G). In the early years of transition, the country had faced hyperinflation which in 1993 has 
reached staggering 874,6 %, which was gradually curbed to 5,1 % in 2012, but raised up 
again to 15,5 % in 2015, mainly due to fiscal measures taken as a response to the sanctions. 
In addition to all mentioned advantages, it is worth adding that Bodrova and Ogneva (2013, 
141) nicely summarised the advantages of Russia as an attractive business destination, as 
follows: (1) rapid economic growth, (2) favourable geographical position, (3) abundance of 
natural resources, (4) large population and consumer market, (5) high level of technological 
development of the economy (aviation industry, shipbuilding, automobile industry, 
pharmaceutical industry, metallurgy, nuclear physics), (6) government investment-friendly 
policy (strong investment promotion at both federal and regional level; establishment of the 
Investment Fund, Foreign Investment Advisory Council and Special Economic Zones), (7) 
investment-conducive taxation system – VAT is 18 %, personal income tax is 13 %, and 
corporate tax is 24 %, (8) well educated and highly skilled work force (focus on natural and 
applied sciences and engineering), and (9) investment-conducive legal framework. 
6.1.1.4 Why Russia has good prospects for the future businesswise? 
Russia is one of the emerging economies (compared to other BRICS countries) that managed 
to attract a large volume of FDI. In the first decade, the volume of inward FDI relative to 
GDP value was relatively modest, being in the range between 0,2 to just over 1,5 %, to come 
to substantially increase during the second decade of transition, reaching the record high of 
4,5 % in 2008, after which is gradually decreased to 0,5 % in 2015, as shown in Figure G11 
(see Appendix G). One of important development indicators where Russia is particularly well 
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standing is the amount of saving relative to GDP, which from 1989 to 2015 has mainly 
floated in the range between 25 to 35 %, as shown in Figure G12 (see Appendix G). Better 
volume of saving relative to GDP have only other two great emerging economies – China and 
India. If translated in hard currency, Russia is again in the company of the world’s greatest 
economies, managing to increase the amount of saving from 175,9 billion in 1990 to 385,5 
billion in 2015, as illustrated in Figure G13 (see Appendix G). As Figure G14 (see Appendix 
G) demonstrates, Russia has also been able to maintain a large per cent of the investment 
volume relative to GDP, mainly being the range between 15 and 25 %, in line with most 
other developed countries. Where Russia is on par with other world’s top economies is the 
share of high-technology exports in total manufactured exports, the percentage of which has 
been constantly on the rise in the last decade (from 6,8 % in 2007 to 11,5 % in 2014), as 
presented in Figure G15 (see Appendix G). Russia is also one of the very few countries 
among the world’s greatest to have managed to maintain positive value of its current account 
balance ever since the early 1990s, primarily thanks to export of fuels, as shown in Figure 
G16 (see Appendix G). The IMF predictions for the next couple of years is that Russia will 
further keep on improving its balance, the growth of which will be second best, only next to 
Germany’s. Translated in hard currency, Russia has managed to improve its current account 
balance from -1,2 billion USD in 1992 to 34,2 billion USD in 2013. The IMF predicts that its 
balance will reach the figure of 89,1 billion USD in 2020. The values are given in Figure G17 
(see Appendix G). Lastly, as Figure G18 (see Appendix G) shows, in terms of 
unemployment, in the first decade of transition, as is the case with most transitional countries 
due to a complete change of economic structure and industrial restructuring, unemployment 
in Russia rapidly increased from 4,7 % in 1992 to 13 % in 1999, after what started to 
decrease, falling down to 5,5 % in 2013, coming close to unemployment rate of most other 
developed countries, such as the United States, United Kingdom and Germany. The IMF 
predicts that unemployment in Russia will slightly increase to about 6 % in 2020. 
6.1.1.5 Additional notes  
Having taught lessons from the world economic crisis about how vulnerable its economy is 
under global economic shocks when predominantly relying on energy sectors, Russian policy 
makers need to realise the importance of diversifying the economy in the sense of orienting 
more towards developing industry, and strongly investing in human capital and modernising 
management (Bodrova and Ogneva 2013, 138). Based on the noted, Russia's economic 
growth will be contingent mainly on the following factors: 
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 level of fixed capital investment, and creation of an investment-friendly 
macroeconomic environment, 
 economic (product) diversification amid strong reliance of the Russian economy on 
global demand and prices of fuels, 
 development of infrastructure, 
 investing in and subsidising production, especially in the private sector, 
 stimulation and facilitation of housing construction primarily by means of affordable 
loans, 
 increasing labourers’ wages and stimulating consumption (Baranov 2014, 19–21), 
 create growth-driven fiscal and monetary policy (with focus on targeted inflation, 
more strict banking surveillance and keeping the reserve fund stabile), and in that way 
help alleviate consequences on domestic economy of external economic shocks 
(Bodrova and Ogneva 2013, 143),  
 improve productivity and competitiveness (Bodrova and Ogneva 2013, 143),  
 conduct restructuring and modernisation of industrial sectors (Bodrova and Ogneva 
2013, 138), 
 invest more in research and development, which is to serve as the basis for sustainable 
economic growth (Ghosh et al. 2009, 24). 
To sum up, Russia needs a more diversified economic structure and enhanced productivity to 
avoid being vulnerable to fluctuations of commodity prices in the world market of some 
goods which make the core of its export. It also needs substantial investment in development 
of new and modernisation of existing infrastructure, as well as to conduct institutional reform 
with the aim to create business-friendly environment. 
6.1.2 Serbia's commercial diplomacy towards Russia 
6.1.2.1 Introductory notes  
Based on traditionally close cultural and therefrom political relations between the two 
countries,167 and having realised real potential that cooperation with Russia (with its huge 
                                                          
167 In a questionnaire answered by Slavica Višnjić, the acting head of Department for Bilateral Economic 
Relations with Russia (in addition to China) in the Serbian Ministry of Trade, Tourism and 
Telecommunications, she gave answers to the question(s) whether and to what extent have (good) political and 
cultural relations of Serbia and Russia contributed to: (a) the signing of an agreement on free trade between 
these two countries, as well as the accompanying Protocols (which significantly enhanced foreign trade 
exchange between the two countries, and especially favoured the Serbian side)? (on the 1–5 scale, the answer 
is 5); (b) Serbia's decision not to join the sanctions of the European Union against Russia in 2014? (on the 1–5 
scale, the answer is 5); (c) the successfulness of doing business of Serbian enterprises at the Russian market? 
(on the 1–5 scale, the answer is 4); (d) the signing of interstate agreements and development of cooperation in 
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population of nearly 145 million people, rising economy and growing consumption capacity), 
if exploited to the largest extent possible, could bring to its weak, transition-stricken 
economy, especially in years following the 2007/'08 world economic crisis, Serbia engaged 
in active commercial diplomacy towards it, thanks to which it managed to conclude lucrative 
(bilateral) agreements, primarily in the field of trade, some of them purposely made to 
contain terms and conditions that are preferential for the Serbian side. Nonetheless, Serbia 
has been strongly resorting to its diplomacy to attract Russian investors, especially since the 
outbreak of the global economic crisis (which caused a substantial decrease in volume of 
foreign investment from the EU, wherefrom Serbia traditionally receives most of foreign 
investment), but also encourage and stimulate domestic companies to invest in Russia in a 
quest for new business opportunities that the large Russian market certainly offers. Alike, 
Serbian diplomacy has also been geared at intensifying activities with the aim to promote 
Serbia as a desirable tourist destination among the Russians. Given the mentioned, in this 
case study I will examine the fields of trade, investment and tourism in order to find out 
whether and, if affirmative, to what extent Serbian commercial diplomacy has positively 
contributed to developments in those fields, and hence to internationalisation of its economy 
and economic well-being in general. 
6.1.2.2 Cooperation in the field of trade: contractual basis  
A cornerstone of bilateral trade relations between Serbia168 and Russia was the agreement on 
free trade,169 signed on 28 August 2000 in Belgrade170 (Official Gazette of FR Yugoslavia – 
International Agreements, No. 1/2001, 49). Implementation of the agreement commenced on 
the day of its signing, that is, on 28 August 2000 (Official Gazette of FR Yugoslavia, No. 
1/2001, 51), and it officially (de iure) entered into force in 2001.171 The contracting parties 
agreed on gradual elimination of barriers to free trade over the five years period (Official 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
the field of tourism, what resulted in a significant increase of a number of Russian tourists in Serbia? (on the 1–
5 scale, the answer is 5); and (e) the signing of interstate agreements and development of cooperation in the 
field of investment? (on the 1–5 scale, the answer is 5) (Višnjić 2018). 
168 At that time Serbia was still part of the FR Yugoslavia. 
169 The agreement's full name is the Agreement between the Federal Government of the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia and the Government of the Russian Federation on Free Trade between the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia and the Russian Federation (Official Gazette of FR Yugoslavia – International Agreements, No. 
1/2001, 49). 
170 The agreement was confirmed by the Law on Confirmation of the Agreement between the Federal 
Government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Government of the Russian Federation on Free 
Trade between the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Russian Federation (Official Gazette of FR 
Yugoslavia – International Agreements, No. 1/2001, 49). 
171 After both parties informed each other in a written form that national legal procedures have been 
fulfilled/finished for its (meaning of the agreement) coming into force, pursuant to the law on confirmation of 
the agreement.  
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Gazette of FR Yugoslavia, No. 1/2001, 50). The agreement itself was made to be compliant 
with main principles of the World Trade Organisation (Official Gazette of FR Yugoslavia, 
No. 1/2001, 49). 
Its (meaning the agreement's) main objectives are the following:  
(a) broadening and stimulation of mutual trade and economic relations, geared at fastening 
of economic development of the two countries, improvement of conditions for living and 
labour, increasing of employment of the citizens, in the field of production, and achieving of 
production and financial stability of the two countries; (b) providing conditions for loyal 
competition between economic subjects of the two countries; (c) harmonisation of customs 
procedures and ways of implementation of rules on the origin of goods which are in line 
with norms of international practise, and harmonisation of the procedure for the control of 
origin of goods by customs bodies of the two countries (Official Gazette of FR Yugoslavia, 
No. 1/2001, 40). 
The agreement was subsequently amended, i.e. expanded (when Serbia started to confront 
consequences of the world economic crisis) mainly to the benefit of the Serbian side by the 
two protocols, the first of which was signed on 3 April 2009,172 whose implementation 
commenced on the day of its signing173 (Official Gazette of the Republic of Serbia – 
International Agreements, No. 105/2009, 75), and the second (signed) on 22 July 2011,174 
whose implementation started on the day of its signing175 (Official Gazette of the Republic of 
Serbia – International Agreements, No. 8/2011, 75). In terms of the protocol(s), one of the 
most beneficial terms agreed from the perspective of direct benefit for Serbia is Article 4 of 
the latter (2011) protocol, which reads that  
It will be considered that goods went through sufficient procession in one of the party 
countries if the goods were processed and if the value of the material used in this process 
(raws, semi-finished products and finished products) of origin from other countries (that are 
not party countries) or if the value of the material of the unknown origin is not bigger than 
                                                          
172 The 2009 protocol's full name is the Protocol between the Government of the Republic of Serbia and the 
Government of the Russian Federation on Exceptions from the Regime of Free Trade Attached to the 
Agreement between the Federal Government of Yugoslavia and the Government of the Russian Federation on 
Free Trade between the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Russian Federation. 
173 The protocol was confirmed by the Law on Confirmation of the Protocol between the Government of the 
Republic of Serbia and the Government of the Russian Federation on Exceptions from the Regime of Free Trade 
with the Agreement between the Federal Government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the 
Government of the Russian Federation on Free Trade between the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the 
Russian Federation from 28 August 2000; published in the Official Gazette of the Republic of Serbia on 16 
December 2009 (Official Gazette of the Republic of Serbia – International Agreements, No. 105/2009). 
174 The 2011 protocol's full name is the Protocol between the Government of the Republic of Serbia and the 
Government of the Russian Federation on Exceptions from the Regime of Free Trade Attached to the 
Agreement between the Federal Government of Yugoslavia and the Government of the Russian Federation on 
Free Trade between the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Russian Federation. 
175 The protocol was confirmed by the Law on Confirmation of the Protocol between the Government of the 
Republic of Serbia and the Government of the Russian Federation on Exceptions from the Regime of Free Trade 
and Rules on Determination of the Country of Origin of Goods with the Agreement between the Federal 
Government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Government of the Russian Federation on Free 
Trade between the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Russian Federation from 28 August 2000; published 
in the Official Gazette of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia on 19 October 2011(Official Gazette of the 
Republic of Serbia – International Agreements, No. 8/2011). 
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50 % of the value of goods that are exported (Official Gazette of the Republic of Serbia No. 
8/2011, 76–77).  
This provision is a noteworthy achievement of Serbian (commercial) diplomacy, as it was 
added in primarily to encourage foreign investors, primarily from the EU, but also from the 
overseas to (re)locate their production facilities into Serbia in order to get benefit of the large 
Russian market, but also of Belarus and Kazakhstan, with which Serbia signed and ratified 
agreements on free trade (Ministry of Trade, Tourism and Telecommunications 2017a). In 
addition, regarding just mentioned, on 31 May 2016 in Astana, Kazakhstan, the High 
Eurasian Economic Council adopted a decision on commencement of negotiations on 
unification of the trade regime between the Eurasian Economic Union and its member states, 
on one side, and Serbia, on the other. A unified, all-encompassing trade agreement between 
the EAEU and Serbia is currently being negotiated. So far, two rounds of negotiations have 
been held, in Belgrade, in September 2016, and in Moscow, in December 2016 (Ministry of 
Trade, Tourism and Telecommunications 2017a). Serbia has special interest that a unified 
trade agreement with the EAEU be agreed on and ratified as soon as possible, having that it 
has not concluded separate free trade agreements with Armenia and Kyrgyzstan, as it (the 
unified free trade agreement with the EAEU) would also enable free trade with these two 
countries (Ministry of Trade, Tourism and Telecommunications 2017a), and access to 
markets of another 9 million people. 
6.1.2.2.1 Benefits of the agreement and the amending protocols  
Thanks to the agreement and the amending protocols, overall looking, foreign trade between 
Serbia and Russia has been developing at a satisfying pace, and particularly to Serbia's 
benefit. Since the Statistical Office of the Republic of Serbia does not dispose of data for the 
years before 2004, and having that the FTA between the two countries started to be 
implemented in August 2000, it is not feasible to compare the trade values before and after 
that date in order to show whether and to what extent the FTA has contributed to 
development of trade, especially of export on the Serbian side. However, even if those data 
(for the years before 2004 and especially before 2000) were available, due to harsh sanctions 
that the international community imposed on Serbia throughout most of the 1990s, which, 
among other things, banned international trade with Serbia, what had a devastating effect on 
its economy, and NATO military campaign against Serbia in spring and early summer 1999, 
which ruined much of the country's economic infrastructure, such comparison would not be 
plausible anyway. 
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As presented in Tables 6.1 and 6.1a below, the FTA and the amending protocols with Russia 
have been highly beneficial for Serbia, that is, its export, which has increased from 152,9 
million USD in 2004 to 795,1 million USD in 2016, what represents an increase of 420,1 %. 
Moreover, it needs to be noted that this figure would have very likely been substantially 
higher (somewhere between 1,3–1,4 billion USD in 2016, in line with the then average 
annual pace of growth) had Russia not been imposed international sanctions in March 2014, 
which, as already evidenced, have started to cause serious economic downturn, and Serbia 
not been hit by disastrous floods in May 2014, which negatively affected its economy in the 
short-term. Furthermore, since in the period 2004–2013 (prior to sanctions on Russia and 
floods in Serbia) Serbian export has gone up 595,1 %, had sanctions not been imposed in the 
first place (additionally aggravated by flooding), given the then pace of growth, the amount 
of export increase in the period 2004–2016 would have been with much certainty somewhere 
around 800 % instead of official 420,1 %. Furthermore, annual export changes show that 
Serbian export has recorded the strongest growth in the period 2009–2013,176 what is mainly 
due to further liberalisation of export (mostly in favour to the Serbian side) in April 2009 and 
July 2011. Managing to negotiate these two protocols with Russia happened at the right time 
for Serbia given a serious fall in demand for Serbian export goods (and export goods in 
general) and hence decreased export in its main export markets in the EU and the 
neighbourhood region, but elsewhere too, including Russia, as a consequence of the world 
economic crisis in 2007/'08. What can also be seen is that after strong initial growth in the 
first couple of years following signing of the FTA, the world economic crisis contributed to a 
fall of Serbian export to Russia in the short-term, causing the first annual fall (in 2009) since 
2004 (-36,6 %). But, thanks to the protocols, in 2010 as the first full year of implementation 
of the April 2009 protocol, export growth recovered quickly and satisfyingly (in relation to 
2008), reaching the value of -2,9 %, continuing to rise to 57,4 % until 2012 (as the first full 
year of implementation of the July 2011 protocol) and 92,9 % by 2013, after what, for the 
reasons already noted, it started to go downscale for two consecutive years, managing to 
slightly recover in 2016, keeping positive value. Still, despite these recent unfavourable 
circumstances, in the period 2008–2016 growth of export has recorded a respectable increase 
of 44,3 %. As evidenced, trade balance has gone to better for Serbia, what directly made that 
coverage of import by export be substantially improved, surpassing the figure of 52 % in 
                                                          
176 Herein worth noting is that high export growth of 260,4 % in the period 2004–2008 can be explained by very 
low export base in the first years following beginning of implementation of the FTA which enabled its rapid 
growth. 
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2016 in comparison to only 11 % in 2004. It is also visible that Russia maintains its position 
as one of Serbia's largest trading partners and top 5 export destinations. 
Table 6.1: Foreign trade between Serbia and Russia, for the period 2004–2016, in thousand USD 
Year Export 
Annual 
export 
change 
Import 
Annual 
import 
change 
Total 
trade 
exchange 
Trade 
balance 
Coverage 
of import 
by export 
Position of 
Russia as 
Serbia's 
export 
destination  
2004 152.883   1.396.063   1.548.947 -1.243.180 11,0% 6
th 
2005 225.252 47,3% 1.668.726 19,5% 1.893.978 -1.443.475 13,5% 5
th 
2006 311.080 38,1% 2.142.497 28,4% 2.453.576 -1.831.417 14,5% 5
th 
2007 450.592 44,8% 2.671.646 24,7% 3.122.237 -2.221.054 16,9% 5
th 
2008 550.969 22,3% 3.519.745 31,7% 4.070.714 -2.968.776 15,7% 5
th 
2009 349.424 -36,6% 1.968.119 -44,1% 2.317.543 -1.618.694 17,8% 7
th 
2010 534.746 53,0% 2.156.127 9,6% 2.690.873 -1.621.381 24,8% 6
th 
2011 792.309 48,2% 2.654.224 23,1% 3.446.533 -1.861.915 29,9% 6
th 
2012 866.971 9,4% 2.078.399 -21,7% 2.945.370 -1.211.428 41,7% 5
th 
2013 1.062.702 22,6% 1.903.545 -8,4% 2.966.247 -840.844 55,8% 4
th 
2014 1.029.133 -3,2% 2.340.354 22,9% 3.369.487 -1.311.221 44,0% 4
th 
2015 724.826 -29,6% 1.748.539 -25,3% 2.473.365 -1.023.713 41,5% 5
th 
2016 795.124 9,7% 1.511.201 -13,6% 2.306.326 -716.077 52,6% 5
th 
Change* 420,1% 
 
8,2% 
 
48,9% 
  
 
Change** 595,1% 
 
36,4% 
    
 
*Change for the period 2004–2016 
**Change for the period 2004–2013 before Russia was imposed international sanctions in March 2014 and 
before disastrous floods hit Serbia in May 2014 
Note: Data for the period 2000–2003 and before are not available. 
Source: Own elaboration based on data of the Statistical Office of the Republic of Serbia – online database  
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Table 6.1a : Export from Serbia to Russia, for the period 2004-2016, in thousand USD 
Year Export 
Annual 
export 
change 
         
2004 152.883   
         
2005 225.252 47,3% 
         
2006 311.080 38,1% 
         
2007 450.592 44,8% 
         
2008 550.969 22,3% 260,4% Growth in the period 2004–2008 (in the first years after the FTA) 
 
2009 349.424 -36,6% -36,6% Growth in the period 2008–2009 (when the world economic crisis hit Serbia) 
2010 534.746 53,0% -2,9% Growth in the period 2008–2010 (after the April 2009 Protocol) 
  
2011 792.309 48,2% 
         
2012 866.971 9,4% 57,4% Growth in the period 2008–2012 (after the July 2011 Protocol) 
  
2013 1.062.702 22,6% 92,9% Growth in the period 2008–2013 (before Russia was imposed sanctions) 
 
2014 1.029.133 -3,2% 
         
2015 724.826 -29,6% 
         
2016 795.124 9,7% 44,3% Growth in the period 2008–2016 (after Russia was imposed sanctions) 
 
Change* 420,1% 
          
Change** 595,1% 
          *Change for the period 2004–2016 
**Change for the period 2004–2013 before Russia was imposed international sanctions in March 2014 and before disastrous 
floods hit Serbia in May 2014 
Note: Growth in the period 2010–2012 was 62,1 %. 
Note: Growth in the period 2013–2016 was -25,2 %. 
Note: The year 2008 was taken as the last year before the beginning of implementation of the April 2009 and the July 2011 
Protocols. 
The years 2010 and 2012 were taken as the first full years of implementation of the two Protocols. 
In terms of cumulative monetary value, as shown in Tables H1 and H1a (see Appendix H), 
over the entire period 2004–2016 the strongest export sector is (of) various manufactured 
goods, not classified, followed by the machines and transport equipment, and the food and 
live animals sectors (whereat export of food has been substantially higher than of live 
animals). However, in terms of growth, the strongest sector is (of) food and live animals, 
which (over the observed period) has grown by as much as 2,031 %, followed by the 
beverages and tobacco (1,626 %) and various manufactured goods, not classified, (373,4 %) 
sectors, whereat only two sectors have recorded a fall, but still with notably positive short- to 
middle-term periods, what (meaning negative growth over the entire time span) could likely 
be explained by the very nature of goods and related periodical changes, i.e. fluctuations in 
supply and demand, in addition to two main aggravating factors already noted – sanctions on 
Russia and floods in Serbia. It can be seen that export of literally all sectors had been 
negatively affected when Serbia started to confront spill-over effects of the world economic 
crisis. But, mainly thanks to the April 2009 and the July 2011 protocols, over the period 
2009–2013 export managed to recover well, reaching high positive values, after what Russia 
was imposed sanctions (in 2014), what has negatively reflected on Serbian export, as 
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illustrated. It is also worth noting that many goods that by classification belong to the two 
sectors with by far the highest growth between 2004 and 2016 have been fully or additionally 
liberalised by the mentioned protocols, what will be shown later. 
Sectoral export in tons mainly reflects its monetary values, as shown in Tables H2 and H2a 
(see Appendix H). 
In terms of (export) divisions, in Tables H3 and H3a (see Appendix H) are listed top 30 
divisions by monetary value in 2016.177 As presented, fruit and vegetables division is on top 
of the list, having substantially higher export value of 227,4 million USD than the second – 
garments and clothing accessories division, whose export in 2016 was worth 91,5 million 
USD, followed by the medical and pharmaceutical products division with 57,6 million USD, 
and so on. 
It is important to note that among those 30 divisions 10 of them (coloured in green), i.e. 
certain goods that belong to them, have been on the lists of both the April 2009 and the July 
2011 protocols, among which 3 are in the top 5. Moreover, the same 3 divisions are among 
the top 5 also in terms of the overall cumulative (monetary) value for the observed period. In 
addition, in order to show that Serbia has strongly benefited from not joining EU sanctions 
against Russia in 2014 as a backlash to Russia's military involvement in the civil war in 
Eastern Ukraine, followed by Russia's ban on import of food from the EU as a 
countermeasure, among other things,178 herein I will note that among the top 30 listed 
divisions 8 of them are related to the field of agriculture (designated with the star „*“), 
among which 5 belong to divisions that were encompassed by the two mentioned protocols. 
Of the top 30 divisions only one - miscellaneous products, not mentioned, had a negative 
value over the entire given period. For comparison, in Tables H4 and H4a (see Appendix H) 
are presented their (meaning of the top 30 divisions) respective values in tons. 
Furthermore, as demonstrated in Table 6.2 below, over the period 2004–2016 the number of 
Serbian agricultural export goods which belong to the top 20 export goods has increased from 
3 to 7, whereat in the period 2013–2016 alone, after Serbia started to take full advantage of a 
Russian ban on import of food from the EU, that number has increased from 4 to 7, in 
comparison to 3 to 4 in the period 2004–2013. Overall, a share of Serbian agricultural goods 
in the top 20 export goods has increased from 15 % in 2004 to 35 % in 2016, whereat an 
                                                          
177 The year 2016 (and not the cumulative value over the entire period 2004–2016) is taken so to be 
demonstrated that Serbia has strongly benefited from Russian ban on import of food and other agricultural 
products from the EU which imposed sanctions on it. 
178 In that way Serbia was offered an opportunity to increase its export, mainly of food, but also of other 
agricultural goods, in order to fill the gap in demand in the vast Russian market incurred by Russian 
countersanctions on the EU. 
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increase in the period 2004–2013 was much less (5 %) than since 2013 onward, the period 
during which export has grown by 15 %. In other words, thanks to prudent Serbian 
(commercial) diplomacy based on friendly relations with Russia, in only 3 years export of 
agricultural goods has achieved better growth than it did over almost the entire decade. In 
terms of percentual (cumulative) value, during the observed period, a share of agricultural 
goods in the top 20 Serbian export goods has risen by 2,270,6 %. 
The most desirable Serbian agricultural goods is the Russian market are fresh apples, 
followed by plums and peaches. Values in tons closely follow their respective monetary 
values, as shown in Table H5 (see Appendix H). 
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Table 6.2: Agricultural goods which belong to the top 20 Serbian export goods to Russia, for the period 2004–2016, in thousand USD 
 
Year 
Sum 
Goods 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2004-2016 
Other vegetables, canned, except in vinegar, not frozen 4.664,8 5.579,0 6.092,2 5.096,1     7.818,2             29.250,3 
Other products for nourishment 2.289,7                         2.289,7 
Maize seed, hybrid 2.222,7     4.072,5 7.768,2                 14.063,4 
Sweet corn, canned, except in vinegar, not frozen   3.313,5         7.383,9             10.697,4 
Apples, fresh     9.246,3 12.557,3 13.081,1 13.148,5 42.855,5 57.952,2 39.631,7 41.191,2 76.677,6 98.055,6 119.896,7 524.293,7 
Plums and sloes, fresh       7.813,3 5.944,3 7.692,5 12.802,7 17.077,6 13.292,7 16.233,0 13.721,2 9.967,7 7.058,8 111.603,8 
Tobacco, partly or wholly veinless         7.308,5                 7.308,5 
Sweet cherries and sour cherries, fresh           5.069,0           8.346,8 13.396,2 26.812,0 
Peaches (including nectarines), fresh           4.234,1 7.467,1 11.642,5 9.707,9 13.329,4   18.714,5 29.298,7 94.394,2 
Dried fruit, nor mentioned and mixtures of pome and dried 
fruit           4.174,6               4.174,6 
Fresh (immature) cheese, incl. also from whey and urd                   15.493,1 23.704,7 19.476,5 21.677,7 80.352,0 
Sour cherries, frozen, without sugar                     10.995,6     10.995,6 
Strawberries, fresh                     10.398,6 8.484,3 16.403,0 35.285,9 
Other vegetables and mixtures of vegetables, frozen                       8.090,4   8.090,4 
Pears and quinces, fresh                         9.826,5 9.826,5 
Sum for the period 2004-2016 by years 9.177,2 8.892,5 15.338,5 29.539,2 34.102,1 34.318,7 78.327,4 86.672,3 62.632,3 86.246,7 135.497,7 171.135,8 217.557,6 2270,6% 
Annual change   -3,1% 72,5% 92,6% 15,4% 0,6% 128,2% 10,7% -27,7% 37,7% 57,1% 26,3% 27,1% 
 
Number of agricultural goods by years 3 2 2 4 4 5 5 3 3 4 5 7 7 
 
Share of a number of agri. goods in top 20 export goods 15% 10% 10% 20% 20% 25% 25% 15% 15% 20% 25% 35% 35% 
 Note: Percentual value of 2270,6 % relates to the change for the period 2004–2016  
Source: Own elaboration based on data of the Statistical Office of the Republic of Serbia – online database 
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Likewise, as shown in Table 6.3 below, during the period 2004–2016 the number of Serbian 
agricultural export goods in the top 50 export goods has increased from 6 to 18, whereat only 
in the period 2013–2016 that number has increased from 12 to 18, in comparison to 6 to 12 in 
the period 2004–2013. In other words, in only 3 years, thanks to favourable circumstances for 
Serbian exporters, the increase of a number of agricultural goods exported to Russia is equal 
to the increase achieved in the period of near a full decade. Overall, a share of agricultural 
goods in the top 50 export goods has increased from 12 % in 2004 to 36 % in 2016, having 
that an increase in the period of almost a decade (2004–2013) was equal to that in the period 
2013–2016. Percentually, during the observed period, a share of Serbian agricultural goods in 
the top 50 Serbian export goods has risen by 2024.8 %. Values in tons closely follow on their 
respective monetary values, as shown in Table H6 (see Appendix H). 
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Table 6.3: Agricultural goods which belong to the top 50 Serbian export goods to Russia, for the period 2004–2016, in thousand USD 
  
Year 
Sum 
Goods 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2004-2016 
Other vegetables, canned, except in vinegar, not frozen 4.664,8 5.579,0 6.092,2 5.096,1 5.253,0 3.661,6 7.818,2 7.681,2 9.549,9 5.082,3       60.478,3 
Other products for nourishment 2.289,7 2.010,7 2.133,1 1.925,1 3.722,6 2.643,2 4.505,3 4.024,6 4.868,6 5.599,8 6.398,1 3.816,4 3.974,1 47.911,3 
Maize seeds, hybrid 2.222,7 1.996,8 1.816,6 4.072,5 7.768,2 2.900,3 2.356,1   3.655,9 5.989,3 9.142,0 5.517,4 3.586,7 51.024,5 
Sunflower seeds, other 1.377,6                         1.377,6 
Sweet corn, canned, except in vinegar, not frozen 1.371,9 3.313,5 1.614,7 3.325,2   2.534,6 7.383,9 5.823,0 6.854,7         32.221,5 
Dried fruit, not mentioned and mixtures of pome and dried 
fruit 682,9 679,8     3.553,9 4.174,6 4.284,2     6.604,7 5.552,5     25.532,6 
Sunflower seeds, for sowing   1.711,4 1.655,8   1.953,0                 5.320,2 
Artificial casings for sausage products   1.440,8   3.298,0   2.345,1 3.790,6 4.998,4 4.256,2   5.607,2 4.889,0 6.185,6 36.810,9 
Apples, fresh   1.317,9 9.246,3 12.557,3 13.081,1 13.148,5 42.855,5 57.952,2 39.631,7 41.191,2 76.677,6 98.055,6 119.896,7 525.611,6 
Tobacco, partly and wholly veinless     2.417,1 3.431,1 7.308,5                 13.156,7 
Plums and sloes, fresh     1.928,5 7.813,3 5.944,3 7.692,5 12.802,7 17.077,6 13.292,7 16.233,0 13.721,2 9.967,7 7.058,8 113.532,3 
Sweet cherries and sour cherries, fresh       3.471,8 5.455,2 5.069,0 5.336,1 6.957,0 6.130,4 5.395,2 6.278,7 8.346,8 13.396,2 65.836,4 
Peaches (including nectarines), fresh       2.146,1 3.577,9 4.234,1 7.467,1 11.642,5 9.707,9 13.329,4 8.818,2 18.714,5 29.298,7 108.936,4 
Juice of other individual fruit or vegetables       1.921,6 3.318,0 1.478,5       6.182,4   2.933,4   15.833,9 
Edible fruit seedlings, grafted or not         3.453,8 1.513,1             6.483,0 11.449,9 
Wine of fresh grapes; must with stopped fermentation           1.928,7 2.541,1 3.100,4 3.541,0 5.704,2 6.610,5 4.025,6 4.616,4 32.067,9 
Strawberries, fresh           1.779,3 2.315,2 3.353,9 3.535,3 8.196,0 10.398,6 8.484,3 16.403,0 54.465,6 
Other cheese, not for treatment               3.125,0 4.315,2   4.909,8 4.457,0 3.645,2 20.452,2 
Fresh (immature) cheese, including also from whey and urd                  8.191,8 15.493,1 23.704,7 19.476,5 21.677,7 88.543,8 
Carcasses and half-carcasses of pork, frozen                 6.385,4   48.751,2 22.694,3 3.511,8 81.342,7 
Sour cherries, frozen, without sugar                     10.995,6 6.827,2 4.802,2 22.625,0 
Other vegetables and mixtures of vegetables, frozen                     6.230,9 8.090,4 4.346,1 18.667,4 
Pears and quinces, fresh                     5.875,9 5.028,7 9.826,5 20.731,1 
Other pork meat, frozen                     4.863,8     4.863,8 
Raspberries, frozen, without sugar                     4.373,5 4.033,2   8.406,7 
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Beans and green beans, frozen                       3.859,8 5.563,7 9.423,5 
Food for dogs and cats, for retail trade                         3.656,9 3.656,9 
Sum for the period 2004-2016 by years 12.609,6 18.049,9 26.904,3 49.058,1 64.389,5 55.103,1 103.456,0 125.735,8 123.916,7 135.000,6 258.910,0 239.217,8 267.929,3 2024,8% 
Annual change   43,1% 49,1% 82,3% 31,3% -14,4% 87,7% 21,5% -1,4% 8,9% 91,8% -7,6% 12,0% 
 
Number of agricultural goods by years 6 8 8 11 12 14 12 11 14 12 18 18 18 
 
Share of a number of agri. goods in top 50 export goods 12% 16% 16% 22% 24% 28% 24% 22% 28% 24% 36% 36% 36% 
 Note: Percentual value of 2024,8 % relates to the change for the period 2004–2016  
Source: Own elaboration based on data of the Statistical Office of the Republic of Serbia – online database 
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In order to test further whether and how much have the protocols helped recovery of Serbian 
export in crisis time, in Tables 6.4 and 6.4a below are presented data which demonstrate that 
the April 2009 and the July 2011 protocols have indeed significantly contributed to recovery 
of Serbian export after sudden short-term slump incurred predominantly as a spill-over effect 
of the world economic crisis in 2007/'08, which caused global contraction of economic 
activity and demand thereof. In the period 2008–2010 divisions containing goods that were 
fully or additionally liberalised by the 2009 protocol had better export results in comparison 
to the period 2008–2009 when major contraction happened. That this was not just an act of 
coincidence, tells that further improvement continued in the period following the 2009 
liberalisation, as the figures for the period 2008–2013 show. A sudden decrease in 2014 in 
comparison to 2013 was primarily due to the sanctions on Russia, as already explained, 
additionally worsened by disastrous floods in spring 2014 in Serbia, which damaged 
production facilities of many export-oriented enterprises and devastated much agricultural 
yield. The same applies for those divisions that contain goods that were fully liberalised by 
the 2011 Protocol. In other words, divisions containing goods that were fully liberalised in 
the second half of 2011 managed to additionally improve their performance in 2012 and 
continued to do so until 2014 when growth started to slow down. It is noteworthy that the 
fruit and vegetables, then beverages, as well as the meat and meat products divisions, in other 
words – agricultural divisions are among very few which have managed to maintain positive 
growth rates even after 2014, when Serbia seized an opportunity to increase to maximum its 
agricultural export, predominantly of food. For comparison, in Tables H7 and H7a (see 
Appendix H) are given respective values in tons, which mainly coincide with monetary 
values. 
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Table 6.4: Export from Serbia to Russia by the divisions that contain goods that were either fully or additionally liberalised by the April 2009 and the July 2011 Protocols, for 
the period 2004–2016, in thousand USD 
 
Year 
Divisions containing goods fully liberalised by the 2009 
Protocol 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
Beverages 62,1 66,5 177,2 581,8 1.931,4 2.911,6 3.568,8 5.253,3 5.056,9 7.360,2 7.978,2 4.842,7 5.258,6 
Essential oils, perfumes and toiletries 174,2 36,2 13,6 0,4 84,2 369,0 989,9 122,0 196,4 1.164,7 1.763,1 7.188,5 7.858,6 
Textile yarn, fabrics and textile products 3.585,1 6.234,7 8.326,3 10.333,3 11.147,3 9.356,9 17.836,7 21.734,1 21.926,3 27.132,4 19.739,2 15.309,0 16.605,3 
Electrical machines, apparatuses and appliances, not ment. 8.739,8 17.757,4 21.555,5 57.011,0 43.362,2 29.234,0 66.377,6 92.116,5 98.202,4 115.434 97.264,1 45.324,2 44.818,8 
Furniture and parts thereof; bedding, mattresses, pillows 493,8 781,1 834,3 2.316,7 1.281,3 4.182,9 12.290,5 19.088,2 26.628,0 37.907,5 11.923,8 8.035,6 5.584,8 
Animal and plant raw materials, not mentioned 571,7 652,9 953,1 1.751,0 4.180,3 2.741,8 3.822,7 4.633,0 4.312,5 5.514,3 4.439,5 3.483,2 7.554,9 
Divisions containing goods additionally liberalised by the 
2009 Protocol 
            
Fruit and vegetables 8.127,6 12.441,0 22.190,5 39.807,6 47.914,9 47.509,2 106.170 135.662 113.598 129.238 173.658 188.653 227.445,9 
Medical and pharmaceutical products 31.310,5 43.329,7 46.977,2 60.497,5 71.584,6 50.618,5 57.067,8 49.214,3 69.039,1 69.083,5 56.494,0 53.943,7 57.616,8 
Meat and meat products 0,0 52,9 287,7 536,5 1.058,6 1.462,4 2.038,4 3.492,7 10.410,5 4.713,2 67.938,2 29.418,1 6.820,9 
Sugar, products made of sugar and honey* 0,0 6,5 0,0 0,9 1,5 30,6 1,3 55,0 43,4 419,6 377,8 297,2 204,4 
Beverages 62,1 66,5 177,2 581,8 1.931,4 2.911,6 3.568,8 5.253,3 5.056,9 7.360,2 7.978,2 4.842,7 5.258,6 
Divisions containing goods fully liberalised by the 2011 
Protocol 
            
  
Textile yarn, fabrics and textile products 3.585,1 6.234,7 8.326,3 10.333,3 11.147,3 9.356,9 17.836,7 21.734,1 21.926,3 27.132,4 19.739,2 15.309,0 16.605,3 
Furniture and parts thereof; bedding, mattresses, pillows 493,8 781,1 834,3 2.316,7 1.281,3 4.182,9 12.290,5 19.088,2 26.628,0 37.907,5 11.923,8 8.035,6 5.584,8 
Telecommunications and audio apparatuses and equipment* 285,5 69,3 19,5 73,3 826,8 10,0 18,7 35,6 49,2 106,3 161,7 794,8 562,7 
Miscellaneous products for food and related products 2352,9 2073,6 2512,3 2379,0 3765,9 2816,3 4663,1 4363,3 6333,7 6268,7 7334,1 4367,7 7.164,1 
*Divisions that do not belong to top 30 by value in 2016 (all others do). 
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Table 6.4a:  Periodical changes 
Change 
2008–2009 2008–2010 2008–2013 2013–2014 2013–2016 
50,8% 84,8% 281,1% 8,4% -28,6% 
338,2% 1075,7% 1283,3% 51,4% 574,7% 
-16,1% 60,0% 143,4% -27,2% -38,8% 
-32,6% 53,1% 166,2% -15,7% -61,2% 
226,5% 859,2% 2858,5% -68,5% -85,3% 
-34,4% -8,6% 31,9% -19,5% 37,0% 
     
-0,8% 121,6% 169,7% 34,4% 76,0% 
-29,3% -20,3% -3,5% -18,2% -16,6% 
38,1% 92,6% 345,2% 1341,4% 44,7% 
1940,0% -13,3% 27873,3% -10,0% -51,3% 
50,8% 84,8% 281,1% 8,4% -28,6% 
2010–2011 2010–2012 2010–2013 2013–2014 2013–2016 
21,9% 22,9% 52,1% -27,2% -38,8% 
55,3% 116,7% 208,4% -68,5% -85,3% 
90,4% 163,1% 468,4% 52,1% 429,4% 
-6,4% 35,8% 34,4% 17,0% 14,3% 
Source: Own elaboration based on data of the Statistical Office of the Republic of Serbia – online database 
Further, most concrete evidence of positive effects of the protocols on Serbian export is given 
in Tables 6.5 and 6.5a, and 6.6 and 6.6a below where are presented randomly selected goods 
that were either fully or additionally liberalised by them. First, in terms of the 2009 Protocol, 
the available data show that export results in the period 2008–2010 were significantly better 
than in the period 2008–2009, when export was negatively affected by the world economic 
crisis. Further growth continued in the period 2008–2013, and for some goods in high 
demand even in 2014, when sanctions were imposed on Russia and floods hit Serbia. 
Additionally, some of selected products such as: „fruit, fruit barks, other parts of plant, 
candied“, two categories of soaps, and freezers started to be exported only in the period 
following beginning of implementation of the mentioned protocol. This can also mean that 
the protocol and the expanded trade arrangements with Russia, predominantly in favour of 
Serbia, did not only stimulate domestic producers, but also encouraged foreign investors to 
invest in Serbia in order to take advantage of the Russian and other markets of the Eurasian 
Economic Union. Alike, in terms of the 2011 Protocol, export results of 5 selected goods 
show that export in the period 2010–2012 was much better for them all than during the 2010–
2011 period. Trend of growth was kept on also in 2013 and some some goods even in 2014, 
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when it started to decrease for the mentioned reasons. For comparison, corresponding values 
in tons are presented in Tables H8 and H8a, and H9 and H9a (see Appendix H).
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Table 6.5: Export from Serbia to Russia of 15 selected goods that were fully or additionally liberalised by the April 2009 Protocol, for the period 2004–2016, in thousand 
USD 
  Year 
Goods fully or additionally liberalised by the 2009 Protocol 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
Apple juice 0,0 12,5 3,0 2,1     108,8   4,0 8,8 151,0 16,3 40,6 
Fruit, fruit barks, other parts of plant, candied                   172,3 221,7 178,5 124,1 
Other products of sugar, with no cocoa   6,5 0,0 0,9 0,0 6,0 0,0 16,2 28,5 128,7 124,1 99,5 67,6 
Wines of all grapes, with stopped fermentation 14,1 29,9 79,1 356,3 979,5 1928,7 2541,1 3100,4 3541,0 5704,2 6610,5 4025,6 4.616,4 
Beer of malt (incl. Light, strong and black beer)         0,0     6,7 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 25,1 
Medicines (other antibiotics), for retail  2443,9 4562,5 5135,1 6405,0 8897,8 11260,2 10580,4 10479,2 16039,2 19382,9 10186,6 13009,9 8.528,3 
Medicines (penicillin, streptomycin), for retail 2929,4 4649,9 4759,3 8764,6 9263,9 8084,9 11069,2 5733,0 13181,9 11011,3 8673,6 6197,3 7.426,3 
Soap in the form of a piece for other use       0,0       0,0 0,0 5,1 14,3 0,0 5,9 
Soap in the form of a piece for toilet use 0,0                 21,6 12,6 35,9 0,0 
Refrigerators for household 0,0 47,0 90,5 120,4 91,2 19,3 114,3 6,7 36,9 217,6 161,0 56,9 174,8 
Freezers in the shape of wardrobe, V> 250l <= 900l 0,0                 550,6 330,9 593,0 1.052,7 
Washing machines with capacity up to 10kg 0,0 1.885,1 196,8 2.918,9 2.459,4 1.418,5 2.563,0 1.947,2 17.671,8 17.424,7 24.461,7 11.243,4 10.220,4 
Wooden office furniture, not ment. 109,1 33,3 15,5 83,7 22,5 24,8 80,8 145,4 226,8 209,1 264,4 174,8 364,9 
Mattresses of cellular rubber or plastics 74,9 26,4   2,2       667,0 1.877,1 979,6 39,5   0,0 
Mattresses of other materials 7,1 4,2 11,6 11,0 2,8 10,0 171,1 44,6 258,0 347,3 14,2 25,0 8,6 
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Table 6.5a: Periodical changes 
Change 
2008–2009 2008–2010 2008–2013 2013–2014 2013–2016 
   
1615,9% 361,4% 
   
28,7% -28,0% 
   
-3,6% -47,5% 
96,9% 159,4% 482,4% 15,9% -19,1% 
     
26,6% 18,9% 117,8% -47,4% -56,0% 
-12,7% 19,5% 18,9% -21,2% -32,6% 
   
180,4% 15,7% 
   
-41,7% -100,0% 
-78,8% 25,3% 138,6% -26,0% -19,7% 
   
-39,9% 91,2% 
-42,3% 4,2% 608,5% 40,4% -41,3% 
10,2% 259,1% 829,3% 26,4% 74,5% 
   
-96,0% -100,0% 
257,1% 6010,7% 12303,6% -95,9% -97,5% 
Source: Own elaboration based on data of the Statistical Office of the Republic of Serbia – online database 
Table 6.6: Export from Serbia to Russia of 5 selected goods that were fully or additionally liberalised by the 
July 2011 Protocol, for the period 2004–2016, in thousand USD 
 
Year 
Goods fully or additionally 
liberalised by the 2011 Protocol 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
Parts of furniture from 821.3, 
821.5 and 821.7 2,4 23,6 94,6 81,3 63,0 178,1 161,5 156,0 601,5 607,6 328,2 306,5 645,1 
Wooden kitchen furniture, not 
ment. 
 
7,3 7,7 53,4 16,2 75,4 85,3 115,8 261,6 431,5 572,9 1394,8 345,6 
Wooden furniture, for dining 
rooms-living rooms, not ment. 10,5 33,9 200,1 507,2 246,8 693,4 726,4 1384,2 2153,4 5972,2 3947,5 1875,2 1.448,1 
Other furniture, of wood, not ment. 33,9 15,3 27,7 355,7 138,1 147,9 203,2 231,9 2438,2 9163,6 1613,4 632,8 242,4 
Table 6.6a: Periodical changes 
Change 
2010–2011 2010–2012 2010–2013 2013–2014 2013–2016 
-3,4% 272,4% 276,2% -46,0% 6,2% 
35,8% 206,7% 405,9% 32,8% -19,9% 
90,6% 196,4% 722,2% -33,9% -75,8% 
14,1% 1099,9% 4409,6% -82,4% -97,4% 
Source: Own elaboration based on data of the Statistical Office of the Republic of Serbia – online database 
As shown in Table H10 (see Appendix H) in which are listed top 10 Serbian exporting 
exterprises by years, Serbian export is satisfyingly diversified in terms of number of 
enterprises. The obtained data disclose that during the period 2012–2016 that number has 
increased by 8; in other words it almost doubled. It is interesting to note that among the top 
10, only 2 are enterprises that belong to the sector of agriculture, what implies that 
agricultural enterprises are relatively small in size. Among the largest exporters the most are 
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companies in foreign ownership such as: Valy d.o.o., Hemofarm, Tarkett d.o.o., Grundfos, 
Tigar Tyres, Gorenje, Impol Seval, and others, which mainly invested in Serbia in order to 
take full advantage of the free trade agreement that Serbia has with Russia, but also with 
Belarus and Kazakhstan. 
As presented in Tables 6.7 and 6.8 below, favourable trade arrangements with Russia have 
positively reflected on the overall development of the export sector and entrepreneurship in 
Serbia. In the period 2008–2015 the number of Serbian enterprises exporting (in)to Russia 
increased from 416 to 811, meaning it almost doubled. Respectively, in the period 2007–2016 
the number of (Serbian) export goods has increased from 785 to 1,279, what represents a 
significant increase of 62,9 %. The most export-intensive divisions in terms of number of 
(exporting) enterprises are those of manufacture of food products, and wholesale trade, 
except of motor vehicles and motorcycles. 
Table 6.7: Number of Serbian exporting enterprises in Russia, for the period 2008–2016 
 
Year Change 
Country 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2008–2015 
Russia 416 394 499 637 704 764 838 811 N/A 95,0% 
Annual change 
 
-5,3% 26,6% 27,7% 10,5% 8,5% 9,7% -3,2% 
  
Source: Own elaboration based on data of the Statistical Office of the Republic of Serbia (2008–2009 ,42–44; 
2010 ,44–46; 2011 ,48–50; 2012–2015, 50–52) 
Table 6.8: Number of Serbian export goods to Russia, for the period 2007–2016 
Year Number 
of goods 
Annual 
change 
2007 785   
2008 737 -6,1% 
2009 761 3,3% 
2010 846 11,2% 
2011 1.045 23,5% 
2012 1.181 13,0% 
2013 1.342 13,6% 
2014 1.427 6,3% 
2015 1.317 -7,7% 
2016 1.279 -2,9% 
Change* 62,9% 
 *Change for the period 2007–2016 
Source: Own elaboration based on data of the Statistical Office of the Republic of Serbia 2017a* 
*Data are not available at online database nor are available in documents, but obtained upon request. 
Lastly, it is relevant to note that Serbian export is much better diversified than Russian, as 
illustrated in Tables 6.9 below, which shows that in terms of sectoral import a share of 
mineral fuels, lubricants and related products alone in Serbia's total import from Russia 
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amounts 75,8 %. Percentual share in tons is even more conspicuously emphasised and 
amounts 82,4 %, as illustrated in Table H11 (see Appendix H). 
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Table 6.9: Import of Serbia from Russia, by sectors, for the period 2004–2016, in thousand USD 
 
Year 
Sum 
Sectors 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2004–2016 
Food and live animals 10.153,0 2.832,6 8.695,5 15.621,2 16.954,0 16.688,9 14.249,9 13.010,5 13.005,4 16.937,6 19.616,5 11.365,3 12.817,9 171.948,3 
Beverages and tobacco 417,3 5.728,8 13.499,4 87,5 1.539,7 2.410,0 11.352,0 33.779,4 31.042,5 36.586,9 38.245,9 33.788,9 46.244,9 254.723,2 
Crude materials, inedible, except fuels 13.495,0 17.292,9 67.376,1 57.004,1 33.595,7 15.125,2 30.262,0 36.608,4 43.273,7 54.338,4 52.336,2 55.056,3 45.848,1 521.612,1 
Mineral fuels, lubricants and related products 1.188.153,9 1.424.826,2 1.737.810,8 1.977.128,5 2.772.598,5 1.555.252,3 1.693.600,1 2.065.036,3 1.498.439,5 1.261.146,3 1.778.341,4 1.285.127,9 812.012,0 21.049.473,7 
Animal and plant oils, fats and waxes 36,0 23,4 10.333,0 3.787,6 2.094,3 2.001,6 6,4 50,7 17,3 4.697,4 1.980,1 891,3 1.776,2 27.695,3 
Chemical and similar product, not stipulated 56.428,2 66.570,9 91.631,5 178.746,0 287.840,6 171.247,2 115.218,3 143.659,7 216.182,3 240.461,4 189.943,3 170.616,5 222.910,2 2.151.456,1 
Manufactured goods classified by material 91.097,1 112.150,7 171.552,2 254.927,8 196.067,4 106.967,2 217.140,4 298.948,1 200.750,9 227.758,4 179.573,1 156.391,0 167.922,9 2.381.247,2 
Machines and transport equipment 31.213,2 34.369,6 36.379,7 31.210,5 30.408,8 34.390,0 53.182,5 49.752,1 66.757,3 50.039,7 60.370,4 23.205,9 157.036,7 658.316,4 
Miscellaneous manufactured products 2.475,2 3.603,1 3.992,5 3.596,3 12.672,4 4.987,3 4.812,5 3.978,3 3.479,4 2.899,5 2.863,0 2.116,7 3.564,1 55.040,3 
Products not stipulated in mentioned sectors 2.594,5 1.328,2 1.226,2 149.536,1 165.973,4 59.048,9 16.303,0 9.400,4 5.450,0 8.680,1 17.084,4 9.979,4 41.068,1 487.672,7 
*Sum of all sectors for the period 2004–2016 * 27.759.185,3 
**Sum of the sector - mineral fuels, lubricants and related products, for the period 2004–2016 ** 21.049.473,7 
***Percentual share of the sector - mineral fuels, lubricants and related products in the sum of all sectors *** 75,8% 
Source: Own elaboration based on data from the Statistical Office of the Republic of Serbia - online database 
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Likewise, in terms of divisions, in the observed period, a share of import of only two 
divisions, namely of oil, oil derivatives and related products, and (of) natural and industrial 
gas in Serbia's total (import) is 74,5 %. Similar values are also in terms of values in tons (77,7 
%), as presented in Tables H12 and H13 (see Appendix H). Therefore, it is visible that with 
the energy sector excluded, Serbia even has trade surplus with Russia. 
6.1.2.3 Cooperation in the field of investment 
In terms of Russian (inward) investment into Serbia, as presented in Table 6.10 below, the 
available data disclose that the volume of inward FDI was relatively stable until 2014 when 
Russia was imposed sanctions, after what it expectedly started to go downscale. However, it 
is likely to believe that when the sanctions be abolished, the volume of investment will start 
to increase again. 
In Table 6.11 below are given the most important Russian investment in(to) Serbia in recent 
years, with values and numbers of new working places created. As can be seen, the largest (in 
volume) investments are those in the field of energy, based on the intergovernmental 
agreement between the two countries in the field of oil and gas, signed in 2008 (Chamber of 
Commerce and Industry of Serbia 2017a). 
Table 6.10: Russian foreign direct investment into Serbia, net, inward, in million EUR 
 
Year 
Country 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
Russia 216,2 488,5 232,5 189,7 73,5 96,4 81,2 
Note: The available years are 2010–2016. 
Source: Own elaboration based on data from the Statistical Office of the Republic of Serbia - online database 
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Table 6.11: The most important Russian investments into Serbia 
Investor 
Value of 
investment 
Type of 
investment 
Type of activity 
Number 
of new 
working 
places 
opened 
Number 
of new 
working 
places 
planned 
Location of 
investment 
Additional notes 
„Gazprom Neft / NIS a.d” 947 mil. EUR Brownfield Oil industry 3,992 N/A Pančevo 
On 1 November 2012 
renovated refinery 
opened. Expansion of 
investments 
(expansion of 
production, retail 
stations and 
exploration of oil) 
planned in the coming 
years in the amount of 
1.5 bil. EUR. 
„Lukoil / Lukoil Srbija a.d” 210 mil. EUR Brownfield Oil industry 155 N/A Belgrade 
The company 
purchased "Beopetrol" 
company for storage 
and distribution of oil 
derivatives in 2003. 
„GSK Krasniy Treugolnik / Vulkan 
gume d.o.o“ 
3.5 mil. EUR N/A Automobile industry 197 N/A Niš 
 
„Sogaz & Srbijagas / Sogaz a.d.o“ 3.1 mil. EUR N/A Insurance 20 N/A Novi Sad 
 
„C-Project / Srpsko ruska trgovinska 
kuća d.o.o” 
2.5 mil. EUR 
N/A 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Food industry 7 N/A Nova Crnja 
 
  
 
1
64 
„ICL Services and Solutions” N/A N/A 
Information 
technology (IT) 
industry 
15 N/A Belgrade 
Representative office 
opened on 22 
February 2016 
together with Japanese 
company "Fujitsu". 
The company offers 
IT services for Fujitsu 
clients and partners. 
Expansion of doing 
business across Serbia 
and the region 
planned. 
„Metropol Group” 41 + 7.2 mil. EUR Privatisation Tourism N/A N/A Belgrade 
The company 
purchased 71.2 % of 
shares in Serbian 
oldest tourist company 
"Putnik". In December 
2010 the Hotel "Tulip 
In Putnik Beograd" 
was opened. 
„Interform“ N/A Privatisation 
Products of 
polyurethane foam 
N/A N/A Čačak 
The company 
purchased 70 % of 
shares of the company 
"Vapeks". 
„Red Triangle“ 3.5 mil. EUR Privatisation 
Automobile industry 
(tyres production) 
N/A N/A Niš 
On 12 March 2013 the 
company purchased 
the company 
"Vuklan". Investment 
in the amount of 5 mil. 
EUR planned. 
„Sberbank / Sberbank Srbija a.d. 
Beograd (former Volksbank a.d. 
Beograd)“** 
N/A 
 
Finances N/A 685 Belgrade 
In February 2012 the 
Bank became owner 
of 26 branch offices 
across Serbia. 
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„Appina Group“ N/A Privatisation Copper production N/A N/A Majdanpek 
A joint Russian-Swiss 
company took part in 
privatisation of the 
factory of copper 
pipes „Majdanpek“. 
„Koks“ N/A Privatisation N/A N/A N/A N/A 
The company took 
part in privatisation of 
„Goša Fom“ 
company. 
„Harviner” N/A Privatisation Energy production N/A N/A Belgrade 
The company took 
part in privatisation of 
„Termoelektro d.d.“ 
„MargoshviliMuhmadAhmatovi“ N/A Privatisation Food industry N/A N/A Jermenovci 
The company took 
part in privatisation of 
„Jermenovci“. 
„North Karton“ 
20 mil. USD (in the 
first phase) 
Greenfield 
Manufacture of 
cardboard packaging 
N/A 200 Jagodina 
Factory is under 
construction. 
Source: Chamber of Commerce and Industry of Serbia 2017a 
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In terms of Serbian (outward) investment into Russia, the available data presented in Table 
6.12 disclose that the volume of outward FDI has certainly been negatively affected by the 
world economic crisis, managing to get stabilised only in 2014, reaching the record high of 
21,1 million EUR in 2016, from when trend of growth has been successfully maintained. The 
examples of Hemofarm (which opened a pharmaceutical factory, with the value of 
investment of 32 million USD) and Sintelon (which opened a factory for production of floor 
coverings, worth 250 million USD) to this day remain the largest domestic (Serbian) 
investments in Russia. 
Table 6.12: Serbian foreign direct investment into Russia, net, outward, in million EUR 
 
Year 
Country 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
Serbia -3,3 -24,7 -0,8 -16,5 3,7 8,0 21,1 
Note: The available years are 2010–2016. 
Source: Own elaboration based on data from the Statistical Office of the Republic of Serbia - online database 
6.1.2.4 Cooperation in the field of tourism  
Tourism is one of the fields that has been devoted much (diplomatic) attention, especially in 
recent years. Thanks to prudent Serbian (commercial) diplomacy, the two countries 
concluded an agreement,179 signed on 23 March 2011 in Belgrade,180 which set conditions 
and laid down the basis for rapid development in this field, the benefit of which is especially 
expected for the Serbian side. The National Tourism Organisation of Serbia regularly takes 
part at the International Tourism Fair in Moscow as the largest and most well known tourism 
promotional event in whole Russia, and since 2013 also at the International Tourism Stock 
Exchange in Moscow, then is advertising Serbia in the Russian media, organising visits for 
specialised Russian tourist journalists to Serbia, and does other activities working to promote 
Serbia as an attractive tourist destination. The emphasis in on winter and spa tourism. In this 
context, it is important to note that in September 2016, the National Tourism Organisation of 
Serbia launched a tourist guide in the Russian language named „Poliglot“, that is being sold 
in all Russian-speaking countries (apart from Russia: Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine). The 
first edition of the guide was printed in 10,000 copies (Ministry of Trade, Tourism and 
Telecommunications 2017a).  
As Table 6.13 shows, thanks to numerous tourism promotional activities, mainly of the 
National Tourism Organisation of Serbia (but also of other related organisations and agencies 
                                                          
179 The agreement’s full name is the Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Serbia and the 
Government of the Russian Federation on Cooperation in the Field of Tourism. 
180 It came into force on 19 October 2011. 
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at lower levels of administration in Serbia) as in the country, so abroad, the number of 
Russian tourists coming to Serbia has been growing over the years, especially since 2010, as 
in the period 2010–2016 it increased from 21,636 to 43,916, meaning that it more than 
doubled (103 %). This positive ratio is even better, though slightly (109,8 %), in terms of 
overnight stays. Given a constant rise ever since 2005, it is quite probable that the results 
would have been much better had Russia not been imposed sanctions (good results in 2014 
indicate that floods in Serbia did not affect places of interest of Russian tourists); hence a 
serious fall of 17,7 % in 2015 in comparison to 2014, as presented. Overall, in the observed 
period the number of arrivals and overnight stays of the Russian tourists in Serbia has 
increased by nearly 300 %. The tourists are spending about 3 days at average while in Serbia, 
what indicates that Serbia is not only their transit route, but a rest-oriented destination. Given 
intensive promotional activities in Serbia and abroad, it is expected that in the years to come 
Russian tourists will keep coming to Serbia in greater numbers and spend more time there. 
Table 6.13: Arrivals and overnight stays of the Russian tourists in Serbia, in numbers, for the period 2005–2016 
Year Arrivals 
Annual 
change 
Overnight 
stays 
Annual 
change 
Average 
number 
of 
overnight 
stays (per 
person) 
2005 11   33   3,0 
2006 12 9,1% 37 12,1% 3,1 
2007 16 33,3% 52 40,5% 3,3 
2008 16 0,0% 54 3,8% 3,4 
2009 17 6,3% 60 11,1% 3,5 
2010 21.636 27,3% 62.583 4,3% 2,9 
2011 25.236 16,6% 75.308 20,3% 3,0 
2012 31.628 25,3% 91.517 21,5% 2,9 
2013 43.007 36,2% 120.899 32,1% 2,8 
2014 50.571 17,4% 153.811 27,2% 3,0 
2015 41.623 -17,7% 129.011 -16,1% 3,1 
2016 43.916 5,5% 131.323 1,7% 3,0 
Change* 299,2% 
 
297,9% 
  Change** 103,0% 
 
109,8% 
 *Change for the period 2005–2016 
**Change for the period 2010–2016 
Note: For the period 2005–2009 statistics was done according to methodology by which number(s) were presented in the 
form of being rounded off in thousands. 
Note: In terms of arrivals, growth in the period 2014–2016 after economic slowdown in Russia mainly as a consequence of 
the sanctions was -13,2 %. 
Note: In terms of overnight stays, growth in the period 2014–2016 after economic slowdown in Russia mainly as a 
consequence of the sanctions was -14,6 %. 
Note: Data for the period 2000-2004 are not available. 
Source: Statistical Office of the Republic of Serbia - compilation from the Statistical Workbooks*** 
***Data for the period 2011–2015 have been found in the Statistical Workbook of the SORS (2016, 350–351). 
***Data for the period 2005–2009 have been found in the Statistical Workbook of the SORS (2010, 336). 
***Data for the year 2016 have been found in the Information on the Statistics on Catering and Trade of the SORS (2017, 
4). 
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6.1.2.5 Concluding notes  
This case study clearly shows that, based on close friendly political and cultural relations, 
Serbia has succeded to draw substantial benefits from engaging in assertive commercial 
diplomacy towards Russia, especially in the field of trade. The free trade agreement which, in 
essence, was purposely charted to be strongly preferential for the Serbian side, represented a 
strong basis that gave wind to the overall development of bilateral trade relations, which, as 
evidenced, Serbia has indeed managed to exploit satisfyingly. In the observed period (2004–
2016), Serbian export to Russia has increased by 420,1 %. Its annual growth rates have been 
far ahead of those of import, which in the given period has increased by only 8,2 %. As a 
result, coverage of import by export has drastically improved in favour of Serbia, from only 
11 % in 2004 to 52,6 % in 2016. Since import of Russian oil and gas to Serbia alone makes 
for as much as 74,5 % of its total, with the energy sector excluded, Serbia even has trade 
surplus with Russia. 
Moreover, since in the period 2004–2013, before Russia was imposed sanctions (in 2014), 
Serbian export has increased by 595,1 %, had sanctions not been imposed in the first place 
(additionally aggravated by floods in Serbia), given the then pace of growth, the amount of 
export increase in the period 2004–2016 would have very probably been around 800 % 
instead of 420,1 %. Or, translated in monetary value, had sanctions not been imposed, instead 
of official 795,1 million USD in 2016, export would have probably reached the margin of 
1,3–1,4 billion USD (in 2016), in line with the then average pace of growth. Further, in the 
years following the outbreak of the world economic crisis in 2007/'08, having confronted 
consequences of severe contraction of global economic activity, especially that of/in the EU, 
what had negative repercussions on its economy, Serbia resorted to prudent diplomacy to take 
advantage of close cultural and political ties with Russia. Thanks to them, it succeded to 
additionally facilitate and encourage prospects for stronger development of export, managing 
to finangle the two (FTA-amending) protocols, in 2009 and 2011, which have indeed helped 
recovery of Serbian export already in the short-term, as presented in the study. Likewise, 
primarily by virtue of close cultural and political ties with Russia, and unwillingness of 
Serbia to join the EU sanctions on Russia in early 2014, Serbia took advantage of the Russian 
ban on import of food and other agricultural goods from the EU as part of its 
countermeasures (on the EU), as a result of what Serbian export of food products has been 
growing at yet unprecedented rates. In the period 2004–2016 a share of Serbian agricultural 
goods in the top 20 export goods has increased from 15 % to 35 %, whereas only in the 
period 2013–2016 it did by 15 %. In other words, in only 3 years export has achieved better 
 169 
 
growth than it did over almost the entire decade. Likewise, during the period 2004–2016 the 
number of Serbian agricultural export goods in the top 50 export goods has increased from 6 
to 18, whereat only in the period 2013–2016 that number has increased from 12 to 18, in 
comparison to 6 to 12 in the period 2004–2013. In other words, in only 3 years the increase of 
the number of Serbian agricultural goods exported to Russia is equal to the increase obtained 
in the period of near a full decade. The grasped opportunity has opened up space for domestic 
entrepreneurs to position themselves permanently in the vast Russian market, guaranteeing 
sustainable business. This also has indirect positive effects on the Serbian economy, as it 
stimulates development of entrepreneurship in Serbia and helps attract foreign investment, 
especially in the field of agriculture. Hence, in the period 2008–2015 the number of Serbian 
enterprises exporting to Russia increased from 416 to 811, meaning it almost doubled, and in 
the period 2007–2016 the number of export goods went up from 785 to 1,279 respectively. In 
addition, it is important to mention that on more occasions during 2015 and 2016 the Serbian 
authorities at the highest level have attempted to start off negotiations with their Russian 
counterparts in order to come to terms on further liberalisation of trade that would include tax 
free export of automobiles produced in Serbia, as well as some quotas of cheese, cigarettes, 
sugar, chicken meat and alcohol drinks (Ministry of Trade, Tourism and Telecommunications 
2017a). For the time being, despite occasional hints that such agreement would be agreed on, 
still no concrete arrangements have been made, especially vis-à-vis export of cars of the 
Italian automobile brand FIAT manufactured in Kragujevac.    
In terms of (both inward and outward) investment, despite the fact that trade has been in 
prime focus of Serbia's commercial diplomacy towards Russia, diplomatic efforts at various 
levels have been invested in this field too, as a result of which Russian, especially energy 
companies, notably invested in Serbia's energy sector. Herein noteworthy are the activities of 
Serbia's former economic counsellor stationed in Moscow, who passionately worked to 
promote Serbia as a suitable investment destination, in addition to other duties. Given 
systemic shortcomings in the economies of both countries in the sense of inadequately 
developed sector of small and medium enterprises, particularly in Russia, whose economy is 
centered around large, state-owned energy sector companies, the volume of attracted Russian 
investment cannot be expected to be large anyway. 
Commercial diplomacy of Serbia has also contributed to positive developments in the field of 
tourism. The concluded agreement in March 2011 laid down the basis for rapid development 
in this field, the benefit of which is especially expected for the Serbian side. Over the period 
2005–2016, Serbia has recorded an increase of nearly 300 % both in terms of number(s) of 
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both arrivals and overnight stays of the Russian tourists in Serbia. Moreover, intensified 
activities of the National Tourism Organisation of Serbia and other lower-level tourism 
organisations and agencies which regularly take part at international tourism fairs and other 
promotional events, such as tourism stock exchange, across Russia are helping advertise 
Serbia as a desirable tourist destination. In addition, noteworthy is that favourable climatic 
and geographical conditions, especially for spa and winter tourism, and strong investment in 
improving existing and building new facilities, have positively contributed to better 
competitiveness of Serbia in this field, and facilitated diplomatic efforts in reaching positive 
arrangements. 
6.2 Case study 2: Serbia–Turkey 
6.2.1 Turkey as emerging market: advantages and challenges 
6.2.1.1 Reforms and gaining the status of emerging market  
 [Turkey is one of those countries which managed to transform themselves from being low-
income to becoming an emerging economy with stable economic growth and good prospects 
for the future in a relatively short period]. The country commenced carrying out 
comprehensive economic reforms only in the 1980s (Heinemann 2014, 5), based on 
postulations of free, market economy (under the so-called 24 January Programme), 
encouraged and financially assisted by the World Bank and the IMF (Öniş and Bayram 2008, 
6). The second phase of economic reforms took place in the 1990s amid stagnant economic 
growth, accompanied by high inflation, and additionally worsened by occasional periods of 
political instability [what is especially characteristic of Turkey] (Öniş and Bayram 2008, 7). 
Since the banking sector was the primary instigator of the financial crises that happened in 
1994, 2000 and 2001, the then and subsequent reforms were largely focused on improving 
and strengthening the banking sector, and a more controlled monitoring by a regulatory 
agency. In addition, as areas that needed to be reformed were designated fiscal policy (focus 
to be on enhancing discipline and transparency) and tax administration (Öniş and Bayram 
2008, 14). Further economic reforms continued after the crisis in 2001(Öniş and Bayram 
2008, 3), with focus on regulatory framework in the banking sector, then FDI-related 
legislation and fiscal policy (Öniş and Bayram 2008, 3). 
[Over the years, largely thanks to its large population and relatively low-cost labour force, but 
nothing less importantly to favourable geographical position too, being at the crossroad 
between Europe and Asia, Turkey has managed to attract a significant volume of foreign 
investment, mainly export-oriented, what served as the basis for its rapid economic 
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development. Conducted reforms in many areas, achieved political stability, modernisation of 
the country’s infrastructure and high investing in economic fields where Turkey has 
comparative advantage, such as textile industry and tourism, only expedited its fast growth]. 
In that context, Aras (2014, 46–48) nicely summarised the following driving factors behind 
country’s steady economic growth: 
 establishment of functional market economy, 
 monetary discipline with targeted inflation, 
 improved fiscal discipline and independent Central Bank, 
 relatively high level of financial freedom, 
 easy access to international capital, 
 capitalised banking sector (bottom level of capital set at 12 %; it was 16 % in 2014; 
for comparison, the international average is 8 %), 
 notable improvement of the overall business environment, 
 independent regulatory agencies, 
 government stimulation of the private sector of the economy, 
 political stability from 2000 onward, and 
 strong investment in infrastructure. 
Öniş and Bayram (2008, 3–4) argue that Turkey’s sustained economic growth will remain 
contingent on: (a) high inflow of FDI and investment flows in general, (b) expansion and 
success of the export sector, (c) investing in and stimulating research and development, (d) 
political and economic stability, (e) fostering regional cooperation and integration, and (f) 
success in the EU integration process. Similar reasoning is also shared by Aras (2014, 43–
44), who stressed a need for production-oriented economy and contemporary educational 
system based on practical knowledge to stimulate development of innovation and 
enhancement of productivity.  
In addition, favourable demographic picture, with the average age being only 29, also 
contributes to Turkey's good economic prospects (The Economist 2010). In relation to that, 
Aras (2014, 46) said that “[i]f Turkey can educate [its] young population effectively it will 
achieve sustainable economic growth based on high productivity and innovation.”  
6.2.1.2 Advantages of Turkey as an emerging market 
As mentioned, Turkey has geographically favourable position, being located at the crossroads 
between Europe, Russia and the Middle East. As such, it is attractive in terms of business and 
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represents a favourable destination for foreign investors and capital. In addition, close 
military ties with the United States give Turkey a favourable and, in a way, patronising status 
in world multilateral institutions such as the IMF. 
In the text to follow, some of main economic indicators will be presented that will show 
advantages of Turkey as an emerging market. In terms of GDP growth, Figure I1 (see 
Appendix I) shows that Turkish (growth) rate has been highly fluctuating since the beginning 
of thorough reforms in the 1980s. There have been four major, but short in duration, sharp 
falls when GDP growth rate went well below positive value, and double as many sharp 
positive mid- to long-term increases as well, when GDP grew between 6 and 9 % rate. 
Overall, Turkey has managed to enable relatively stable GDP growth, which has been highly 
positive ever since 2010. It is important to add that in terms of GDP value, Turkey has 
reached the world’s top 20, being 17th in 2016, with its GDP worth 857,7 billion USD (see 
the Appendix). GDP per capita growth is mostly a reflection of GDP growth rate value. 
Turkey has maintained its per capita growth in line with other big emerging markets, as 
illustrated in Figure I2 (see Appendix I). Translated into hard currency, as given in Figure I3 
(see Appendix I), Turkey’s GDP per capita has increased from 1,566 USD in 1980 to 13,039 
USD in 2011, what was the record high, but since then decreased to 9,130 USD in 2015, 
being approximately in line with other great emerging economies. In terms of household 
consumption expenditure per capita, Turkey has also recorded a notable increase, being even 
better than some of the BRICS economies. As is the case with GDP growth, household 
expenditure growth have had its periods of ups and downs, but overall, periods of positive 
rates have been mid- and long-term, whereas periods of negative rates have been only few, 
yet short in duration. Mentioned values are given in Figure I4 (see Appendix I). Translated in 
hard currency, household consumption per capita value in Turkey has increased from 4,267 
USD in 1987 to 7,958 USD in 2015, which is currently the highest amount of all presented 
emerging markets, as shown in Figure I5 (see Appendix I). In terms of outward FDI, its rate 
relative to GDP has increased from 0,6 % in 1990 to 6,1 % in 2015, as illustrated in Figure I6 
(see Appendix I). Likewise, as shown in Figure I7, the volume of outward FDI stock has 
increased from 1.1 billion USD in 1990 to 46,6 billion USD in 2015. In terms of a number of 
procedures required for registering a property, Turkey is mainly in line with most other of the 
world’s top developed countries, as shown in Figure I8 (see Appendix I). Where Turkey has 
made laudable improvement is time required for starting a business. In 2003 it took 39 days 
for one to start running a business; in 2015 only 7,5 days, putting Turkey ahead of some of 
the world’s best entrepreneurial economies such as Germany and Japan. Values are presented 
 173 
 
in Figure I9 (see Appendix I). Likewise, in order to become as attractive as possible business 
destination especially for foreign firms, Turkey has lowered taxes on income, profit and 
capital gains from 61,8 % in 1980 to 30 % in 2014, as shown in Figure I10 (see Appendix I). 
Turkey has also managed to curb persistently high inflationary pressures, which at periods 
turned into hyperinflation, such as in 1980 when it was 110,2 % and 106,3 % in 1994. 
However, having realised the severity of damage inflation can do on its developing economy, 
Turkey made steps that eventually led to a decrease of inflation to 7,7 % in 2015. Values are 
given in Figure I11 (see Appendix I). 
6.2.1.3 Why Turkey has good prospects for the future businesswise? 
As presented in Figure I12 (see Appendix I), Turkey has also been successful in attracting 
FDI, the volume of which has increased from 0,1 % of GDP in 1980 to 2,4 % in 2015. During 
this entire period, a sharp decrease that lasted for a couple of years happened only once, 
which, by the way, coincided with the global economic crisis. From 2010 (when it was 1,3 
%) onward the volume started to move upscale, reaching 2,4 % of GDP in 2015, in line with 
the BRICS economies (see the Appendix). After the sharp initial increase in the first reform 
years, Turkey has managed to keep its savings rate relative to GDP above 20 % for the whole 
decade, from the late 1980s to the late 1990s, in line with most of the world’ most developed 
economies, as shown in Figure I13 (see Appendix I). Since 1999 the savings rate has slightly 
decreased, but still continued at the stabilizing rate of around 15 %, surpassing 25 % in 2016, 
being the 4th largest among the listed countries. Turkey has also managed to maintain a 
relatively high level of investment relative to GDP in line with other developed countries, 
being in the range between 15 and 25 % ever since the beginning of the early 1980s. 
Mentioned values are given in Figure I14 (see Appendix I). Where Turkey has been 
particularly successful at is the level of increase of exports relative to GDP value. Despite 
some short-term fluctuations, cumulatively, Turkish exports have increased from 5,2 % in 
1980 to 28 % in 2015, as given in Figure I15 (see Appendix I). As presented in Figure I16 
(see Appendix I), although still lagging behind the world’s most developed economies in 
terms of R&D expenditures, since the 2000s Turkey has started to invest increasingly in 
R&D, the amount of which relative to GDP has increased from 0,5 % in 1996 to 1 % in 2014. 
Given the intensity and stability of expenditure growth, it is likely to expect that Turkey will 
keep up this trend. As presented in Figure I17 (see Appendix I), Turkey has managed to 
decrease unemployment in recent years, which has been relatively high, at the verge of 10 % 
ever since the early 2000s, what is in line with many of the world’s developed economies.  
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6.2.2 Serbia's commercial diplomacy towards Turkey 
6.2.2.1 Introductory notes 
Based on good political relations between the two countries which gave wind to the overall 
economic cooperation, especially in the last decade, Serbia has engaged in strong commercial 
diplomacy towards this fast-growing economy. In terms of bilateral economic cooperation, 
relations between Serbia and Turkey have traditionally been centered around trade; hence a 
primary focus of Serbian (commercial) diplomacy has been on this field. The free trade 
agreement with Turkey, finangled to be more preferential for the Serbian side, represents the 
most laudable diplomatic accomplishment of Serbia vis-a-vis its relations with Turkey, and 
certainly one of the greatest (diplomatic) achievements overall in Serbia's newest history 
(since 2000 onward). Given the mentioned, the main task of this case study will be to test 
whether and to what degree that agreement has positively affected the two countries' bilateral 
trade flows, Serbian export in the first place. Another highly beneficial feature of the 
agreement is that it enables Serbia to import textile and leather raw and semi-finished goods 
from Turkey tax free, process, i.e. manufacture them in Serbia, adding more value, and export 
them further at competitive price in many markets with which Serbia has free or preferential 
trade arrangements, such as the EU, CEFTA and the Eurasian Economic Union, whereat 
primarily thinking of Russia. Diplomacy has also been intensified in terms of investment, 
primarily inward, i.e. Turkish investment (in)to Serbia, especially in the field of clothing 
industry, as well as tourism, the field which has been devoted growing attention in recent 
years. To what extent Serbian diplomacy has succeded to make positive developments in 
these fields, will be shown in the lines to follow. 
6.2.2.2 Cooperation in the field of trade: contractual basis 
The most significant achievement of Serbia's (commercial) diplomacy in terms of its trade 
relations with Turkey is the agreement on free trade,181 signed in Istanbul, Turkey, on 1 June 
2009182 (Official Gazette of the Republic of Serbia, No. 105/2009, 81–82), which laid down 
strong foundation for faster development of trade between the two countries. Implementation 
of the agreement commenced as of 1 September 2010 (Development Agency of Serbia 2018). 
Its (meaning the agreement's) main objectives are the following:  
                                                          
181 The agreement’s full name is the Agreement on Free Trade between the Republic of Serbia and the Republic 
of Turkey. 
182 The agreement was confirmed by the Law on Confirmation of the Agreement on Free Trade between the 
Republic of Serbia and the Republic of Turkey (Official Gazette of the Republic of Serbia – International 
Agreements, No. 105/2009, 81). 
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(a) increasing and improvement of economic cooperation between the Parties and increasing 
of living standard of its citizens, (b) gradual elimination of obstacles and limitations to trade 
with goods, (c) improvement of harmonised development of economic relations between the 
Parties, through broadening of mutual trade, (d) making of just conditions for competition in 
trade between the Parties, (e) contribution to harmonised development and expansion of 
global trade by eliminating obstacles to trade, (f) making conditions for further subventing 
of investments, especially for development of joint investment in both countries, and (g) 
improvement of trade and cooperation between the Parties in the markets of the third 
countries (Official Gazette of the Republic of Serbia, No. 105/2009, 82). 
The agreement enabled asymmetrical trade liberalisation in favour of the Serbian side. In 
other words, Serbian export was exempt from taxes immediately from the beginning of its 
implementation, whereas Turkish export was set to be gradually liberalised over the 5 years 
period, until 2015. This clause alone represented a very important diplomatic success of 
Serbia, as it was given a preferential status at unequal terms. Further, during negotiations on 
the agreement, Serbia managed to finangle protection of strategically important fields of 
agriculture, textile industry and black and non-ferrous metallurgy. As already noted in the 
introductory notes, another highly positive feature of the agreement (and diplomatic success 
at the same time) is that it enables Serbia to import raw materials and semi-finished goods 
from Turkey, process them further in Serbia, and export mostly in the markets of the EU and 
the neighbourhood region (CEFTA), but in other markets too, of which certainly the most 
relevant is the one of the Eurasian Economic Union (Ministry of Foreign and Internal Trade 
and Telecommunications 2013; Development Agency of Serbia 2018). Based on the 
agreement, a joint committee for its implementation was established. The first committee 
meeting was held in February 2012 in Belgrade, whereat both sides agreed on a need for 
further liberalisation of agricultural goods. Having realised a need for further intensification 
of cooperation in the field of agriculture, in September 2011, in Ankara, the two countries 
signed the Memorandum of Understanding in the field of agriculture, based on which was 
established the Agricultural Monitoring Committee, tasked with tackling issues regarding 
phytosanitary protection and veterinary medicine. In addition, the Protocol on Rules on 
Origin has enabled diagonal cumulation of origin with Turkey and improvement of the 
overall business environment (Ministry of Foreign and Internal Trade and 
Telecommunications 2013). Economic cooperation was additionally stimulated by the two 
countries' intergovernmental agreements on economic cooperation,183 and technical and 
                                                          
183 Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Serbia and the Government of the Republic of 
Turkey on Economic Cooperation (in 2010) (Chamber of Commerce and Industry of Serbia 2017a). 
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financial cooperation,184 both signed in 2010, as well as by the agreement on cooperation in 
the field of infrastructural projects185 (2009), agreement on the avoidance of double taxation 
in relation to income and property taxes186 (2006), and the agreement on cooperation in the 
field of prevention and action against customs violations187 (2003) (Chamber of Industry and 
Commerce of Serbia 2017). Furthermore, with the aim to encourage development of 
entrepreneurship in both partner countries, the Business Council was established (in 2002). 
Its main partners are the Chamber of Economy and Industry of Serbia, on the Serbian side, 
and the Committee for Economic Cooperation with Abroad of the Republic of Turkey 
(established by the Union of Industrial and Trade Chambers of Turkey), on the Turkish side 
(Ministry of Foreign and Internal Trade and Telecommunications 2013). Business 
cooperation between the two countries also takes place within the framework of the 
Enterprise Europe Network, especially in the field of small and medium enterprises. In that 
regard, it is important to mention that in February 2012, in Belgrade, the two sides agreed on, 
that is, signed the Memorandum on Cooperation between the National Agency for Regional 
Development of the Republic of Serbia (HAPP) and the Organisation for Support of 
Development and the Promotion of Small and Medium Enterprises of the Republic of Turkey 
(KOSGEB) (Ministry of Foreign and Internal Trade and Telecommunications 2013).  
6.2.2.2.1 Benefits of the agreement 
The free trade agreement with Turkey has turned out to be one of the most successful 
achievements of Serbia's commercial diplomacy, as shown in Tables 6.14 and 6.14a below. 
Thanks to it Turkey has become one of those rare non-EU and non-Western Balkans 
countries with which Serbia has notably improved overall trade exchange, which in the 
period 2004–2016 has increased by 259,3 %. In the same period export has recorded far 
greater growth rate (of 330,4 %) than import (236,9 %). Consequently, coverage of import by 
export has improved from 31,6 % in 2004 to 40,3 % in 2016. In order to best illustrate the 
                                                          
184 Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Serbia and the Government of the Republic of 
Turkey on Technical and Financial Cooperation (in 2010) (Chamber of Commerce and Industry of Serbia 
2017a). 
185 Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Serbia and the Government of the Republic of 
Turkey on Cooperation in the Field of Infrastructural Projects (in 2009) (Chamber of Commerce and Industry of 
Serbia 2017a). 
186 Agreement between the Council of Ministers of Serbia and Montenegro and the Government of the Republic 
of Turkey on the Avoidance of Double Taxation in Relation to Taxes on Income and Property (in 2006) 
(Chamber of Commerce and Industry of Serbia 2017a). 
187 Agreement on Mutual Administrative Assistance in Prevention, Investigation and Taking Action against 
Customs Violations between the Federal Government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the 
Government of the Republic of Turkey (in 2003) (Chamber of Commerce and Industry of Serbia 2017a). 
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benefits of the agreement will be compared the export values before and after its 
implementation. So, in the period 2004–2009, prior to the FTA, export decreased by 27,9 %. 
In only one year, that is, in the period 2009–2010, it grew by as much as 95 %, continuing to 
grow in 2011 rapidly, reaching a cumulative growth (since 2009) of 306 %. Growth has 
continued since then all by up to most recently, recording a cumulative growth of nearly 500 
% (meaning in the period 2009–2016). Therefore, as demonstrated, growth of export in the 
years following the agreement was far better than before it. Moreover, another fact that 
explains the beneficial effect of the agreement (for Serbian economy) is that in the period 
2009–2011 alone, position of Turkey on the list of Serbia's main export destinations 
improved from place 27 to 18. For comparison, in the period 2004–2009, i.e. before the 
agreement, Turkey's position went to worse, from 14 to place 27. In addition, the agreement 
has come at the right time for Serbia, when the country started to challenge harsh spill-over 
effects of the 2007/'08 world economic crisis, which seriously (negatively) affected Serbia's 
traditional export partners in the EU and the neighbourhood region, and indirectly Serbian 
export. With than in mind, the benefit of the agreement is thus greater.  
Table 6.14: Foreign trade between Serbia and Turkey, for the period 2004–2016, in thousand USD 
Year Export 
Annual 
export 
change 
Import 
Annual 
import 
change 
Total 
trade 
exchange 
Trade 
balance 
Coverage 
of import 
by 
export 
Position of 
Turkey as 
Serbia's 
export 
destination  
2004 62.615,3 
 
198.417,2 
 
261.032,5 -135.802 31,6% 14th 
2005 50.315,6 -19,6% 211.684,4 6,7% 262.000,0 -161.369 23,8% 22nd 
2006 38.762,9 -23,0% 256.625,4 21,2% 295.388,3 -217.863 15,1% 26th 
2007 58.531,3 51,0% 405.700,1 58,1% 464.231,4 -347.169 14,4% 26th 
2008 45.336,8 -22,5% 441.419,4 8,8% 486.756,2 -396.083 10,3% 28th 
2009 45.122,3 -0,5% 290.802,1 -34,1% 335.924,4 -245.680 15,5% 27th 
2010 87.986,3 95,0% 322.832,2 11,0% 410.818,5 -234.846 27,3% 23rd 
2011 183.178,5 108,2% 405.142,3 25,5% 588.320,8 -221.964 45,2% 18th 
2012 186.361,1 1,7% 439.142,8 8,4% 625.503,9 -252.782 42,4% 15th 
2013 219.009,6 17,5% 530.871,5 20,9% 749.881,1 -311.862 41,3% 18th 
2014 230.852,5 5,4% 589.736,8 11,1% 820.589,3 -358.884 39,1% 17th 
2015 248.914,7 7,8% 578.853,9 -1,8% 827.768,6 -329.939 43,0% 17th 
2016 269.467,5 8,3% 668.521,9 15,5% 937.989,4 -399.054 40,3% 17th 
Change* 330,4% 
 
236,9% 
 
259,3% 
   *Change for the period 2004–2016 
Note: Data for the period 2000–2003 are not available. 
Source: Own elaboration based on data of the Statistical Office of the Republic of Serbia – online database 
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Table 6.14a:  Export from Serbia to Turkey, for the period 2004–2016, in thousand USD 
Year Export 
Annual 
change 
      2004 62.615,3   
      2005 50.315,6 -19,6% 
      2006 38.762,9 -23,0% 
      2007 58.531,3 51,0% 
      2008 45.336,8 -22,5% 
      2009 45.122,3 -0,5% -27,9% Growth in the period 2004–2009 (before the FTA) 
2010 87.986,3 95,0% 95,0% Growth in the period 2009–2010 
 2011 183.178,5 108,2% 306,0% Growth in the period 2009–2011 (after the FTA) 
2012 186.361,1 1,7% 
      2013 219.009,6 17,5% 
      2014 230.852,5 5,4% 
      2015 248.914,7 7,8% 
      2016 269.467,5 8,3% 497,2% Growth in the period 2009–2016  
Change* 330,4% 
       *Change for the period 2004–2016 
Note: The year 2009 was taken as the last year before the beginning of implementation of the FTA (on 1 
September 2010). 
Note: The year 2011 was taken as the first full year of implementation of the FTA. 
Source: Own elaboration based on data of the Statistical Office of the Republic of Serbia – online database 
In terms of sectoral export, as shown in Tables J1 and J1a (see Appendix J), during the 
observed period the strongest sector is (of) manufactured goods, classified by material, 
followed by the inedible crude materials, except fuels, and the machines and transport 
equipment sectors. In terms of growth, by far the largest (over the entire observed period) has 
had the sector of mineral fuels, lubricants and related products, as illustrated. Moreover, it is 
shown that in the period 2009–2011 9 of 10 sectors have kept positive growth rates compared 
to the period 2009–2010. Likewise, in the first period 7 of them had better growth rates than 
during the latter. This fact alone clearly illustrates positive effects the agreement had on 
growth of export. In terms of cumulative growth, over the period 2009–2016 only 1 of the 
(10) sectors has recorded a fall, yet slight; others have grown mainly at the 3 digit rates. For 
comparison, respective values in tons are given in Tables J2 and J2a (see Appendix J). 
Same results in terms of divisions and related benefits of the agreement are presented in 
Tables J3 and J3a (see Appendix J). As can be seen, in the period 2009–2011 only 1 of 30 
largest divisions recorded a fall compared to the 2009–2010 period. Stable growth has been 
kept since all until most recently. Respective values in tons are shown in Tables J4 and J4a 
(see Appendix J). 
As already noted, another positive feature of the agreement is the fact that it enables Serbia to 
import raw materials and semi-finished goods from Turkey, process them in Serbia, adding 
more value, and export mostly in the markets of the EU and the CEFTA region, but in other 
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important markets too, such as the Eurasian Economic Union. This mainly relates to textile 
industry materials/goods. In Table 6.15 below are given values of selected export divisions 
that relate to the mentioned sector. The data show that the agreement has stimulated import of 
especially textile fibers and their scraps, but also raw leather and fur, though the latter to a 
much less extent, as (with the agreement in force) Turkey happened to become only as an 
alternative import destination of that material, the main part of which has been traditionally 
imported from the EU and other mainland European countries. For comparison, respective 
values in tons are given in Table J5 (see Appendix J). 
Table 6.15: Import of Serbia from Turkey of selected divisions related to leather and textile industries, in 
thousand USD 
  
Year 
Divisions 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
Leather and fur, raw 0,3 2,8 0,0 0,0 0,0 4,3 0,0 1,4 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 
Textile fibers and their scraps 170,8 291,6 117,9 293,0 181,4 598,1 1.107 1.360 1.547 1.088 1.374 1.003 1.052 
Products for dyeing and tanning 236,9 489,9 437,5 1.023 1.311 1.490 2.166 2.744 3.025 3.264 4.464 4.031 4.106 
Leather, products of leather, not 
ment., and processed furs 1.184 1.303 2.787 3.877 4.508 2.526 2.285 2.632 3.309 4.301 5.855 4.258 4.597 
Textile yarn, fabrics and textile 
products 37.805 42.473 55.603 76.170 81.584 57.528 64.103 84.696 84.198 105.805 118.215 113.816 119.630 
Garments and clothing accessories 11.930 10.194 12.497 20.008 21.117 15.347 16.541 19.697 23.870 28.673 41.275 39.677 47.912 
Footware/shoes 3.291 1.902 1.974 1.984 1.643 1.181 1.291 3.221 3.384 3.497 5.078 5.125 6.090 
Source: Own elaboration based on data of the Statistical Office of the Republic of Serbia – online database 
 
Furthermore, as presented in Table 6.16 below, the agreement also positively reflected on a 
number of Serbian enterprises exporting (in)to Turkey, which increased from 183 in 2008 to 
323 in 2015, what represents an increase of respectable 76,5 %. 
Table 6.16: Number of Serbian exporting enterprises in Turkey, for the period 2008–2016 
  
Year  Change 
Country 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2008–2015 
Turkey 183 182 208 255 281 276 279 323  N/A 76,5% 
Annual ch.   -0,5% 14,3% 22,6% 10,2% -1,8% 1,1% 15,8%   
 Source: Own elaboration based on data of the Statistical Office of the Republic of Serbia (2008–2009 ,42–44; 
2010, 44–46; 2011, 48–50; 2012–2015, 50–52) 
The most export-intensive divisions in terms of number of (exporting) enterprises that belong 
to the top 20 Serbian exporting enterprises in Turkey are those of the manufacture of rubber 
and plastic products, and of chemicals and chemical products. Respectively, the number of 
export goods that Serbia exported to Turkey has increased from 381 in 2007 to 608 in 2016, 
what represents an increase of 59,6 % (see Table 6.17). 
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Table 6.17: Number of Serbian export goods to Turkey, for the period 2007–2016 
Year Number 
of goods 
Annual 
change 
2007 381   
2008 401 5,2% 
2009 388 -3,2% 
2010 442 13,9% 
2011 491 11,1% 
2012 357 -27,3% 
2013 488 36,7% 
2014 487 -0,2% 
2015 632 29,8% 
2016 608 -3,8% 
Change* 59,6% 
 *Change for the period 2007–2016 
Note: Data are not available at online database nor are available in documents, but obtained upon request. 
Source: Own elaboration based on data of the Statistical Office of the Republic of Serbia 2017b* 
In addition, as given in Table J6 (see Appendix J), over the period 2012–2016, the number of 
Serbian enterprises operating in Turkey belonging to the top 10 in terms of monetary value 
has more than doubled, reaching the number of 22, of which 2 are agricultural. This might 
indicate a positive trend that the agreement has had on the development of the sector of small 
and medium enterprises in Serbia. 
6.2.2.3 Cooperation in the field of investment 
Despite that a focus of bilateral economic relations of the two countries has been on the field 
of trade, noteworthy results have also been achieved in terms of investment, especially of 
Turkish directi nvestment (in)to Serbia, the volume of which has reached respectable figures 
in the last two years, as presented in Table 6.18. It goes without saying that Serbian 
diplomacy owes important credits for such improvement, as attraction of foreign investment 
in general is one of its priority issues, especially in recent years. In this regard it is important 
to mention the agreement on mutual stimulation and protection of investment (signed in 
2001),188 which positively contributed to early developments in this field.  
                                                          
188 Agreement between the Federal Government of the FR Yugoslavia and the Government of the Republic of 
Turkey in Relation to Mutual Stimulation and Protection of Investment (2001) (Chamber of Commerce and 
Industry of Serbia 2017a). 
 
 181 
 
Table 6.18: Turkish foreign direct investment to Serbia, inward, in million EUR 
 
Year 
Country 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
Turkey 0,99 1,37 0,38 1,67 2,01 27,78 15,46 
Note: The available years are 2010–2016 
Source: Own elaboration based on data of the Statistical Office of the Republic of Serbia – online database 
In Table 6.19 are listed some of the most important Turkish investments in Serbia. From the 
presented it can be seen that Turkish investors most readily invest in the field of textile 
industry. However, it is encouraging that planned investments are focusing on other sectors 
too, such as agriculture, tourism and renewable energy (see Table J7 in Appendix J). 
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Table 6.19: Most important Turkish investments in Serbia 
Investor 
Value of 
investment 
Type of investment Type of activity 
Number of 
new 
working 
places 
opened 
Number of new 
working places 
planned 
Location of 
investment 
Additional notes 
“Birlešik tekstil” 
N/A Brownfield  Textile industry 
 
1200 (in two 
phases) 
Lazarevac 
In April 2017 the 
investor 
purchased a 
"Beko" factory 
in bankruptcy. 
“Jeanci Istanbul” 
6 mil. EUR (in 
Leskovac) and 
746,000 EUR est. 
(in Krupanj) 
Greenfield and 
brownfield 
combined 
Textile industry 
760 (in 
Leskovac) 
+ 100 (in 
Krupanj)  
200 (in Krupanj) Leskovac and Krupanj 
The investment 
was initiated in 
July 2011. In 
April 2015 the 
investor opened 
a new factory in 
Krupanj. 
“Halk Bank” 10.1 mil. EUR Brownfield Banking N/A N/A N/A 
In March 2015 it 
acquisited a 
majority share of 
the Čačak Bank. 
It is expected 
that opening of 
the Turkish bank 
will further 
encourage 
Turkish 
companies to 
invest in Serbia. 
“Aster Tekstil” 6.5 mil. EUR Brownfield  Textile industry 500 2000 est. Niš 
In October 2016 
production 
started. 
“Teklas Automotiv” 11.3 mil. EUR  Brownfield  Automobile industry 200 200 Vladičin Han 
Production 
started in April 
2017. Export 
planned to 
  
1
8
3
 
Russia, Europe, 
Asia and the 
Americas. 
“Arčelik” (BEKO) N/A Brownfield Household appliances N/A 100+ Belgrade 
In June 2015 the 
investor opened 
a office in 
Belgrade, which 
will be a regional 
office. 
“Fiset International” N/A Brownfield Textile industry N/A 40 Paraćin 
The investor 
purchased a 
textile fabric 
company in 
bankruptcy. 
Additional 
investment 
announced. 
“BORAL Aluminum” 55 mil. EUR Greenfield 
Production of 
aluminum 
300 
 
Doljevac 
 
 
 
 184 
 
Given that a focus of Serbian (commercial) diplomacy has been on Turkish (inward) 
investment (in)to Serbia, the volume of Serbian (outward) investment (in)to Turkey is not 
satisfying, as shown in Table 6.20 below. According to the available data, only one Serbian 
company „Bonex holding“, a refractory bricks producer has opened a production facility in 
Turkey (the investment is worth 10 million USD) (Ministry of Trade, Tourism and 
Telecommunications of Serbia 2017b). 
Table 6.20: Serbian foreign direct investment to Turkey, outward, in million EUR 
 
Year 
Country 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
Serbia 4,77 5,92 -1,75 -0,56 -3,67 -8,53 -0,04 
Note: The available years are 2010–2016 
Source: Own elaboration based on data of the Statistical Office of the Republic of Serbia – online database 
6.2.2.4 Cooperation in the field of tourism  
The Serbia Tourism Organisation participates on a regular basis at the International Tourism 
Fair „EMITT“, held in Istanbul. They have been present at the event since the year 2000 
(with the exception of a few years in the early 2000s when it did not participate) (National 
Tourism Organisation of Serbia 2018b). Apart from the national tourism organisation, the 
event is also attended by representatives of the tourism organisations of Vojvodina, and the 
cities of Belgrade and Novi Pazar (Pašin 2015; Republika 2018). The Turkish tourism 
delegation, together with the Turkish national airline company “Turkish Airlines” is also 
regularly exhibiting at the International Fair of Tourism (IFT) held in Belgrade. Places of 
highest interest for the tourists from Turkey in Serbia are the two largest cities - Belgrade and 
Novi Sad (National Tourism Organisation of Serbia 2018b). Owing credits to active 
diplomatic activities, in 2015 Serbia has also managed to finagle to be part of the trilateral 
partnership programme between Turkey, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia – the Mid-Term 
Cooperation Programme of the Trilateral Trade Committee of Serbia, Turkey and Bosnia and 
Herzegovina (for the period 2016–2018), followed by the Action Plan, to serve as the basis 
for enhancement of cooperation between these countries in the areas of trade and tourism 
(Ministry of Trade, Tourism and Telecommunications 2015). 
Thanks to highly intensified diplomacy, in terms of number of arrivals of guests from Turkey, 
as shown in Table 6.21 below, in the period 2005–2016 significant growth of 1095,4 % was 
recorded. However, due to low base in the early 2000s, certainly more plausible figure is of 
504,5 % achieved in the period 2010–2016, what also represents an excellent result. Similar 
achievement is recorded in terms of overnight stays. Resultantly, market share has notably 
increased too, from 2 % in 2007 to 5,2 % in 2016. As Table shows, Turkish tourists spend in 
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Serbia less than 2 days at average. Intergovernmental agreement on visa free regime signed in 
2010 has enabled and facilitates faster development in this field. 
Table 6.21: Arrivals and overnight stays of the Turkish tourists in Serbia, for the period 2005–2016, in numbers 
Year Arrivals 
Annual 
change 
Overnight 
stays 
Annual 
change 
Average 
number 
of 
overnight 
stays 
(per 
person) 
Market 
share 
2005 7 
 
13 
 
1,9 N/A 
2006 7 0,0% 13 0,0% 1,9 N/A 
2007 12 71,4% 23 76,9% 1,9 2% 
2008 12 0,0% 20 -13,0% 1,7 1% 
2009 14 16,7% 25 25,0% 1,8 2% 
2010 13.842 -1,1% 23.531 -5,9% 1,7 2% 
2011 19.196 38,7% 33.843 43,8% 1,8 2.1% 
2012 20.865 8,7% 35.839 5,9% 1,7 2% 
2013 32.437 55,5% 55.017 53,5% 1,7 2.8% 
2014 45.049 40,2% 81.071 48,5% 1,8 3.8% 
2015 64.191 41,1% 115.038 40,8% 1,8 4.8% 
2016 83.676 30,4% 141.608 23,1% 1,7 5.2% 
Change* 1095,4% 
 
989,3% 
   Change** 504,5% 
 
501,8% 
   *Change for the period 2005–2016 
**Change for the period 2010–2016 
Note: For the period 2005–2009 statistics was held according to methodology by which number(s) were 
presented in the form of being rounded off in thousands. 
Note: Data for the period 2000–2004 are not available. 
Source: Statistical Office of the Republic of Serbia – compilation from the Statistical Workbooks*** 
***Data for the period 2011–2015 were found in the Statistical Workbook of the SORS (2016, 350–351) 
***Data for the period 2005–2009 were found in the Statistical Workbook of the SORS (2010, 336) 
***Data for the year 2016 were found in the Information on the Statistics on Catering and Trade of the SORS 
(2017, 4). 
6.2.2.5 Concluding notes  
On the wings of very satisfying political and overall bilateral relations, as demonstrated, 
Serbia's commercial diplomacy has brought tangible benefits for the country's economy. The 
agreement on free trade with Turkey represents one of the most respectable achievements of 
Serbia's commercial diplomacy during the last decade, bringing significant benefits for its 
economy. What is especially praiseworthy is that it strongly contributed to the recovery of 
Serbian export in the years following the 2007/'08 world economic crisis, which severely 
(negatively) affected Serbia's traditionally important export partners in the EU and the 
neighbourhood region. It has helped improve the overall trade exchange between the two 
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countries, which in the period 2004–2016 has increased by 259,3 %. In the same period 
export has grown by 330,4 %, far better than import (236,9 %). Consequently, in the 
observed period coverage of import by export has improved from 31,6 % to 40,3 %. The 
benefit of the agreement is perhaps best illustrated if are compared the short- and long-term 
export values before and after its implementation. For illustration, in the pre-agreement 
period (2004–2009) export even decreased by 27,9 %. But, in only one year (mainly with the 
help of the agreement, whose implementation commenced in September 2010), that is, in the 
period 2009–2010, it recorded growth of 95 %, continuting to grow in 2011, reaching a 
cumulative growth (since 2009) of 306 %. As shown, growth has continued in the following 
years all until most recently, reaching a cumulative growth (over the period 2009–2016) of 
nearly 500 %. Therefore, export has grown far better in the years following the agreement 
than before. Another fact that explains the welfare effect of the agreement (for the Serbian 
economy) is that only in the period 2009–2011 position of Turkey on the list of Serbia's main 
export destinations improved from place 27 to 18. For comparison, in the period 2004–2009, 
i.e. before the agreement, Turkey's position even worsened, yet notably, from 14 to place 27. 
The agreement also enabled Serbia to import raw materials and semi-finished goods from 
Turkey, process them in Serbia, and export further mostly in the markets of the EU and 
CEFTA. This mainly relates to textile industry materials/goods. The agreement has enabled 
Turkey to become an alternative import destination of leather and textile material, the main 
part of which has been traditionally imported from the EU and other mainland European 
countries. However, for various reasons, this provision has not yet been satisfyingly exploited 
by Serbian enterprises. Furthermore, the agreement has stimulated development of the export 
sector in Serbia. A number of Serbian enterprises exporting (in)to Turkey increased from 183 
in 2008 to 323 in 2015, what represents an increase of respectable 76,5 %. In addition, the 
agreement has also  contributed to the development of entrepreneurship in Serbia. In the 
period 2012–2016 the number of Serbian enterprises operating in Turkey belonging to the top 
10 in terms of monetary value has more than doubled, reaching the number of 22. Likewise, 
the number of Serbian export goods to Turkey has increased from 381 in 2007 to 608 in 
2016, what represents the increase of 59,6 %. In addition, as is the case with Russia, given 
that Turkey has very large population, whose purchasing power and overall living standard 
have been constantly improving for years, the mentioned free trade agreement  is also 
regarded very beneficial in the sense of attracting foreign investors (in)to Serbia with the aim 
of exploiting, in terms of business, prosperous Turkish market.  
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In terms of investment, despite the fact that trade has been in the focus of the two countries' 
bilateral economic relations, Serbian commercial diplomacy can be credited for noteworthy 
results that have been achieved, especially of Turkish inward direct investment (in)to Serbia, 
the volume of which has reached respectable figures in 2015 and 2016. Given that in recent 
years attraction of FDI is one of priorities of Serbian (commercial) diplomacy, it is likely to 
expect even higher volumes of FDI from Turkey. 
Last, but not least, Serbian commercial diplomacy has also notably contributed to positive 
developments in the field of tourism. As shown,  in terms of number of arrivals, in the period 
2005–2016 significant growth of 1095,4 % was recorded. However, due to low base in the 
early 2000s, certainly a more plausible figure is one of 504,5 % achieved in the period 2010–
2016, what also represents an excellent result. Likewise achievements are also recorded in 
terms of overnight stays. The intergovernmental agreement on visa free regime signed in 
2010 has facilitated faster development in this field. 
6.3 Case study 3: Serbia–China  
6.3.1 China as emerging market: advantages and challenges 
6.3.1.1 Coming into power of Deng Xiaoping and beginning of reforms  
Early reforms [which marked the beginning of China's economic miracle] started more than 
three decades ago (Naughton in Brandt and Rawski 2008, 91) under the authoritarian 
communist regime (Haggard and Huang in Brandt and Rawski 2008, 338) led by Deng 
Xiaoping, who is regarded as the main architect of the country's economic transformation 
(Coase and Wang 2012, 2).189 In 1978, prior to the onset of economic reforms, China was a 
very poor country.190 It lacked quality human capital, and was openly strongly hostile to any 
form of radical reform (Knight and Ding 2012, 24).191 Prior to taking decision to unleash 
reforms, the Chinese authorities (led by Xiaoping) were very much aware that the system was 
harshly damaged by Mao Zedong's two decades long rule (Naughton in Brandt and Rawski 
2008, 93), and that there was a real danger of falling apart, largely as a result of consequences 
of the legacy behind the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution.192 Something had 
                                                          
189 Xiaoping invented economic reform policy called „reform and opening“ (Kroeber 2016, 45). 
190 Yao (2000, 470) estimated that in 1978, at the onset of the reforms, three-quaters of the Chinese total 
population lived in extreme poverty (though the official government figures are much lower, about 270 
millions). 
191 Meredith (2007) and Knight and Ding (2012) gave a detailed narration of the overall political, economic and 
social state of affairs in China in the post World War II period under Mao Zedong. 
192 [The Great Leap Forward was an attempt of the Chinese communist regime from 1958 to 1962 to transform 
the predominantly agriculture-based economy into being more industrialised. It ended up in total fiasco, causing 
widely spread famine. Alike, the Cultural Revolution in the 1960s and the early 1970s meant just the opposite of 
what it should have stood for, causing educational backwardness]. In terms of the latter, Bosworth and Collins 
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to be changed, as keeping the status quo would only lead to disaster (Naughton in Brandt and 
Rawski 2008, 94). Resultantly and gradually, economy was given primacy over politisation, 
and the traditionally dominant issue of „class struggle“ was put aside (Chen 2002, 573). 
At the beginning of the economic reforms in 1978, having seen how successful economic 
openness and reforms (in terms of productivity improvement) were in case of Taiwan, Hong 
Kong and Singapore (Huang et al. in Brandt and Rawski 2008, 478), China opted to apply the 
model of other Asian economies which based their economic growth primarily on attracting 
export-oriented FDI (home appliances and textile companies), mainly from Japan and the 
United States (Ghosh et al. 2009, 53).193 In reality, the reforms marked a shift from centrally 
planned to market economy (Brandt and Rawski in Brandt and Rawski 2008, 21). They were 
so revolutionary from the perspective of anachronistic and narrow-minded communist 
establishment, that in March 1985, on the occasion of a meeting with representatives of the 
Japanese Liberal Democratic Party, Deng Xiaoping described the then ongoing economic 
reforms as China's second revolution (Coase and Wang 2012, 2). [The chosen policy started 
to pay off quickly]. Since its very opening, China has soon become a magnet for trade and 
investment (Li and Worm 2011, 86). Thanks to its low-cost labour force, reduction of 
obstacles to trade and investment flows, and labour mobility from rural to urban areas, it has 
managed to attract foreign investors in large numbers (Brandt et al. in Brandt and Rawski 
2008a, 720).194 Thanks to its prudent policy, over time, the country started to take advantage 
of a substantial inflow of FDI from all over the world to stimulate development of export-
oriented industrial sectors with high value-added (Lall and Albaladejo 2004, 1441). 
Concerning the reforms themselves, in their initial stage China focused on reforming the legal 
and institutional system (Svejnar in Brandt and Rawski 2008, 73) in the rural sector, 
hampered by numerous flaws (Meredith 2007,17–19; Huang et al. in Brandt and Rawski 
2008, 478). First signs of the reforms were positive, as the sector of agriculture was improved 
to a certain extent (Huang et al. in Brandt and Rawski 2008, 478). Reforms were gradually 
expanded to encompass the industrial and the service sector (Ghosh et al. 2009, 51). In 1979 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
(2008, 52) argued that it hindered the educational process. In addition, under the leadership of Mao Zedong, the 
process of urbanisation was stalled (Ghosh et al. 2009, 50). 
193 However, the investment-driven growth resulted in strong disbalance in terms of the investment-consumption 
ratio. Interestingly, other East Asian countries – Japan, South Korea and Taiwan, whose growth model was 
mainly copied by China, had their own periods of disbalance, what is argued to be intrinsic in the process of 
reforming a country from low- to high-income status. That basically happens when the period of strong 
investing in the construction of factories, infrastructure and housing ends, as a result of which economy slows 
down and consumption becomes the new driver of economic growth (Kroeber 2016, 180–181).  
194 In the initial stage of the reform process, China openly favoured foreign investors. However, over time it 
became clear that such system in which domestic enterprises are being unfairly discriminated against in not 
sustainable in the long-term (Clarke et al. in Brandt and Rawski 2008, 380). 
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the system opened to competition (Naughton in Brandt and Rawski 2008, 104). In the 1980s 
the then leadership decided to allow development of the private sector (Haggard and Huang 
in Brandt and Rawski 2008, 368), although enterprises registered as entirely private faced 
limited access to loans and incentives (Haggard and Huang in Brandt and Rawski 2008, 344). 
During that period, China had two quite different trade regimes - the first being more open 
for predominantly foreign, but also domestic export-oriented companies, while the other one 
was more restrictive, applicable for all others (Branstetter and Lardy in Brandt and Rawski 
2008, 637).195 As the private sector in China expanded, the new (private) entrepreneurs began 
entering fields of economy that were until then exclusively publicly-owned (Brandt and 
Rawski in Brandt and Rawski 2008, 3). 
6.3.1.2 Reforms of the 1990s and the 2000s  
In terms of the reforms, the 1990s marked a continuation of liberalisation of trade and FDI 
(Sally in OECD 2008, 119). Throughout the decade the Chinese state authorities offered 
generous benefits in the form of tax reliefs and liberalisation of foreign investment-related 
regulations in order to attract as higher volume of (inward) FDI as possible, and did so with 
much success (Haggard and Huang in Brandt and Rawski 2008, 368), as will be illustrated 
later in this chapter. Reform of the taxation system initiated in 1994 gave wind to the 
authorities at local levels to further stimulate their economies and increase budget revenues, 
so to be able to keep the pace with planned expenditures. This is so because GDP growth is 
certainly one of the factors taken into account when being decided about political promotion 
of local governors. As a result of that, local political elites started to privatise public 
enterprises and fought to attract as much FDI as possible in order to create economic growth 
and raise living standard of the local population (Zhao 2013, 2133; Wang 2011, 33). Deng 
Xiaoping's famous saying that economic development should be the absolute principle 
became the primary guiding idea in China (Zhao 2013, 2133). Since 1998 onward, China 
strongly kept up with the reforms. Some of the most conspicuous are: (1) transformation of 
state-owned enterprises into corporations, with public sale of minority shares, (2) reforming 
the banking sector196 to make it sustainable, (3) creation of business environment-related 
legal framework, (4) fulfilment of requirements for entrance into the WTO, (5) reducing 
restrictions to free movement of people inside the country, and (6) developing real estate 
                                                          
195 Haggard and Huang in Brandt and Rawski (2008, 368) found credible enough evidence which demonstrates 
that the state policies strongly favoured foreign firms in comparison to domestic. 
196 Concerning the banking sector, in order to strengthen it China allowed foreign investors to enter into banks 
ownership structure with minority share (Svejnar in Brandt and Rawski 2008, 71–72). 
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property market. It is noteworthy that in the period following the reforms, productivity of 
state-owned enterprises outpaced that of their private counterparts. But, as time passed by, 
this ratio gradually changed in favour of the latter, meaning that public enterprises benefited 
from the reforms only in the short-term (OECD 2013, 4). The 1990s were also marked by 
large scale privatisation of public enterprises197 which started during the last years of the 
decade.198 In the process of privatisation public enterprises were either sold off, merged with 
foreign enterprises or liquidated. It is only large public enterprises that remained being kept 
in possession of the state or were restructured (Ghosh et al. 2009, 52).  
The 2000s were marked by the the State Council directive in 2005 which equalised the rights 
of Chinese domestic enterprises with their foreign counterparts, which until then had been 
openly privileged by the Chinese state. The directive stipulates that „all the economic sectors 
open to FDI should be open to domestic private participation.“ (Haggard and Huang in 
Brandt and Rawski 2008, 371).199 As a result of the improved policies that provided 
conditions for stimulative business environment, the private sector started to expand 
(Haggard and Huang in Brandt and Rawski 2008, 343). Interestingly, there is a tendency in 
China that, in order to avoid being constrained by the state, entrepreneurs register their new 
firms under the category „collective firms“, as the state imposes certain restrictions on firms 
registered as entirely private. In that way, they get political support and easier access to 
business loans (Haggard and Huang in Brandt and Rawski 2008, 341). However, despite 
growing and less constrained private sector, the state has remained to be in full control of the 
economy, and it seems to be strongly determined to continue to do so. Kroeber (2016) nicely 
explained this in the following way: 
China has a large and fast-growing private sector, which in aggregate accounts for the 
majority of economic output and employment, and its share of both is rising. But private 
firms are, on average, small. The overwhelming majority of the largest companies in China 
are state-owned, and state firms dominate virtually all capital-intensive sectors. The state 
sector's share of national assets is far larger than in any other major economy. State 
enterprises command a share of resources (such as financial capital, land, and energy) much 
bigger than their contribution to economic output. The SOEs are also an integral part of the 
political power structure. They are often used as instruments of macroeconomic policy and 
industry regulation in place of relatively weak formal policy and regulatory instruments. So 
                                                          
197 Public companies may be in possession by either the central or one of decentralised levels of government, or 
under joint ownership of both (Ghosh et al. 2009, 52). 
198 China did not start privatisation simultaneously with the initial opening of China a few decades ago (Svejnar 
in Brandt and Rawski 2008, 71, 79). The author also argues that large scale privatisation started to be conducted 
in the beginning of the new millennium (Svejnar in Brandt and Rawski 2008, 71, 79). 
199 However, Chinese domestic private firms stayed prohibited from entering into the energy sector, which has 
predominantly remained in the hands of the state. Since the early 1990s, foreign firms too have been given that 
right (Haggard and Huang in Brandt and Rawski 2008, 371). 
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the power and importance of SOEs are much greater than implied by economic statistics 
alone (Kroeber 2016, 89). 
It is worth noting that in the process of economic reforms China opted for the so-called 
„gradualist“ approach, meaning that the Chinese government decided rather to encourage 
new enterpreneurs to start their own private businesses than to set off large scale privatisation 
(like it was done in the transitional countries which belonged to the former Soviet Union), 
which would be unsafe in terms of outcome and also potentially „politically costly“. This 
process is simply paraphrased as creating winners without producing loosers (Haggard and 
Huang in Brandt and Rawski 2008, 342). Furthermore, China joined the WTO in 2001.200 
This implies that it had to align its legal framework with the WTO rules and regulations. 
China had to reduce tariffs on certain goods, in terms of FDI no consent by local authorities 
would be needed any more, intellectual property rights needed to be improved and services 
sector liberalised, and so on (Ghosh et al. 2009, 55). The country continued 
liberalising/opening its economy after 2001 and the WTO accession (Sally in OECD 2008, 
119). Reduction of tariffs and import barriers, development of infrastructure for transport and 
communication, and hence better business prospects for the Chinese domestic and foreign 
companies made suitable conditions for development of competition. Various forms of 
ownership, such as: TVEs, joint ventures between domestic and foreign companies, 
shareholders companies, individually owned corporations, in addition to restructured state 
companies, intensified the rate of competition (Brandt et al. in Brandt and Rawski 2008b, 
621). Under new circumstances, the increased competition positively affected growth of 
productivity, as enterprises fought to enhance economic performance in order to „survive“ 
(Brandt et al. in Brandt and Rawski 2008b, 622). Zhao (2013, 2128) explained this process of 
growing competition in China well: „The increasingly competitive product market provided a 
battlefield for enterprises with different ownerships to compete. And it also provided a 
laboratory for economists to test the efficiency implications of enterprises with different 
property rights arrangements. The end result was that private ownership won the „war“, since 
more and more public enterprises got privatized“. 
  
                                                          
200 Even prior to joining the WTO, China liberalised its trade and investment policy to the extent that it became 
one of the most „open“ countries in the world in economic terms (Branstetter and Lardy in Brandt and Rawski 
2008, 676). 
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6.3.1.3 Functioning of the economy  
Over time, China has become a more decentralised state in terms of functioning of the 
economy (Ghosh et al. 2009, 53). In its nature, China's economic system could be said to 
represent a form of capitalism, although not entirely (Bolesta 2007, 110), since the central 
government controls and regulates the overall economy (Ghosh et al. 2009, 52). The system 
itself combines elements of a market economy and political authoritarianism (Naughton in 
Brandt and Rawski 2008, 97). Ghosh et al. (2009, 49) described it in the following way: 
„...the Chinese economy can be characterized as a hybrid economy, combining elements of a 
developing country, a transition country and a 'newly industrializing country' within the 
institutional and political framework of a 'Socialist Market Economy', which gives the state 
significant influence on the basically market-driven system.“201 Also, Naughton in Brandt 
and Rawski (2008, 91) offered good explanation of the system itself and the reform process:  
...the hierarchical political system shaped the process of market transition, and the 
political hierarchy itself has been reshaped in response to the forces unleashed by 
economic transition. The critical economic transition policies were made by national 
leaders acting in the context of their positions in the authoritarian political system 
and as a result, many of the basic features of the reform process can be explained by 
the structure of the political system and the changing needs of politicians within that 
system. However, whatever its real form, in practice the system proved to be very 
functional (Brandt and Rawski in Brandt and Rawski 2008, 21).  
6.3.1.4 Advantages of China as an emerging market 
As shown in Figure K1 (see Appendix K), since the beginning of reforms in 1978, China’s 
GDP has grown steadily at an unprecedented rate. In 1978 it was around 12 %. Since then 
onward, it never fell below 4 % (in 1990), which was the lowest rate in almost four decades 
of transition. During that period there were actually only few years when GDP growth rate 
was below 8 %; in some years it even surpassed 14 %. The Figure also shows that apart from 
China, India’s GDP growth rate too was at average considerably higher than that of 
developed economies. Brazil’s GDP has also grown well, though with much more 
emphasised short-term fluctuations than is the case with China and India. It can also be seen 
that during the world economic crisis GDP of all developed economies (that belong to the 
world’s top ten in terms of GDP) fell sharply (for about 6–8 % at average), while China’s 
even went up, what demonstrates its strong resilience to global economic shocks. India’s and 
Brazil’s GDP growth during the crisis years did record a fall, still much lesser than was that 
of the world’s most developed economies. In addition, China’s GDP (measured in hard 
                                                          
201 The United States and the European Union still view China as a non-market economy (Ghosh et al. 2009, 
53). 
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currency) has grown staggeringly from 149.5 million USD in 1978 to even 11,2 trillion in 
2016, having become the world’s second largest, only behind that of the United States. 
China’s GDP per capita growth has closely followed the pace of growth of GDP, as shown in 
Figure K2 (see Appendix K). In terms of GDP per capita, Figure K3 (see Appendix K) shows 
that during the transition period China’s per capita growth in hard currency has increased 
from 1. 3 USD in 1978 to 7.924 USD in 2015. Given its extremely large population that 
serves as the basis for this calculation, this is a truly remarkable achievement. Likewise, other 
big emerging economies belonging to the BRICS have also substantially increased their per 
capita value. Figure K4 (see Appendix K) shows that household final consumption 
expenditure per capita growth in China has also recorded a remarkable increase. During the 
transition period the consumption growth rarely fell below 4 %, whereas it happened many 
times that it grew at the 10 % rate or higher. Both India and Brazil have also achieved a 
notable pace of growth. As given in Figure K5 (see Appendix K), if translated into the hard 
currency value, the household consumption in China has grown from 209 USD in 1978 to 
2,152 USD in 2014. Given the country’s large population and extremely low starting base in 
the initial stage of reforms, it is understandable that other big BRICS emerging economies 
such as Brazil, Russia currently have much higher rate of household consumption than China. 
Chinese households have maintained strong inclination for savings in comparison to high-
income countries, despite notable improvement of living standard in the last decade. As 
Figure K6 (see Appendix K) shows, a share of savings relative to total disposable household 
income has increased from 34 % in 1992 to 38 % in 2014. Figure K7 (see Appendix K) 
shows that China has been heavily investing in outward FDI, the amount of which, relative to 
GDP, has increased from 1,1 % in 1990 to 9,2 % in 2015. Given steadiness of growth rates, it 
is very likely that this trend will continue. The amount of outward FDI stock has increased 
from 4,455 billion USD in 1990 to 1,010 trillion USD in 2015. As Figure K8 (see Appendix 
K) shows, the pace of growth has rapidly increased since the mid 2000s. In terms of a number 
of procedures necessary to register a property, China stands among the best, as Figure K9 
(see Appendix K) illustrates. The available statistics for this indicator kept only since 2013 
demonstrates that China along with Italy requires the lowest number of those procedures of 
all given countries – only four; in most others this number ranges between five and nine. 
Figure K10 (see Appendix K) shows that in terms of time required to start a business, as is 
the case with the previous indicator, the statistics is being kept only since 2013. Since then, 
number of days for which a business can registered has decreased from 34.4 in 2013 to 31.4 
in 2015. Despite that all developed economies are well in advance of China in terms of this 
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indicator, lesser time for which one can start a business in China is certainly an improvement. 
Given the pace of development of entrepreneurship in China and strong advocacy for creating 
an environment that is highly conducive to business, it is very likely that value for this 
indicator will further improve in the coming years. As Figure K11 (see Appendix K) shows, 
likewise, China offers the lowest taxes on income, profits and capital gains among the 
world’s largest economies, ranging between 27 and 29 % during the period for which 
statistics is being kept. This is certainly a strongly stimulating incentive for foreign 
companies when deciding whether to open business facilities there. Figure K12 (see 
Appendix K) illustrates that during the transition period, China has gradually managed to 
curb inflation which was periodically quite high in the initial stages of reforms (in 1994 it 
reached the record high of 24,3 %). Since the 2000 onward inflation was mainly kept at the 
rate similar to that of the developed countries, though with more emphasized periods of 
fluctuations, what is understandable given that China is a still atransforming developing 
economy. 
6.3.1.4.1 Resilience to global economic crises  
Thanks to recovery-driven stimulative measures202 (Lardy 2012, 1) and strong foreign 
reserves (Ghosh et al. 2009, 61; Business Monitor International 2014, 13), China has been 
quite successful in managing to alleviate negative effects of the 2007/'08 world economic 
crisis in comparison to other developed countries, such as the United States, Japan and many 
European countries (Zhu and Kotz 2011, 26–27; Lardy 2012, 11). In general terms, the 
country has vindicated a formidable resilience to external economic fluctuations and shocks, 
primarily thanks to strongly positive macroeconomic foundation. Also noteworthy in this 
regard is that China has been and remained committed to maintaining a high level of saving 
and investing, whereby preserving the exchange rate stable. This has enabled significantly 
positive balance of payment, low debt level, and also helped accumulate strong foreign 
reserves, which served to protect the economy under crisis conditions (Rasiah et al. 2013, 
303). Moreover, notable and growing consumer demand in the huge domestic market which 
nowadays strongly contributes to sustainability of economic growth in China is a credible 
enough indicator that the Chinese economy will be less vulnerable to global economic shocks 
than other highly developed countries nearby, such as South Korea, Singapore and Taiwan 
(Rasiah et al. 2013, 310). 
                                                          
202 The measures consisted of expansive monetary and stimulative fiscal policy (Woo and Zhang 2010). 
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6.3.1.5 Why China has good prospects for the future businesswise?  
Napoleon Bonaparte once described China as a „sleeping giant“, which „...when she wakes 
she will shake the world.“ (Czinkota et al. 2011, 262). His predictions turned out to be true. 
Ever since the late 1970s when it started the reforms, China has managed to sustain 
unprecedentedly strong economic growth (Bosworth and Collins 2008, 62; Brandt and 
Rawski in Brandt and Rawski 2008, 1; Greene et al. in OECD 2008, 373). Its opening and 
taking full part in the globalised world brought many advantages for the country well-being – 
productivity increased, its products enjoy a higher level of competitiveness globally, and 
purchasing power of the population has increased too (Branstetter and Lardy in Brandt and 
Rawski 2008, 677; Greene et al. in OECD 2008, 373). In just a few decades, China has 
managed to gain the status of the world's new economic superpower (Petras 2006, 423). It has 
become the main driver of global economic activity (Meredith 2007, 13; Greene et al. in 
OECD 2008, 373) and the largest global consumer of a plethora of various goods such as 
steel, aluminum, oil and gas, as a result of which it directly started influencing their rising 
demand and price at the world market. In parallel, given that many of the world's countries 
have outsourced their production facilities to China, that brought about a decrease of price of 
many products globally (Wong 2013, 288).  
[Furthermore, China has been working diligently on fulfilling another highly important 
precondition for economic development of industrialising and transition countries – it is 
heavily investing in infrastructure]. It is expected that investment in infrastructural projects 
countrywide will soon reach the figure of 5,3 % relative to the country's GDP (Business 
Monitor International 2014, 28). Lardy (2012, 31) argues that economic returns to 
infrastructural investment will be substantial, especially taking into account the rising needs 
for quality infrastructure amid huge internal migrations from rural into urban areas.  
Having become aware of its economic strength and potentially lucrative business 
opportunities in other parts of the world, in 2001 the Chinese Government adopted the „going 
global“ strategy (Korniyenko and Sakatsume 2009, 16), based on engaging in outward 
investment with the primary aim to gain access to new markets and advanced technology.203 
                                                          
203 Part of that strategy was that China tends to avoid anti-dumping conflicts in foreign markets by means of 
locating production facilities in proximity to the targeted market (Korniyenko and Sakatsume 2009, 18). The 
main driving factors behind China's outward FDI: (1) search for new markets for Chinese export, (2) search for, 
from the perspective of production costs, more efficient markets, (3) search for the (natural) resources (such as 
oil) necessary to sustain China's economic development, (4) search for acquisition of foreign assets, primarily 
with the aim to gain the technology and add in the portfolio some of the well established global brands 
(examples are IBM and Rover), (5) diversification-driven acquisions (in line with the Japanese and South 
Korean model). China has been successful in this, as in only 5 years the number of the Chinese companies on 
the so-called „Fortune 500“ list has increased from 11 to 29 (Korniyenko and Sakatsume 2009, 16–17). 
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In the initial phase the plan was to include 30–50 big domestic companies in the business 
(Ghosh et al. 2009, 56). Since then, China has been working intensely on broadening and 
fostering its political and economic relations with Latin America, Africa and the Middle East 
(Business Monitor International 2014, 7), but also with Europe and other parts of the world 
too. With reference to the topic of the research, it is especially worth emphasising that the 
volume of Chinese outward investment is also increasing in the post-communist transition 
countries of Central and Eastern Europe and the Baltics, as well as the CIS countries 
(Commonwealth of Independent States) (Korniyenko and Sakatsume 2009, 2). Needless to 
say that the country's rapid economic growth and development for the past couple of decades 
has greatly contributed to faster development of globalisation in general (Lo and Li 2011, 
59). In this context, it is important to mention the reasoning of Kroeber (2016, 44–45) who 
found that suitable circumstances which helped China in economic internationalisation are: 
(1) „good“ neighbouring countries – Japan, South Korea and Taiwan, which at the time of 
China's opening had already been successfully reformed and fast-growing export-oriented 
economies, the recipe China could easily apply, (2) Hong Kong, which a few decase ago, at 
the time when China opted to become economically open, had already been a well-
functioning and excellently performing finance-based economy, a convenience which China 
had an opportunity to exploit, (3) beginning of mass use of shipping containers in global trade 
which substantially reduced transport costs, and (4) Taiwan – which from the late 1980s has 
become well-known for its electronics industries, which due to the then suitable (Chinese) 
business environment and low labour cost moved many of its production facilities to 
mainland China. Furthermore, in terms of outward FDI of China’s multinational companies, 
Ramamurti and Hillemann (2018, 34) argue that what characterises those companies is 
primarily: (a) lack of experience in doing business outside national borders, (b) global 
economic and business environment and trends what went in their favour compared to the 
time a few decades ago, (c) significant government assistance which substantially helped 
improve their global competitiveness, and (d) the related so-called “leapfrogging advantage” 
which enabled “sluggish” national companies to gain sufficient level of competitiveness to be 
able to compete especially in some new-emerging industries in international markets. On the 
other side, when it is about conditions which have an impact on Chinese outward FDI, 
Buckley et al. (2017) stressed the importance of institutional factors and the way they are 
reflected on the investing companies' business strategies and decisions, as well as managerial 
knowledge. Likewise, the authors found not so widely advocated determining factors, namely 
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domestic social and political arrangements, which are strongly believed to have had an 
influential impact on international business decisions and aspirations of the Chinese firms.  
In line with the afore-mentioned („going global“) strategy, it is important to emphasise the 
“Belt and Road Initiative” and the “Made in China 2025” strategy. The first - “Belt and Road 
Initiative” is the Chinese government development strategy (which is a joint reference for the 
Silk Road Economic Belt, and the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road) [brought in late 2013] 
aimed to promote economic cooperation and development among the countries encompassed 
by the strategy, with focus on enabling free movement of goods and access to resources. The 
Initiative is set to connect Asia, Europe and Africa via five main routes, of which three 
belong to the Silk Road Economic Belt and two to the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road. The 
first three routes are: (1) connecting with Europe via Central Asia and Russia, (2) connecting 
China with the Middle East via Central Asia, (3) connecting China and Southeast Asia, South 
Asia and the Indian Ocean, and the remaining two are: (4) connecting China and Europe via 
the South China Sea and Indian Ocean, and (5) connecting China with the South Pacific 
Ocean via the South China Sea (Hong Kong Trade Development Council 2018). On the other 
side, “Made in China 2025” is a strategic plan brought by the Chinese government in May 
2015 with the aim to substantially increase the value-added of its domestic products, making 
them more competitive internationally. In essence, it envisions strong investment in and/or 
development of the following high technology sectors/industries: information technology 
(IT), numerical control instruments, aerospace equipment, high-technology ships, railway 
equipment, energy saving, new materials, medical devices, agricultural machinery, power 
equipment, and pharmaceutical industry (People’s Daily Online 2015; The Diplomat 2018). 
In order to present China’s rising global strength in the lines to follow will be presented some 
of important (mainly) macroeconomic indicators that will enable us to compare position(s) of 
China vis-à-vis other world’s largest economies that belong to top 10 by the value of GDP. 
As presented in Figure K13 (see Appendix K), primarily thanks to its predominantly low-cost 
labour force and rising consumption capacity of huge population, China has been very 
successful in managing to attract a high level of inward FDI,204 which since the beginning of 
the 1990s has mainly been at the rate between 3 and 5 % of GDP. With refence to foreign 
investment, it is important to note that during its transition China has developed a cult of 
investment, so to call it (Vuving 2012, 419), what served as the basis for its development and 
                                                          
204 The guiding idea behind foreign investors in the initial phase was primarily to take advantage of Chinese 
low-cost work force. On the other side, the guiding idea behind foreign investors in recent years was primarily 
to explore the rising consumption capacity of China's huge domestic market and take use of its highly skilled 
human resources (Brandt et al. in Brandt and Rawski 2008b, 623). 
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growth. Foreign investing companies in China heavily influenced some sectors of the 
Chinese economy to the extent that it could be said that their influence decreased the role of 
the Chinese state in them, making those sectors more dependable and susceptible to their 
policies (Petras 2006, 425). Main positive effects of inward FDI can be summaried as 
follows: 
- FDI has positively affected economic growth (Zhang 2001, 113), especially in the 
eastern coastal regions (Zhang 2001, 113), 
- FDI has enabled transfer of technology, management (Zhao 2013, 2130) and know-
how (Brandt et al. in Brandt and Rawski 2008b, 623), 
- foreign capital has proved to output a higher level of productivity than domestic 
(Zhang 2001, 113), 
- FDI has forced China's domestic enterprises to raise the level of their competitiveness 
(Chen et al. 1995), 
- investment positively affected employment (Lardy 2012, 23), 
- FDI has generally contributed to the success of economic reforms (Chen et al. 1995). 
In relation to the context, it is important to note that Chinese enterprises have been very 
successful in taking advantage of FDI spill-overs, especially in the sense of absorbing new 
technologies (Zhang et al. 2009, 7). Over time, they have managed to substantially improve 
the level of technological upgrade of their own (domestic) products (Zhang et al. 2009, 8), 
what helped them increase productivity and become more competitive globally (Chuang and 
Hsu 2004). For example, the steel industry producers such as: Angang, Baogang, Baosteel 
and Wugang, thanks to technological advancement, have become competitive at the 
international market (Zhang et al. 2009, 8). As a matter of fact, technological development of 
Chinese enterprises can largely be credited for the overall economic development of the 
country (Zhang et al. 2009, 10; also in Davies and Raskovic 2018).205 Furthermore, where 
China particularly stands out is the level of savings relative to GDP. As can be seen from the 
Figure K14 (see Appendix K), China has a conspicuously strong propensity towards savings 
in comparison to all other world’s largest developed economies. It has managed to increase 
the level of savings from 37,2 % in 1978 to 49 % of GDP value in 2014. For comparison, 
Germany, traditionally known for its strong affinity for savings has increased the level of 
                                                          
205 It is often neglected that historically looking, this Asian giant has been technologically well in advance 
compared to the Western civilisation. Invention of paper, printing technique, gunpowder and compass are 
perhaps some of the most important and broadly well-known of a large number of inventions which eventually 
found their application worldwide (Davies and Raskovic 2018, 5–6). 
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savings relative to its GDP from 23,4 % in 1978 to 26,1 % in 2014, whereas Japan’s rate even 
decreased during this time-span (from 32,4 % to 18,7 %). Translated in hard currency, the 
volume of savings has increased from 55,2 billion in 1978 to even 5,1 trillion in 2014, as 
shown in Figure K15 (see Appendix K). The volume of savings started to increase at an 
unprecedentedly rapid pace in the early 2000s, surpassing the American in 2008 (in 2015 
American GDP was 18.1 trillion USD and the Chinese 11 trillion USD; the savings ratio 
between the two was 5.1 trillion in comparison to 2.9 trillion USD in favour of China). China 
has also maintained the level of investment growth relative to GDP value in line with the 
savings rate; the first increased from 34,3 % in 1980 to 47,8 % in 2013. The disparity 
between China and all other developed countries is conspicuously in favour of China in this 
matter too. Values are given in Figure K16 (see Appendix K). In terms of research and 
development, China is heavily investing in the development of the knowledge-based 
economy (Zhang et al. 2009, 7), what is regarded as highly important.206 Figure K17 (see 
Appendix K) shows a rapid increase of Chinese investment in research and development. In 
1996, of the world’s ten largest economies China had invested the least – only 0,6 %. From 
then on, the country has been heavily increasing expenditure on R&D, reaching the figure of 
2,1 % of GDP value in 2014, having jumped from the last to the fifth position among those 
countries. For comparison, in the given period Germany and Japan, the world’s most 
technologically advanced countries, have recorded the increase in R&D expenditure of less 
than 1 % of their GDP value. Given the steadiness of the level of growth of expenditure in 
R&D, it becomes likely that China will strongly keep on investing in what will largely 
determine its pace of economic growth in the future – technological sophistication. In 
addition, China set the target to increase expenditure for scientific research and technology 
relative to GDP from about 2 % in 2010 to 2,5 % by 2020. This would imply an ambitious 
annual increase in the range 10–15 % (Schaaper 2009, 3). In the years to come, innovation 
and know-how will certainly play a significant role in the Chinese economy (Wu 2011, 130). 
As Figure K18 (see Appendix K) shows, rapid increase in R&D expenditure has naturally 
resulted in the increase of high-technology exports, whose share in total manufactured 
exports has increased from 6,4 % in 1992 to 25,4 % in 2014. Interestingly, in the given period 
this ratio has dramatically decreased in the United States (from 32,6 % in 1992 to 18,2 % in 
2014) and Japan (from 24 % in 1992 to 16,7 % 2014). If translated into hard currency, the 
value of Chinese high-technology export has increased from 4.3 billion USD in 1992 to 558,6 
                                                          
206 On the sample of 310 Chinese regions, covering the time span from 1998 to 2007, Wu (2011,139) found that 
innovation and R&D indirectly via innovation positively affect economic growth across Chinese regions. 
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billion USD in 2014, as presented in Figure K19 (see Appendix K). For comparison, 
Germany as the world’s second largest producer of high-technology goods, in 2014 exported 
high-technology goods worth 199,7 billion USD. As a result of being the world’s largest 
trading nation in terms of value of trade flows, and having predominantly export-oriented 
economy, China’s current account balance has also increased steadily, keeping positive value 
ever since 1997 wherefrom data are available. The pace of balance increase reached its 
highest in the mid-2000s, during which it was in the range between 4 and 10 %. Values are 
presented in Figure K20 (see Appendix K). Translated into hard currency, as illustrated in 
Figure K21 (see Appendix K), China has increased its current account balance from 40,4 
billion USD in 1997 to 209,8 billion USD in 2014, being the world’s second largest value, 
next to Germany’s. For comparison, in the given period the United States dramatically 
worsened its balance, keeping huge deficit, which in 2006 reached the record high of 806,7 
billion USD, although since then it decreased to 410,6 % in 2014. The growth-driven 
economy fueled by a huge volume of inward and outward investment has resulted in a 
relatively low unemployment rate, as given in Figure K22 (see Appendix K). During the 
period 1991-2014 it ranged between 4 and 5 %, which was the third lowest rate among the 
world’s ten largest economies, only behind India and Japan. Given a huge number of 
available labour force in China (806,5 million in 2014), keeping the unemployment rate 
below 5 % represents a remarkable achievement. In addition, it is worth mentioning that 
China is also substantially contributing to tourism development of other countries, as shown 
in Figure K23 (see Appendix K). Expenditures of the Chinese citizens on travelling abroad 
have increased from 4 billion USD in 1995 to nearly 165 billion USD in 2014, what, in 
comparison to other countries - the world’s largest economies, represents a paramount 
increase, placing China as the world leader in terms of money spent on travelling abroad. 
Logically, that is due to notably improved living standard and hence increased expenditures 
of numerous Chinese population. 
6.3.1.5.1 Special economic zones  
First Special Economic Zones (SEZs) in China were established in its southern part, primarily 
to attract FDI from Taiwan and South Korea (Ghosh et al. 2009, 53). The basis for doing 
business in SEZs was a joint venture law which introduced the so-called „market for 
technology strategy.“ The law was to enable the transfer and absorption of advanced 
technology by Chinese enterprises under joint venture with their foreign partners, whereat the 
latter were prohibited from taking full control or be in full ownership of such a venture 
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(Ghosh et al. 2009, 53).207 Moreover, the Chinese government reduced tax burden for FDI 
companies and devalued its currency, aiming to stimulate higher volume of [primarily export-
oriented] inward FDI (Ghosh et al. 2009, 54). In the first stage, foreign companies were given 
the right to operate in four SEZs (Naughton in Brandt and Rawski 2008, 104). Over time, the 
SEZs belt stretched along most of the country's eastern coastline. Since the early 1990s more 
SEZs were also established in inland China (Ghosh et al. 2009, 53). Today, in China there are 
seven SEZs: Shenzhen, Zhuhai, Shantou, Xiamen, Hainan, Shanghai Pudong New Area, and 
Tianjin Binhai New Area (Zeng in Zeng 2010, 5). According to Zeng in Zeng (2010, 4), 
SEZs bring the following benefits: (1) direct benefits: (a) accumulation of foreign exchange 
deposits, (b) increase of volume of inward FDI, (c) increase of government revenues, and (d) 
export growth; (2) indirect benefits: (a) skills upgrade, (b) SEZs can serve as a testing ground 
for wider economic reforms, the experience of which, if positive, can be applied elsewhere 
(c) enable transfer of technology and know-how, (d) enable export diversification, and (e) 
enhance trade efficiency of domestic firms (Overall looking, establishment of the SEZs 
contributed to the success of China's further internationalisation (Kroeber 2016, 45).  
In addition, establishment of the SEZs and seeports along most of the eastern coastline, what, 
as noted, created conditions for attraction of foreign investment and economic development, 
can explain why the eastern part so far has developed at a far quicker pace, and hence has 
been far in advance of inland regions in terms of development (Chen et al. 1995; Brandt et al. 
in Brandt and Rawski 2008b, 624; Ghosh et al. 2009, 50).208 The central government seems 
to have neglected vast inland rural population, as they enjoy very limited social benefits 
(Svejnar in Brandt and Rawski 2008, 72). Having become aware of this, due to substantially 
lower wages in the central and western part of the country (Li and Worm 2011, 86), aiming to 
reduce this development gap, in 2000 the Chinese government adopted a policy in order to 
stimulate economic development in the those parts of the country (Ghosh et al. 2009, 54). It 
mainly comprises measures for stimulating the inflow of FDI and investment in infrastructure 
in order to make conditions for economic development (Li and Worm 2011, 86).209  
                                                          
207 Each foreign investment required official approval by the Chinese state (Ghosh et al. 2009, 54). 
208 Eastern coastal provinces are: Tianjin, Shandong, Jiangsu, Shanghai, Zhejiang, Fujian and Guangdong are 
notably more developed than western; hence a much larger internal migration flows from central and western 
parts into eastern (Business Monitor International 2014, 10). 
209 Yao (2000, 471) argues that if the central government does not manage to reduce poverty in the western parts 
of the country, its population residing in those parts will not be so much impressed with China's overall growth. 
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6.3.1.5.2 China as engine of regional cooperation and development  
Another highly important contribution of China in terms of its global role is that it stimulates 
regional economic integration via establishing numerous production networks (Wong 2013, 
291). Countries which border with China take advantage of exporting to China's huge 
domestic market, and in that way sustain their economic growth (Wong 2013, 288). In this 
context, the mentioned author also offered an illustration of the role of China within the 
regional and global economic framework, given in Figure 6.1. 
Figure 6.1: China's role within the regional and global economic framework 
 
Source: Wong (2013, 288) 
In terms of cooperation with its neighbour countries, China needs to take the advantage of its 
low-cost work force to negotiate mutually beneficial deals in order to enable the transfer of 
technology needed for its economic development (Lall and Albaladejo 2004, 1442). In order 
to show how vividly China has been involved in intensifying trade and overall economic 
relation with other countries in that part of the world, below are listed the arrangements in 
different phases of conclusion/implementation: 
Free Trade Agreements: 
1. China-Korea FTA 
2. China-Singapore FTA 
3. China-Pakistan FTA 
4. China-ASEAN FTA 
5. China-ASEAN FTA Upgrade Negotiations 
6. Mainland and Hong Kong Closer Economic and Partnership Arrangement 
7. Mainland and Macau Closer Economic and Partnership Arrangement 
8. China-Australia FTA 
9. China-New Zealand FTA 
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Free Trade Agreements under negotiation 
1. Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership, RCEP 
2. China-GCC(Gulf Cooperation Council) FTA 
3. China-Japan-Korea FTA 
4. China-Sri Lanka FTA 
5. China-Pakistan FTA second phase 
6. China-Maldives FTA 
Free Trade Agreements under consideration 
1. China-India Regional Trade Arrangement Joint Feasibility Study 
2. China-Nepal FTA Joint Feasibility Study 
Preferential Trade Agreement: 
1. Asia-Pacific Trade Agreement (China FTA Network) 
6.3.1.5 Predictions for the future 
China has managed to transform its economy from being predominantly agricultural and low-
cost, labour intensive to becoming industrial and technologically advanced with rapidly 
increasing value-added. Rising expenditure on research and development and positive 
balance accounts suggest that it has promising economic prospects for the future (Rasiah et 
al. 2013, 295; also in Davies and Raskovic 2018). This prediction is largely based on its 
outstanding ability to transform the structure of its manufacturing industries such as: 
chemical industry, machinery, electronics, medical and optical equipment for the better in the 
sense of managing to attach more value-added to them, the level of which has been constantly 
increasing over time (Rasiah et al. 2013, 309–10; also in Davies and Raskovic 2018). One of 
many eminent scholars who share this view is Subramanian (2011), who nicely summed up 
his forecasts in terms of China and its rising global power as follows:  
The upshot of my analysis is that by 2030, relative U.S. decline will have yielded not a 
multipolar world but a near-unipolar one dominated by China. China will account for close 
to 20 percent of global GDP (measured half in dollars and half in terms of real purchasing 
power), compared with just under 15 percent for the United States. At that point, China's per 
capita GDP will be about $33,000, or about half of U.S. GDP. In other words, China will not 
be dirt poor, as is commonly believed. Moreover, it will generate 15 percent of world trade -
- twice as much as will the United States. By 2030, China will be dominant whether one 
thinks GDP is more important than trade or the other way around; it will be ahead on both 
counts. 
Furthermore, Vuving (2012, 420) argues that if China continues to increase productivity 
levels in the way South Korea and Taiwan did, it will make a strong competition to the 
United States in hard power on an equal basis. However, some authors like Perkins and 
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Rawski (2008) and Subramanian (2011) expect that China's economic growth could not be 
maintained at a pace as has been the case for the past years, and that it will slow down to 6–8 
% during the next couple of decades. Subramanian (2011) offered a good explanation why: 
For starters, its population will begin to age over the coming decade. And its economy is 
severely distorted in several respects: overly cheap capital has led to excessive investment; 
the exchange rate has been undervalued, which has led to the overdevelopment of exports; 
and energy is subsidized, leading to its inefficient use and pollution. Correcting these 
distortions will impose costly dislocations. To take account of these costs, I project that 
China's growth will slow down considerably: it will average seven percent a year over the 
next 20 years, compared with the approximately 11 percent it has registered over the last 
decade. History suggests that plenty of economies -- Germany, Japan, Singapore, South 
Korea, and Taiwan -- grew at the pace I project for China after they reached China's current 
level of development. 
In this regard, given high probability that the level of foreign investment will eventually start 
to decrease, China's economic growth in the coming years will mainly depend on the rise of 
domestic consumption, as well as on productivity growth, and with it associated development 
of innovation (Wong 2013, 293) and research and development (Brandt and Rawski in Brandt 
and Rawski 2008, 21). Alike, the country's ability to keep up with reforms, especially in the 
domain of finance and regulatory framework, and the pace of saving will directly determine 
the volume of investment and indirectly economic growth and development in China over the 
next couple of decades. In terms of the most recent happenings, another factors which might 
determine the pace of growth of the Chinese economy in the short- and medium term is the 
ongoing „trade war“ with the United States over import tariffs, and the real estate „bubble“ 
caused by overintensive investing in the real estate sector (the later, among other things, 
resulted in the construction of a number of „ghost cities“ – fully constructed cities with little 
or no inhabitants). Lastly and nothing less importantly, it is worth noting that sustainability of 
the domestic economic model based on its own form of capitalism will also depend on its 
ability to reconcile social tensions (Petras 2006, 424; Davies and Raskovic 2018). 
6.3.2 Serbia's commercial diplomacy towards China 
6.3.2.1 Introductory notes  
Based on traditionally friendly political relations stemming yet from the times of the former 
Yugoslavia,210 and being aware of China's fast growing economy and rising global power, 
                                                          
210 In a questionnaire answered by Slavica Višnjić, the acting head of Department for Bilateral Economic 
Relations with China (in addition to Russia) in the Serbian Ministry of Trade, Tourism and 
Telecommunications, she gave answers to the question(s) whether and to what extent have (good) political and 
cultural relations of Serbia and China contributed to: (a) the development of economic relations between the two 
countries? (on the 1–5 scale, the answer is 5); (b) the successfulness of doing business of Serbian enterprises at 
the Chinese market? (on the 1–5 scale, the answer is 4); (c) the development of cooperation in the field of 
tourism, that resulted in a significant increase of a number of Chinese tourists in Serbia? (on the 1–5 scale, the 
answer is 5); and (d) the signing of the interstate agreements and development of cooperation in the field of 
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Serbia has engaged in active (commercial) diplomacy towards this Asian giant, based on 
which it has succeded to conclude lucrative financial and investment arrangements in the first 
place. However, noteworthy diplomatic efforts have also been invested in intensification of 
cooperation in the fields of trade and tourism, what has resulted in positive developments, as 
will be illustrated in the text. 
6.3.2.2 Cooperation in the field of finance-based investment 
6.3.2.2.1 Cooperation in the field of investment in infrastructure 
The legal basis for the two countries’ cooperation in the field of infrastructure makes the 
agreement on economic and technical cooperation,211 with Annexes 1 and 2. The cooperation 
is based on favourable loans (with preferential conditions and low interest rate(s) in 
comparison to other international financial institutions) by the China Export-Import Bank (or 
more commonly known as the EXIM Bank), for infrastructural projects in Serbia, with joint 
participation of both parties. In essence, being the main financier in/of these joint ventures the 
Chinese side takes the lead in, i.e. is in charge of planning, supplying the materials and 
equipment/machinery and construction, while the Serbian side is involved mainly via 
subcontractors. 
So far, with financial arrangements with the China EXIM Bank, in recent years the following 
projects have been implemented or are under construction in Serbia: 
 Bridge Mihajlo Pupin, more commonly known as the Zemun-Borča Bridge, 
 First and second phase of the project „Kostolac B Power Plant“, 
 Two sections of the highway E-763 in the framework of the Corridor 11 – Obrenovac-
Ub and Lajkovac-Ljig, in the length of 50 km, 
 Section of the highway E-763 – Surčin-Obrenovac, 
 Section of the highway E70/75 – bridge across Sava river „BubanjPotok“ near 
Ostružnica, 
 Reconstruction of the railway Belgrade-Budapest.  
At the trilateral meeting between Serbia, Hungary and China in Belgrade, on 9 September 
2016, the Chinese side proposed the Annex 3 to the agreement (on economic and technical 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
investments, primarily (of) Chinese investments (in)to Serbia? (on the 1–5 scale, the answer is 5) (Višnjić 
2018). 
211 The agreement’s full name is the Agreement on Economic and Technical Cooperation in the Field of 
Infrastructure between the Government of the Republic of Serbia and the Government of the PR of China, with 
Annexes 1 and 2 („Official Gazette of the Republic of Serbia – International Agreements“, No. 90/09, 9/13 and 
13/13). 
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cooperation in the field of infrastructure), supposed to include the purchase of locomotives 
and wagons of Chinese production for the project of construction of the railway Belgrade-
Budapest. The annex was eventually signed on the occasion of attendance of the former 
Serbian Prime Minister Aleksandar Vučić to the Forum on the New Silk Road, held in 
Beijing, China, on 14–15 May 2017. Apart from the listed projects, both parties have shown 
interest in a number of other potential projects, of which majority relates to the construction 
of highways and river channels (Danube and Vardar-Morava). Given strong interest of both 
sides and good experience from completed and ongoing projects, it is very likely that many 
other projects based on this kind of arrangement will be implemented in the forthcoming 
period (Ministry of Trade, Tourism and Telecommunications 2017c). 
6.3.2.2.2 Cooperation in the field of investment in industry  
On several occasions in recent time, the Chinese authorities acknowledged that they are 
interested in investing in (industrial) production facilities in Serbia.212 A positive event is this 
regard represents opening of the Bank of China branch office in Belgrade.213 It was agreed 
that the Bank’s Belgrade branch office be the central branch office of the Bank of China for 
the Balkans, but also for whole Eastern and Western Europe. It is expected that opening of 
the bank will encourage Chinese companies to invest in Serbia in the forthcoming period. In 
addition, it is important to note that the first diplomatic agreement of the two countries in 
terms of investment was the agreement on mutual encouragement and protection of 
investment signed two decades ago214 (Ministry of Trade, Tourism and Telecommunications 
2017c). 
As presented in Table 6.22 below, the available data show that the volume of Chinese 
(inward) investment (in)to Serbia has been on the rise, especially since 2014, reaching very 
high value in 2016 (mainly due to the Chinese acquisition of and investing in the Smederevo 
ironworks). Given official announcements of the Chinese side about plans to invest in the 
                                                          
212 One of those occasions was the China-Central and Eastern European Countries (CEEC) Investment and 
Trade Expo, held in Ningbo, China, on 8-9 June 2016. The Chinese representatives announced that they would 
stimulate and encourage domestic companies to invest in industrial facilities in Serbia (Ministry of Trade, 
Tourism and Telecommunications 2017c). 
213 Via the China Hungary Close Ltd. from Hungary. The National Bank of Serbia gave the Bank work 
permission on 9 January 2017. 
214 The agreement’s full name is the Agreement on Mutual Encouragement and Protection of Investment 
between the Federal Government of FR Yugoslavia and the Government of the PR of China („Official Gazette 
of FR Yugoslavia – International Agreements“, No. 4/96). In December 2015 the Serbian Ministry of Trade, 
Tourism and Telecommunications drafted and sent a new draft version of the agreement to the Chinese 
Government in line with current standards and given that FR Yugoslavia ceased to exist (Ministry of Trade, 
Tourism and Telecommunications 2017c). 
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industry in Serbia, and recent opening of the Bank of China branch office in Belgrade, it is 
very likely that volume of investment will keep increasing. 
Table 6.22: Chinese foreign direct investment to Serbia, inward, in million EUR 
 
Year 
Country 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
China 1,973 5,965 1,028 -0,423 82,530 24,110 70,0 
Note: The available years are 2010-2016 
Source: The National Bank of Serbia – online database 
In Table 6.23 below are given most important Chinese (inward) investment (in)to Serbia. As 
shown, for the time being the largest Chinese investments are in the field of steel, automobile 
and textile industry.  
Table 6.23: Most important Chinese investments in Serbia 
Investor 
Value of 
investment 
Type of 
investment 
Type of 
activity 
Number 
of new 
working 
places 
opened 
Number 
of new 
working 
places 
planned 
Location of 
investment 
Additional 
notes 
He Steel 
(„HBIS“) 
46 mil. EUR 
+ (300 mil. 
EUR 
planned) 
Brownfield 
Iron 
production 
N/A N/A Smederevo 
Agreement on 
purchase of the 
Steelworks 
signed in April 
2016. 
Mei Ta 
Group 
60 mil. EUR 
(in two 
phases) 
Greenfield 
Automobile 
industry 
(production 
of blocks 
and engine 
carriers, 
turbocharger
s and other 
parts for 
famous 
automobile 
brands such 
as Renault, 
Ford, BMW 
and 
Daimler) 
  1400 Obrenovac 
Memorandum of 
understanding 
signed in 
November 2014. 
Completion of 
factory 
construction 
planned for July 
2017. 
Diplon 
d.o.o 
(*mostly 
Chinese 
ownership) 
25 mil. EUR 
(according to 
what the 
owner stated) 
Greenfield Trade centre N/A N/A Zemun 
The trade centre 
CTC Zmaj - 
Belmax opened 
in 2008. 
Johnson 
Electric  
7.5 mil. EUR 
+ ( 50 mil. 
EUR 
planned) 
Greenfield 
Machinery 
(electromoto
rs) 
90 
2400 
until 
2021 
Niš 
Construction 
completed in 
April 2016. 
Eurofiber 
1 mil. EUR + 
(13 mil. EUR 
planned) 
Greenfield 
Textile 
industry 
(yarn) 
N/A 
200 in 
the next 
three 
years 
Ćuprija 
Construction 
completed in 
November 2016. 
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„Healthcar
e Co. Ltd“ 
(in 
cooperatio
n with 
Danish 
company 
„Everrest“) 
15 mil. EUR 
+ (*20 mil. 
EUR 
planned) 
Greenfield 
Textile 
(production 
of memory 
foam) 
350 *500 Ruma 
*Construction of 
a factory for the 
production of 
furniture 
planned. 
Tesla Solar 
(majority 
in Chinese 
ownership) 
47 million 
RSD 
(*bankruptcy 
price) 
Brownfield Glass fibers  N/A 50 Baljevac 
The investor 
purchased a 
factory of glass 
fibers Etex. 
Production of 
solar panels and 
equipment for 
LED lighting 
planned in the 
second phase. 
Source: Ministry of Trade, Tourism and Telecommunications of Serbia 2017c 
In terms of Serbian (outward) investment (in)to China, the available data presented in Table 
6.24 disclose that the volume of investment is still not significant, what is to some point 
justifiable, especially in recent years, given that labour cost in China is on rise, and the fact 
that in Europe there are countries with relatively cheap labour cost and qualified work force. 
Table 6.24: Serbian foreign direct investment to China, outward, in million EUR 
 
Year 
Country 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
Serbia 0,001 N/A N/A 0,001 N/A N/A 1,4 
Note: The available years are 2010–2016 
Source: The National Bank of Serbia – online database 
6.3.2.3 Cooperation in the field of trade: contractual basis 
An important achievement of Serbia’s (commercial) diplomacy and the basis for cooperation 
in the field of trade between the two countries represents the agreement on trade and 
economic cooperation,215 which is already in force for more than a decade. The agreement 
created necessary conditions for faster development of trade. Intensified diplomatic efforts in 
recent time resulted in signing of the agreement on the promotion of cooperation in the field 
of trade (in addition to tourism and telecommunications),216 signed on the occasion of the 
visit of the President of China Xi Jinping to Serbia in June 2016. As part of trade-promotion 
                                                          
215 The agreement’s full name is the Agreement on Trade and Economic Cooperation between the Federal 
Government of FR Yugoslavia and the Government of the PR of China („Official Gazette of the FR Yugoslavia 
– International Agreements“, No. 4/96). 
216 The agreement’s full name is the Agreement on Promotion of Cooperation in the Field of Trade, Tourism and 
Telecommunications between the Ministry of Trade, Tourism and Telecommunications of the Republic of 
Serbia and the Export-Import Bank of China (Ministry of Trade, Tourism and Telecommunication 2017c). 
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diplomacy/measures, Serbia signed three protocols with the General Administration of 
Quality Supervision, Inspection and Quarantine of China (AQSIQ): 
 Protocol on Phytosanitary Requirements for the Export of Wheat from the Republic of 
Serbia into the PR of China (in 2007), 
 Protocol for Export of Frozen Lamb Meat from the Republic of Serbia into the PR of 
China (in 2014), 
 Protocol for the Export of Frozen Beef Meat from the Republic of Serbia into the PR 
of China (in 2015). 
In addition, in 2015 and 2016 the Administration for Veterinary Medicine of Serbia started 
procedures for obtaining of export certificates for China by delivering questionnaires to the 
AQSIQ concerning export of milk and dairy products, pork and pet food. In May 2017 the 
AQSIQ was delivered additional questionnaires on products of plant origin (dried plums, 
corn, molasses and beet pulps). Given the intensity of diplomatic and administrative efforts of 
both sides and announced visit (in 2017) of representatives of the AQSIQ concerning export 
of a number of food and beverages products, it is expected that necessary export procedures 
will be completed by planned deadlines, what should additionally boost Serbian export to 
China. In the field of agriculture, in April 2017 two additional agreements were signed: 
 Memorandum of Understanding on Cooperation in the Field of Security Guarantees 
of Import and Export of Food, 
 Protocol on the Exchange of Information on Livestock Diseases (it is of utmost 
importance for Serbian export of meat as it provides/enables export of meat from 
where livestock is unaffected by diseases in case diseases break out in some 
parts/farms of the country). 
Given notably high costs of Serbian export to China and the fact that Serbia is unable to meet 
demand requirements of the huge Chinese market, the focus of cooperation with China in the 
field of agriculture should be on (looking for) Chinese (inward) investment opportunities, but 
also on mutual technology transfer. Within the frame of economic and trade cooperation with 
China, Serbia regularly takes part at the China – CEEC217 Investment and Trade Expo, which 
is held biannually at the ministerial level in the Chinese city of Ningbo. The last meeting was 
held on 8–9 June 2016. The two countries economic and trade cooperation will also take 
place within the framework of the New Silk Road (as part of the „Belt and Road 
                                                          
217 Central and Eastern European countries are: Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech 
Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Montenegro, Poland, Romania, Serbia, Slovak 
Republic, and Slovenia. 
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Initiative“).218 The New Silk Road initiative is complementary to other initiatives China has 
concluded with Serbia and other European countries. For instance, the planned railway 
Belgrade-Budapest, to be financed by China, represents a part of this new initiative. In that 
regard, Serbia should take advantage of the Chinese initiative for cooperation with 16 CEEC 
in the field of economy and investment (mainly in the field of infrastructure, production 
capacities, high technology, mining, business and technological zones/parks), tourism, 
culture, science and innovations, local self-governance, etc. So far, Serbia has agreed on the 
largest number of projects with the Chinese side of all 16 CEEC (Ministry of Trade, Tourism 
and Telecommunications 2017). 
6.3.2.3.1 Benefits of the trade exchange  
As presented in Table 6.25, in the observed period 2004–2016 the volume of foreign trade 
exchange between Serbia and China has developed well, with expectedly large deficit on the 
Serbian side, having that China is the world's largest exporter, often being paraphrased as the 
„world's factory“. Due to a huge disparity between the volume of export and import, even 
despite notable increase of Serbian export in the amount of 303,4 % over the observed time 
span, which is far better than the increase of import (105,2 %), the coverage of import by 
export, though having been going to the better, is still miniscule (1,6 %). In terms of position 
on the list of Serbia's 50 main export destinations, China has improved from entering the top 
50 in 2006 (being Serbia's 43rd largest export destination) to reaching place 37 in 2016. 
Table 6.25: Foreign trade between Serbia and China, for the period 2004–2016, in thousand USD 
Year Export 
Annual 
export 
change 
Import 
Annual 
import 
change 
Total 
trade 
exchange 
Trade 
balance 
Coverage 
of import 
by 
export 
Position of 
Russia as 
Serbia's 
export 
destination 
2004 
Not 
among 
top 50 
 
Not among 
top 50     
Not among 
top 50 
2005 
Not 
among 
top 50 
 
Not among 
top 50     
Not among 
top 50 
2006 6.263,5 
 
781.702,9 
 
787.966,4 -775.439 0,8% 43
rd 
2007 5.906,5 -5,7% 1.383.709,3 77,0% 1.389.615,8 -1.377.803 0,4% 50
th 
2008 
Not 
among 
top 50 
 
Not among 
top 50 
 
   
Not among 
top 50 
2009 8.954,9 
 
1.097.292,0 
 
1.106.246,9 -1.088.337 0,8% 42
nd 
                                                          
218 The first meeting in relation to the Silk Road took place on 14–15 May 2017 in Beijing, attended by 
representatives of 27 countries at the highest level (heads of state and/or government) and 3 international 
organisations (the United Nations, International Monetary Fund and the World Bank). 
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2010 7.257,7 -19,0% 1.173.025,7 6,9% 1.180.283,4 -1.165.768 0,6% 48
th 
2011 15.257,2 110,2% 1.488.491,6 26,9% 1.503.748,8 -1.473.234 1,0% 36
th 
2012 
Not 
among 
top 50 
 
Not among 
top 50 
 
   
Not among 
top 50 
2013 
Not 
among 
top 50 
 
Not among 
top 50 
 
   
Not among 
top 50 
2014 14.125,3 
 
1.561.045,3 
 
1.575.170,6 -1.546.920 0,9% 50
th 
2015 20.245,1 43,3% 1.540.211,8 -1,3% 1.560.456,9 -1.519.967 1,3% 44
th 
2016 25.264,8 24,8% 1.603.930,8 4,1% 1.629.195,6 -1.578.666 1,6% 37
th 
Change* 303,4% 
 
105,2% 
    
 
*Change for the period 2006–2016 (since there are no data available for 2004–2005) 
Note: Data for the period 2000–2003 and before are not available. 
Source: Own elaboration based on data of the Statistical Office of the Republic of Serbia – online database 
In terms of sectoral export, over the period 2004–2016 the strongest export sector is of 
miscellaneous manufactured goods, not classified, followed by the machines and transport 
equipment, and the inedible crude materials, except fuels. Moreover, all 10 sectors have 
recorded a significant growth during the observed period, as presented in Table L1 (see 
Appendix L). Sectoral export in tons mainly reflects its monetary values, as shown in Table 
L2 (see Appendix L). In terms of divisions, the one with the largest value during the period 
2004–2016 was the cork and wood (division), followed by the shoes, and industrial machines 
for general use, as given in Table L3 (see Appendix L). For comparison, respective values in 
tons are given in Table L4 (see Appendix L). Moreover, as given in Table 6.26 below, the 
number of Serbian enterprises exporting (in)to China has decreased from 219 in 2008 to 170 
in 2015, what percentually represents a fall of 22,4 %. However, Serbian export to China is 
satisfyingly diversified in terms of number of enterprises. The obtained data in Table 6.27 
below show that during the period 2012–2016 that number has trippled.  
Table 6.26: Number of Serbian exporting enterprises in China, for the period 2008–2016 
  
Year Change 
Country 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2008–2015 
China 219 193 210 229 276 123 135 170 N/A -22,4% 
Annual change 
 
-11,9% 8,8% 9,0% 20,5% -55,4% 9,8% 25,9% 
  Source: Own elaboration based on data of the Statistical Office of the Republic of Serbia – compilation from the 
Statistical Workbooks (2008–2009, 42–44; 2010, 44–46; 2011, 48–50; 2012–2015, 50–52) 
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1
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Table 6.27: Export results of the top 10 Serbian exporting enterprises to China, for the period 2012–2016, in million USD 
  Year 
Company name Type of (economic) activity 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
Philip Morris Operations a.d.Niš* Manufacture of tobacco products 1.393.101         
Falc East d.o.oKnjaževac Manufacture of footwear 1.064.355 579.750 341.327 1.038.108 825.509 
Trifeksd.o.o Belgrade Specialized wholesale trade 643.178 1.812.077 2.534.553 2.991.771 3.235.904 
Koteks Viscofan d.o.o Novi Sad Manufacture of other items  332.968         
KnaufInsulationd.o.o Zemun Manufacture of other non-metallic minerals 219.554         
Trim d.o.o Jagodina Production of measuring, testing and navigation instruments and appliances 203.307         
Norma grupa jugoistočna Evropa d.o.o Subotica Manufacture of plastic plates, sheets, tubes and profiles 183.892 558.359 775.946 960.382 759.122 
Vinarija Aleksandrović d.o.o Vinča* Manufacture of wine from grape 183.888 201.262       
Smartphone Concept d.o.o Belgrade Wholesale of electrical household appliances 155.880         
Dellano d.o.o Novi Sad Specialized wholesale trade 146.554         
Eurosax d.o.o Belgrade Production of electronic devices for consumers   319.925       
Gorenjed.o.oValjevo Production of electrical household appliances   317.294       
Hemofarma.dVršac Production of pharmaceutical preparations   254.660       
Guan Nan d.o.o Belgrade* Growing grapes   222.439       
ATB Sever d.o.o Subotica Manufacture of electric motors, generators and transformers   189.521       
Javord.o.oIvanjica – in bankruptcy Manufacture of underwear   167.907       
GrundfosSrbijad.o.oInđija Manufacture of other pumps and compressors     3.243.315 4.955.581 5.764.611 
LarixInvestd.o.o Belgrade Wholesale of wood, construction materials and sanitary equipment     894.684 656.131   
Tetra Pak Production d.o.o Belgrade Manufacture of corrugated paper and paperboard and containers of paper and paperboard     493.177     
Mondi Paraćin d.o.o Paraćin Manufacture of corrugated paper and paperboard and containers of paper and paperboard     439.676     
SEEnergy Timber d.o.o Belgrade Cutting and woodworking     341.773 1.286.966 1.218.047 
Valyd.o.oValjevo Manufacture of knitted and crocheted hosiery     337.479     
Standard Furniture Serbia d.o.oĆuprija Manufacture of other furniture     335.075 425.384   
Iris-Mega d.o.o Belgrade Wholesale of computers, computer peripheral equipment and software       442.294   
Šafrand.o.o Belgrade Wholesale of clothing and footwear       405.053   
Timber Trade d.o.o Novi Sad Wholesale of wood, construction materials and sanitary equipment       378.348 1.029.307 
  
 
2
1
3
 
Biokorpd.o.oPožega Cutting and woodworking         1.400.644 
Fornetd.o.o Belgrade Silviculture and other forestry activities         1.215.567 
JP EPS Belgrade Trade of electricity         1.008.363 
Cooper Standard Srbijad.o.oSremskaMitrovica Manufacture of other parts and accessories for motor vehicles         741.661 
Number of enterprises: 30 Sum of the value of the top 10 exporters on a yearly basis 4.526.677 4.623.194 9.737.005 13.540.018 17.198.735 
 
Annual change   2,1% 110,6% 39,1% 27,0% 
*Agricultural enterprises (coloured in light blue) 
Note: Obtained data are available only for given years. 
Source: Own elaboration based on data of the Chamber of Commerce and Industry of Serbia 2017b 
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Respectively, the number of Serbian export goods has decreased from 791 in 2007 to 326 in 
2016, meaning it has fallen by 58,8 % (see Table L5 in Appendix L).In terms of import, the 
largest division is of telecommunications and audio apparatuses and equipment, followed by 
office machines and machines for automatic data processing. Moreover, export of almost all 
divisions has recorded stable growth over the observed period 2004–2016, as shown in Table 
L6 (see Appendix L). Most hindering factors in terms of Serbian export to China are notably 
high transport costs and hence lower price competitiveness, and inability to meet high 
demand requirements and related inability to meet export deadlines. Economic and trade 
cooperation with China should be broadened and enhanced by means of organising trade 
missions to China in search for new export opportunities, then trainings for current and 
prospective Serbian exporters on how to best approach the Chinese market, and establishing 
closer cooperation of specialised trade-related institutions between the two countries. 
6.3.2.4 Cooperation in the field of tourism  
Tourism represents one of the fastest growing fields in terms of cooperation between the two 
countries, as illustrated in Table 6.28 below. Number of arrivals of the Chinese tourists has 
increased from 3,470 in 2011 to 18,409 in 2016, what represents an increase of 430,5 %. 
Likewise, noteworthy growth of 261,4 % is recorded in terms of number of overnight stays. 
Resultantly, a market share has increased notably too, from 0,7 % in 2011 to 3 % in 2017. 
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Table 6.28: Arrivals and overnight stays of the Chinese tourists in Serbia, in numbers 
Year Arrivals 
Annual 
change 
Overnight 
stays 
Annual 
change 
Average 
number 
of 
overnight 
stays 
(per 
person) 
Market 
share 
2005 N/A   N/A     N/A 
2006 N/A   N/A     N/A 
2007 N/A   N/A     N/A 
2008 N/A   N/A     N/A 
2009 N/A   N/A     N/A 
2010 N/A   N/A     N/A 
2011 3.047   11.895   3,4 0.7% 
2012 4.812 38,7% 13.665 14,9% 2,8 0.9% 
2013 5.783 20,2% 14.047 2,8% 2,4 0.7% 
2014 9.592 65,9% 30.749 118,9% 3,2 1.4% 
2015 14.238 48,4% 32.779 6,6% 2,3 1.4% 
2016 18.409 29,3% 42.986 31,1% 2,3 1.6% 
*Change 430,5% 
 
261,4% 
   *Change for the period 2011–2016 
Note: Data for the period 2000–2004 are not available. 
Note: A market share in 2017 has reached the figure of 3 %. 
Source: Statistical Office of the Republic of Serbia – compilation from the Statistical Workbooks** 
**Data for the period 2011–2015 were found in the Statistical Workbook of the SORS (2016, 350–351). 
**Data/information for the period 2005–2009 were found in the Statistical Workbook of the SORS (2010, 336). 
**Data for the year 2016 were found in the Information on the Statistics on Catering and Trade of the SORS 
(2017, 4). 
 
According to information obtained from some tourist agencies which organise visits to Serbia 
for the Chinese tourists, the most popular destination they are interested to visit/see is 
Belgrade, where they especially tend to see and get familiar with the country’s historical 
heritage, particularly in relation to the World War II period, then Tito's tomb and remains of 
ruined buildings from the NATO military air campaign against Serbia (then FR Yugoslavia) 
in 1999 (Ministry of Trade, Tourism and Telecommunications 2017c). Apart from the 
country’s capital, the Chinese tourists have also shown a notable interest in vising the cities 
of Novi Sad and Subotica, as well as the countryside places of Salaši, Zlatibor and Tara 
(National Tourism Organisation of Serbia 2018b). 
One of the first concrete steps which paved way for faster development in this field happened 
in August 2009 in Beijing, when the Ministry of Economy and Regional Development of 
Serbia and the State Administration for Tourism of China signed the memorandum of 
understanding on reliefs for group tourist visits of the Chinese citizens to Serbia. Serbia also 
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joined the Coordination Centre of the Association of Agencies for the Promotion of Tourism 
and Business between China and the countries of Central and Eastern Europe (established in 
Budapest in May 2014)219 (Ministry of Trade, Tourism and Telecommunications 2017c). 
Since then the National Tourism Organisation of Serbia has been present at the following 
tourist events in China: 
1. China Outbound Travel & Tourism Market (COTTM) held in Beijing. The National 
Tourism Organisation of Serbia regularly takes part at the event (since 2012 it acted 
jointly with Montenegro, but when the Montenegrin delegation withdrew from the 
event, the Serbian delegation continued independently). 
2. COTTM event in Beijing. In 2013 a joint exhibition/(re)presentation of Serbia and 
Montenegro was given the “CTW Chinese Tourists Welcoming Award 2013” for 
innovative market approach. On that occasion the National Tourism Organisation of 
Serbia was awarded by the “Life Style” magazine - the most reputed tourism 
magazine in China, for Serbia being designated in China as one of the most 
prosperous (tourist) destinations in 2013. In 2017 the COTTM event was attended by 
more than 400 exhibitors from 70 countries. 
3. ITB China Travel Exhibition, from 16–18 May 2018, held in Shanghai.220 The event 
was organised for the first time in 2017 and the National Tourism Organisation of 
Serbia took part in it. In 2017 at the ITB event in Shanghai Serbia exhibited jointly 
with other European countries at the European Tourism Commission (exhibition) 
stand, the organisation which gathers 33 national tourism organisations from Europe, 
and whose aim is to promote Europe at overseas markets. The Serbian delegation 
organised emitting of promotional films on Serbia, some of which were translated into 
the Chinese language. Within the European Tourism Commission framework, the 
Serbian delegation also took part at the World Bridge Tourism Shanghai event 
whereby Serbia agreed on joint programmes with Montenegro and Romania. The 
Chinese group encompassing 20 travel agencies and organisations visited Serbia from 
27–30 October 2017. Furthermore, it also participated at the World Bridge Tourism 
event (at which it also invited representatives of tourism-oriented businesses from 
Serbia) - a workshop of about 100 Chinese travel agencies and organisations which 
took place in London, United Kingdom. Alike, within the same frame, the National 
                                                          
219 The establishment of the Coordination Centre was the follow-up of the China-CEEC Cooperation Forum and 
adopted guidelines on cooperation, held in Bucharest, Romania, in 2013. 
220 ITB is the largest tourism stock market that is traditionally held in Berlin and Singapore. In 2017 it was 
organised in China for the first time (the ITB China event). 
 217 
 
Tourism Organisation of Serbia took part in organisation of a visit for the tourist 
journalists from China (Southern Metropolis Weekly being distributed in half a 
million copies, and Chengdu Radio and television, viewed by 2 million people at 
average), who visited Serbia from 8–13 March 2017 (Belgrade, Novi Sad, 
LepenskiVir, Kladovo, Zaječar, Niš, Manasija, etc.). Another visit of the Chinese 
tourist agencies and organisations to Serbia took part within the tour through 
Romania, Serbia and Montenegro, via European Tourism Commission, as part of 
preparations for the year 2018 which is designated as the EU-China tourism year. 
4. 2017 Silk Road International Exposition (SRIE) and the 21st Investment and Trade 
Forum for Cooperation between East and West China ITFCEW held in Xi'an, from 3–
7 June 2017. The motto of the event is “New Platform, New Opportunities and New 
Development”. Serbia was an honorary country that year. The Chinese side provided 
to Serbia, i.e. its delegation exhibition space of 500m2, commercials at large screens 
and assistance in designing and preparation of the exhibition, all free of charge. Serbia 
was given the central position at the venue hall. The Chinese side also organised 
meetings for the Serbian delegation and for the occasion provided the conference hall, 
free of charge, where Serbia as the honorary partner country had a chance to present 
its trade-, investment- and tourism-related offers and potential.  
5. China International Travel Mart (CITM), planned for October 2018, in Shanghai, 
including promotional event. The CITM is held annually, in Shanghai and Kunming 
intermittently year after year. The National Tourism Organisation of Serbia does not 
take part when the event is held in Kunming. In Shanghai it (meaning the Serbian 
delegation) is regularly present since 2014.  
6. On 16–17 October 2017 was held a Global Tourism Economic Forum in Macao, also 
attended by the Serbian national tourism organisation, being one of 16 tourism 
organisations from Europe (National Tourism Organisation of Serbia 2018b). 
In addition, it is very important to emphasise that in March 2014, in Budapest, Hungary, 
representatives of the National Tourism Organisation of Serbia took part at the meeting of the 
Coordination Centre at which was officially launched the programme „2014: Year of 
Promotion of Tourism between China-CEEC (Central and Eastern European countries)“. In 
addition, in September 2015 in Bled, Slovenia, a high-level meeting on tourism was held 
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between China and CEEC.221 Creation of tourist maps for the Chinese tourists was agreed; so 
far three workshops were organised: in Budva, Montenegro on 21 January 2016, Warsaw, 
Poland, on 27 January 2016 and Riga, Latvia, on 5 February 2016 (Ministry of Trade, 
Tourism and Telecommunications 2017). With reference to the mentioned, it is important to 
stimulate and involve private tourist agencies from Serbia and neighbouring countries, such 
as Montenegro and Hungary, in making richer tourist offers for prospective Chinese tourists 
(Ministry of Trade, Tourism and Telecommunications 2017c). Furthermore, the Serbian 
airlines company Air Serbia agreed with the China's national airlines company Air China a 
„code share“ arrangement on joint flights (started as of 5 May 2015), which have facilitated 
and stimulated air traffic between the two countries. Apart from Air China, recently another 
Chinese airlines company Hainan Airlines has shown interest in launching a new airline 
between Beijing and Belgrade (Ministry of Trade, Tourism and Telecommunications 2017c). 
With the aim to facilitate and stimulate tourism in the first place, but also trade, in November 
2016 the two countries agreed on abolishment of visas for duration of 30 days, by which 
Serbia has become the first country in the region of Central and Eastern Europe to conclude 
such agreement with China. Needless to say that friendly state relations and active Serbian 
diplomacy can be credited for this success (Ministry of Trade, Tourism and 
Telecommunications 2017). Also, it is worth noting that in Beijing, in April 2017, at a 
tourism promotional event, Serbia won the prestigious award „Top 5 Overseas Destinations – 
Culture Heritage Tour“, which designated Serbia as one of the most desirable overseas tourist 
destinations in the world in terms of cultural heritage (Ministry of Trade, Tourism and 
Telecommunications 2017c). In addition, it is important to note that the Chinese tourist 
delegation participated for the first time at the 39th International Tourism Fair, held in 
Belgrade, Serbia, in February 2017 (Xinhua 2017). For illustration, just in 2017 the National 
Tourism Organisation of Serbia published 65 magazine/journal articles, had 1,004 online 
announcements and blogs, 8 announcements on Radio/TV, whose total value is nearly 2,8 
million EUR (2.788.467 precisely). The National Tourism Organisation of Serbia has active 
account(s) at Weibo internet social network (which in its form is the Chinese version of 
Facebook) and WeChat. Information on Serbia and its tourism offer considered relevant are 
published there periodically (National Tourism Organisation of Serbia 2018b). With the help 
of Serbian diplomacy, all the stipulated indicates a positive trend of tourism development in 
the years to come. 
                                                          
221 Letter of intention was signed that the Coordination Centre be included in the Chinese initiative „Belt and 
Road“, part „People to People“. 
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6.3.2.5 Concluding notes  
The presented case study has shown that based on traditionally friendly (political) relations 
with China, engaging in assertive (commercial) diplomacy towards China has brought Serbia 
imminent benefits for its economy, primarily in the fields of infrastructure, trade and tourism. 
In terms of infrastructure, based on the intergovernmental agreement on economic and 
technical cooperation, and by assistance of the Chinese EXIM Bank a number of 
(infrastructural) projects (mainly highways, bridges and power facilities) have already been 
implemented, and many others are under consideration. Herein I will only mention the 
Mihajlo Pupin Bridge (more commonly known as the Zemun-Borča Bridge), constructed 
from October 2011 to December 2014, whose total length of 1,5 km makes it the 
longest/largest bridge ever constructed in Serbia. Likewise, the Chinese side is considering 
construction of the two major (river) channels, on the Danube and Moraca rivers, as well as 
the reconstruction of the railway Belgrade-Budapest, in which eventual construction would 
also take part number of Serbian companies, as is the case with all other projects agreed on 
the mentioned agreement. Furthermore, active Serbian diplomacy has helped raise China's 
interest in investing in industrial production facilities in Serbia. An especially positive step is 
this regard certainly represents opening of the Bank of China branch office in Belgrade, 
which will become the Bank’s central branch office for the Balkans, but also for whole 
Eastern and Western Europe. Needless to say that opening of the bank will further encourage 
Chinese companies to invest in Serbia in the forthcoming years. 
Serbian diplomacy has also contributed to positive results in the field of trade. As presented 
in the study, over the observed period (2004–2016) the volume of trade exchange between 
Serbia and China has developed well, with expectedly large deficit on the Serbian side. Due 
to a huge disparity in volume of export and import, despite noticeable increase of Serbian 
export of 303,4 % over the observed time span, which is far better than the increase of import 
(105,2 %), the coverage of import by export, though going to the better, is still very low (1,6 
%). In terms of position of on the list of Serbia's 50 main export destinations, China has 
improved from entering the top 50 in 2006 (being Serbia's 43rd largest export destination) to 
reaching place 37 in 2016. Given the intensity of diplomatic efforts in this field and mutual 
interest in fostering trade ties, it is very likely that position of China will keep improving. 
Lastly, thanks to vivid Serbian diplomacy tourism has become one of the fastest growing 
fields in terms of cooperation between the two countries. For illustration, in the period 2011-
2016 number of arrivals of the Chinese tourists has increased from 3,470 to 18,409, what 
represents an increase of 430,5 %. Likewise, significant growth of 261,4 % is recorded in 
 220 
 
terms of number of overnight stays. Also worth noting that in Beijing, in April 2017, at a 
tourism promotional event, Serbia won the prestigious award „Top 5 Overseas Destinations – 
Culture Heritage Tour“, which designated Serbia as one of the most desirable overseas tourist 
destinations in the world in terms of cultural heritage. Given growing intensity of cooperation 
on both bilateral and multilateral platforms, further growth in this field is almost certain.
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7 Comparison of presented case studies and recommendations for the 
Serbian authorities  
7.1 Comparison of presented case studies  
In the following lines will be presented a short comparison of the three case studies 
elaborated on in this research, in the sense of which of the three emerging countries (Russia, 
Turkey and China) have proved more or less important, i.e. beneficial for Serbia in terms of 
its (meaning of Serbia) diplomatic efforts geared towards these countries with the aim to 
enhance current state of affairs in the fields of trade (with focus on export), investment and 
tourism.  
First, with reference to trade, in terms of the value of (Serbia's) export and trade exchange in 
general, as presented in Table 7.1, in the period covered by the research (2004–2016) of the 
three emerging countries Russia stands on top of the list. The main five sectors by export 
value are: (a) food and live animals, (b) beverages and tobacco, (c) crude materials, inedible, 
except fuels, (d) mineral fuels, lubricants and related products, (e) animal and plant oils, fats 
and waxes. 
Second to Russia is Turkey. As is the case with Russia, the main five sectors by export value 
are: (a) food and live animals, (b) beverages and tobacco, (c) crude materials, inedible, except 
fuels, (d) mineral fuels, lubricants and related products, (e) animal and plant oils, fats and 
waxes. Lastly, of the three emerging countries Serbia exported the least to China. As is the 
case with both Russia and Turkey, the main sectors by export value are: (a) food and live 
animals, (b) beverages and tobacco, (c) crude materials, inedible, except fuels, (d) mineral 
fuels, lubricants and related prod, and (e) animal and plant oils, fats and waxes. 
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Table 7.1: Comparison of the emerging markets of Russia, Turkey and China with reference to trade 
  Trade 
  Export Import Coverage of import by export 
Year Russia Turkey China Russia Turkey China Russia Turkey China 
2004 152.883 62.615,3 
Not 
among 
top 50 
1.396.063 198.417,2 
Not among 
top 50 
11,0% 31,6% 
 
2005 225.252 50.315,6 
Not 
among 
top 50 
1.668.726 211.684,4 
Not among 
top 50 
13,5% 23,8% 
 
2006 311.08 38.762,9 6.263,5 2.142.497 256.625,4 781.702,9 14,5% 15,1% 0,8% 
2007 450.592 58.531,3 5.906,5 2.671.646 405.700,1 1.383.709,3 16,9% 14,4% 0,4% 
2008 550.969 45.336,8 
Not 
among 
top 50 
3.519.745 441.419,4 
Not among 
top 50 
15,7% 10,3% 
 
2009 349.424 45.122,3 8.954,9 1.968.119 290.802,1 1.097.292,0 17,8% 15,5% 0,8% 
2010 534.746 87.986,3 7.257,7 2.156.127 322.832,2 1.173.025,7 24,8% 27,3% 0,6% 
2011 792.309 183.178,5 15.257,2 2.654.224 405.142,3 1.488.491,6 29,9% 45,2% 1,0% 
2012 866.971 186.361,1 
Not 
among 
top 50 
2.078.399 439.142,8 
Not among 
top 50 
41,7% 42,4% 
 
2013 1.062.702 219.009,6 
Not 
among 
top 50 
1.903.545 530.871,5 
Not among 
top 50 
55,8% 41,3% 
 
2014 1.029.133 230.852,5 14.125,3 2.340.354 589.736,8 1.561.045,3 44,0% 39,1% 0,9% 
2015 724.826 248.914,7 20.245,1 1.748.539 578.853,9 1.540.211,8 41,5% 43,0% 1,3% 
2016 795.124 269.467,5 25.264,8 1.511.201 668.521,9 1.603.930,8 52,6% 40,3% 1,6% 
Source: Author's own elaboration based on data given in Tables 6.1, 6.14 and 6.25. 
Then, as Table 7.2 shows, with reference to foreign investment, in terms of (both inward and 
outward) investment, as is the case with the volume of export and trade exchange in general, 
Russia tops the list. Since the energy sector has by far the most dominant position in the 
Russian economy, expectedly, the largest Russian (outward) investments in(to) Serbia are 
those of oil and gas. Cases of Serbian enterprises' outward investments in(to) Russia are very 
few (according to available data), and are in pharmaceutical and construction industries (floor 
coverings producer). Second to Russia is Turkey, whose largest inward investments in(to) 
Serbia are in the aluminum production, followed by the investments in the automobile sector, 
banking and the textile sectors. In terms of Serbia's outward investment in(to) Turkey, 
according to the available data, there is only one such investment, yet in the construction 
industry (refractory bricks producer). Lastly, with reference to China, contrary to Russia and 
Turkey, the focus of its (meaning the Chinese) investing in(to) Serbia has been based on 
giving favourable loans by the China Export Import Bank in the field of transport 
infrastructure. However, according to the official announcements of the Chinese officials, it 
is expected that in the following years China will strongly invest in Serbia's „real“ sector, i.e. 
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industry. So far the largest Chinese investments in the field of industry have been in heavy 
industry (iron production), automobile industry and textile. 
Table 7.2: Comparison of the emerging markets of Russia, Turkey and China with reference to FDI 
 
FDI 
 
Inward Outward 
Year Russia Turkey China Russia Turkey China 
2010 216,2 0,99 1973 -3,3 4,77 0,001 
2011 488,5 1,37 5965 -24,7 5,92 N/A 
2012 232,5 0,38 1028 -0,8 -1,75 N/A 
2013 189,7 1,67 -0,423 -16,5 -0,56 0,001 
2014 73,5 2,01 82530 3,7 -3,67 N/A 
2015 96,4 27,78 24110 8,0 -8,53 N/A 
2016 81,2 15,46 70,0 21,1 -0,04 1,4 
Source: Author's own elaboration based on data given in Tables 6.10, 6.12, 6.18, 6.20, 6.22 and 6.24 
Lastly, when it comes to tourism, as illustrated in Table 7.3, of the three emerging countries 
Turkey heads the list, both in terms of number of arrivals and overnight stays. Second to 
Turkey is Russia, both in terms of arrivals and overnight stays. Lastly, despite significant 
results in recent years, China is still lagging behind Russia and Turkey.  
Table 7.3: Comparison of the emerging markets of Russia, Turkey and China with reference to tourism 
 
Tourism 
 
Arrivals Overnight stays 
Year Russia Turkey China Russia Turkey China 
2004 N/A N/A N/A N/A 
 
N/A 
2005 11 7 N/A 33 13 N/A 
2006 12 7 N/A 37 13 N/A 
2007 16 12 N/A 52 23 N/A 
2008 16 12 N/A 54 20 N/A 
2009 17 14 N/A 60 25 N/A 
2010 21.636 13.842 N/A 62.583 23.531 N/A 
2011 25.236 19.196 3.47 75.308 33.843 11.895 
2012 31.628 20.865 4.812 91.517 35.839 13.665 
2013 43.07 32.437 5.783 120.899 55.017 14.047 
2014 50.571 45.49 9.592 153.811 81.71 30.749 
2015 41.623 64.191 14.238 129.11 115.038 32.779 
2016 43.916 83.676 18.409 131.323 141.608 42.986 
Source: Author's own elaboration based on data in Tables 6.13, 6.21 and 6.28 
7.2 Recommendations for the Serbian authorities  
Having summarised and compared the state of affairs with reference to trade, investment and 
tourism development between Serbia, on one side, and Russia, Turkey and China, on the 
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other, in light of prospects for further improvement in the mentioned fields the following 
recommendations could be given: 
With reference to trade development: 
 improving business-related regulatory framework, especially in terms of time and 
number of procedures required for registering a (new) business, 
 increasing government funds for incentives for export-oriented enterprises, 
 stimulating formation of clusters of export-oriented enterprises in Serbia, in line with 
good practice from the European Union, with the aim to achieve (transport) cost 
rationalisation and increase the level of competitiveness at (distant) foreign markets, 
 establishing business incubators across Serbia, in line with good practice from the 
European Union, that would be at disposal especially to export-oriented enterprises, to 
help their development and doing business by means of providing advice and 
expertise, 
 stimulating and encouraging Serbian domestic, especially export-oriented, enterprises 
to take advantage of the Enterprise Europe Network, and in that way more easily find 
new markets, business partners or fund sources,  
 engaging more intensely representatives of Serbia's diplomatic missions, mainly those 
in embassies, in Russia, Turkey and China, but also in other emerging countries 
regarded potentially lucrative in business terms to find interested business partners, 
facilitate contacts between the two sides, make analysis and disseminate relevant 
market- and business-related information, take part in eventual dispute settlement, and 
promote Serbian export goods; In relation to that, the Serbian Government needs to 
ensure professional training for diplomatic staff employed at Serbia's embassies, in 
the emerging markets and elsewhere, and merit-based positioning, in order to ensure 
quality of delivered services and timely response; 
 considering an option of taking advantage of (traditionally) good political and cultural 
relations with China, and the fact that in this country top political leadership has a 
very influential role when it comes to interference in the economy, in order to try to 
finagle a (more) preferential trade status for the Serbian side that would stimulate 
Serbian export to China, and in that way contribute to development of the export-
oriented sectors in Serbia, 
 considering an option of taking advantage of good political relations with Turkey, and 
the fact that in this country top political leadership has a very influential role when it 
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comes to interference in the economy, in order to try to finagle to broaden the list of 
(Serbian export) goods that are encompassed by the free trade regime between the two 
countries, and 
 improving political stability of the country, fighting against corruption, and improving 
index of economic freedoms. 
With reference to investment development: 
 improving overall business environment and regulatory framework to be(come) more 
investment-friendly, both with respect to inward (i.e. foreign investment into Serbia) 
and outward (i.e. Serbia's domestic investment „going“ abroad) investment, 
 increasing the number of (investment-conducive) free business zones across Serbia, 
especially in relatively undeveloped areas in order to attract as much foreign 
investment as possible, in order to increase employment and stimulate local economic 
development, 
 increasing government funds for incentives for foreign (inward) investment, 
particularly those that are export-oriented, but also for Serbian domestic enterprises 
willing to invest abroad, 
 engaging more intensively representatives of Serbia's diplomatic missions, mainly 
those in embassies, in Russia, Turkey and China, but also in other emerging countries 
regarded potentially lucrative in business/investment terms to find interested potential 
investors, facilitate contacts between them and the Development Agency of Serbia in 
the first place, in addition to other relevant stakeholders/authorities, present them 
(meaning to foreign potential investors) advantages of investing in(to) Serbia, as well 
as to present business prospects and overall political and economic state of affairs 
of/in Russia, Turkey and China and other emerging countries to Serbian enterprises 
interested to invest abroad, then make required analysis and disseminate relevant 
market- and business-related information, and take part in eventual dispute settlement, 
 trying to take advantage of good political and/or cultural relations with China and 
Turkey, and the fact that in these two countries the state, i.e. top political leadership 
has a very influential role when it comes to interference in the economy, in order to 
try to finagle that as many large and export-oriented enterprises/companies invest 
in(to) Serbia, and in that way directly (via preserving employment in 
enterpises/companies which could not maintain being in business without being 
invested to, or increasing employment and productivity in already well operational 
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enterprises/companies) or indirectly (via spill-over effects which mainly comprise 
transfer of technology and improvement of management and marketing) contribute to 
its economic development, and 
 improving political stability of the country, fighting against corruption, and improving 
index of economic freedoms. 
With reference to tourism development: 
 considering/analysing if there is a justifiable need for amending, in the sense of 
improvement, current framework agreement(s) or making new ones, that would 
additionally contribute to facilitation of the inflow of tourists from Russia, Turkey and 
China and development of tourism in Serbia in general, 
 considering/analysing what other emerging countries (in addition to all other 
countries) have good prospects in terms of attraction of tourists (in)to Serbia, and in 
relation to that 
working to establish visa-free regime with those (emerging countries) that are 
regarded most prosperous in that sense, or at least enable facilitatedand more time-
efficient procedure(s) for the approvement of tourist visa for Serbia, where 
establishing visa-free regime is (currently) not justified due to unfavourable political, 
economic and/or security reasons, 
 engaging more intensively representatives ofSerbia's diplomatic missions, mainly 
those in embassies, in Russia, Turkey and China, but also in other emerging countries 
regarded potentially lucrative in tourism terms to promote Serbia as a desirable tourist 
destination both for short, on-tour visits tothe region of Central and Eastern Europe, 
but likewise for longer stay (with focus on spa and mountainous tourism in terms of 
the latter) by holdingvarious promotional events in the premises of (Serbia's) 
diplomatic missions, at international tourism fairs in a host country, then by travelling 
around them (meaning the three mentioned and/or other emerging countries) and 
holding promotional events in regional centers in cooperation with local 
travel/tourism agencies and organisations, as well as by facilitating matchmaking 
between relevant and interested parties from the two countries (meaning Serbia, on 
one side, and Russia, Turkey, China, or any other emerging country, on the other),  
 within the frame of cooperation (in the field of tourism) with other Central and 
Eastern European countries (especially within the China-CEEC cooperation 
framework), insisting on including the Serbia's capital - Belgrade, as unavoidable 
 227 
 
stop-and-see destination on  the Danube river tour (which includes Vienna, capital of 
Austria, Budapest, capital of Hungary, and Bratislava, capital of Slovakia), especially 
for the tourists coming from Asia and overseas, 
 tasking Serbia Tourism Organisation to work more closely with Montenegro national 
tourism organisation to establish tours for tourists primarily coming to Montenegro as 
marine tourists that would include both countries, together with Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, 
 considering establishing/organising river cruising (especially including canyoning) 
tours across Serbia for tourists coming from Asia and overseas, in addition to all other 
countries, 
 engaging more intensively representatives of Serbia's diplomatic missions, mainly 
those in embassies, in Russia, Turkey and China, but also in other emerging countries 
regarded potentially lucrative in tourism terms to search for potential investors in the 
development of Serbiatourism sector, presenting them advantages of investing in(to) 
Serbia,then facilitating correspondence betweenthem (meaning the investors) and the 
Development Agency of Serbia in the first place, but also with other state, regional 
and/or local authorities and tourism-related businesses in Serbia, and to become 
involved in eventual dispute settlement between the sides, 
 establishing precise mechanism of cooperation between the Tourism Organisation of 
Serbia as the country's main institution in charge of tourism and Serbia's diplomatic 
missions in Russia, Turkey and China, but also in other emerging countries,to enable 
that the Tourism Organisation of Serbia could dispose of precise and most recent 
information about tourism fairs and other related promotional events (in emerging 
countries), and with the aim ofbetter coordination of activities and disseminationof 
information, 
 establishing a position of attaché for tourism at Serbia's embassies in Russia, Turkey 
and China, but also in other emerging countries, where justified by economic reasons, 
 stimulating formation of tourism clusters in Serbia, with the aim to facilitate 
development of tourism-oriented businesses, and hence improveoverall national 
tourism offer, and 
 working to develop and maintain close political and/or cultural relations with other 
emerging countries (besides Russia, Turkey and China with which Serbia already has 
very satisfying bilateral political and/or cultural relations) regarded prosperous in 
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terms of tourism (and business in general), what/which could facilitate and serve as 
the basis forcooperation in this and other economic fields. 
Lastly, if we take into consideration the fact that Serbia shares much in common with other 
Western Balkans, i.e. South-East Europe countries in terms of coping with transitional 
challenges, and a need for strengthening the economy in general, these recommendations 
could equally apply/relate to other transitional countries of the region and those beyond alike.
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8 Final conclusion  
This chapter summarises the main facts and findings from the research. Most importantly, in 
short it points out the main research purpose and aims, highlights the (research) problem(s) 
and illustrates evidence which confirm set theses.  
Firstly, with reference to the purpose, this research is about demonstrating the significance of 
commercial diplomacy – a branch of diplomacy being increasingly applied both by 
developing and (industrially) developed countries (Saner and Yiu 2003), especially since the 
1980s with intensification of globalisation which, from the perspective of the research, 
brought about an increase in/of number of bilateral and regional (free) trade and financial 
arrangements across the globe, the volume of investment flows, and greater movement of 
people alike. Initially, as a practical foreign policy instrument commercial diplomacy started 
to be used predominantly by industrially and financially developed Western countries looking 
to find new markets and expand their businesses across national borders. Over time, having 
seen the benefits of commercial diplomacy and its services for business and economic 
development in general, many developing countries, among which a large number of those in 
transition, both small and large in size, started to resort to it and grasp the opportunity that 
globalisation offers. Commercial diplomacy is especially important for territorially and in 
terms of population small countries, especially those developing, which cannot base their 
(economic) growth and sustainability on the economy of volume domestically. So, not long 
after it found its place among top priority foreign policy instruments of policy-makers 
throughout the world, commercial diplomacy quickly started to attract attention of academic 
community too, having become increasingly popular. A particularly important aspect of it has 
become to investigate its effects on internationalisation of national economy, primarily by 
various means of trade and investment promotion, such as: business facilitation (including 
support in negotiations), matchmaking (contact establishment and/or facilitation), information 
gathering, organising visits, seminars and representation at trade fairs, market analysis, and 
similar. Gradually, over time, from the academic point of view, the scope of activity of 
commercial diplomacy has broadened to include studying the effects of development aid, 
then lobbying and/or intelligence, protection of intellectual property rights, conflict 
resolution, promotion of tourism, encouragement of cooperation in science and technology, 
and the related transfer of technology. In that regard, the presented findings of 33 (case) 
studies found available demonstrate a highly positive effect of various commercial diplomacy 
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services and activities on national economy and its internationalisation, both directly and/or 
indirectly. 
Further on, in light of globalisation and increased complexity of global economic relations, it 
is unavoidable to point out the importance of emerging countries/economies, otherwise also 
widely referred to as emerging markets, in terms of business. The facts presented in the 
research illustrate that the emerging markets in general terms will be the main drivers of 
global economic activity and growth in the coming years, given that it has now become 
almost inevitable, what the 2007/’08 world economic and financial crisis only confirmed, that 
the centre of gravity in economic terms will shift from developed, high-income onto strongly 
developing emerging countries/markets, especially those in the East. This is mainly due to the 
following:  
 Many emerging markets have very large populations (as a matter of fact more than 
two-thirds of the world’s total population live in the emerging countries). Hence, 
much of what they produce is/can be consumed domestically, making them resilient 
to wider economic turbulences, especially periodical falls in demand for foreign 
goods (what is not the case with strongly export-oriented developed countries); 
 Their GDP is growing at a notably higher rate than that of developed countries, as 
does purchasing power of the population;  
 Despite improved living standard and higher wages, they are still much more 
competitive vis-à-vis developed countries in terms of labour cost, what makes them 
the most desirable outsource destination for companies from the developed countries; 
 Many emerging markets, such as China as a conspicuous example, manage to 
maintain traditionally high level of (domestic) saving and investment relative to GDP, 
what makes healthy foundations for growth;  
 For the reasons already noted, emerging markets have been attracting the largest 
portion of FDI for years, which they successfully take advantage of in the sense of 
transfer of technology, advanced management and know-how. As a result, to this 
adding higher and higher investment in R&D and innovation, their products are 
getting more value-added (on), what makes them more desirable especially in 
developed countries and more competitive globally; 
 They intensely invest in transport and communication infrastructure, in that way 
fulfilling one of necessary preconditions for economic development; 
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 They substantially improved business and FDI regulatory framework and overall 
business environment, what only increases their business prospects in general terms; 
 They are increasingly investing abroad, what not only makes them attractive 
destinations to attract investments from, but also raises their own growth prospects in 
the long-term. 
As mentioned in the text, even prior to the eruption of the 2007/’08 world economic and 
financial crisis, many were quite confident that the emerging economies would successfully 
buffer consequences of eventual global economic turbulences, especially those originating in 
developed countries. When the crisis became reality, many companies from high-income 
countries started to increasingly turn towards them in pursuit of business opportunities. 
Forecasts that the emerging economies would be more resilient to the spill-over chain effects 
of the crisis than developed countries eventually turned out to be true. Moreover, some 
eminent scholars even argue that the global crisis only speeded up the rise of the emerging 
economies as new dominant players in the world economy (Garten 1997; Gupta and Wang in 
Gupta et al. 2012; Guillen and Garcia-Cannal 2013). 
All the mentioned above applies for Russia, Turkey and China as countries in focus. They all 
have large populations and hence significant consumption capacity, purchasing power is 
getting better, GDP is on rise (with the exception of Russia since 2013 when it was imposed 
international sanctions due to alleged involvement in the civil war in Eastern Ukraine) and 
they are increasingly investing abroad. This and all other highly favourable factors presented 
in detail in the research make(s) them, from the perspective of business, attractive and 
promising partners.  
Based on the noted, we come to the main aim of the research, which is to test whether and to 
what entent engaging in commercial diplomacy by countries in transition towards the 
emerging markets, contributes to enhancement of internationalisation of their economies, 
primarily by means of promoting export, geographical market diversification and tourism, 
then attracting (foreign) inward and promoting outward direct investment, and securing 
favourable investment loans too. The Republic of Serbia as the country of the Western 
Balkans, and in broader terms South-East European region, i.e. its commercial diplomacy, 
was selected for verification of set theses. Why Serbia? Primarily because it is a country in 
transition (alike other post socialist countries of Central and South-East Europe), whose 
economy is still relatively weak (Kovačević in Hanić et al. 2010; Stojiljković 2011; Cerović 
2012; Uvalić 2012; et al.) and from the perspective of internationalisation excessively 
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dependent on the markets of the European Union and the Central European Free Trade 
Agreement (CEFTA) region, both in terms of trade and investment (inward and outward). In 
other words, its economy is weakly diversified, what makes it very fragile, so-to-say, under 
regional and global economic crises. As time would show, consequences of such weak 
market diversification, i.e. internationalisation became visible especially during the 2007/’08 
world economic and financial crisis, which made a serious damage to its transitional 
economy. Moreover, the crisis also disclosed unsustainability of Serbia's development model, 
which has strongly encouraged import at the expense of export, what has negatively reflected 
on high current account deficit (Đukić 2010; Hanić in Hanić et al. 2010; Bošnjak 2011; Penev 
and Marušić 2011; Cerović 2012; Prascevic 2012; Skulić 2012; Uvalić 2012; Prica in Bartlett 
and Uvalić 2013; et al.).  
Since the main research problem is about mentioned weak market diversification (which 
indicates unsatisfying level of economy internationalisation), in the lines to follow will be 
given a recollection of main facts and figures with reference to it. First, in terms of export, 
despite noticeable improvement during the observed period, from 67,1 % in 2004 to 60,4 % 
in 2016, for what the largest credits has active commercial diplomacy, Serbia is still too 
dependent on the markets of the EU and CEFTA. Secondly, in terms of investment, the 
available data disclose a slightly positive, but still far from satisfying trend in the sense of 
diversification. More concretely, concerning inward FDI, the presented data show that a share 
of the EU in Serbia's total FDI has decreased from 67,3 % in 2010 to 63 % in 2016. Likewise, 
a share of Europe (EU+other non-EU European countries) has decreased from 90,1 % in 
2010 to 80,1 % in 2016. Going more in detail, the number of non-EU countries in Serbia's top 
20 inward FDI source countries has gone from 5 in 2010 to 9 in 2016. Or, in terms of value, 
during the observed period, a share of non-EU in Serbia's total attracted FDI has increased 
from 27,1 % to 33,9 %, whereas a share of non-European (attracted) FDI has increased from 
4,7 % to 17,2 %. In terms of outward FDI, mixed results are evidenced, as expected to some 
degree. During the period 2010–2016, a share of Serbia's EU-based FDI has gone to worse, in 
other words it has increased from 25,8 % to 45,5 %, whereas European-based (FDI) has 
decreased, from 98,5 % to 87,5 %, meaning (that) noticeable diversification has been 
achieved. Furthermore, the number of non-EU countries which hosted FDI from Serbia has 
decreased from 10 to 8 in the same period. Or, in terms of value, a share of non-EU based 
FDI in Serbia's total has decreased from 79 % in 2010 to 50,6 % in 2016. On the contrary, a 
share of Serbia's non-European based FDI has gone to better, from 0,8 % in 2010 to 5,7 % in 
2016, implying achieved diversification in European countries other than (of/from) the EU. 
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Having seen how detrimental outward-originated economic crises can be for Serbia's 
vulnerable transitional economy, many experts and policy makers, among whom are: 
Mladjen Kovačević, Miroslav Zdravković, Lu Brefora, Kori Udovički and Olivera Kiro, 
started to outspokenly advocate that Serbia needs to orient towards the emerging markets 
with the aim to decrease being overly contingent on the EU and CEFTA markets, both in 
terms of export and investment; in other words, to enhance market diversification, that is, 
internationalisation of the economy. And, it is commercial diplomacy that was recognised as 
the most important instrument by means of which this can be accomplished. 
Based on the mentioned (problems), the dissertation was to provide answers to the following 
research questions, which at the same time represented the aims of the research. They 
(meaning the questions) are the following: 
1. Can commercial diplomacy be a beneficial foreign policy instrument for stimulating 
and enhancing national economy internationalisation of transition countries, 
particularly those that are small territorially and in terms of population?  
2. Can transition countries gain economic benefits by engaging in commercial 
diplomacy towards the emerging markets, particularly those in the East, especially in 
times of global economic crises? 
3. Can Serbia enhance internationalisation of its economy by actively engaging in active 
commercial diplomacy towards the emerging markets of Russia, Turkey and China?  
4. Can good political and/or cultural home-host country relations influence the 
effectiveness of the home country’s commercial diplomacy in the host market? 
5. Can Serbia take advantage of good political and/or cultural relations with Russia, 
Turkey and China with the aim of achieving economic benefits? 
Those questions made the framework for two main research theses (there are five of them in 
total, including sub-theses) which were to be tested in the research.  
H1: Engaging in commercial diplomacy towards the emerging markets contributes to the 
enhancement of national economy internationalisation of countries in transition. 
H1a: Engaging in commercial diplomacy towards the emerging markets contributes to the 
increase of export of the home country and the overall trade volume. 
H1b: Engaging in commercial diplomacy towards the emerging markets contributes to the 
increase of investment flows, both inward and outward. 
H1c: Engaging in commercial diplomacy towards the emerging markets contributes to the 
development of tourism of the home country and the increase of revenues from tourism. 
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H1d: Engaging in commercial diplomacy towards the emerging markets helps achieve 
agreement on favourable investment loans for the home country. 
H2: Good political and socio-cultural home-host country relations positively influence the 
effectiveness of the home country’s commercial diplomacy in the host market. 
So, primarily in order to avoid being exposed to high economic risk in cases of eventual 
regional and/or global economic crises in the future, but also with the aim to enhance 
internationalisation of its transitional economy, Serbia has opted for orienting and 
intensifying its commercial diplomacy towards the emerging markets, especially those in the 
East, many among which it traditionally has or is trying to establish good political and/or 
cultural relations with. Among those are Russia, Turkey and China, regarded highly 
significant in economic terms. The rightfulness of the decision to turn towards the mentioned, 
but other emerging markets too, gains in importance having that it is found that commercial 
diplomacy can be of notable benefit in the countries/markets in which the state has a strong 
impact and influence on the economy than in those self-regulating (Udovič 2011), what 
exactly characterises these (three) countries. This helped, i.e. enabled Serbia to conclude 
lucrative free trade agreements with Russia (which which it also agreed highly favourable 
amending protocols) and Turkey, and the strategic agreement with China, as the basis for 
multi-level economic cooperation. They, as turned out, represents/ed great accomplishment 
of its commercial diplomacy. It is highly important to emphasise that the two free trade 
agreements are also significant in terms of attracting foreign direct investment, particularly 
from the European Union, as they open up an opportunity for foreign companies registered in 
Serbia to export to these two large markets tax free, especially Russian, but also to Belarus 
and Kazakhstan, with which Serbia also have an agreement on free trade. This diplomatic 
achievement is thus greater having that Serbia in currently negotiating an all-encompassing 
free trade agreement with the Eurasian Economic Union. It, once completed, will enable “free 
access” to markets of Armenia and Kyrgyzstan too.  
Having recollected the research’s main purpose, aims, problems, questions and the theses, in 
the following lines will be outlined a summary of main empirical findings obtained in the 
three case studies (Serbia-Russia, Serbia-Turkey, and Serbia-China) which confirm the 
theses, one by one. In other words, by presenting them (i.e. the findings) it will be shown that 
Serbia’s commercial diplomacy (geared) towards the emerging economies/markets of Russia, 
Turkey and China can be credited for substantial improvement of market diversification and 
economic internationalisation by contributing to the conclusion of lucrative bilateral 
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agreements in the fields of trade, investment and tourism which primarily helped increase 
export and attract respectable volumes of FDI and higher number of tourists from those 
countries. 
H1a: Engaging in commercial diplomacy towards the emerging markets contributes to 
the increase of export of the home country and the overall trade volume. 
With reference to the case study Serbia-Russia, the free trade agreement which Serbia 
managed to agree on with Russia yet almost two decades ago, based on traditionally very 
friendly political and cultural relations between the two countries, was made to be 
deliberately in favour of the Serbian side (which at the time Serbia was in a strong need of 
given its very poor economic situation in the early 2000s after being under international 
sanctions for almost a decade and yet harshly devastated by the NATO bombing in 1999), 
represented a strong basis for development of bilateral trade relations (the volume of the 
overall trade exchange increased from 1,5 billion USD in 2004 to 2,3 billion USD 2016), 
which indeed Serbia took advantage of. This is best illustrated by the fact that during the 
observed period 2004-2016 Serbian export to Russia has increased by 420,1 %, (or) from 
152,9 to nearly 800 million USD in nominal value. Export was growing at a much stronger 
pace than import, what resulted (in) that coverage of import by export has improved 
conspicuously in favour of the Serbian side, from modest 11 % in 2004 to satisfying 52,6 % 
in 2016. This ratio would have been even more favourable for Serbia if it (meaning Serbia) 
had not been largely dependent on Russian energy resources (oil and gas) which combined 
make for about 2/3 of Russia's total export to Serbia. With reference to the mentioned, it is 
important to note that Serbian export (to Russia) would have very likely been substantially 
higher/bigger, somewhere between 1,3–1,4 billion USD (in 2016) in nominal value had 
Russia not been imposed international sanctions, which already in the short-time contracted 
domestic demand, and (had) Serbia not been gravely affected by disastrous floods in spring 
2014. Serbia's favourable position was further enhanced by the 2009 and the 2011 Protocols 
which expanded the list of goods encompassed by the free trade regime. In addition, in terms 
of export, particularly impressive has been growth of a share of Serbian agricultural sector in 
the country's total export, what occured (in 2014) after Russia opted to impose 
countermeasures on the EU, banning its export of agricultural goods (in)to Russia, among 
other things, what opened up space for Serbia, which refused to go along the EU policy in 
this regard. For illustration, only in the period 2013–2016 a share of Serbian agricultural 
goods in the top 20 export goods went up by 15 %, from 86,2 to 217,6 million USD in 
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nominal value. For comparison, during the entire observed period 2004–2016 this share has 
increased from 15 % to 35 %, or nominally from 9,2 to 217,6 million USD. In other words, in 
only 3 years export has recorded better growth than it did over almost the entire decade. As a 
result of all mentioned, in the period 2008–2015 the number of Serbian enterprises exporting 
to Russia increased from 416 to 811, meaning it almost doubled, and in the period 2007–2016 
the number of export goods substantially increased too, from 785 to 1,279.  
With reference to the case study Serbia-Turkey, as in the case with Russia, friendly political 
ties, which have particularly been improved during the last decade, presented the basis for the 
free trade agreement, which the two countries (meaning Serbia and Turkey) concluded in 
June 2009, and which started to be implemented in September 2010. The agreement was 
made to strongly favour the Serbian side in the initial phase of its implementation as it 
provided tax free export from Serbia immediately upon its signing, whereas Turkish export 
was liberalised in phases over the 5 years period, until 2015. The agreement was of special 
benefit for Serbia as it was concluded in the first years following the 2007/'08 world 
economic crisis, when Serbian export recorded a serious fall amid contraction of demand in 
the markets of the EU, which traditionally absorbs most of Serbian export. Thanks to the 
agreement, the overall trade exchange between the two countries in the observed period 
2004–2016 increased by 259,3 %, from 261 to 938 million USD. In the same period export 
grew by 330,4 %, which is far greater than import (236,9 %). What is important to stress in 
this regard is that during the free trade period (2009–2016) export recorded a cumulative 
growth of nearly 500 %, meaning it grew at far better rates than in the years which preceded 
the agreement. Resultantly, coverage of import by export substantially improved, from 31,6 
% to 40,3 % in the period 2004–2016; a number of Serbian enterprises exporting (in)to 
Turkey increased from 183 to 323 in the period 2008-2015; and the number of Serbian export 
goods to Turkey increased from 381 to 608 in the period 2007–2016. Moreover, on the list of 
Serbia's 50 main export destinations, position of Turkey improved from place 28th in 2008 to 
17th in 2016.  
With reference to the case study Serbia-China, despite notable improvement in terms of the 
overall trade exchange (in the period 2004–2016), trade deficit is understandably on the 
Serbian side, and hence coverage of import by export is still at a very low margin (1,6 %). 
However, what is praiseworthy is that during this period Serbian export increased by 303,4 
%, what is certainly much better than the increase of import (105,2 %), Resultantly, on the 
list of Serbia's 50 main export destinations, China's position has notably improved, entering 
the top 50 in 2006 (being Serbia's 43rd largest export destination), having reached 37th 
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position in 2016; or nominally, export rose from 6,3 million USD in 2006 to 25,3 in 2016. 
Given the intensity of the two countries' economic cooperation in recent years, particularly in 
the field of trade (the volume of the overall trade exchange increased from 788 million in 
2006 to 1,6 billion USD 2016), both at bilateral and multilateral level, it is very likely that the 
volume of Serbia's export will keep increasing in the years to come.  
H1b: Engaging in commercial diplomacy towards the emerging markets contributes to 
the increase of investment flows, both inward and outward. 
H1c: Engaging in commercial diplomacy towards the emerging markets helps achieve 
agreement on favourable investment loans for the home country. 
With reference to the case study Serbia-Russia, in terms of Russian (inward) investment into 
Serbia, as presented the volume of inward FDI was significant until 2014 when Russia was 
imposed sanctions, after what it expectedly took a downscale turn. However, given the 
positive trend before the sanctions, it is very likely to expect that when they be abolished, the 
volume of investment will reach higher values again. Similar trend in terms of periodical ups 
and down does also apply when it comes to Serbia's (outward) investment in(to) Russia. 
Given that the energy sector is by far the most dominant in the Russian economy, making for 
approximately 2/3 of its total export, understandably the largest Russian (outward) 
investments in(to) Serbia are in the sector of oil industry.  
The top 5 (by value of investment) Russia's investments to Serbia are:  
1. „Gazprom Neft / NIS a.d“, a brownfield investment in the oil industry in Pančevo, 
worth 947 million EUR, which provided opening of nearly 4000 new working places 
(precisely 3992). The renovated refinery opened in November 2012. Expansion of 
investments (expansion of production, retail stations and exploration of oil) is planned 
in the coming years in the total amount of 1.5 billion EUR; 
2. „Lukoil / Lukoil Srbija a.d“, a brownfield investment in the oil industry in Belgrade, 
worth 210 million EUR, which provided opening of 155 new working places. The 
company purchased „Beopetrol“ company for storage and distribution of oil 
derivatives in 2003; 
3. „Metropol Group“, a privatization-type of investment in the sector of tourism in 
Belgrade, worth 41 + 7.2 million EUR (in phases); 
4. „GSK Krasniy Treugolnik / Vulkan gume d.o.o“, an investment in the automobile 
industry sector in Niš, worth 3,5 million EUR, which provided opening of 197 new 
working places; 
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5. „Red Triangle“, a privatization-type of investment in the automobile industry sector 
(tyres production) in Niš, worth 3,5 million EUR. In March 2013 the company 
purchased the company „Vuklan“. Additional investment in the amount of 5 million 
EUR is planned. 
Herein it is worth noting that since Russian economy is centered around large, state-owned 
energy sector companies, and the sector of small and medium enterprises is inadequately 
developed, the number of Russian companies investing in(to) Serbia cannot be expected to be 
substantial anyway. 
In terms of Serbian (outward) investment (in)to Russia, its volume was negatively affected by 
the world economic crisis, managing to get better only in 2014, from when on growth has 
been successfully maintained. The examples of Hemofarm (which opened a pharmaceutical 
factory, with the value of investment of 32 million USD) and Sintelon (which opened a 
factory for production of floor coverings, worth 250 million USD) to this day remain the 
largest domestic (Serbian) investment in Russia. 
With reference to the case study Serbia-Turkey, in terms of Turkish (inward) investment 
in(to) Serbia, the positive trend is present and significant ever since 2010 from when data are 
available, especially since 2015 onward, the period during which the value of attracted 
investment was multiplied. Given Serbia's active commercial diplomacy towards Turkey in 
recent years, and especially months, which resulted in bilateral state visits at the highest level 
in both countries, and official announcements of especially the Turkish side, it is certain that 
the value of Turkish inward investment into Serbia will be much higher in the years to come 
compared to current ones. 
Second to Russia is Turkey, whose inward direct investment (in)to Serbia have been 
improving over the last couple of years, having reached respectable numbers.  
The top 5 (by value of investment) Turkey's investments to Serbia are:  
1. “BORAL Aluminum”, a greenfield investment in the aluminum production in 
Doljevac, worth 55 million EUR, which provided opening of 300 new working 
places; 
2. “Teklas Automotiv”, a brownfield investment in the automobile industry in Vladičin 
Han, worth 11.3 million EUR, which provided opening of 200 new working places 
(with another 200 planned). Production started in April 2017. Export is planned to the 
markets of Europe, with Russia, Asia and the Americas; 
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3. “Halk Bank”, a brownfield investment in the banking sector in Čačak, worth 10.1 
million EUR. In March 2015 the investor became owner of a majority share of the 
Čačak Bank. It is expected that opening of the Turkish bank will further encourage 
Turkish companies to invest in Serbia; 
4. “Aster Tekstil”, a brownfield investment in the textile industry in Niš, worth 6.5 
million EUR, which provided 500 new working places (with another 2000 planned). 
The investor started production in October 2016; 
5. “Jeanci Istanbul”, a greenfield and brownfield investment(s) combined in the textile 
industry in Leskovac and Krupanj, worth 6 million EUR (with another 746,000 EUR 
planned in Krupanj), which opened 760 new working places (in Leskovac) and 100 
(in Krupanj), with 200 more planned (in Krupanj). The investment was initiated in 
July 2011. In April 2015 the investor opened a new factory in Krupanj. 
As previously the case with Russia, the volume of Turkish investment is greater than the 
other way around. According to the available data, only one Serbian company „Bonex 
holding“, a refractory bricks producer, invested in Turkey where it opened a production 
facility, the value of investment being 10 million USD. 
With reference to the case study Serbia-China, in terms of China's inward investment in(to) 
Serbia, the trend of growth is stable and significant ever since the beginning of the observed 
period (for which data are available), especially since 2014 onward.  
Concerning China, as is the case with Russia and Turkey, friendly (political) relations 
between the two countries (meaning Serbia and China) made the basis for the conclusion of 
the intergovernmental agreement on economic and technical cooperation, thanks to which a 
number of large (infrastructural) projects (mainly highways, bridges and power facilities) 
have already been implemented, while a number of them are in some phase of preparation or 
planning. The cooperation is based on favourable loans (with preferential conditions and low 
interest rate(s) in comparison to other international financial institutions) by the China 
Export-Import Bank (more commonly referred to as the EXIM Bank) for infrastructural 
projects in Serbia, with joint participation of both parties.  
So far, with financial arrangements with the China EXIM Bank, in recent years the following 
infrastructural projects have been implemented or are under construction in Serbia: 
 Bridge Mihajlo Pupin, more commonly known as the Zemun-Borča Bridge, 
 First and second phase of the project „Kostolac B Power Plant“, 
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 Two sections of the highway E-763 in the framework of the Corridor 11 – Obrenovac-
Ub and Lajkovac-Ljig, in the length of 50 km, 
 Section of the highway E-763 – Surčin-Obrenovac, 
 Section of the highway E70/75 – bridge across Sava river „Bubanj Potok“ near 
Ostružnica, 
 Reconstruction of the railway Belgrade-Budapest.  
 Construction of the two major (river) channels, on the Danube and Moraca rivers. 
With regard to investment in industrial facilities in Serbia, it is important to emphasise that 
according to announcements of the Serbian Government, the Chinese companies are 
interested to invest more in the forthcoming years. Certainly an important step represents 
opening of the Bank of China branch office in Belgrade, which will become the Bank’s 
central branch office for the Balkans, but also for whole Eastern and Western Europe. 
Needless to say that opening of the bank will further encourage and stimulate Chinese 
companies to invest (in Serbia). 
The top 5 (by value of investment) China's investments to Serbia (completed or planned) are:  
1. „Mei Ta Group“, a greenfield investment in the automobile industry (production of 
blocks and engine carriers, turbochargers and other parts for famous automobile 
brands such as Renault, Ford, BMW and Daimler) in Obrenovac, worth 60 million 
EUR (in two phases), with 1400 new working places planned. Completion of the 
factory construction was planned for the second half of 2017; 
2. „He Steel“ („HBIS“), a brownfield investment in heavy industry (iron production) in 
Smederevo, worth 46 million EUR (with another 300 million EUR planned). The 
agreement on the purchase of the steelworks was signed in April 2016; 
3. „Diplon d.o.o“ (mostly Chinese ownership), a greenfield investment in the trade 
sector (trade centre) in Zemun, worth 25 million EUR (according to what the owner 
stated). The trade centre „CTC Zmaj – Belmax“ was opened in 2008; 
4. „Healthcare Co. Ltd“ (in cooperation with Danish company „Everrest“), a greenfield 
investment in the textile industry (production of memory foam) in Ruma, worth 15 
million EUR (with another 20 million EUR planned), which opened 350 new working 
places (with another 500 planned). Additionally, a factory for the production of 
furniture is planned; 
5. „Johnson Electric“, a greenfield investment in the machine industry (construction of 
electromotors) in Niš, worth 7,5 million EUR (with another 50 million EUR planned), 
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which opened 90 new working places (in total 2400 planned until 2021). Construction 
of a factory was completed in April 2016. 
In addition, three large projects are planned, two of them relate to the construction of 
industrial zones/parks in Serbia (one of them being construction of industrial, commercial 
and technological business zone „Stublenica“, in close proximity to the Corridor 11, in Ub 
municipality, whose total worth is (planned to be) approximately 1,2 billion EUR, and which 
would open about 15,000 new working places in the first phase, while the other phase would 
include construction of a centre for logistics, transport port, educational and technological 
institute), and one referring to the port on the Danube river, in close proximity to the Zemun-
Borča Bridge.  
H1d: Engaging in commercial diplomacy towards the emerging markets contributes to 
the development of tourism of the home country and the increase of revenues from 
tourism. 
With reference to the case study Serbia-Russia, the intergovernmental agreement which 
Serbia and Russia signed in March 2011 laid down the basis for faster development in this 
field, which indeed happened. During the observed period 2005–2016, the number of arrivals 
of Russian tourists to Serbia increased from 11,000 to almost 44,000, what amounts to the 
increase of nearly 300 %, whereas in the period 2010–2016 that number went up from 21,636 
to 43,916. Respective growth rates are also recorded in terms of overnight stays, which over 
the entire observed period increased from 33,000 to more than 131,000 (or nearly 300 %), 
and from 62,538 to 131,323 between 2010–2016 (or 109,8 %). 
With reference to the case study Serbia-Turkey, in the period 2005–2016 the number of 
arrivals of the Turkish tourists in Serbia increased from 7,000 to nearly 84,000; in order 
words the increase was over 1,000 %. However, due to a low base in the early 2000s as a 
consequence of the fact that promotion of tourism, especially abroad, was certainly not 
among priority issues, a more plausible figure is the increase of 504,5 % achieved in the 
period 2010–2016, during which the number of arrivals grew up from 13,842 to 83,676. A 
praiseworthy growth has been achieved in terms of overnight stays too. Over the entire 
observed period (2005–2016) that number went up from 13,000 to nearly 142,000, what 
represents an increase of nearly 1,000 %. Again, a more credible result is the one achieved in 
the period 2010–2016, during which the number of Turkish guests who decided to „stay“ in 
Serbia grew from 23,531 to 141,618, what translated in percentual value amounts to 501,8 %. 
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The intergovernmental agreement on visa free regime signed in 2010 has surely gave wind to 
faster development in this field. 
With reference to the case study Serbia-China, lastly, thanks to Serbia’s active commercial 
diplomacy tourism has become one of the fastest growing fields in terms of cooperation 
between the two countries. Praiseworthy is to note that in the period 2011–2016 the number 
of arrivals of the Chinese guests in Serbia has gone up from 3,470 to 18.409, what represents 
an increase of 430,5 %. Likewise, significant growth of 261,4 % is recorded in terms of 
number of overnight stays, which (during the mentioned period) increased from 11,895 to 
42,986. Given the intensity of Serbia’s promotional activities, it is very likely that this 
positive trend will continue in the years to come. 
H2: Political and socio-cultural home-host country relations influence the effectiveness 
of the home country’s commercial diplomacy in the host market. 
With reference to this thesis, notwithstanding the fact that testing it could not be done on the 
basis of quantified results, the presented data and information in the research give enough 
credibility so that it can be argued that political and socio-cultural relations between Serbia as 
a country in transition, on one side, and Russia, Turkey and China as the emerging 
economies/markets, on the other, have had a significant impact on the level of successfulness 
of Serbia’s commercial diplomacy in/towards each of these emerging markets. In this regard, 
of particular importance are very affirmative answers obtained in a questionnaire with Slavica 
Visnjić, the acting head of department for bilateral economic relations with Russia and China 
in the Serbian Ministry of Trade, Tourism and Telecommunications.  
As noted earlier in the research, foundations for (what developed into) good political and/or 
cultural relations between Serbia and the three mentioned countries date back much earlier 
than (the period) encompassed by this research. In case of Russia it could be said to be 
centuries old, primarily developed on the basis of Pan-slavism and in relation to it Orthodox 
Christianity. In case of Turkey and China good political relations which spilled over to the 
sphere of culture primarily stem from the time when the former Yugoslavia actively took part 
in the Non-Aligned Movement between the 1960s and the 1980s. In addition, to the 
successfulness of Serbia’s commercial diplomacy vis-à-vis good (political and/or cultural) 
relations with the noted countries certainly impacted and contributed the fact that the latter 
countries are characterised by more or less authoritarian regimes, whereat top political 
leadership has a very influential role when it comes to interference in the economy. This has 
largely helped Serbia to become one of few European countries to conclude a free trade 
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agreement with Russia, which was additionally expanded on two occasions to be strongly 
preferential for the Serbian side, and one of very few countries in the whole world, and the 
only one in Europe, to conclude an inter-governmental agreement with China, which serves 
as the basis for development of the overall bilateral economic relations. To this could be 
added a free trade regime with Turkey, again, charted to favour the Serbian side from the 
beginning of its implementation. Relatively frequent bilateral state visits at the highest level, 
usually accompanied by numerous economic delegations, both in Serbia and in each of these 
three countries, is a credible indicator of Serbia's diplomatic success in trying to take 
advantage of its political and/or cultural relations for economic benefits. 
Finally, on the basis of all the aforementioned, it can be concluded that strengthening 
commercial diplomacy towards the emerging markets of Russia, Turkey and China has 
helped Serbia to notably improve market diversification and enhance internationalisation of 
its transitional economy. This has been achieved primarily by means of improving bilateral 
trade exchange with the mentioned countries, in particular export performance, then 
attracting respectable volume of inward foreign direct investment, as well as promoting 
outward investment, then attracting substantially high number of (foreign) tourists, as well as 
by managing to secure favourable investment loans. The free trade agreements with Russia 
(including the amending protocols) and Turkey, representing immense achievement of 
commercial diplomacy of Serbia, have resulted in substantial increase of bilateral trade 
exchange, particularly of export, compared to the period preceding the agreements/protocols. 
The free trade agreement and the protocols with Russia in particular whereby also have 
indirect benefits for Serbia, in the form of helping to stimulate foreign investors, primarily 
from the EU, but also from the overseas to (re)locate their businesses into Serbia in order to 
take advantage of the large Russian market, but of the markets of Belarus and Kazakhstan 
too, with which Serbia signed and ratified agreements on free trade. In terms of cooperation 
with China, the multi purpose agreement on economic and technical cooperation based on 
favourable investment loans by the China Export-Import Bank, mainly for infrastructural 
projects in Serbia, has enabled Serbia access to finance under much more preferential terms 
compared to those offered by main international financial institutions. Thanks to these 
arrangements, many large projects of transport and energy infrastructure have been 
successfully implemented. Likewise, the bilateral agreements in the field of investment and 
tourism have contributed to noteworthy improvements too. Nothing less important is the 
secondary finding which provides enough evidence to argue that Serbia’s good political 
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and/or socio-cultural relations with the three emerging countries/economies have had a 
significant impact on the successfulness of its commercial diplomacy in/towards these 
emerging countries/markets. 
With reference to the mentioned, Serbia’s embassies in the emerging countries and beyond 
should put more focus on commercial diplomacy. Appointment of ambassadors and other 
diplomatic staff should be highly professionalised and merit-based, non-political, in line with 
good practice of many developed countries. Training of diplomats for carrying out 
commercial diplomacy activities should become standard. In relation to that, the Serbian 
Government needs to ensure, i.e. provide professional training for diplomatic staff employed 
at Serbia's embassies, in the emerging markets and elsewhere, in order to ensure quality of 
delivered services and timely response. Likewise, home-stationed staff in charge of 
commercial diplomacy needs to ensure adequate and timely response to the business 
community, entrepreneurs in particular. In that regard, promoting Serbia as a suitable 
investment and tourism destination, assisting domestic exporters, and working on country 
branding and lobbying that should help its export goods win new markets, should make the 
core of their activities. At the same time, its policy-makers should focus on preventing brain 
drain and fostering human resources in order to provide conditions for the transfer of 
technology and know-how as positive aspects of foreign investments. In parallel with 
strengthening commercial diplomacy in/towards the emerging markets, Serbia needs to 
further work on enhancing its institutions and secure business-friendly regulatory framework 
and environment. To provide healthy foundations for sustainable development, it is of utmost 
importance for Serbia to focus less on import and the service sector, and instead to stimulate 
“real economy”, i.e. industry, especially export-oriented sectors. The country must provide 
enough financial means for stimulating development of the entrepreneurship, especially small 
and medium, and encourage cluster-based approach. Only in this way it can count on the 
increase of employment and GDP in parallel. In that regard, the examples of some countries, 
particularly those in South-East Asia, which have based their economic growth almost 
exclusively on foreign investors exploiting low cost labour, without investing in human 
resources and creating conditions for the transfer of technology and know-how, in that way 
having being “trapped” in the so-called permanent medium development phase, should pose a 
serious warning. 
Lastly, in terms of scientific contribution of the research, having that the theory on the 
effectiveness of commercial diplomacy of transitional, i.e. developing countries towards the 
emerging countries/economies, notably those in the East, is found to be insufficiently dealt 
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with, this dissertation could be said to offer a fresh perspective to applicability and usefulness 
of commercial diplomacy as an academic discipline. Particularly noteworthy is the fact that 
the presented findings go in favour of strengthening the theory that (a) commercial diplomacy 
is/can be much more effective when applied by developing towards developed countries or 
vice versa, than between developing or developed countries themselves, and (b) (small) 
transition countries can take advantage of, i.e. exploit good political and/or cultural relations 
with the host (target) countries, especially those that are politically and economically much 
more influential and powerful, with the aim to increase the successfulness of their 
commercial diplomacy in the markets of the latter. However, even more important is to 
emphasise the main novel contribution(s) of this research to the theory on commercial 
diplomacy, which are that (a) commercial diplomacy of the territorially and in terms of 
population small countries of the Western Balkans towards the emerging economies/markets 
in the East is found to be highly beneficial in the sense of improving geographical market 
diversification and enhancing national economy internationalisation, and (b) good political 
and/or cultural relations between the territorially and in terms of population small countries 
of the Western Balkans and the emerging economies/markets in the East is found to increase 
the successfulness of their commercial diplomacy in the markets of the latter. Since the 
research also elaborates in detail the micro- and macroeconomic issues of both transitional 
and the emerging countries, business-conducive regulatory framework in particular, it might 
also be interesting and insightful for policy-makers and business community, and scholars of 
international business too. Given that its findings are applicable far beyond the South-East 
European region, its relevance is thus greater. 
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Appendix A 
Table A.1: Main findings of research studies found available on the importance of commercial diplomacy-related activity areas 
Author(s) Sample Testing Research finding 
1. Coughlin and Cartwright 
(1987) 
N/A 
 
whether export promotion 
programmes contribute to the increase 
of export 
Each United States dollar (USD) invested in export 
promotion programmes cause the increase of export 
in the amount of 432 USD (Coughlin and Cartwright 
1987). 
2. Van Bergeijk (1994) N/A the effects of intensification of 
diplomatic activities on the rise of 
export 
 
Intensification of diplomatic activities by 50 % can 
stimulate the rise of export by approximately 25 % 
(Van Bergeijk 1994, 163). 
3. Spence (1999) N/A 
 
whether export promotion 
programmes positively influence 
export performance of small and 
medium enterprises (SMEs) 
Export promotion programmes positively influence 
export performance of small and medium enterprises 
(SMEs). Participation in export promotion 
programmes raises the awareness of business 
opportunities in foreign markets and of markets 
themselves (Spence 1999). 
4. Wilkinson and Brouthers 
(2000) 
55.000 manufacturing (U.S.) firms (for 
the first two dependent variables - direct 
export and hi-tech export) 
the effectiveness of export promotion 
programmes on export performance 
(1) trade fairs have a positive impact on direct and 
high-tech export, (2) trade missions do not stimulate 
high-tech export, (3) foreign representative offices do 
not contribute to export increase, and (4) objective 
market information programmes did not prove helpful 
in terms of direct export increase (Wilkinson and 
Brouthers 2000, 229, 233). 
5. Gençtürk and Kotabe (2001) The sample frame encompassed 8761 
manufacturing firms of which 13.8% 
were classified as exporters. Of those, 
for the purpose of the research, 500 
the impact of export marketing and 
government export promotion on 
overall export performance 
The firms which have developed good export 
marketing strategy and use government export 
promotion services achieve substantial export success 
(Gençtürk and Kotabe 2001, 51).222 
                                                          
222 The authors stressed the relevance of information in business. They note that success in a competitive global business environment nowadays largely depends on effective 
use of information as a source of competitive advantage (Gençtürk and Kotabe 2001, 51). They found that various government export promotion programmes can help firms 
improve efficiency through improved profitability and effectiveness through export increase. In addition, exporting behaviour through bettered management can positively 
affect their competitive position in a foreign market (Gençtürk and Kotabe 2001, 66). However, the authors also note that export assistance programmes may not be a 
sufficient factor in enhancing exporting firms’ effectiveness. Success in a foreign market entails some other related activities too which also affect business prospects 
(Gençtürk and Kotabe 2001, 66–67). The authors further point that reluctance of especially smaller firms to use government export promotion programmes may stem from a 
lack of their awareness of potential contribution of such programmes for export increase. Therefore, export promotion offices have a serious task to disseminate information 
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exporters were taken as random sample, 
which represented approximately 41% 
of the population of interest. 
6. Morisset (2003) 58 countries (75 agencies both from 
developed and developing countries) 
whether investment promotion 
agencies (IPAs) positively influence 
decisions of investors to invest 
Investment promotion agencies (IPAs) positively 
influence decisions of investors to invest; market size 
and general investment climate are the key 
determining factors. In other words, IPAs do indeed 
stimulate investment inflows, but still decision to 
invest largely depends on the quality of investment 
environment. Hence, investment promotion gives 
better results if a targeted country has provided good 
investment environment and is relatively developed 
(Morisset 2003, 18–19).223 
7. Francis and Collins-Dodd 
(2004) 
500 Canadian high-tech SMEs whether export promotion can help 
exporting firms enhance their business 
performance and improve expansion 
and marketing strategies 
Export promotion can help exporting firms 
[especially pre-exporters and sporadic exporters] 
enhance their business performance and improve 
expansion and marketing strategies (Francis and 
Collins-Dodd 2004, 474).224 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      
to exporters on the value and benefits of their programmes and services based on good practice and positive experience. Likewise, efforts need to be invested to make firms 
familiar that such programmes reduce marketing costs and thus make doing business more cost-effective (Gençtürk and Kotabe 2001, 67). 
223 To what extent the quality of investment environment is important tells the finding that investment promotion can even be counterproductive if a country potential 
investors are interested to invest in has unsatisfying investment environment. This means that an interested investor who sees that the overall investment environment in a 
country is not investment-friendly will likely lose interest and opt for some other country destination. The detriment for a country can be ever worse given high probability 
that a disappointed investor will discourage other potential investors (Morisset 2003, 18–19). The conveyed study also showed that some functions of investment promotion 
are more important than other; it is evident that policy advocacy gives better results in attracting investors than image-building or investor servicing. Furthermore, it is found 
that political support to investment promotion agencies from the highest level, as well as participation of the private sector in supervisory body of an IPA are seen to 
contribute to effectiveness and success of investment promotion (Morisset 2003, 18–19). 
224 The authors classified exporting firms from the sample into 4 groups: pre-exporters, sporadic exporters, active exporters, majority exporters (Francis and Collins-Dodd 
2004, 484). In addition, pre-exporters find export promotion programmes highly valuable, especially in creating marketing strategies (Francis and Collins-Dodd 2004, 487). 
Export promotion programmes have also shown to be strongly beneficial for sporadic exporters whose export performance is highly positively correlated with their 
participation in export promotion programmes. These programmes have helped them enter new markets and gain valuable export knowledge. This high positive contribution 
of the programmes on export performance of sporadic exporters is explained in a way that sporadic exporters have the largest potential to increase export either by entering 
new markets or by increasing sales in the markets in which they are already present (Francis and Collins-Dodd 2004, 488). Francis and Collins-Dodd (2004) have shown that 
in case of active exporters, export promotion programmes stimulate companies to adopt policies that support geographical market diversification both in short- and long-term. 
Active exporters benefit from export promotion programmes, but not to the extent sporadic exporters do. This is because active exporters usually have enough experience and 
knowledge obtained in the markets in which they mostly operate (Francis and Collins-Dodd 2004, 482, 489). Majority exporters (whose income comes mainly from 
exporting) do not find export promotion programmes of any benefit as they fully rely on their own experience and knowledge (Francis and Collins-Dodd 2004, 489). 
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8. Nitch (2005) Data covering travel activities of heads 
of states of the United States, France 
and Germany, in the period 1948–2003 
the impact of trade missions on 
international trade 
There is a positive correlation between diplomatic 
visits and export increase; a trade mission increases 
export by 8–10% (Nitch 2005, 22).225 
9. Lederman et al. (2006) 104 developed and developing countries the impact of export promotion 
agencies (EPAs) on export 
performance 
Each dollar invested in export promotion generates 
approximately 40 dollars of export in the full sample, 
and 60 dollars in the sub-sample encompassing 
developing countries (Lederman et al. 2006, 19).226 
10. Oh and Selmier II (2006) ASEAN countries, during the period 
1980–2001 
the effects of ASEAN’s diplomacy 
(via regional trade agreements) on 
trade increase 
Regional trade agreements (RTAs) positively 
contribute to trade increase. They also discovered that 
RTAs, like in case of ASEAN, not only improve 
intra-regional trade and foster economic 
inderdependency, but also enhance economic 
exchange with non-member states (Oh and Selmier II 
2006, 5). 
11. Wilkinson and Brouthers 
(2006) 
764 small manufacturing U.S. business 
firms in the period 1992–1999 
the impact of state-sponsored trade 
shows on firm's satisfaction with 
export performance 
(1) Firm's internal resources (technological and export 
resources) are positively correlated with firm's 
satisfaction with export performance; (2) The 
participation in state-sponsored trade shows is 
positively correlated with firm's satisfaction with 
export performance; (3) The use of state-sponsored 
programs envisaged to identify agents and distributors 
is positively correlated with firm's satisfaction with 
export performance (Wilkinson and Brouthers 2006, 
243).227 
12. Nitsch (2007) Large number of state visits of the 
heads of state of France, Germany and 
the United States during the period 
1948–2003 
whether state visits have a measurable 
positive effect on international trade 
The author found a positive correlation between state 
visits and export; a visit results in the increase of 
export by 8–10%, though in terms of import the 
figures are much less contributing (Nitsch 2007, 
1816).228 
                                                          
225 Nevertheless, the results also demonstrate a much less robust correlation in terms of import (Nitch 2005, 22). 
226 The authors also argue that in terms of funding the best solution for EPAs is to be financed both from the public and the private sector. Their findings also suggest that 
focus should be on non-traditional and sectoral export (Lederman et al. 2006, 24). 
227 The impact of trade missions on firm's satisfaction with export performance is not statistically significant (Wilkinson and Brouthers 2006, 243). 
228 However, the author noted that the effects of state visits on international trade are short-lived if not carried out repeatedly (Nitsch 2007, 1816). He stressed that it is widely 
known that political factors affect trade flows (Nitsch 2007, 1798). 
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13. Rose (2007) 22 important exporting countries;229 
covering the period 2002–2003 
the impact of diplomatic missions – 
embassies and consulates on the level 
of export increase in bilateral relations 
The obtained results show that export rise between 6–
10% for each additional consulate (abroad), what is 
both statistically significant and economically 
plausible (Rose 2007, 23, 35). The findings also show 
that embassies have a much higher (positive) impact 
on export increase than additional consulates (Rose 
2007, 35), and that the first established (diplomatic) 
mission proved to have a stronger positive impact on 
export results than any of successive missions (Rose 
2007, 23). 
14. Gil et al. (2008) all 17 Spanish regions, 188 trading 
flows, during the period 1995–2003 
the impact of regional export 
promotion agencies abroad on export 
performance 
Export promotion agencies do indeed promote trade, 
and their positive impact is larger than that of 
embassies and consulates (Gil et al. 2008, 139, 144). 
More concretely, an export promotion agency 
increases exports by 74 %. In addition, the authors 
also found that positive impact of embassies and 
consulates on export increase is measured at 11 % 
(Gil et al.  2008, 142). 
15. Segura-Cayuela and 
Vilarrubia (2008) 
162 importing and 21 exporting 
countries 
 
the impact of diplomatic 
representation office in a foreign 
country on the increase of export 
Establishing a diplomatic representation office in a 
foreign country increases probability of exporting to 
that country by 11–18%, though it does not seem to 
increase the volume of exports (Segura-Cayuela and 
Vilarrubia 2008, 24). 
16. Shamsuddoha et al. (2009) 203 exporting Asian firms (management 
level) 
whether government export assistance 
programmes positively affect 
internationalisation of SMEs 
 
 
Government export assistance programmes positively 
affect internationalisation of SMEs directly by 
supporting doing business, and indirectly by 
increasing the quality of marketing (Shamsuddoha et 
al. 2009, 418). 
17. Yakop and van Bergeijk 
(2009) 
63 importing and exporting countries in 
the year 2006, and 3730 bilateral trade 
flows 
the impact of diplomatic 
representations on facilitating trade 
(replication of the study by Rose 
(2007)) 
Embassies and consulates positively contribute to 
export increase (Yakop and van Bergeijk 2009, 14); 
diplomatic representations facilitating export 
contribute to the increase of export by 9 % (Yakop 
                                                          
229 Australia (97 foreign missions), Belgium (108 foreign missions), Brazil (117 foreign missions), Canada (147 foreign missions), China (216 foreign missions), France (233 
foreign missions), Germany (209 foreign missions), India (186 foreign missions), Indonesia (132 foreign missions), Italy (229 foreign missions), Japan (204 foreign 
missions), Korea (127 foreign missions), Mexico (120 foreign missions), Netherlands (461 foreign missions), Poland (135 foreign missions), Russia (228 foreign missions), 
Spain (165 foreign missions), Sweden (92 foreign missions), Switzerland (301 foreign missions), Turkey (148 foreign missions), UK (259 foreign missions), US (239 foreign 
missions), and their 200 (export) destination countries. 
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and van Bergeijk 2009, 16). The same applies for 
import - a diplomatic representation of the exporting 
country in the importing country produces the effect 
measured as 5 % increase of import for the importing 
country (Yakop and van Bergeijk 2009, 16).230 
18. Afman and Maurel in van 
Bergeijk and Brakman (2010) 
26 OECD countries and 30 transition 
economies, and the time period under 
review is 3 years. The total computed 
number of individual observations is 
4680, of which 4269 are operated with. 
The authors analysed trade flows 
between the OECD countries, and the 
transition economies separately. Trade 
between the two groups of countries is 
excluded from the study 
whether diplomatic representation of a 
country in another country facilitates 
trade and promotes export 
The obtained results are significantly higher 
compared to those of Rose (2007) from which the 
authors borrowed the variable model. The authors 
found the estimates according to which foreign 
diplomatic missions performing export facilitation 
activities help increase export between 22 % and 67 
% (Afman and Maurel in van Bergeijk and Brakman 
2010, 290).231 
 
19. Head and Ries (2010) Canada, 1994–2005 whether trade missions (abroad) 
stimulate trade 
In case of Canada (Team Canada), trade missions 
(abroad) stimulate trade (exports by 14 %) (Head and 
Ries 2010, 772).232 
20. Martincus et al. (2010) Latin American and Caribbean 
countries; 1995–2004 
the impact of export promotion 
institutions on bilateral trade 
Export promotion institutions positively contributed 
to bilateral trade (Martincus et al. 2010, 7).  
21. Martincus et al. (2010) 26 Latin American and Caribbean 
countries during the period 1995–2004 
whether export promotion agencies 
help increase export 
As specialised institutions EPAs are found helpful for 
removing impediments to trade and diversifying the 
range of goods being offered. On the other side, 
diplomatic representations such as embassies and 
consulate offices, which do not always have a 
specialised commercial section/department, also 
proved helpful in terms of stimulating and facilitating 
exports, though to a lesser extent (Martincus et al. 
2010, 14–15). Opening an EPA in an exporting 
market helps increase export by 27.6 %, while 
                                                          
230 The study disclosed that embassies and consulates are effective in solving market failures, and that they facilitate trade between developed and developing countries more 
than between developed countries themselves. This may be so because the market obstacles in developing countries are much more conspicuous and prevail in larger number 
than in developed countries, and hence export facilitation aimed at developing countries is effective. That is why economic diplomacy is so much important in international 
trade (Yakop and van Bergeijk 2009, 25). 
231 Still the authors state that the figure pointing at 26 % is the most realistic and reliable, as it reflects fix effects (Afman and Maurel in van Bergeijk and Brakman 2010, 
290).  
232 However, when country-pair fixed effects are employed, the obtained results are insignificant (about zero) (Head and Ries 2010, 772). 
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establishing a new diplomatic representation office 
does so by only 0.5 % respectively (Martincus et al. 
2010, 10).233 
22. Van Veenstra et al.  (2010) The sample consists of 1242 bilateral 
trade flows between 36 countries during 
the year 2006. 20 exporting countries 
identified by Rose (2007) present the 
basis + countries identified by Yakop 
and van Bergeijk (2009) and Lederman 
et al. (2006). The collected countries 
make for nearly half of the total world 
export, more than 60 % of the global 
GDP, and nearly ¼ of the total world 
population. Among them are a number 
of developing countries from Africa, 
Asia, Latin America and the Middle 
East and high-growth (OECD) 
countries.234  
the impact of export promotion 
agencies, embassies and consulates on 
trade flows, and how their 
development influences their impact 
The obtained results show that commercial diplomacy 
substantially contributes to trade increase among 
developing countries, though its effect is not relevant 
among the OECD (Organisation for Economic 
Cooperation and Development) member states (Van 
Veenstra et al. 2010, 3).235 
  
                                                          
233 Lack of adequate information presents a serious impediment to trade, especially when exporters are diversifying the variety of goods being exported, as well as market 
destinations (Martincus et al. 2010, 2). 
234 Australia, Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Ireland, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United 
Kingdom, United States, Algeria, Bangladesh, Brazil, Chile, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, Israel, Malaysia, Mexico, Morocco, South Africa, Thailand, Tunisia, 
Turkey, Uganda, Uruguay and Venezuela. 
235 This study for the first time analysed the impact of economic and commercial diplomacy simultaneously. The results disclose that the overall contribution of export 
promotion agencies to trade increase is insignificant; in contrast, the overall effect of embassies and consulates is significant; a 10 % increase of a number of embassies and 
consulates positively affects trade by 0,5–0,9%. Statistically, this positive ratio is minor, but in practice the benefits of diplomacy exceed incurred costs by large amount. It is 
found that export promotion agencies of developed countries do not increase export to low and middle-income countries; in contrast, export promotion agencies of low and 
middle-income countries increase export both to developed and low and middle-income countries. Overall, economic and commercial diplomacy bring more positive results 
for low and middle-income countries than for those with high-income (Van Veenstra et al. 2010, 18–19). In addition, another result is that effectiveness of economic and 
commercial diplomacy depends on the level of development of exporting and importing country; hence diplomacy should adapt its instruments depending on the level of 
development of trading countries (Van Veenstra et al. 2010, 19). 
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23. Hayakawa et al. (2011) 60 JETRO EPAs offices abroad and 85 
KOTRA EPAs offices abroad. 9 FTAs 
presented in case of Japan and 9 FTAs 
in case of Korea. *Japan’s JETRO and 
Korea’s KOTRA 
whether export promotion agencies 
(EPAs) increase exports 
Export promotion agencies increase export. In other 
words, in terms of benefits, establishing an export 
promotion agency is equivalent to having a free trade 
agreement (Hayakawa et al. 2011, 12).236 
24. Van Bergeijk et al. (2011) 63 countries in the year 2005 and 
10,524 economic diplomatic 
representations. The foreign missions 
are categorised into six groups: 
embassies, career consulates, honorary 
consulates, trade offices, embassy 
branches, and other representative 
offices 
the real contribution of economic 
diplomatic representations to bilateral 
trade flows, both export and import 
Both inward- and outward-oriented economic 
diplomacy contribute to the expansion of trade, with 
the latter being far more effective. In other words, the 
research shows that economic diplomacy, through 
diplomatic representations (embassies, career 
consulates and embassy branches), proved more 
successful in promoting export than import (Van 
Bergeijk et al.  2011, 117). In this regard, embassies, 
embassy branches and career consulates have the 
most important role, whereas honorary consulates’ 
work did not prove helpful for promoting trade (Van 
Bergeijk et al. 2011, 117). It also ascertains that 
embassies are far more efficient in facilitating trade 
than career consulates, and that honorary consulates 
are not deemed beneficial in that regard (Van 
Bergeijk et al. 2011, 119). 
25. Van Bergeijk and Moons 
(2011) 
The analysis combined 23 individual 
studies and 873 parameters 
the effects of economic diplomacy 
(performed through embassies and 
other diplomatic missions, investment 
and export promotion agencies, trade 
missions, etc.) on international trade 
Economic diplomacy proved to positively contribute 
to bilateral trade. The authors found that embassies 
seem to have the above average contribution to 
bilateral trade and FDI flows, while consulates, 
investment and export promotion agencies appear to 
be less stimulating, but still with positive contribution 
to trade. The authors' results show that economic 
diplomacy has an important role in reducing trade 
transaction costs and consequently increasing 
potential commercial gains, as well as making a home 
country an attractive destination for FDI (Van 
Bergeijk and Moons 2011). 
                                                          
236 Interestingly, the findings show that positive effects are stronger for manufactured than non-manufactured goods. In addition, EPAs offices in low-income countries 
produce better results than in high-income countries (Hayakawa et al. 2011, 12). 
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26. Jalali (2012) 200 decision-makers in charge of 
exports in Iran 
 
the impact of export promotion 
programmes on export performance of 
firms in developing countries 
(a) the use of export promotion programmes 
positively influences the exporting firms’ knowledge, 
export strategy, commitment, and resultantly export 
performance, (b) the exporting firms’ knowledge 
positively influences their export strategy, (c) the 
exporting firms’ strategy positively influences their 
export performance, (d) the exporting firms’ 
commitment positively influences their export 
strategy (Jalali 2012, 124–126). Export promotion 
programmes can provide the exporting firms with 
information about economic, political, cultural and 
technological factors and market forces such as 
competitive trends in an export market. Firms’ 
managers can benefit from these programmes in a 
way to acquire important know-how about a new 
export market prior to commencing as well as during 
exporting, what can help them improve efficiency of 
doing business (Jalali 2012, 131).237 
27. Busschers and Ruël in Ruël 
(2012) 
115 interviewed SMEs whether small and medium enterprises 
(SMEs) have found commercial 
diplomacy useful in stimulating their 
international business activities 
Commercial diplomacy activities aimed at assisting 
SMEs in their doing business abroad are perceived by 
them as very useful (Busschers and Ruël in Ruël 
2012). 
28. Jones-Bos et al. (2012) 300 firms were interviewed about 
whether the Embassy and Consulates 
General had supported their activities in 
the U.S. market 
the impact of public and private 
(Dutch) interest networks established 
in the United States on business 
opening for Dutch firms 
These networks do have a positive influence on 
business, and investing in their strengthening pays 
off. According to the results, 97 % of interviewed 
firms value the network service with „good“ or „very 
good“. This implies that vast majority of Dutch firms 
operating in the U.S. market find services of the 
Netherlands economic network in the U.S. useful 
(Jones-Bos et al. 2012, 135).238 
  
                                                          
237 Export promotion programmes have both short and long term effects; in a short term they help the private sector firms enhance their business performance, whereas in a 
long run they showed to be beneficial in gaining competitive advantages globally (Jalali 2012, 131–132). 
238 The scale from the worst to the best is as follows: very bad, bad, neutral, good, very good. In addition, furthermore, 53 % of firms confirmed that the Dutch economic 
network assisted them in agreeing business contracts whose total value is 360 million euros. For a country of size of the Netherlands, economic and commercial diplomacy 
represents a necessity (Jones-Bos et al. 2012, 135). 
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29. Creusen and Lejour (2013) Results of Dutch exporting firms 
operating in high-income countries 
(EU-15, 10 OECD countries, Singapore 
and Hong Kong) and middle-income 
countries (EU12, the BRIC and other 
countries which belong to top 50 Dutch 
export destinations), and export market 
characteristics. The research covered 
the period from 2003 to 2007 
whether economic diplomacy 
(through trade missions) stimulate the 
entry of businesses into new markets 
Economic diplomacy, through the presence of trade 
missions in, especially, middle-income countries, 
stimulate the entry of businesses into new markets, 
regardless of whether the exporting firm is a starter or 
an experienced enterprise. This, however, has not 
proved to be the case with higher-income countries. 
The authors thus point that in terms of assistance to 
domestic firms to win new markets, economic 
diplomacy is likely to be more efficient in developing 
countries characterised by market entry obstacles than 
in high-income countries (Creusen and Lejour 2013, 
507).239 
30. Moons and van Bergeijk 
(2013) 
29 individual empirical studies in the 
period 1986-2011. Economic diplomacy 
was measured based on event data on: 
(a) geographical distribution of foreign 
networks (embassies, consulates and 
foreign offices of export and investment 
promotion agencies), (b) foreign 
networks activities (trade missions and 
state visits) and (c) activities in the 
home market (export and investment 
promotion) 
the impact of economic diplomacy on 
trade and investment. 
 
The obtained results are generally supportive of 
economic diplomacy and emphasise the importance 
of embassies in comparison to consulates, trade 
missions, state visits and export promotion agencies 
(Moons and van Bergeijk 2013, 4). 
31. Ruël (2013) 450 SMEs 
 
the usefulness of commercial 
diplomacy services for SMEs 
A major number of SMEs find commercial diplomacy 
services highly valuable. The conducted study 
showed that among the most requested services are 
information concerning market, trade and culture, and 
rules and regulations, in other words intelligence-
related services; as less used services are quoted 
assistance in dispute settling, at fairs, on trade 
missions and in negotiation meetings, i.e. 
relationship-based services (Ruël 2013, 24). 
The study also showed that a number of SMEs which 
requested commercial diplomacy services while 
                                                          
239 Market entry costs are often higher in developing countries primarily due to weak institutions, but also cultural differences (Creusen and Lejour 2013, 507). Size of a firm 
and labour productivity are determinants which positively affect the probability of an exporting firm’s entry into a new market (Creusen and Lejour 2013, 506). 
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operating in developing countries as their target 
markets, characterised by weak institutions, is 
considerably higher (70 %) than those operating in 
developed countries (30 %). This finding suggests 
that it is more reasonable for SMEs to use commercial 
diplomacy as beneficiary clients in developing 
countries (Ruël 2013, 25).240 
32. Ruël et al. (2013) 21 firms, of which 70 % are actually 
based in Malaysia 
the effects of the Dutch embassy CD 
activities in Malaysia as a host 
country on business performance of 
Dutch firms operating at this Asian 
market 
Firms that are new in the market highly appreciate 
commercial diplomacy assistance, especially relating 
to: (a) eliminating trade barriers, (b) providing 
intelligence, (c) promoting the home country’s image, 
and (d) matchmaking (Ruël et al. 2013). 
33. Gil-Pareja et al. (2015) trade flows from 17 Spanish regions to 
158 countries during the period 1995–
2010 
whether Spanish regional trade 
promotion agencies (REPOs) have a 
positive impact of export increase as 
in Europe, so elsewhere 
Spanish regional trade promotion agencies (REPOs) 
have a positive impact of export increase as in 
Europe, so elsewhere (Gil-Pareja et al. 2015). 
                                                          
240 The study also showed that SMEs with experience in international markets tend not to use commercial diplomacy services often, particularly those relating to trade dispute 
settling (Ruël 2013, 25). 
 
  
 
3
1
3
 
Appendix B 
 
Table B.1: Findings of case studies on the causality between export and economic growth 
                                                          
241 Income decrease negatively affects export (and import too) (Afzal and Hussain 2010, 144). 
242 On the case of India, the author found that overvalued exchange rate, high tariffs and non-existence of export promotion policies hinder export growth (Agrawal 2014, 17). 
Author(s) Sample Testing Research finding 
1. Abbas 2012  Pakistan; the observed period is 
1975–2010  
the impact of export on 
economic growth 
There is uni-directional causality from GDP growth to export growth in both short- 
and long-term (Abbas 2012, 97–98). 
2. Abhayaratne 
1996  
Sri Lanka, the observed period is 
1960–1992 
the impact of export on 
economic growth 
Export has a positive impact on economic growth (Abhayaratne 1996). 
3. Abou-Stait 2005  Egypt, the observed period is 1977–
2003  
the impact of export on 
economic growth  
Export has a positive impact on economic growth. The author stresses the 
importance of export-friendly economic reform and removing barriers to trade 
(Abou-Stait 2005, 14).  
4. Abu Al-Foul 
2004 
Jordan, the observed period is 
1976–1997  
the impact of export on 
output growth 
There is uni-directional causality from export to output growth (Abu Al-Foul 
2004). 
5. Afzal and 
Hussain 2010  
Pakistan, the observed period is 
1990–2008  
the impact of export on 
economic growth  
Export does not have a positive impact on economic growth (Afzal and Hussain 
2010, 144).241 
6. Agrawal 2014  
 
India; the observed period is 1960–
2012 
the impact of export on 
economic growth  
 
Bi-directional causality between export and economic growth occurred only after 
trade liberalization took place (in the period 1991:3–2012:2). During this period, 
the growth of export contributed to GDP growth by 21 %. For comparison, in the 
period preceding trade liberalization (1960–1991:2), the contribution of export to 
growth of GDP was miniscule, 0.6 % (Agrawal 2014, 17).242 
7. Ahmad and 
Harnhirun 1996  
79 countries, the observed period is 
1970–98  
the impact of export on 
economic growth 
Export has a positive impact on economic growth (Ahmad and Harnhirun 1996). 
8. Ahmed and 
Uddin 2009  
Bangladesh, the observed period is 
1976–2005  
the impact of export on 
GDP growth  
There is uni-directional causality from export to GDP growth in the short-term 
(Ahmed and Uddin 2009, 89). 
9. Ajmi et al. 2015  
 
South Africa; the observed period is 
1911–2011  
 
the impact of export on 
GDP growth  
 
When using Diks and Panchenko test (2006), the authors found that there is bi-
directional causality between export and GDP growth. When using Hiemstra and 
Jones (1994) test, the authors found uni-directional causality from GDP growth to 
export growth. The authors also stress the importance of human capital and 
technological development for export (Ajmi et al. 2015, 175). 
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243 Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, Mali, Senegal, Togo, Niger, Benin. 
244 Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, Oman. 
245 The authors also found a positive correlation between FDI and export (Andraz and Rodrigues 2010). 
 
10. Aka 2008 7 African countries;243 the observed 
period is 1960–2005  
the impact of export on 
GDP growth 
(1) There is bi-directional causality between export and GDP growth in Senegal 
and Togo; (2) there is uni-directional causality from GDP growth to export growth 
in Niger; (3) there is no causality between export and GDP growth in Benin, and 
(4) the causality results for Burkina Faso, Cote d'Ivoire and Mali are conflicting 
(Aka 2008, 164). 
11. Alam  et al. 
2014 
Iran, the observed period is 2002–
2010 
the impact of export on 
industrial output growth 
Export has a positive impact on industrial output and development (Alam et al. 
2014, 114). 
12. Al-Assaf and 
Al-Abdulrazag 
2015 
Jordan, the observed period is 
1980–2012 
 
the impact of export on 
output growth 
 
Export has a positive impact on output growth in both the short- and the long-term 
(Al-Assaf and Al-Abdulrazag 2015, 199). 
 
13. Al-Yousif 1997  4 Middle East countries;244 the 
observed period is 1973–93  
the impact of export on 
economic growth  
Export has a significant positive impact on economic growth in all sample 
countries (Al-Yousif 1997, 696). 
14. Amavilah 2002  Namibia, the observed period is 
1968–1992  
the impact of export on 
output growth  
Export has a positive impact on output growth. However, export alone, despite 
being necessary, is not a sufficient condition for output growth; other growth 
determinants matter too (Amavilah 2002, 16–17). 
15. Andraz and 
Rodrigues 2010 
Portugal; the observed period is 
1977–2004  
the impact of export on 
economic growth 
Export has a positive impact on economic growth in the long-term (Andraz and 
Rodrigues 2010).245 
16. Anwer and 
Sampath 1997  
 
96 countries (a list of all countries is 
not given); the observed period is 
1960–92  
 
the impact of export on 
economic growth  
 
The findings as to whether export positively affects economic growth are mixed. In 
only 9 countries there is evidence of a positive correlation between economic 
growth and export; in 12 countries there is uni-directional link from GDP to export 
growth; in 6 there is uni-directional link from export to GDP growth; in 2 there is 
bi-directional link between the export and GDP; in 11 there is no causality between 
the two variables. Hence, the authors note that for the majority of countries under 
survey there is no positive link between export and economic growth (Anwer and 
Sampath 1997, 15–16). 
17. Awokuse 2003  
 
Canada; the observed period is 
1961–2000  
the impact of export on 
economic growth 
Export has a positive impact on economic growth both in the short- and the long-
term (Awokuse 2003, 134). 
18. Awokuse 2006  Japan; the observed period is 1960–
1991  
the impact of export on 
productivity growth 
There is bi-directional link between export and productivity, and hence economic 
growth (Awokuse 2006, 601). The authors also note that export-promotion policies 
have a significant role in stimulating export (Awokuse 2006, 595). 
19. Aydin and Sari 
2014  
Turkey, the observed period is 
1980–2012  
the impact of export on 
GDP growth  
There is uni-directional causality from GDP to export growth (Aydin and Sari 
2014, 287). 
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20. Babalola  et al. 
2012  
Nigeria; the observed period is 
1960–2009  
the impact of export, 
FDI, import and 
openness to trade on 
economic growth 
Export and openness to trade positively affect economic growth (Babalola et al. 
2012, 100). 
 
21. Bahmani-
Oksooee et al.  
2005  
61 developing countries (not listed); 
the observed period is 1960–'99  
the impact of export on 
economic growth 
Export has a positive impact on economic growth in the long-term (when export is 
a dependent variable). The cointegration ceased to be positive when output is a 
dependent variable (Bahmani-Oksooee et al.  2005, 48). 
22. Bahmani-
Oskooee and Alse 
1993  
Colombia, Greece, Korea, Malaysia, 
Pakistan, Philippines, Singapore, 
South Africa, Thailand; the 
observed period is 1973–1988  
the impact of export on 
output growth  
There is bi-directional causality between export and output growth (in almost all 
sample countries) in the long-term (Bahmani-Oskooee and Alse 1993, 536). The 
authors stress the importance of export promotion (policy and strategies), 
especially for developing countries (Bahmani-Oskooee and Alse 1993, 541). 
23. Bahmani-
Oskooee and 
Economidou 2009  
61 countries (a list of all countries is 
not given), the observed period is 
1960–99  
the impact of export on 
output growth  
(1) There is bi-directional causality between export and output growth in the long-
term (in Algeria, Gambia, Ghana, Malawi, Senegal, Hungary, El Salvador and 
Honduras); (2) direction of causality in the long-term was not found in (Burkina 
Faso, Burundi, Gabon, Kenya, Lesotho, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Togo, India, Korea, 
Thailand, Egypt, Israel, Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Costa Rica, Dominican 
Republic, Guatemala, Mexico and Trinidad and Tobago); (3) there is uni-
directional causality from export and output growth in the long-term (in Congo, 
South Africa, Swaziland, Tunisia, Ecuador and Nicaragua), and (4) there is uni-
directional causality from output to export growth in the long-term (in Benin, 
Guinea Bisu, Rwanda, Zambia, Bangladesh, Indonesia, Papua New Guinea, Chile 
and Colombia) (Bahmani-Oskooee and Economidou 2009, 203). In addition, the 
authors stress the importance of export promotion, especially in developing 
countries (Bahmani-Oskooee and Economidou 2009, 206). 
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246 Algeria, Bangladesh, Benin, Botswana, Burkina, Burundi,  Centran African Republic, Chad, Congo Republic, Costa Rica, Cote D'Ivoire, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, 
Egypt,  El Salvador, Gabon, Ghana, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, India, Jamaica, Kenya, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Mauritania, Mexico, Morocco, 
Niger, Nigeria, Paraguay, Philippines, Rwanda, Senegal, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Venezuela, Zambia. 
247 Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Poland, Slovenia, Slovakia. 
248 Trade liberalisation is positively associated with economic growth and technological development (Bajo-Rubio and Díaz-Roldán 2011, 1). 
 
24. Bahmani-
Oskooee and 
Oyolola 2007  
44 developing countries;246 the 
observed period is 1960–2002  
the impact of export on 
output growth 
Export has a long-term positive impact on output growth in 60 % of the sample 
countries (in 26 of them), whereas output growth has a positive impact on export in 
40 % of the sample countries (Bahmani-Oskooee and Oyolola 2007, 9). More 
specifically, (1) there is bi-directional causality between export and output growth 
in the long-term in 8 countries; (2) there is uni-directional causality from export to 
output growth in the long-term in 18 countries; (3) there is uni-directional causality 
from output to export growth in the long-term in 12 countries; (4) there is no 
causality between export and output growth in the long-term in 6 countries 
(Bahmani-Oskooee and Oyolola 2007, 6). Furthermore, there is also evidence of a 
short-term impact of export on output growth in as many as 85 % of the sample 
countries (Bahmani-Oskooee and Oyolola 2007, 3). 
25. Bahmani-
Oskooee et al. 1991 
20 countries  the impact of export on 
economic growth 
Export has a positive impact on economic growth, especially in the newly 
industrialised countries (NICs) (Bahmani-Oskooee et al. 1991). 
26. Bajo-Rubio and 
Díaz-Roldán 2011  
 
8 Central and Eastern European 
countries;247 the observed period is 
1996–2009  
the impact of export on 
economic growth  
 
Export has a significantly positive impact on economic growth only in Czech 
Republic (Bajo-Rubio and Díaz-Roldán 2011, 4).248 
 
27. Balaguer and 
Cantavella-Jordá  
2001 
Spain; the observed period is 1901–
1999  
the impact of export on 
economic growth 
Export exerted a positive impact on economic growth when the country was 
liberalised in economic terms. In contrast, during the periods of protectionism and 
autarky, the authors did not find a positive correlation between the two variables 
either in a short or a long-term (Balaguer and Cantavella-Jordá 2001). 
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249 They also found a positive causal link between establishing free trade and export performance, in the sense that the first stimulated the latter, especially in manufacturing 
(the most evident in Korea, Singapore and Taiwan) (Balassa 1978a, 54–55). In contrast, the countries (Brazil, Colombia and Mexico) which did not take measures to promote 
and stimulate export had far less pace of growth (Balassa 1978a, 56). In addition, developing countries should focus on manufacturing component parts of industrial durable 
products, and even take over comparative advantage over developed countries which refocused on making technologically more advanced goods (Balassa 1978a, 55). 
250 In order to demonstrate the importance of export for economic growth, the author stressed that Korea's GNP would have been lower by 37 % and Taiwan's by 25 % had 
export growth of these countries been at an average of the sample; in contrast, had Chile, India and Mexico adopted export-promotion measures like Korea and Taiwan, their 
GNP would have been higher by 14 %, 12 % and 18 % respectively. Likewise, per capita income in Korea would have been lower by as much as 43% and 33% in Taiway 
respectively had the export growth been in line with the sample average; on the contrary, per capita income would have been higher in Chile by 21 %, India by 22 % and 
Mexico by 17 % had these countries adopted export promotion policies like Korea or Taiwan had done (Balassa 1978b, 186–187). Hence, Korea, Singapore and Taiwan can 
serve as examples for that openness to trade and adoption of export-promotion policies result in higher export growth and hence economic growth (Balassa 1978b, 183). The 
author further argues that successfulness of export-orientedness may attract foreign investors in a given country (Balassa 1978b, 188). 
28. Balaguer and 
Cantavella-Jordá 
2002  
Spain; the observed period is 1961–
2000 
the impact of structural 
changes in export on 
economic growth  
There is bi-directional causality between export and economic growth. Exporting 
seems to have a beneficial indirect effect on product specialisation and vice versa, 
resulting in economic growth. The authors note that resource allocation to the most 
lucrative and potentially prosperous export sectors is fundamental for the success 
in terms of exporting and its beneficial effect on economic growth. This implies the 
importance of export-promotion policies (Balaguer and Cantavella-Jordá 2002, 11–
12). 
29. Balassa 1978a  Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, 
Mexico, Israel, Yugoslavia, India, 
Korea, Singapore and Taiwan; the 
observed period is largely 1966–73  
the impact of export 
incentives on export, and 
indirectly on economic 
growth  
Export incentives positively affect growth of export and indirectly economic 
growth (Balassa 1978a, 54). The author found that export-promotion activities and 
export diversification, especially in the manufacturing sector, coincided with better 
export performance; in other words, export-promotion helped enhance export 
(Balassa 1978a, 54–55).249 
30. Balassa 1978b  
 
Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, 
India, Israel, Korea, Mexico, 
Taiwan and Yugoslavia; the 
observed period is 1966–1973  
the impact of export on 
economic growth  
 
Export has a positive impact on economic growth (Balassa 1978b,186–187).250 
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251 Israel, Singapore, Argentina, Portugal, Yugoslavia, Jamaica, Uruguay, Mexico, Brazil, China, Costa Rica, Taiwan, Peru, Turkey, Guatemala, Tunisia, Zambia, Mauritius, 
Korea, Honduras, Morocco, Ghana, Senegal, Philippines, Thailand, Cameroon, Egypt, Bolivia, Botswana, Togo, Kenya, Madagascar, Zaire, Sudan, Tanzania, Sri Lanka, 
India, Pakistan, Benin, Malawi, Bangladesh, Upper Volta, Mali. 
252 They also found that political instability negatively affects export growth (Begum and Shamsuddin 1998). 
253 Trade has a positive impact on firms productivity and efficiency, and hence indirectly on economic growth (Bernard and Jensen 2000, 16). 
 
31. Balassa 1985  
 
43 developing countries;251 the 
observed period is 1973–78  
 
the impact of export and 
outward-orientedness on 
GNP growth  
 
Export has a positive impact on economic growth. The greater the outward-
orientedness, the higher the rate of GNP growth. The author further argues that 
developing countries can foster their development by applying advanced 
technology, creating business-friendly policies and the environment, and focusing 
more on manufactured export (Balassa 1985, 34). 
32. Begum and 
Shamsuddin 1998 
 
Bangladesh; the observed period is 
1961–‘92  
 
the impact of export on 
economic growth 
 
Export has a positive impact on economic growth, which is achieved through the 
impact of total factor productivity. The authors stress that export-led economic 
growth was particularly conspicuous following the country’s decision to carry out 
structural reforms and become more open in economic terms (Begum and 
Shamsuddin 1998).252 
33. Bernard and 
Jensen 2000  
 
United States; the observed period is 
1983–1992 
 
the impact of export on 
productivity growth  
 
The obtained results are mixed. The positive impact of export on productivity 
growth is due to the fact that high productivity firms tend to be more export-
oriented. Exporting also positively affects employment and output growth. Export 
firms tend to grow at a much faster pace than  those that are non-export (Bernard 
and Jensen 2000, 23).253 
34. Bernard et al.  
2007  
 
N/A the impact of trade on 
firms productivity  
 
Export firms have shown to have many more advantages in comparison to non-
export; they tend to grow larger, be substantially more productive and give higher 
wages (Bernard  et al. 2007, 105, 110–111). 
35. Bilas et al.  
2015  
Croatia, the observed period is 
1996–2012  
the impact of export on 
economic growth 
There is uni-directional causality from export to GDP growth (Bilas et al.  2015, 
28). The authors call for a more open trade policy (Bilas et al. 2015, 28). 
36. Bilgin and 
Şahbaz 2009  
Turkey; the observed period is 
1987–2007  
the impact of export on 
economic growth  
Export has a positive impact on economic growth (Bilgin and Şahbaz 2009, 178). 
37. Biswal and 
Dhawan 1998 
Taiwan; the observed period is 
1960–90  
the impact of export on 
economic growth 
There is bi-directional causality between export and GDP growth. The positive 
correlation occurred in the period following the reforms (Biswal and Dhawan 
1998). 
38. Boltho 1996 Japan  the impact of export on 
economic growth 
Export has a positive impact on economic growth. The author stresses that export 
was the key driver of economic growth in several growth cycles (Boltho 1996). 
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254 Export growth also exerts a positive effect on labour productivity (Chen 2007, 7). 
255 Export of primary products has had a special contribution to economic growth in case of Zimbabwe (Chigusiwa et al. 2011, 124). 
256 Australia (1961–2001), China (1971–2001), Fiji (1968–2001), *Hong Kong (1970–2001), Indonesia (1967–2001), Japan (1971–2001), Korea (1970–2001), Malaysia 
(1961–2001), Philippines (1961–2001), Thailand (1969–2001). 
257 The authors argue that a plethora of other factors too influence economic development, such as: quality education, adequate investment in R&D, developed financial 
system, low inflation, poverty and corruption rates, weak involvement of the state in the functioning of the economy, etc. (Clarke and Ralhan 2005, 21–22). 
 
39. Chen 2007  Taiwan; the observed period is 
1976–2004 
the impact of export on 
economic growth  
There is bi-directional causality between export and output growth. Fostering 
foreign trade has proved crucial for economic development of the country (Chen 
2007, 7).254 
40. Chigusiwa et al. 
2011  
Zimbabwe, the observed period is 
1977–2006  
the impact of export on 
economic growth  
Export has a positive impact on economic growth in both short- and long-term. 
Moreover, the authors emphasise the importance of well devised economic policies 
(Chigusiwa et al. 2011, 124).255 
41. Choong et al. 
2007  
10 Asian and Pacific countries (9 + 
Hong Kong256) 
the impact of export on 
economic growth  
Overall, export, in addition to other determinants given, has a long-term positive 
impact on economic growth. More specifically, the authors found that (1) there is 
uni-directional positive causality from export to economic growth in Australia, 
China, Hong Kong, the Philippines and Thailand, and (2) there is uni-directional 
positive causality from economic growth to export growth in Fiji and Malaysia. In 
addition, they also stress the importance of export-promotion economic policies 
(Choong et al. 2007, 145). 
42. Choong et al. 
2005  
Malaysia, the observed period is 
1960–2001  
the impact of export on 
output growth  
Export has a significant positive impact on economic growth in both short- and 
long-term. In addition, the authors stress the importance of providing export-
friendly macroeconomic environment and attracting export-oriented FDI (Choong 
et al. 2005, 22). 
43. Chow 1987 8 newly industrialised countries not 
specifically stated (NICs)  
the impact of export on 
industrial growth 
 
There is a significant bi-directional causality between export and industrial growth. 
Export promotion also positively affects structural reforms and transformation in 
developing countries (Chow 1987). 
44. Christopoulos 
and Reppas 2005 
 
22 developing Asian and African 
countries; the observed period is 
1969–1999  
the impact of export on 
output growth 
There is uni-directional causality from output to export growth (Christopoulos and 
Reppas 2005). 
45. Ciftcioglu and 
Nekhili 2005  
 
Turkey, the observed period is 
1987–2004  
 
the impact of export on 
economic growth  
 
There is bi-directional causality between export and economic growth. In addition, 
there is uni-directional causality from the relative share of tradable sector 
(alternatively referred to as economic openness) and economic growth (measured 
through GDP) (Ciftcioglu and Nekhili 2005). 
46. Clarke and 
Ralhan 2005  
Bangladesh (1960–2003) and Sri 
Lanka (1960–2003)  
the impact of export on 
economic growth  
Export has a positive impact on economic growth (Clarke and Ralhan 2005, 21–
22).257 
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258 Bangladesh (1973–2002), Pakistan (1973–2002), India (1960–2002), Nepal (1965–2002), Sri Lanka (1960–2002). 
259 There is a uni-directional causality from export to import in the long-term (Din 2004, 121). 
260 Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania. 
47. Constant 2010  
 
Cote d’Ivoire; the observed period is 
1980–2007  
 
the impact of export on 
economic growth  
 
Export has a positive impact on economic growth in the long-term. The author 
stresses the importance of technological development, quality of institutions and 
infrastructure for the success of export (Constant 2010, 10). 
48. Daoud and 
Basha 2015  
 
Jordan, Kuwait and Egypt; the 
observed period is 1976–2013  
 
the impact of export on 
GDP growth  
 
(1) There is bi-directional link between export and GDP growth in Jordan, and (2) 
there is uni-directional link from export to GDP growth in Kuwait and Egypt. The 
authors stress the importance of open trade policy and export-orientedness (Daoud 
and Basha 2015, 237). 
49. Dar et al.  2013  
 
India; the observed period is 1992–
2011  
 
the impact of export on 
output growth  
 
Export has a positive impact on output growth in medium- and long-term. More 
specifically, (1) there is no evidence of a positive corelation between export and 
output in the short-term (up to 8 months); (2) there is uni-directional link from 
export to output in the medium-term (from 8–32 months), and (3) there is bi-
directional link between export and output growth in the long-term (from 32–64 
months) (Dar et al. 2013, 877). 
50. Devi 2013  
 
India; the observed period is 
1990/'91–2011/'12  
the impact of export on 
economic growth  
There is bi-directional positive causality between export and economic growth 
(Devi 2013). 
51. Din 2004  
 
5 Central Asian countries258 
 
the impact of export on 
output and economic 
growth  
 
(1) There is bi-directional causality between export and economic growth in the 
short- and long-term in Bangladesh; (2) there is uni-directional causality from 
export to economic growth in the long-term in Pakistan; (3) there is bi-directional 
causality between export and economic growth in the long-term in India and Sri 
Lanka, and (4) there is uni-directional causality from output to export growth in 
Nepal (Din 2004, 121).259 
52. Doraisami 1996  
 
Malaysia, the observed period is 
1963–‘93  
the impact of export on 
output growth  
There is bi-directional causality between export and output growth in the long-term 
(Doraisami 1996, 228). 
53. Doyle 1998  (Republic of) Ireland, the observed 
period is 1953–1993  
 
the impact of export on 
output growth  
 
There is uni-directional causality from export to output growth in the short-term. 
The author also stresses that outward-oriented policy substantially contributed to 
the success of Irish economic development (Doyle 1998, 157). 
54. Dritsaki et al. 
2004  
 
3 Baltic countries;260 the observed 
period is 1992–2000  
 
the impact of export on 
economic growth  
 
Export has a positive impact on economic growth in the long-term. In addition, the 
authors especially stressed that investment played a crucial role in driving export 
growth (Dritsaki et al. 2004, 78). 
55. Dumitriu et al. 
2010  
Romania; the observed period is 
1999–2009  
the impact of export on 
economic growth  
There is uni-directional causality from export to GDP growth (Dumitriu et al. 
2010, 4). 
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261 Australia, Brazil, Canada, Columbia, Denmark, France, Germany, Guatemala, India, Israel, Italy, Japan, Korea, Mexico, Morocco, Netherlands, Pakistan, Philippines, 
South Africa, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States, Venezuela. 
262 India (1960–1996); Indonesia (1965–1997); Korea (1960–1997); Malaysia (1960–1997); Pakistan (1960–1997); Philippines (1960–1997); Sri Lanka (1960–1997) and 
Thailand (1962–1997). 
263 Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Syria, Tunis, UAE. 
56. Dutt and Ghosh 
1996 
 
26 low, middle, and high-income 
countries (including 4 newly 
industrialised countries);261 the 
observed period is 1953–1991  
 
the impact of export on 
economic growth.  
 
The authors note that the findings as to whether export positively affects economic 
growth differ among countries so much, that it makes unfeasible to draw any 
broader conclusions. In Australia, Brazil, Canada and Korea they found no 
causality between the two variables; in Colombia and France they found bi-
directional causality; in Israel, Mexico, Morocco, Philippines, Switzerland and 
Turkey they found uni-directional causality from export to economic growth, and 
in Pakistan and the United States they found uni-directional causality from 
economic growth to export growth (Dutt and Ghosh 1996, 177). 
57. Ekanayake 1999  
 
8 Central and South-East Asian 
countries262 
the impact of export on 
economic growth 
 
There is bi-directional causality between export and economic growth (causality 
found in 7 of 8 sample countries); (2) there is uni-directional causality from export 
to economic growth in the long-term for all sample countries, and (3) there is uni-
directional causality from export to economic growth in the short-term only in 
Indonesia and Sri Lanka (Ekanayake 1999, 53). 
58. El-Sakka and 
Al-Mutairi 2000  
 
16 African and Middle East 
countries;263 the observed period is 
1970–1999  
 
the impact of export on 
economic growth  
 
Export does not seem to have a significant impact on economic growth in the Arab 
countries. More specifically, (1) there is bi-directional causality between export 
and economic growth in Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Jordan, Mauritania, and Oman; 
(2) there is uni-directional causality from export and economic growth in Iraq, 
Morocco, Saudi Arabia and Syria; (3) there is uni-directional causality from 
economic growth to export growth in the United Arab Emirates, and (4) there is no 
causality between export and economic growth in Kuwait, Libya, Qatar, Sudan and 
Tunisia (El-Sakka and Al-Mutairi 2000, 164–167). 
59. Emery 2007  
 
50 countries; the observed period is 
1953–‘63  
 
the impact of export on 
economic growth  
 
There is bi-directional causality between export and economic growth (the export-
led growth causality is slightly stronger than the other one). Export brings about 
the increase of the volume of investment in more efficient and productive sectors, 
technological upgrading and improved management, what indirectly leads to 
enhanced competitiveness, what is of key importance for being able to sustain in 
international markets (Emery 2007). 
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264 Strictly semi-industrialized countries are: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Greece, Hong Kong, Israel, Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, Portugal, Singapore, 
South Africa, Spain, Taiwan, Turkey, Uruguay and Yugoslavia. The ‘marginally’ semi-industrialized countries are: Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, Guatemala, 
India, Ivory Coast, Kenya, Morocco, Peru, Philippines, Syria, Thailand and Tunisia; (Venezuela, Iran, Iraq, and Algeria were excluded as special cases). 
265 Economic openness and outward-orientation contribute to long-term economic growth (Federici and Marconi 2002, 329). 
266 Algeria, Benin, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo, Egypt, Ethiopia, Ghana, Ivory Coast, Kenya, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Morocco, Niger, 
Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Sudan, Togo, Tunisia, Uganda, Upper Volta (Burkina Faso), Zaire, Zambia. 
60. Esfahani 1991  
 
31 semi-industrialised and 
marginally semi-industrialised 
countries;264 the observed period is 
1983–1987  
the impact of export and 
import on economic 
growth  
Export has a positive impact on economic growth in the long-term. The author 
stresses the importance of export promotion policies which can be very beneficial 
for stimulating foreign exchange (Esfahani 1991, 114). 
61. Fajana 1979  
 
Nigeria  the impact of export and 
trade on economic 
growth  
Export (and trade) has a positive impact on economic growth. The author also 
stresses the importance of export promotion (Fajana 1979). 
62. Falvey et al.  
2004  
 
3484 Swedish firms (with at least 20 
employees; only firms with 50+ 
employees reported on exports and 
R&D); the observed period is 1981–
94  
the impact of export on 
productivity growth  
Export has a positive impact on productivity growth. Exporting helps firms, 
especially the new entrants, increase their productivity (Falvey et al. 2004, 20). 
63. Feder 1983  
 
group of semi-industrialised less 
developed countries; the observed 
period is 1964–1973  
the impact of export on 
economic growth  
Export has a positive impact on economic growth. The author further notes that 
one of solutions to achieve better productivity is to reallocate the resources from 
the non-export to the export sector (Feder 1983, 59). 
64. Federici and 
Marconi 2002  
 
Italy; the observed period is 1960–
1998  
 
the impact of export on 
economic growth  
 
Export has a positive impact on economic growth (Federici and Marconi 2002, 
336). Exporting positively affects specialisation and indirectly technological 
development and investment (Federici and Marconi 2002, 329).265 
65. Fosu 1990  
 
28 African LDCs;266 the observed 
period is 1960–80  
the impact of export on 
economic growth 
Export has a positive impact on economic growth (Fosu 1990, 831). 
66. Fugarolas et al. 
2007  
 
Cuba, the observed period is 1960–
2004  
 
the impact of export on 
economic growth  
 
Export does not have a significant positive impact on economic growth. Instead, 
the authors found plausible enough evidence that point to import-led economic 
growth (Fugarolas et al. 2007, 31). 
67. Furuoka 2007  
 
Malaysia, the observed period is 
1970–2004  
the impact of export on 
GDP growth  
There is uni-directional causality from GDP to export growth (Furuoka 2007, 10). 
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267 Algeria, Bolivia, Burma, Colombia, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, Iran, Kenya, Morocco, Nigeria, Panama, Peru, Sierra Leone, Sri Lanka, Syrian Arab, Tanzania 
U., Togo, Argentina, Chile, Congo, El Salvador, Ethiopia, India, Mali, Nicaragua, Somalia, Upper Volta, Uruguay, Angola, Bangladesh, Benin, Central Africa, Chad, Ghana, 
Iraq, Jamaica, Madagascar, Mozambique, Senegal, Sudan, Trinidad and Tobago, Uganda, Venezuela, Zaire, Zambia, Brazil, Cameroon, Costa Rica, Guatemala, Honduras, 
Indonesia, Israel, Ivory Coast, Jordan, Liberia, Malawi, Malaysia, Mauritania, Mexico, Niger, Pakistan, Paraguay, Philippines, Rwanda, Saudi Arabia, Thailand, Korea 
Republic, Tunisia. 
268 Albania, Algeria, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Belarus, Belgium, Belize, Benin, Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, 
Brazil, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Canada, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chile, China, Colombia, Comoros, Congo Republic, Costa Rica, Cote 
d'Ivoire, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt Arab Republic, El Salvador, Estonia, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, France, Gabon, 
Gambia The, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Guinea, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hong Kong China, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran Islamic Republic, 
Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Korea Republic, Kyrgyz Republic, Latvia, Lebanon, Lesotho, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Macao, Macedonia 
FYR, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Mali, Malta, Mauritius, Mexico, Moldova, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, 
Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russia, Rwanda, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, 
Sierra Leone, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, St Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Sudan, Swaziland, Sweden, Switzerland, Syrian Arab 
Republic, Tanzania, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Uganda, Ukraine, United Kingdom, United States, Uruguay, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Zambia, 
Zimbabwe. 
68. Ghatak et al. 
1997  
 
Malaysia; the observed period is 
1955–‘90   
 
the impact of export on 
economic growth  
 
Overall, export has a positive impact on economic growth. More specifically, 
export has a positive impact on real GDP and non-export GDP in the long-term. 
The authors also find the existence of a negative correlation, but only between the 
“traditional”, i.e. primary, non-oil export, and GDP (Ghatak et al. 1997, 222). 
Moreover, exporting may positively affect product productivity, specialisation, 
development of R&D, and contribute to capital accumulation and absorption of 
know-how (Ghatak et al. 1997, 214). 
69. Gokmenoglu et 
al. 2015  
 
Costa Rica, the observed period is 
1980–2013  
 
the impact of export on 
economic growth  
 
Export does not seem to be a significant growth determinant in the sample country. 
However, there is uni-directional causality from economic growth to export growth 
(Gokmenoglu et al. 2015, 476). 
70. Gonçalves and 
Richtering 1987  
 
69 developing countries;267 the 
observed period is 1960–1981  
 
the impact of export on 
output growth  
 
The authors note that the results as to whether export growth is positively 
correlated with output growth differ widely among countries. He found that export 
growth has a positive impact on GDP growth, but not on non-export growth 
(Gonçalves and Richtering 1987, 9,16) 
71. Greenaway et 
al. 1999   
69 countries  the impact of export on 
economic growth  
Export has a positive impact on economic growth. The pace of growth is to large 
extent determined by the export structure (Greenaway et al. 1999). 
72. Guariglia and 
Santos-Paulino 
2008  
139 countries;268 the observed 
period is 1992–2003  
the impact of export 
productivity and finance 
on economic growth  
There is a direct causal link between export productivity and economic growth. 
Moreover, export goods with higher value-added contribute more to export 
productivity and hence economic growth (Guariglia and Santos-Paulino 2008, 18). 
73. Hatemi 2002  
 
Japan; the observed period is 1960–
1999  
the impact of export on 
economic growth  
There is bi-directional causality between export and economic growth (Hatemi 
2002). 
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269 (1) (Manufactured) export has a positive impact on non-export GDP, and (2) primary export has a negative impact on non-export GDP (Herzer et al. 2004, 24). 
270 The authors note that even with reference to Pakistan, as is also the case with many developing countries, the findings of various studies as to whether export has a positive 
impact on economic growth differ (Iqbal et al. 2012, 459). 
74. Hatemi-J and 
Irandoust 2000  
 
Greece, Ireland, Mexico, Portugal 
and Turkey  
 
the impact of export on 
economic growth  
 
(1) There is a long-term uni-directional causality from export to economic growth 
in Ireland and Mexico, and from economic growth to export growth in Portugal, (2) 
there is no causality between export and economic output/growth in Greece and 
Turkey (Hatemi-J and Irandoust 2000). 
75. Heller and 
Porter 1978  
 
41 LDCs (not listed); the observed 
period is 1950–1973  
 
reexamination of the 
impact of export on 
economic growth  
 
Export positively affects economic growth. Growth of export and non-export is 
also significantly positively correlated (Heller and Porter 1978, 193). Moreover, 
the authors also found thatthe positive impact of export on economic growth in less 
developed countries is contingent on a minimum level of development (Heller and 
Porter 1978, 192). 
76. Henriques and 
Sadorsky 1996  
 
Canada   the impact of export on 
GDP growth  
 
There is a positive correlation between export, trade and GDP in the long-term. 
The authors also found uni-directional causality from GDP to export growth 
(Henriques and Sadorsky 1996) 
77. Herrerias and 
Orts 2010  
 
China; the observed period is 1964–
2004  
 
the impact of export and 
investment on economic 
growth  
Export has a positive impact on productivity and output growth in the long-term, 
and hence on economic growth (Herrerias and Orts 2010, 48). 
78. Herzer et al. 
2004  
 
Chile; the observed period is 1960–
2001  
 
the impact of 
manufactured export on 
economic growth  
 (Manufactured) export has a positive impact on economic growth in the long-term 
(Herzer et al. 2004, 25).269 
79. Holman and 
Graves 1995  
Korea; the observed period is 1953–
1990  
the impact of export on 
GNP growth 
There is bi-directional causality between export and GNP (gross national product) 
(Holman and Graves 1995, 54) 
80. Hossain and 
Karunaratne 2004 
Bangladesh; the observed period is 
1974–‘99 
the impact of export on 
economic growth 
Export (both manufactured and total) has a positive impact on economic growth 
both in the short- and long-term (Hossain and Karunaratne 2004). 
81. Hye and 
Siddiqui 2011  
Pakistan; the observed period is 
1985–2008 
the impact of export on 
GDP 
Export has a positive impact on GDP and hence economic growth (Hye and 
Siddiqui 2011). 
82. Ibrahim and 
MacPhee 2003  
 
30 developing countries; the 
observed periods are 1974–‘83 and 
1984–‘93  
 
the impact of export 
externalities on 
economic growth  
 
Export externalities exert a positive impact on economic growth (the obtained 
results are positive and statistically significant for 18 of 30 countries. Moreover, 
the extent to which export will positively affect economic growth is contingent on 
the size of population, degree of outward-orientedness and strength of the 
manufacturing sector (Ibrahim and MacPhee 2003, 257). 
83. Iqbal et al. 2012  
 
Pakistan, the observed period is 
1960–2009  
the impact of export on 
GDP growth  
There is uni-directional causality from GDP to export growth (Iqbal et al. 2012, 
459).270 
84. Islam 1998  
 
15 Asian countries; the observed 
period is 1967–‘91  
the impact of export on 
economic growth  
There is a positive correlation between export and economic growth in two/thirds 
of sample countries (Islam 1998). 
  
 
3
2
5
 
                                                          
271 Indonesia, Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand, the Philippines. 
272 Seoul, Kyunggee, Kyungnam, Pusan. 
273 The authors argue that export growth in Korea may have occurred as a result of the enhancement effect of imported primary and intermediate goods on final export 
products (Jin and Jin 2015, 110). 
274 Taiwan, South Korea, Singapore, Hong Kong. 
85. Islam and 
Hossain 2015 
Bangladesh; the observed period is 
1971–2011 
the impact of export on 
economic growth 
Export has a positive impact on economic growth in the long-term (Islam and 
Hossain 2015, 8). 
86. Ismail and 
Harjito 2003  
 
ASEAN countries;271 the observed 
period is 1966–2000  
 
the impact of export on 
GDP  
 
(1) There is bi-directional positive link between export and economic growth in 
Indonesia and the Philippines; (2) there is uni-directional causality from export to 
economic growth in Singapore, and (3) there is no direct causality between export 
and economic growth in Malaysia and Thailand (Ismail and Harjito 2003, 93–94). 
87. Husein 2010  
 
Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Morocco 
(1960–2005), Tunisia (1961–2005), 
Iran (1974–2005), Sudan and 
Turkey (1973–2005)  
 
the impact of export on 
GDP  
 
(1) There is bi-directional positive link between export and economic growth in 
Egypt, Israel, Morocco, Tunisia, and Turkey (Husein 2010, 172), (2) there is uni-
directional causality from export to economic growth in Algeria and Iran, (3) there 
is uni-directional causality from economic growth to export growth in Sudan 
(Husein 2010, 173). 
88. Jarra 2013  
 
Ethiopia, the observed period is 
1960–2011  
 
the impact of export on 
GDP  
 
There is uni-directional causality from export to economic growth both in the 
short- and the long-term. The author also notes that export positively affects 
employment and foreign currency deposits (Jarra 2013, 368–369). 
89. Jin 2002  
 
Korea’s four largest provinces272  
 
the impact of export on 
output growth  
Export has a positive impact on output growth in all sample provinces. Bi-
directional causality occurred in Seoul and Kyungnam provinces (Jin 2002). 
90.  Jin and Jin 
2015  
Korea, the observed period is 1981–
2011  
 
the impact of export on 
GDP growth 
 
Export does not have a statistically significant impact on economic growth, despite 
the generally accepted fact that Korea is an export-oriented country. GDP growth 
does not have a statistically significant impact on export growth either  (Jin and Jin 
2015, 110).273 
91. Jin and Shih 
1995  
Asia’s “Four Little Dragons”274  the impact of export on 
output growth  
Export has a strong positive impact on output growth in the short-term (Jin and 
Shih 1995). 
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275 Not all are listed. Those listed are: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, 
Japan, Korea, Luxembourg, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovak Republic, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, United Kingdom, United 
Stated. 
276 However, contrary to the main finding, the authors also found that import does positively affect GDP growth (Kim and Lim 2009, 18). 
92. Jun 2007  
 
81 countries;275 the observed period 
is 1960–2003  
 
the impact of export on 
output growth  
 
There is a positive bi-directional causality between export and output growth (Jun 
2007, 163–165). More specifically, (1) in this bi-directional causality the positive 
effect of output growth on export growth is stronger than the other way around; (2) 
there is a positive correlation between investment and export [though the author 
does not specify direction of causality]; (3) export of high-income countries has a 
much more beneficial effect on output growth than that of low-income countries 
(this is mainly due to the technological supremacy and higher volume of capital 
stock of the first vis-à-vis the latter); in the same way, output growth of high-
income countries has a much more beneficial effect on export growth than that of 
low-income countries; (4) countries with strong export-oriented industrial policies 
(predominantly high-income countries such as South Korea, Hong Kong, 
Singapore and Taiwan) have better output results than inward-oriented low-income 
countries, and (5) export of countries with high investment in human capital and 
R&D exerts better effect on output growth (as in the afore-mentioned countries) 
(Jun 2007, 163–165). 
93. Jung and 
Marshall 1985 
37 developing countries  the impact of export on 
output growth 
The authors did not find a plausible positive correlation between export and 
economic growth (Jung and Marshall 1985). 
94. Kavoussi 1984 
 
73 developing countries; the 
observed period is 1960–78  
 
the impact of export on 
output growth 
 
Export has a positive impact on economic growth (mainly through the positive 
impact on total factor productivity) in both low- and middle-income countries. The 
author also notes that it seems that the more diversified the export structure, the 
greater positive effect of export on economic performance (in developing 
countries) (Kavoussi 1984). 
95. Khalid and 
Cheng 1997  
Singapore  the impact of export on 
economic growth  
There is a positive correlation between export and economic growth in the long-
term (Khalid and Cheng 1997). 
96. Khan et al. 1995  
 
Pakistan; the observed period is 
1972–1994  
the impact of export on 
economic growth  
There is bi-directional causality between export (both primary and manufactured) 
and economic growth (Khan et al. 1995, 1009) 
97. Kim and Lim 
2009  
Korea; the observed period is 1980–
2003  
the impact of export on 
GDP growth  
Export does not have a positive impact on GDP growth (Kim and Lim 2009, 18).276 
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277 Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Korea Republic, Luxembourg, Mexico, Netherlands, New 
Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, United States. 
278 The effect of import on economic growth, despite being generally negative, is found positive in five countries (Kristjanpoller and Olson 2014, 6). 
279 Malaysia (1971–2008), Thailand (1953–2008), Indonesia (1963–2008) and Philippines (1958–2008). 
280 The authors stress the importance of openness to trade, financial development, human capital and quality of infrastructure for sustainable economic growth (Lim et al. 
2011, 2691). 
 
98. Kónya 2000  
 
25 OECD countries;277 the observed 
period is 1960–1997 for all 
countries, except Hungary (1970–
1998), and Korea and Mexico 
(1960–1998)  
 
the impact of export on 
economic growth  
 
The results are mixed; (1) there is no causality between export and economic 
growth in the Netherlands (also likely in Hungary, France, Greece and 
Luxembourg); (2) there is uni-directional causality from export to economic 
growth in Belgium and Iceland (also likely in Australia, Austria, Denmark, Ireland, 
Spain and Switzerland); (3) there is uni-directional causality from economic 
growth to export in Canada and Japan (also likely in Finland in Korea), and (4) 
there is bi-directional causality between export and economic growth in Sweden 
and the United Kingdom. Moreover, in case of Italy, Mexico, New Zealand, 
Norway, Portugal and the United States, the results are too inconsistent for the 
authors to be able to draw a concrete conclusion (Kónya 2000, 26–28). 
99. Kristjanpoller 
and Olson 2014  
 
15 Latin American countries  
 
the impact of export on 
economic growth 
 
Export has a positive impact on economic growth (in 8 countries). Furthermore, the 
authors also found that export-led and import-led economic growth cannot exert a 
positive effect on economic growth at the same time; in other words, they are 
mutually exclusive (Kristjanpoller and Olson 2014, 6).278 
100. Kugler 1991  
 
United States, Japan, Switzerland, 
West Germany, United Kingdom, 
France; the observed period is 
1970–‘87  
the impact of export on 
output growth  
There is weak evidence of an export-led economic growth. Only in France and 
West Germany did the author find a significant positive correlation between export 
and economic growth (Kugler 1991, 80). 
101. Kunst and 
Marin 1989  
Austria, the observed period is 
1965–‘85  
the impact of export on 
productivity growth  
Export does not have a positive impact on productivity growth (Kunst and Marin 
1989, 703). 
102. Kwan and 
Cotsomitis 1991  
 
China; the observed periods are 
1952–78 and 1952–‘85  
 
the impact of export on 
national income per 
capita growth  
 
There is bi-directional causality between export and growth of national income per 
capita (for the period 1978–1985). However, in the period 1952–1978, there was 
no such causality. The reason is that since 1978 onward China became an outward-
oriented economy (Kwan and Cotsomitis 1991). 
103. Lim et al. 2011  
 
4 South East Asian countries279 
 
the impact of export on 
GDP growth  
 
(1) There is bi-directional causality between export growth and GDP growth per 
capita (the author stipulates the examples of Malaysia and Thailand); (2) there is 
uni-directional causality from GDP growth to export growth in Indonesia; (3) 
export has almost insignificant positive effect on economic growth in Philippines 
(mainly due to service-oriented economy) (Lim et al. 2011, 2691).280 
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281 The author also found that terms of trade positively affect productivity growth (in United States and United Kingdom) (Marin 1992, 686). 
104. Lorde 2011  
 
Mexico; the observed period is 
1960–2003  
the impact of export on 
GDP growth  
Export has a positive impact on non-export GDP in the short-term (Lorde 2011, 
41). 
105. Love and 
Chandra 2004  
 
India, Pakistan and Sri Lanka  
 
the impact of export on 
economic growth and 
real income  
 
(1) There is bi-directional causality between export and real income growth in 
India; (2) there is uni-directional causality from export to economic growth in 
Pakistan, and (3) there was no causality found in Sri Lanka (Love and Chandra 
2004). 
106. Mah 2005  
 
China; the observed period is 1979–
2001  
the impact of export on 
economic growth  
There is bi-directional causality between export and economic growth (Mah 2005). 
107. Mamun and 
Nath 2005  
Bangladesh, the observed period is 
1976–2003  
the impact of export on 
industrial output  
There is a positive uni-directional causality from export to industrial output growth 
in the long-term (but not in the short-term too) (Mamun and Nath 2005, 364). 
108. Marin 1992  
 
Germany, United Kingdom, United 
States, Japan; the observed period is 
1960–‘87  
the impact of export on 
productivity growth  
Export has a positive impact on productivity growth (in United States, Japan, 
United Kingdom and Germany, but especially in Japan and Germany due to strong 
outward-oriented policies) (Marin 1992, 686).281 
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282 Yasar and Rejesus 2005; Alvarez and Lopez 2005: Girma and Görg 2004;  Wagner 2002; Kraay 1999; Baldwin and Gu 2003; Bigsten and al 2002; Hallward-Driemeier et 
al 2002; Isgut 2001; Castellani 2002; Bernard and Jensen 1999; Aw et al 2000; Mengistae and Pattillo 2004; Greenaway and Kneller 2003; Yasar et al 2006; Hahn 2004; 
Fernandes and Isgut 2005; De Loecker 2004; Van Biesebroeck 2005; Greenaway and Kneller 2004a; Greenaway and Yu 2004; Arnold and Hussinger 2005; Crespi et al 
2006; Kostevc 2005; Greenaway and Kneller 2004b; Damian et al 2004; Blalock and Gertler 2004; Greenaway et al 2005; Bernard and Jensen 2004; RequenaSilvente 2005; 
Farinas and Martin-Marcos 2007; Hansson and Lundin 2004. 
283 The authors stress the importance of trade internationalisation, especially for developing countries (Martins and Yang 2007, 10). 
284 Angola, Algeria, Benin, Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, People’s Republic of the Congo, Egypt, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea, Ivory Coast, Kenya, 
Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Mozambique, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, South Africa, Sudan, Tanzania, 
Togo, Tunisia, Uganda, Burkina Faso, Zambia, Libya. 
285 Political instability and inflation, among other things, negatively affect export growth (Mbaku 1989, 138–139). 
286 The author also found a long-term linear co-integration between export, investment and population on one side, and GDP growth, on the other (Medina-Smith 2000, 35). 
109. Martins and 
Yang 2007  
 
Meta-analysis of 32 case studies282 
 
the impact of export on 
productivity growth  
 
The positive growth-enhancement effect of export on productivity is stronger in 
developing than in developed countries, and is more conspicuous in the initial stage 
than after (Martins and Yang 2007, 10).283 
110. Mbaku 1989  
 
37 African countries;284 the 
observed period is 1970–‘81  
 
the impact of export on 
economic growth  
 
Export has a positive impact on economic growth in the middle-income countries, 
whereas the positive effect is much less evident in the poor-income countries 
(Mbaku 1989, 138–139).285 
111. McCarville 
and Nnadozie 1995  
Mexico  the impact of export on 
GDP growth  
Export has a positive impact on GDP growth (McCarville and Nnadozie 1995). 
112. Medina-Smith 
(2000) 
Costa Rica, the observed period is 
1950–1997 
the impact of export on 
output growth 
Export has a positive impact on GDP growth in the long-term (Medina-Smith 
2000, 35).286 
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287 Countries are grouped into two groups: oil-rich and non-oil. Oil-rich countries include: Venezuela, United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Nigeria, Kuwait, Iran, Algeria 
and Ecuador. Non-oil developing countries include: Belarus, Albania, Argentina, Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Cameroon, 
Cambodia, Chad, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cote d'Ivoire, Czech Republic, Egypt Arab Rep, El Salvador, Estonia, Finland, Ghana, Guatemala, Honduras, Hong Kong, 
China, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kyrgyz Republic, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Mali, Mexico, Moldova, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Oman, Pakistan, 
Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Malaysia, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Tajikistan, Tanzania, Thailand, Trinidad and Tobago, Uganda, Turkmenistan, Turkey, Ukraine, Uruguay, 
Zimbabwe, Zambia, Uzbekistan, Yemen, Sweden, Senegal, Slovenia, Romania, Georgia. 
288 Algeria, Argentina, Bangladesh, Benin, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cote d'Ivoire, Dominican 
Republic, Ecuador, Egypt Arab Rep, El Salvador, Ghana, Guatemala, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Iran Islamic Republic, Jordan, Kenya, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, 
Malaysia, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Morocco, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Rwanda, Senegal, South Africa, 
Sri Lanka, Sudan, Swaziland, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, Uruguay, Venezuela, Zambia, Zimbabwe. 
289 (1) Growth of export and GDP also positively effect the inflow of FDI, and (2) growth of GDP and increase of inward FDI do not have a positive impact on export growth 
(Mehrara et al. 2014, 14–15). 
290 Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Ceylon, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cyprus, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Honduras, 
India, Indonesia, Iran, Israel, Jamaica, Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, Morrocco, Nicaragua, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Taiwan, Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey, 
Uganda, Uruguay, Venezuela, Zambia. 
113. Mehdi and 
Shahryar 2012  
Iran, the observed period is 1961–
2006  
the impact of export on 
output growth  
 
Export has a positive impact on output growth. Export (especially of oil) causes an 
increase of value added in industry and mining, but also in the service sector 
(Mehdi and Shahryar 2012, 26). 
114. Mehrara and 
Firouzjaee 2011  
 
73 developing countries;287 the 
observed period is 1970–2007  
 
the impact of export on 
GDP growth  
 
There is a significant positive bi-directional causality between export and GDP 
growth in both country groups. The authors stress the importance of human capital 
and technological development for the success in exporting (Mehrara and 
Firouzjaee 2011, 229). 
115. Mehrara et al. 
2014 
57 developing countries;288 the 
observed period is 1980–2008  
the impact of export on 
economic growth 
There is uni-directional causality from export and economic growth in both the 
short- and the long-term (Mehrara et al. 2014, 14–15).289 
116. Michalopoulos 
and Jay 1973  
 
39 LDCs;290 the observed period is 
1960–'69  
 
the impact of export on 
output growth 
 
There is bi-directional causality between export and GNP (gross national product) 
growth. The extent to which a country will benefit from export depends on its 
ability to cope with and adapt to external fluctuation in demand and other factors, 
as much as on its internal policies. Furthermore, competitiveness of export is 
positively correlated with the level of economic openness, in the sense that the 
more open the economy, the more competitive the export (Michalopoulos and Jay 
1973, 22–23). 
117. Mishra 2011  
 
India, the observed period is 1970–
2009 
the impact of export on 
GDP growth  
There is uni-directional causality from GDP to export growth in the long-term 
(Mishra 2011, 65–66). 
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291 There is also a positive bi-directional causality between import and GDP growth in both short- and long-term (Mohsen 2015, 257). 
292 Pakistan, India, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, Philippines. 
293 India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka. 
294 The author stresses the importance of openness to trade for developing countries (Paul 2014, 4). 
118. Mohsen 2015  
 
Syria, the observed period is 1980–
2010  
 
the impact of export on 
GDP growth  
 
There is a positive bi-directional causality between export and GDP growth in both 
short- and long-term. The author stresses the importance of opening specialised 
export-promotion agencies to help stimulate export (Mohsen 2015, 257).291 
119. Muhammad et 
al. 2011  
Pakistan, the observed period is 
1990–2008  
the impact of export on 
economic growth 
Export has a positive impact on economic growth. The focus should be on products 
with more value-added (Muhammad et al. 2011, 17–18). 
120. Nasreen 2011  
 
8 South East Asian countries;292 the 
observed period is 1975–2008 
 
the impact of export on 
economic growth  
 
(1) There is bi-directional causality between export and economic growth in India 
and Philippines; (2) there is uni-directional causality from export to economic 
growth in Malaysia and Thailand; (3) there is uni-directional causality from 
economic growth to export growth in Pakistan, Sri Lanka and Indonesia, and (4) 
where no causality is found, a minimum sufficient level of economic growth is 
necessary to enable growth of export. In addition, the author notes that efficiency 
of the export sector highly depends on the following factors: stability and 
efficiency of the judicial system, level of development of the financial system, 
quality of education and infrastructure, respect for quality standards, political 
stability, degree of corruption, etc. (Nasreen 2011, 11). 
121. Omisakin 2009  
 
Nigeria, the observed period is 
1970–2006  
the impact of export on 
output growth  
There is bi-directional causality between export and output growth in the long-term 
(10 % of increase in export increases output by 35 %) (Omisakin 2009, 223). 
122. Onafowora et 
al. 2006  
12 countries of sub-Saharan Africa  the impact of export on 
economic growth  
Export has a positive effect on economic growth (Onafowora et al. 2006). 
123. Oxley 1993 
 
Portugal; the observed period is 
1965–1985  
the impact of export on 
output growth 
There is uni-directional causality from economic growth to export growth (Oxley 
1993). 
124. Pal and 
Ashwani 2011  
 
India, the observed periods are 
1970–‘71 to 2006–‘07  
 
the impact of export on 
economic growth  
 
There is uni-directional causality from economic growth to export growth in the 
long-term, whereat a minimum sufficient level of economic growth is necessary to 
enable growth of export (Pal and Ashwani 2011, 188–189). 
125. Panas and 
Vamvoukas 2002  
 
Greece, the observed period is 
1948–1997  
 
the impact of export on 
output growth  
 
Export does not positively affect output growth. Instead, there is uni-directional 
causality from output to export growth in the long-term (Panas and Vamvoukas 
2002, 735). 
126. Chandra 
Parida and Sahoo 
2007 
4 South East Asian countries;293 the 
observed period is 1980–2002 
the impact of export on 
economic growth  
Export has a long-term positive impact on economic growth (Chandra Parida and 
Sahoo 2007, 155). 
127. Paul 2014  
 
Bangladesh; the observed period is 
1979–2010  
the impact of export on 
economic growth  
Export has a positive impact on economic growth both in the short- and the long-
term (Paul 2014, 4).294 
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295 Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovenia, Slovakia, Romania, Bulgaria. 
296 Bangladesh (1971–1994), India (1965–1994), Pakistan (1965–1994), Sri Lanka (1965–1991), Nepal (1975–1994), China (1978–1994), Japan (1965–1994), Indonesia 
(1968–1992), Thailand (-), South Korea (1966–1994), Singapore (1972–1993), Philippines (1965–1994), Malaysia (1965–1994). 
297 Afghanistan, Algeria, Argentina, Bangladesh, Benin, Bolivia, Brazil, Burma, Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, Colombia, Congo, Costa Rica, 
Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guatemala, Guinea, Haiti, Honduras, Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Iran, Israel, Ivory Coast, Kenya, 
Korea (South), Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Mali, Mexico, Morocco, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, 
Philippines, Portugal, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Syria, Taiwan, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, 
Upper Volta, Uruguay, Venezuela, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia. 
298 Importance of exporting became important especially since the 1970s (Ram 1985, 422). 
128. Paul and 
Chowdhury 1995  
Australia, the observed period is 
1949–91  
the impact of export on 
economic growth  
Export has a positive impact on economic growth. The authors stress the 
importance of export promotion (Paul and Chowdhury 1995, 179). 
129. Pop Silaghi 
2009  
 
10 Central and Eastern European 
countries;295 the observed period is 
1990–2004  
 
the impact of export on 
economic growth  
 
There is a significant uni-directional causality from export to economic growth in 4 
of the sample countries, namely in Czech Republic, Bulgaria, Estonia and Latvia. 
In addition, the authors also stress the importance of export-promotion policies 
(Pop Silaghi 2009, 109). 
130. Quddus and 
Saeed 2005   
 
Pakistan, the observed periods are 
1970–‘71 to 2003–‘04  
 
the impact of export on 
economic growth 
 
Export has a positive impact on economic growth in the long-term (Quddus and 
Saeed 2005, 933). The authors stress the importance of export promotion (Quddus 
and Saeed 2005, 934). 
131. Rahman and 
Mustafa 1997 
 
13 Asian countries296 
 
the impact of export on 
economic growth  
 
(1) There is bi-directional causality between export and economic growth in China, 
South Korea and Malaysia both in the short- and long-term; (2) there is bi-
directional causality between export and economic growth in Bangladesh, Thailand 
and Philippines both in short- and long-term; (3) there is uni-directional causality 
from export and economic growth in Bangladesh, Thailand and Philippines in the 
long-term; (4) there is bi-directional causality between export and economic 
growth in Pakistan and Nepal in the short-term; (5) there is uni-directional 
causality from economic growth to export growth in Pakistan and Nepal in the 
long-term; (6) there is uni-directional causality from economic growth to export 
growth in India, Sri Lanka and Indonesia in both the long- and short-term, and (7) 
there is bi-directional causality between economic growth and export in Singapore 
in the short-term (Rahman and Mustafa 1997, 91). 
132. Ram 1985 
 
73 LDCs;297 the observed periods 
are 1960–'70 and 1970–'77 
the impact of export on 
economic growth 
Export has a positive impact on economic growth (Ram 1985, 422).298 
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299 The authors stress the importance of human capital, import and investment as conditioning factors when determining whether there is a correlation between export and 
economic growth (Riezman et al. 1995, 2). 
300 The authors argue that the absence of an export-led economic growth in India is due to a huge domestic market and a relatively low share of export in GDP (Ronit and 
Divya 2014, 139). 
301 Export also positively affects growth of import (Samad 2011, 95). 
133. Ram 2003  
 
Fiji, the observed period is 1971–
2001  
the impact of export on 
economic growth  
Export has a positive impact on economic growth. The author stresses the 
importance of export-orientedness (Ram 2003, 22). 
134. Ramos 2001  
 
Portugal; the observed period is 
1865–1998  
the impact of export on 
income growth 
There is bi-directional causality between export and income growth (Ramos 2001, 
620). 
135. Ray 2011  
 
India; the observed periods are 
1972–‘73 to 2010–‘11  
 
the impact of export on 
economic growth  
 
There is bi-directional causality between export and economic growth both in the 
short- and long-term. The author stresses the importance of export-promotion (Ray 
2011, 33). 
136. Riezman et al. 
1995  
 
126 countries (*precise number of 
countries is not precisely given) 
 
the impact of export on 
economic growth  
 
There is a “modest” uni-directional causality from export to economic growth 
(Riezman et al. 1995, 2); there is evidence for an export-led economic growth for 
30 sample countries; likewise, there is evidence for an economic growth-led export 
for 25 of them (Riezman et al. 1995, 20).299 
137. Ronit and 
Divya 2014  
India, the observed period is 1969–
2012  
the impact of export on 
economic growth  
There is uni-directional causality from economic growth to export growth (Ronit 
and Divya 2014, 139).300 
138. Saad 2012 
 
Lebanon, the observed period is 
1970–2010  
 
the impact of export on 
economic growth  
 
There is uni-directional causality from export to economic growth, whereat a 
minimum sufficient level of economic growth is necessary to enable growth of 
export (Saad 2012, 142). 
139. Sahni and Atri 
2012  
 
India, the observed periods are 
1980–‘81 to 2008–‘09  
 
the impact of export on 
economic growth  
 
Export has a positive impact on economic growth. Interestingly, the authors also 
found that a minimum sufficient level of economic growth based on domestic 
investment is necessary to enable growth of export (Sahni and Atri 2012, 294). 
140. Samad 2011 
 
Algeria, the observed period is 
1960–2005 
the impact of export on 
economic growth  
Export has a positive impact on economic growth (Samad 2011, 95).301 
141. Sannassee et 
al. 2014  
 
meta-analysis of 82 studies  
 
the impact of export on 
economic growth  
 
The authors found that chosen methodology, control variables and time period 
covered significantly impacted the findings of surveyed studies. However, the 
general conclusion is that in order to have better export results, it is important for 
countries to have quality infrastructure, advanced level of technological 
development, quality education and well devised export strategy (Sannassee et al. 
2014, 380). In addition, both market and product diversification positively 
contributes to export performance and hence economic growth (Sannassee et al. 
2014, 381). 
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302 Ireland, Estonia, Slovakia, Hungary, Netherlands, Czech Republic, Slovenia, Lithuania, Cyprus, Austria, Sweden, Denmark, Latvia, Finland, Germany, Poland, Romania, 
Portugal, United Kingdom, Spain, France, Italy, Greece. 
303 Low and lower middle income - Africa: Benin, Cameroon, Republic of Congo, Egypt, Ghana, Jordan, Kenya, Malawi, Mali, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Syria, 
Tanzania, Tunisia, Zambia, Zimbabwe; America: Bolivia, Colombia, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Peru; Asia/Oceania: 
China, India, Indonesia, Nepal, Pakistan, Philippines, Sri Lanka, Thailand; Upper middle and high income – Africa: Israel, South Africa; America: Argentina, Brazil, 
Canada, Chile, Costa Rica, Jamaica, Mexico, Panama, United States, Uruguay; Asia/Oceania: Australia, Hong Kong, Japan, Republic of Korea, Malaysia, New Zealand, 
Singapore and Turkey; Europe: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Spain, 
Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom. 
304 The authors note that the strongest positive impact of export on economic growth is found in the transition (mostly middle-income) countries (Seabra and Galimberti 2012, 
20). 
305 The authors note that economic growth in Shanghai during the observed period was mainly due to a strong inflow of foreign investment and domestic fiscal policy (which 
enabled the city to take back much of the revenues it had generated) (Shan and Tian 1998, 11). 
142. Santos et al. 
2013  
 
23 EU countries;302 the observed 
period is 1995–2010  
 
the impact of export on 
economic growth  
 
Export has a positive impact on economic growth. The authors stress the 
importance of export specialization. They also argue that high-income countries 
should further enhance their export products from the perspective of technological 
advancement, and in that way add more final value to them (Santos et al. 2013, 24).  
The authors also note that greater market diversification is needed, especially 
towards the prosperous Eastern markets, such as those of China, Russia and Poland 
(Santos et al. 2013, 25). 
143. Seabra and 
Galimberti 2012  
 
72 countries;303 the observed period 
is 1974–2003  
 
the impact of export on 
economic growth  
 
Export has a positive impact on economic growth. Moreover, the correlation 
between the two (variables) is contingent on the level of output and human capital 
(Seabra and Galimberti 2012, 20).304 
144. Serletis and 
Afxentiou 1991  
 
industrial countries; the observed 
period is 1950–‘85  
 
the impact of export on 
economic growth  
 
There is evidence of only a modest positive impact of export on economic growth 
(clear positive impact was found in the case of United States, Norway, Japan and 
Canada) (Serletis and Afxentiou 1991). 
145. Shan and Sun 
1998  
China; the observed period is 1987–
1996  
the impact of export on 
industrial output  
There is bi-directional causality between export and real industrial output (Shan 
and Sun 1998). 
146. Shan and Tian 
1998  
Shanghai (China); the observed 
period is 1990–1996  
the impact of export on 
GDP growth  
There is a modest uni-directional causality from GDP to export growth (Shan and 
Tian 1998 ,11).305 
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306 There is a positive correlation between foreign exchange and export growth in 15 countries (Sharma and Dhakal 1994, 1145). 
307 Pakistan (1960–2003), India (1960–2002), Bangladesh (1973–2002), Sri Lanka (1960–2002), Nepal (1975–2003). 
308(1) There is a uni-directional causality from export and output growth to import growth in India, and (2) there is a bi-directional causality between export and import 
growth in Bangladesh and Nepal (Shirazi and Manap 2005, 484). 
309 There is a uni-directional causality from export to import growth (Siddique and Selvanathan 1998, 10). 
147. Sharma and 
Dhakal 1994  
30 developing countries; the 
observed period is 1960–‘88  
the impact of export on 
output growth 
(1) There is bi-directional causality between export and output growth in five 
countries; (2) there is uni-directional causality from export to output growth in six 
countries; (3) there is uni-directional causality from output to export growth in 
eight countries, and (4) there is no causality between the two variables in eleven 
countries (Sharma and Dhakal 1994, 1145).306 
148. Shihab et al. 
2014  
 
Jordan, the observed period is 
2000–2012  
 
the impact of export on 
economic growth  
 
There is uni-directional causality from economic growth to export growth. The 
authors stress the importance of stronger export-oriented industrialisation policy 
(Shihab et al. 2014, 307). 
149. Shirazi and 
Manap 2005  
 
4 South East Asian countries307 
 
the impact of export on 
economic growth  
 
 (1) Export has a positive impact on economic growth in Bangladesh, Pakistan and 
Nepal, and (2) export does not positively affect economic growth in India and Sri 
Lanka (Shirazi and Manap 2005, 484).308 
150. Siddique and 
Selvanathan 1998  
Thailand, the observed period is 
1953–‘95  
the impact of export on 
economic growth  
 (1) There is uni-directional causality from economic growth to export growth 
(Siddique and Selvanathan 1998, 10).309 
151. Siddique and 
Selvanathan 1999  
 
Malaysia, the observed period is 
1966–‘96  
 
the impact of export on 
economic growth  
 
Export does not have a positive impact on economic growth. However, there is uni-
directional causality from economic growth to manufactured export (Siddique and 
Selvanathan 1999, 6–7). 
152. Siliverstovs 
and Herzer 2005  
 
Chile, the observed period is 1960–
2001  
 
the impact of export on 
GDP growth  
 
There is uni-directional causality from (manufactured) export to GDP growth. 
Moreover, the authors stress that the impact of manufactured and primary export to 
GDP growth does not produce equal results (Siliverstovs and Herzer 2005, 2). 
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310 Germany, Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Spain, Finland, France, Greece, Netherlands, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Portugal, Sweden, United Kingdom. 
311 (a) small non-primary: Benin, Congo, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Greece, Guatemala, Haiti, Hong Kong, Israel, Kenya, Malaysia, Nicaragua, 
Portugal, Senegal, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Tunisia, Uruguay; (b) small primary: Bolivia, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chile, Cote d’Ivoire, 
Ecuador, Gabon, Ghana, Honduras, Jamaica, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, 
Somalia, Syria, Togo, Venezuela, Zambia; (c)large: Algeria, Argentina, Bangladesh, Brazil, Colombia, Egypt, Ethiopia, India, Indonesia, Iran, South Korea, Mexico, 
Morocco, Myanmar, Nigeria, Pakistan, Philippines, Spain, Sudan, Tanzania, Thailand, Turkey, Yugoslavia, Zaire. 
153. Soukiazis and 
Madaleno 2007  
 
15 European countries;310 the 
observed period is 1981–2004  
 
the impact of export on 
economic growth  
 
Export has a positive effect on economic growth (Soukiazis and Madaleno 2007, 
2). The authors argue that export is important for the following reasons: (1) export 
makes the strongest multiple effect on national income; (2) export generates saving 
through reinvestment of profit (in new technologies and product improvement); (3) 
export goods contain a relatively low level of import content, but also stimulate 
import (when) necessary for increasing the value-added of (export) goods; (4) 
export generates new output value without negatively effecting balance of 
payment; (5) export takes advantage of factor supplies and obviates demand 
constraints to economic growth; (6) export acts as one of the main catalyst of 
technological diffusion, innovation and efficiency; (7) export generates increasing 
returns, and (8) export generates economic growth through the cumulative 
causation effect (Soukiazis and Madaleno 2007, 7). In addition, the authors stress 
the importance of technical development and innovation through technological 
advancement for the growth of export (Soukiazis and Madaleno 2007, 2, 21). 
154. Sprout and 
Weaver 1993 
 
72 LDCs311 
 
the impact of export on 
economic growth 
 
The authors note that the findings as to whether export positively affects economic 
growth differ among countries in the sense that those countries whose export are 
mostly primary goods that contain low value added benefit the least from export, 
and those whose export products are of high value added benefit the most from 
export (Sprout and Weaver 1993, 298). 
155. Tahir et al. 
2015  
Sri Lanka, the observed period is 
1981–2012  
the impact of export on 
GDP growth  
Export does not have a positive effect on GDP growth, either in the short- or a 
long-term (Tahir et al. 2015, 67). 
156. Tang 2006  
 
Hong Kong, the observed period is 
1973–2005  
the impact of export on 
economic growth  
There is bi-directional causality between export and economic growth in the short-
term (Tang 2006, 41–42). 
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312 Hong Kong (1973:Q1 to 2007: Q2); South Korea (1960:Q1 to 2007:Q2); Singapore (1966:Q1 to 2007:Q2); Taiwan (1961:Q1 to 2007:Q2). 
313 Egypt, Cameroon, Yemen PDR, Ghana, Honduras, Liberia, Nigeria, Thailand, Senegal, Yemen Arab Republic, Philippines, Zambia, People’s Republic of Congo, Papua 
New Guinea, Rhodesia, El Salvador, Morocco, Bolivia, Ivory Coast, Jordan, Colombia, Paraguay, Ecuador, Guatemala, South Korea, Nicaragua, Dominican Republic, Peru, 
Tunisia, Syria, Malaysia, Algeria, Turkey, Mexico, Jamaica, Lebanon, Chile, Taiwan, Panama, Costa Rica, South Africa, Brazil, Uruguay, Iraq, Argentina, Portugal, 
Yugoslavia, Iran, Trinidad and Tobago, Hong Kong, Venezuela, Greece, Israel, Singapore, Spain. 
314 India, Pakistan, the Philippines, Malaysia, Thailand. 
315 The authors stress the importance of technological innovation, especially in the manufacturing sectors, and fostering cooperation with domestic supplier firms (Waithe et 
al. 2011, 41). 
 
157. Tang et al. 
2015 
 
4 Asian “tigers”312 
 
the impact of export on 
GDP growth  
 
The following findings apply when the bivariate model is used: (1) there is bi-
directional causality between export and GDP growth in Hong Kong and 
Singapore, (2) there is uni-directional causality from GDP to export growth in 
South Korea and Taiwan. In case the trivariate model is used, the finding points to 
that there is bi-directional causality between export and GDP growth in all sample 
countries (Tang et al. 2015, 234). 
158. Thornton 1996  
 
Mexico; the observed period is 
1895–1992  
the impact of export on 
economic growth  
Export has a significant positive effect on economic growth (Thornton 1996). 
159. Thornton 1997 
 
6 European countries; from the 
middle of the 19th century to 1913  
the impact of export on 
economic growth  
There is uni-directional causality from export to economic growth in Italy, Norway 
and Sweden (Thornton 1997). 
160. Tyler 1980  
 
55 countries;313 the observed period 
is 1960–‘77  
the impact of export on 
economic growth  
Export has a positive impact on economic growth, especially in developing 
countries (Tyler 1980, 12). 
161. Udah 2012  
 
Nigeria, the observed period is 
1970–2006  
 
the impact of export on 
output growth  
 
Export has a positive impact on output growth both in the short- and long-term. In 
terms of export, the author stresses the importance of investing in human capital 
and innovations for productivity growth (Udah 2012, 46). 
162. van den Berg 
and Schmidt 1994  
17 countries from Latin America  the impact of export on 
economic growth  
Export has a positive impact on economic growth in most sample countries (van 
den Berg and Schmidt 1994). 
163. Vohra 2001 
 
5 Asian countries;314 the observed 
period is 1973–1993 
 
the impact of export on 
economic growth 
 
Export has a strong positive impact on economic growth; however, the positive 
impact is contingent on a minimum sufficient level of economic development in a 
given country. The author further stresses the importance of export promotion and 
open trade policy (Vohra 2001, 345). 
164. Waithe et al. 
2011  
 
Mexico; the observed period is 
1960–2003  
 
the impact of export on 
GDP growth  
 
Export has a positive impact on non-export GDP in the short-term. The absence of 
a positive long-term effect is explained by a relatively weak cooperation with 
domestic supplier firms, what disabled positive spill-over effects (Waithe et al. 
2011, 40).315 
165. Williamson 
1978 
22 Latin American countries, the 
observed period is 1960–‘74 
the impact of export on 
GDP growth 
Export has a positive impact on GDP growth (Williamson 1978, 418). 
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316 Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom. 
166. Xu 1996  
 
32 countries   the impact of export on 
economic growth  
Export has a positive impact on economic growth in 17, and significantly positive 
in 9 countries (Xu 1996). 
167. Zang and 
Baimbridge 2011  
 
Japan (1957–2003) and South Korea 
(1963–2003)   
 
the impact of export on 
economic growth  
 
Export has a positive impact on economic growth in Japan; economic growth does 
not positively affect growth of export in South Korea. In case of Japan this can be 
explained by the fact that Japan produces technologically advanced export goods 
with high value-added, the profit of which serves for boosting economic growth 
further, whereas in Korea, that is not the case, as the profit from export is being 
invested in the strong domestic market, not so much in export). In addition, the 
authors stress the importance of creating a business-friendly environment and 
building functional institutions (Zang and Baimbridge 2011, 10).  
168. Zeren and 
Kilinç Savrul 2013  
 
15 European countries;316 the 
observed period is 1970–2011  
 
the impact of export on 
economic growth  
 
Export has a long-term positive impact on economic growth. The beneficial effect 
on economic growth is achieved via the increase of productivity and revenues 
(Zeren and Kilinç Savrul 2013, 146). 
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Appendix C 
1. Bacchetta et al. in Newfarmer et al.2009 
Sample: 180 countries, not stipulated (bilateral trade); the observed time is 1962–2004 
Finding: Geographical (and product) diversification of export reduces the level of risk 
exporters are exposed to, especially in times of economic crisis (Bacchetta et al. in 
Newfarmer et al. 2009, 81–82,91). 
Additional finding 1: There are three factors that determine the level of risk that relates to 
trading among countries: (1) the level of achieved geographical diversification of export, (2) 
stability [economic and political] of targeted markets, and (3) volatility [of supply and 
demand] in the markets of the trading countries (Bacchetta et al. in Newfarmer et al. 2009, 
87). 
Additional finding 2: In low-, middle-, and high-income countries exporters found 
geographical diversification of export more important than diversification of a number of 
export goods. In the observed period, in high-income countries, a number of trading 
partners/new markets increased by more than 50 %, while a number of export goods being 
offered had not changed significantly (Bacchetta et al. in Newfarmer et al. 2009, 91). 
Additional finding 3: The authors stress the importance of Special Economic Zones, which 
in case of Bangladesh, India and Sri Lanka, proved to be successful in managing to attract a 
large number of foreign investors, generate employment and enable transfer of technology 
(Bacchetta et al. in Newfarmer et al. 2009, 223) 
Additional finding 4: The authors stress the importance of export promotion agencies, in 
relation to which they emphasise the following: (1) Export promotion agencies should get 
funding from both the public and the private sector; (2) Export promotion agencies should 
primarily assist the exporters offering new, untraditional goods; (3) in terms of effectiveness, 
in the observed period, the authors also found that EPAs of developed countries abroad have 
proved far more effective than is the case with developing countries’ EPAs (Bacchetta et al. 
in Newfarmer et al. 2009, 220) 
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2. Cieślik et al. 2012 
Sample: Poland (50,000 export enterprises are included); the observed period is 2003–2006 
Finding: Geographical concentration on a limited number of markets may pose a potential 
threat for export enterprises and inhibit their growth prospects (Cieślik et al. 2012). 
3. Amurgo-Pacheco and Pierola 2008 
Sample: EU – EEC15 and 23 worldwide (Argentina, Australia, Bangladesh, Brazil, Canada, 
Chile, China, Ghana, Indonesia, India, Japan, Kenya, Morocco, Mexico, Mauritius, Malaysia, 
Peru, Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, United States of America, South Africa); the 
observed period is 1990–2005 
Finding: Geographical diversification of export is found to positively contribute to export 
performance of enterprises (Amurgo-Pacheco and Pierola 2008, 21). 
Additional finding 1: Geographical diversification of export has shown to be more beneficial 
in terms of export performance than diversification of a range of goods in offer (Amurgo-
Pacheco and Pierola 2008, 21). 
4. Shepherd 2008 
Sample: 123 countries 
Finding: Geographical diversification of export can be highly beneficial especially for 
developing countries (Shepherd 2008, 2). 
Additional finding 1: Factors which largely determine the level of geographical 
diversification of export, that is, the number of new markets entered are: export price, tariffs 
and transport costs. It has been found that a 10 % reduction of any of those factors increases 
the number of new markets entered by 5–6 % (Shepherd 2008, 1). 
Additional finding 2: Geographical diversification of export is found to positively contribute 
to technological sophistication of enterprises (Shepherd 2008, 20) 
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5. Brenton and Newfarmer 2007 
 
Sample: 99 countries;317 the observed period is 1995–2004 
Finding: Geographical diversification of export has positively contributed to export 
performance of enterprises Brenton and Newfarmer 2007 (prepage) 
Additional finding 1: Export-oriented enterprises should seek ways to further enhance the 
quality of those goods which are found to be most productive in terms of sales; in other 
words, those with strongest comparative advantage (Brenton and Newfarmer 2007, 19–20). 
Additional finding 2: The authors stress the importance of creating of business-friendly 
regulatory framework [to stimulate export-oriented economic sectors] (Brenton and 
Newfarmer 2007, 19–20). 
6. Contractor et al. 2007 
Sample: N/A; observed period N/A 
Finding: Geographical diversification of export has positively contributed to export 
performance of enterprises (Contractor et al. 2007, 414). 
7. Hitt et al. 1997 
Sample: 295 firms, the precise observed period is not specified (late 1980s and the 1990s) 
Finding: Geographical diversification of export positively affects export performance of 
enterprises (Hitt et al. 1997, 788–789) 
Additional finding: The larger the scope of export goods, the better the prospects for 
enterprises from geographical market diversification; in other words, (export) diversification 
                                                          
317 LOW-INCOME COUNTRIES: Bangladesh, Benin, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Central African 
Republic, Chad, Ethiopia, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, India, Kenya, Kyrgyz Republic, Laos, 
Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mongolia, Mozambique, Nepal, Niger, Nigeria, Pakistan, Rwanda, Sao 
Tome, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Sudan, Tajikistan, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda, Uzbekistan, Vietnam, Zambia; 
LOWER-MIDDLE INCOME COUNTRIES: Albania, Algeria, Angola, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bolivia, Brazil, 
Bulgaria, Cameroon, Cape Verde, China, Colombia, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, 
Georgia, Guatemala, Guyana, Honduras, Indonesia, Jamaica, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Morocco, Nicaragua, 
Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Tunisia, Turkmenistan, Ukraine; UPPER-MIDDLE-INCOME 
COUNTRIES: Argentina, Chile, Costa Rica, Croatia, Czech Republic, Equatorial Guinea, Estonia, Gabon, 
Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malaysia, Mauritius, Mexico, Panama, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, South Africa, 
Trinidad, Turkey, Uruguay, Venezuela; HIGH-INCOME COUNTRIES: Korea, Singapore, Slovenia, and 
Taiwan. 
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in terms of a number of goods has a positive effect on export/economic growth (Hitt et al. 
1997, 793). 
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Appendix D 
Table D.1: Findings of case studies on the causality between FDI and economic growth 
                                                          
318 Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovak Republic, Slovenia. 
319 (1) There is a uni-directional positive causality from FDI to export in Poland; (2) There is a bi-directional positive causality between FDI and export in Latvia (Acaravci 
and Ozturk 2012, 64). In addition, based on the obtained results, the authors note that it is very much important for countries to devise policies that would help attract FDI. In 
that regard, the focus should be on: free trade, tax incentives, human capital, financial system, market regulations and infrastructure (Acaravci and Ozturk 2012, 64). 
320 The findings as to whether FDI positively affects output growth of the host country firms differ, depending on the approach taken (Aitken and Harrison 1999, 610). 
Author(s) Sample Testing Research finding 
1. Acaravci and Ozturk 
2012 
10 European countries in transition;318 the 
observed period is 1994–2008 
long-term causality 
between FDI, export and 
economic growth 
Overall, there is a long- and a short-term positive causality between 
FDI, export and economic growth in 4 of 10 countries (Czech 
Republic, Slovak Republic, Poland and Latvia). More specifically: (1) 
There is uni-directional positive causality from FDI to economic 
growth in Czech Republic and Slovak Republic; (2) There is uni-
directional positive causality from economic growth to inward FDI in 
Latvia; (3) There is not a constant positive long-term link between 
real GDP, real export and FDI in: Bulgaria, Estonia, Hungary, 
Lithuania, Romania and Slovenia (Acaravci and Ozturk 2012, 63–
64).319 
2. Afşar 2008 Turkey; the observed period is 1992:1–
2006:3 
bi-directional causality 
between FDI and 
economic growth 
There is uni-directional positive causality from FDI to economic 
growth, but not vice versa (Afşar 2008, 7). 
 
3. Aitken and Harrison 
1999 
Venezuela (more than 4000 plants); the 
observed period is 1976–1989 (without 
1980) 
the impact of FDI on 
economic growth 
(1) FDI has a positive impact on output growth in (the host country) 
firms which employ more than 50 employees, and (2) FDI may also 
produce a negative effect on output growth of other domestic firms in 
the same branch (Aitken and Harrison 1999, 616). Furthermore, the 
authors did not find that FDI inflow causes a positive technological 
spill-over effect onto domestic firms (Aitken and Harrison 1999, 
617).320 
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321 Listed countries: Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Barbados, Benin, Bolivia, Brazil, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Canada, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, 
Congo, Costa Rica, Cote d’Ivoire, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Fiji, Finland, France, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, India, 
Indonesia, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, 
Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Portugal, Rwanda, Senegal, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Syrian Arab 
Republic, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States, Uruguay, Venezuela. 
4. Alfaro et al. 2002 Sample321 consists of 3 samples: (1) 39 
countries (both developed and developing); 
the observed period is 1981–1997; (2) 41 
countries (mostly developed); the observed 
period is 1977–1997; (3) 49 countries 
(mostly developing); the observed period is 
1970–1995 
the impact of FDI on 
economic growth 
FDI has a positive impact on economic growth. However, its 
beneficial effect is contingent upon the level of development ofthe 
host country financial market (Alfaro et al. 2002, 17–18). 
5. Alfaro et al. 2007 N/A the impact of FDI on 
economic growth 
FDI inflow creates economic growth which is three times higher in 
(host) countries which have developed financial market than in 
countries whose financial market is in a poor state of development 
(Alfaro et al. 2007, 34–35) 
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322 Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Malta, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, the United Kingdom. 
323 Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain. 
324 Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, FYR of Macedonia, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, Moldova, Montenegro, Russia, 
Serbia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, Uzbekistan. 
325 (1) The level of economic openness is an important factor for attracting FDI in economically integrated countries (EU and EMU); (2) A decrease of inflation and an 
increase of the volume of domestic investment is positively associated with the attraction of FDI in the transition countries (Angelopoulou and Liargovas 2014, 491). The 
authors suggest that in order to be more successful in attracting FDI, the transition countries need to provide various incentives to stimulate attraction of inward FDI, 
andoverall enhance their integration with economically advanced European countries (Angelopoulou and Liargovas 2014, 492).  
6. Angelopoulou and 
Liargovas 2014 
sample consists of 3 different samples: EU-
27 member states,322 EMU-16 member 
states323 and 18 transition countries;324 the 
observed period is 1989–2008  
 
causality between 
economic openness and 
integration, and FDI and 
economic growth 
FDI has a slightly positive impact on economic growth in the EU and 
EMU countries, and a slightly negative impact in the transition 
countries. These results are not statistically significant. However, 
when R&D and tariffs are used as variables alone, the finding reveals 
a substantially higher positive impact of FDI on economic growth 
both in the EU and the transition countries, but also a negative effect 
of FDI on economic growth in the EMU countries (Angelopoulou and 
Liargovas 2014, 491).325 
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326 Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Czech Republic, Estonia, Georgia, Hungary, Kazakhstan, Lithuania, FYR of Macedonia, Moldova, 
Mongolia, Poland, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, Bulgaria, Croatia, Kyrgyz Republic, Latvia, Romania, Russia, Uzbekistan. 
327 In essence, this conclusion points to the fact that successfulness of privatisation and size of income are determining factors for foreign investors when taking decision 
whether to invest somewhere or not (Apergis et al. 2004, 11). 
328 Andalucia, Aragon, Asturias, Baleares, Canarias, Cantabria, Castilla y Leon, Castilla-La Mancha, Cataluna, Comunidad Valenciana, Extremadura, Galicia, Madrid, 
Murcia, Navarra, Pais Vasco, Rioja. 
329 Moreover, the entry of FDI is also found to depend on the regions' stability – the more stable the regions, the more FDI they are likely to attract. In addition, FDI has had a 
strong welfare-enhancement role in the revival of the Spanish economy since the 1960s (Bajo-Rubio et al. 2007, 11). 
7. Apergis et al. 2004 27 countries in transition;326 the observed 
period is 1991–2004 
 
the impact of FDI on 
economic growth 
FDI has a significant positive impact on economic growth (only holds 
when all sample countries are included). However, when the countries 
are divided into two groups – those with low income and 
unsuccessfully conducted privatisation, and on the other side the high 
income countries which conducted privatisation successfully, the 
FDI-led economic growth holds only for the latter group (Apergis et 
al. 2004, 11).327 
8. Azman-Saini et al. 
2010 
85 countries (not listed) the impact of FDI and 
economic freedom on 
economic growth 
FDI does not exert a growth-enhancing effect by itself. Its beneficial 
effect on economic growth depends on the level of economic freedom 
in the host country, in the sense that countries with high level of 
economic freedom are likely to attract substantially more FDI 
(Azman-Saini et al. 2010, *1079). 
9. Bajo-Rubio et al. 
2007 
 
17 Spanish regions;328 the observed period is 
1987–2000 
 
the impact of FDI on 
economic growth 
FDI has a positive impact on economic growth, especially through the 
accumulation of human capital (in Madrid and Catalonia) and transfer 
of technology (Bajo-Rubio et al. 2007, 10–11).329 
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330 EP countries: Kenya, Haiti, El-Salvador, Nicaragua, Malawi, South Korea, Honduras, Sri Lanka, Ivory Coast, Costa Rica, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Zambia, Chile, 
Jamaica, Malaysia, Hong Kong and Signapore. IS countries: Bangladesh, Nepal, Pakistan, India, Argentina, Bolivia, Guatemala, Brazil, Equador, Mexico, Uganda, Ghana, 
Venezuela, Colombia, Turkey, Sudan, Ethiopia, Uruguay, Paraguay, Peru, Nigeria, Indonesia, Philippines, Panama, Tanzania, Thailand, Morocco, Egypt. Furthermore, the 
author notes that Bhagwati (1978) defines the EP policy as „one which equates the average effective exchange rate on exports to the average effective exchange rate on 
imports“, while he describes the IS strategy as „one where the effective exchange rate on imports exceeds the effective exchange rate on exports and is biased in favour of 
import substitution activities“ (Balasubramanyam et al. 1996, 92–93). 
331 Conducive economic environment (market economy, EP policy and competition (Balasubramanyam et al. 1996, 95–96)) is essential for attracting FDI. In that regard, due 
to investment-wise unfavourable economic climate they generate, the IS trade policies are regarded inefficient (Balasubramanyam et al. 1996, 95). In terms of generating 
economic growth, the authors give advantage to FDI over domestic investment (Balasubramanyam et al. 1996, 101). 
332 China, Indonesia, India, Republic of Korea, Malaysia, Philippines, Thailand. 
333 There is a bi-directional causality between domestic saving, domestic investment and economic growth in both short- and long-term. In addition, domestic saving should 
be channelled to the most productive investments expected to fuel economic growth the most, what in return would then increase the volume of domestic saving (Bayar 2014, 
1118). 
10. Balasubramanyam 
et al. 1996 
46 developing countries with 2 different 
trade policies –export promoting (EP) and 
import substituting (IS)330 
the impact of FDI on 
economic growth 
FDI has a positive impact on economic growth. It exerts a strong 
growth-enhancing effect in the export-oriented countries, especially 
through the spill-over effect associated with human capital and 
advanced technology (Balasubramanyam et al. 1996, 98).331 
11. Basu et al. 2003  23 developing countries the impact of FDI on 
economic growth 
FDI has a positive impact on economic growth in a long-term. There 
is bi-directional causality between GDP and FDI in countries 
characterised by a high level of economic openness. On the other 
side, in more „closed  economies“, the authors found uni-directional 
link from GDP to FDI. This implies that restrictive trade regimes 
inhibit FDI-induced economic growth (Basu et al. 2003). 
12. Bayar 2014 
 
7 emerging Asian countries;332 the observed 
period is 1982–2012 
the impact of domestic 
saving, domestic 
investment and inward 
FDI on economic growth 
 
There is a positive impact of domestic saving, domestic investment 
and inward FDI on economic growth in the long-term. In terms of 
FDI only, there is bi-directional causality between inward FDI and 
economic growth in the short- and uni-directional causality between 
inward FDI and economic growth in the long-term (Bayar 2014, 
1118).333 
13. Berthélemy and 
Démurger 2000 
24 Chinese provinces; the observed period is 
1985–’96 
the impact of FDI on 
economic growth 
FDI has a positive impact on economic growth. Availability of a 
sufficient level of human capital (in the host country) is a necessary 
factor for enabling transfer of technology through the FDI spill-over 
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334 Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia. 
335 However, the authors did not find that fixed investment is the key determinant for economic growth (Blomström et al. 1996, 276). They also stressed that apart from FDI, 
economic growth is also influenced by: the level of institutional development, overall political and economic stability, the number of population and its growth prospects, 
share of secondary school graduates in the total working-age population, and geographical distance between the countries (Blomström et al. 1996, 275–276). 
 
effects (Berthélemy and Démurger 2000, 153). 
14. Bijsterbosch and 
Kolasa 2009 
8 countries from Central and Eastern 
Europe;334 the observed period is 1995–2005 
 
the impact of FDI on 
productivity growth in 
Central and Eastern 
Europe 
FDI has a positive impact on productivity growth, especially in 
manufacturing sector. Productivity growth of FDI firms depends on 
the absorptive capacity of a host country, with emphasis on human 
capital (Bijsterbosch and Kolasa 2009, 28). Moreover, they also argue 
that FDI represents an important channel for the transfer of 
technology and modern and sophisticated management techniques 
(foreign multinational firms spend a substantial portion on R&D) 
(Bijsterbosch and Kolasa 2009, 13) and helps economic restructuring 
too (Bijsterbosch and Kolasa 2009, 14). 
15. Blomström et al. 
1996 
United States; the observed period is 1960–
1988 
the impact of FDI on 
economic growth 
FDI has a positive impact on economic growth (Blomström et al. 
1996, 275, 276).335 
16. Borensztein et al. 
1995 
69 developing countries; the observed period 
is 1970–1989 (FDI flows from industrial 
countries to 69 developing countries) 
 
the impact of FDI on 
economic growth 
(1) FDI exerts a positive impact on economic growth of a host 
country, in terms of productivity, only if it (the host country) disposes 
of a sufficient level of human capital; in other words, the beneficiary 
effect of FDI is contingent upon the existence of a minimum level of 
human capital (Borensztein et al. 1995, 19). If/when that is the case, 
then the FDI outputs more productivity than domestic investment 
(Borensztein et al. 1995, 3); (2) FDI increases the overall net value of 
investment in the host country, regardless of the level of human 
capital available (Borensztein et al. 1995, 19). The authors found that 
every dollar invested by a foreign firm in the host country outputs the 
value of more than one dollar in the overall investment (in the host 
country). The ratio goes between 1,5 and 2,3 times the increase of a 
total investment value created (Borensztein et al. 1995, 3); (3) The 
beneficiary effect of FDI is substantially higher when the source 
countries are industrially advanced, and the recipient countries are 
developing countries (Borensztein et al. 1995, 19); (4) FDI can also 
represent an important channel for advanced technology from 
industrial to developing countries, and (5) Foreign firms benefit from 
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336 A host country may also benefit from attracting FDI to economic sectors (primarily industrial) deemed strategic for the country's development. The only limitation of FDI 
may be profit-seeking at the expense of efficiency (Borensztein et al. 1995, 18). 
337 Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Botswana, Canada, Switzerland, Chile, China, Cote d'Ivoire, Colombia, Cape Verde, Costa Rica, Germany, 
Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, Spain, Finland, France, United Kingdom, Ghana, Guinea, Greece, Guatemala, Hong Kong, Honduras, Indonesia, India, 
Ireland, Iceland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Jordan, Japan, Kenya, Republic of Korea, Sri Lanka, Morocco, Madagascar, Mexico, Mali, Mauritius, Malaysia, Nigeria, Netherlands, 
Norway, New Zealand, Pakistan, Panama, Peru, Philippines, Portugal, Paraguay, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Singapore, El Salvador, Sweden, Swaziland, Thailand, Tunisia, 
Turkey, Taiwan, Uruguay, United States, Venezuela, South Africa. 
investing in other countries, as that enables them a direct access to 
new markets for their products without having to export to them from 
the outside. Theyare also expected to have better productivity and 
efficiency than domestic firms (in a host country) due to being 
superior in technology and management (Borensztein et al. 1995, 
18).336 
17. Bruno and Campos 
2013 
(meta analysis) of two data sets: 549 micro 
and 553 macro studies; the observed period 
for micro studies is 1965–2007 and for 
macro studies is 1940–2008 
the impact of FDI on 
economic growth 
FDI has a positive impact on economic growth in low- and middle-
income countries (at the level of firms). As much as 44 % of 
controlled findings for the micro studies and 50 % for the macro 
studies point to a statistically significant impact of FDI on economic 
growth, whereas only 12 % of the micro and 11 % of the macro 
studies show a negative correlation (Bruno and Campos 2013, 24). 
18. Calderón et al. 
2004 
22 industrial and 50 developing countries;337 
the observed period is 1987–2001 
the impact of FDI, 
domestic investment, and 
merger and acquisitions on 
(1) There is not a link from greenfield FDI to economic growth in 
none of the countries, and (2) There is a link from economic growth 
to greenfield FDI in industrial, developing and countries of Latin 
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338 (1) There is a link from greenfield FDI to M&As in developing countries, (2) There is a link from M&As to greenfield FDI in industrial, developing and countries of Latin 
America, (3) There is a link from greenfield FDI to domestic investment in industrial, developing and countries of Latin America, (4) There is not a link from domestic 
investment to greenfield FDI in none of the countries, (5) There is a link from M&As to domestic investment in industrial, developing and countries of Latin America; (6) 
There is not a link from domestic investment to M&As in none of the countries; (7) There is not a link from M&As to economic growth in none of the countries, and (8) 
There is a link from economic growth to M&As in industrial, developing and countries of Latin America (Calderón et al. 2004, 28). 
339 Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Albania, Bulgaria, Croatia, Macedonia, Moldova, Romania, Estonia, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Belarus, Ukraine, Russia, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia. 
340 [Under data there are 76 countries – those are countries for FDI inflows per capita; it is not explained which are 72 from the sample] (Algeria (DZA), Argentina, Australia, 
Austria, Belgium,  Bolivia, Brazil, Cameroon, Canada, Central African Republic, Chile, Colombia, Congo, Costa Rica,  Cyprus, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El 
Salvador, Egypt, Finland, France, Gambia, Germany, Ghana, Britain, Greece, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Israel, Italy, 
Jamaica, Japan, Kenya, Lesotho, Malaysia, Malta, Mauritius, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Norway, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, 
Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Suriname, Sweden, Switzerland, Syria, Togo, 
Thailand, Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay, United States, Venezuela, Zaire, Zimbabwe.  
each other and on 
economic growth 
America (Calderón et al. 2004, 28).338 
19. Campos and 
Kinoshita 2002 
25 transition countries from Central Europe 
and the former Soviet Union;339 the observed 
period is 1990–1998 
the impact of GDP on 
economic growth 
FDI has a positive impact on economic growth (Campos and 
Kinoshita 2002, 20–21). Its beneficial spill-over effect on the host 
country primarily go via transfer of technology and modern 
management (Campos and Kinoshita 2002, 4). 
20. Carkovic and 
Levine in Moran et al. 
2005 
 
72 countries;340 7 five year periods between 
1960–1995 
the impact of FDI on 
economic growth 
 
FDI does not produce a positive impact on economic growth 
independently of other growth determinants (Carkovic and Levine in 
Moran et al. 2005, 219). Whether FDI will have a positive impact on 
economic growth of a host country depends on the sufficient level of 
human capital, which seems to be a conditio sine qua non for the 
transfer of technology from FDI to occur (Carkovic and Levine in 
Moran et al. 2005, 206). The authors also found that trade openness is 
not a necessary factor for enabling positive spill-overs from FDI 
(Carkovic and Levine in Moran et al. 2005, 211). 
21. Carp (2014) Romania; the observed period is 1991–2012 
 
the impact of FDI and 
export on economic 
growth 
 
FDI has a positive impact on economic growth, mainly through the 
spill-over effects it generates, associated with the transfer of 
technology and advanced management (Carp 2014, 39). 
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341 5 Western Balkans countries: Romania, Bulgaria, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia; 9 Western European countries: Germany, Italy, Greece, Austria, Belgium, 
the Netherlands, Switzerland, United Kingdom, France; 5 Central European countries (as the control group): Hungary, Poland, Czech Republic, Slovenia, Slovakia. 
342 Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Georgia, Hungary, Kazakhstan, Kyrgystan, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Mongolia, Poland, Romania, Russia, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Tajikistan, Ukraine, Uzbekistan. 
343 Trade openness positively influences economic growth (Curwin and Mahutga 2014, 1170). 
344 However, the authors also found that technological transfer from the source to the recipient country enabled by FDI does not imply that the latter will surely take 
advantage of it. This is because developing countries are less efficient in absorbing new technologies (De Mello 1997, 30). In general terms, FDI regarded as an important 
instrument for developing countries for the transfer of technology, improving professional skills of labour force and increasing economic growth in general (De Mello 1997, 
9). 
345 OECD: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, New Zealand, Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, 
United States; non-OECD: Dominican Republic, Honduras, Mexico, Panama, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Ecuador, Paraguay, Peru, Venezuela, Ivory Coast, Kenya, Nigeria, Sierra 
Leone, Zimbabwe, Philippines. 
22. Christie 2003 5 from the Western Balkans, 9 from Western 
Europe and 5 from Central Europe341 
 
the impact between FDI 
and trade  
FDI does not have either a significantly positive or a negative impact 
on trade development, whereat the authors argue that level of 
technological development is an important determinant in terms of 
attraction of FDI (Christie 2003, 18). 
23. Curwin and 
Mahutga 2014 
 
25 Central and Eastern European, and 
Eurasian post-socialist transition 
countries;342 the observed period is 1990–
2010 
 
the impact of FDI on 
economic growth 
FDI does not exert a positive impact on economic growth, and can 
even lead to economic contraction. The authors emphasise the 
importance of domestic investment, which, according to them, has a 
positive impact on economic growth (Curwin and Mahutga 2014, 
1160, 1179).343  
24. Dash and Parida 
2012 
India; the observed period is 1996–2011 the impact of FDI and 
trade services on economic 
growth 
There is uni-directional positive causality from FDI to services 
export, and the overall services, and through the spill-over effects, 
also to the manufacturing output and hence to economic growth. In 
addition, FDI does not have a positive impact on services import 
(Dash and Parida 2012, 235–236). 
25. De Mello 1997 South-East Asia and Pacific Rim, South 
Asia, Latin America and Caribbean, Middle 
East and North Africa, Sub-Saharan Africa, 
Eastern Europe and Central Asia;the 
observed period is 1980–1994 
the impact of FDI on 
economic growth 
The positive impact of FDI on economic growth (of the host country) 
is contingent on the host country's level of institutional development, 
investment-friendly business environment and the (foreign) investors' 
interest to transfer advanced technology. In other words, whether the 
host country will benefit from FDI depends on both external and 
internal factors (De Mello 1997, 30).344 
26. De Mello 1999 16 OECD and 17 non-OECD countries;345 
the observed period is 1970–1990 
the impact of FDI on 
economic growth 
The results are the same as in De Mello (1997). The authors note that 
quality of institutions, political risk and trade policies represent the 
factors from which depend to what extent the recipient countries will 
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346 Foreign investors rather choose to invest in firms with higher productivity (Djankov and Hoekman 2000, 61). 
347 Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia. 
348 Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Bulgaria, Romania, Croatia. 
349 Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovenia, Slovakia. 
take advantage of technological transfer (De Mello 1999, 148). 
27. Djankov and 
Hoekman 2000 
Czech Republic; the observed period is 
1992–1996 (513 firms) 
the impact of FDI on 
economic growth 
FDI has a positive impact on economic growth (Djankov and 
Hoekman 2000, 61, 62).346 
28. Domanski 2003 
 
Poland (concrete time span is N/A) the impact of FDI on 
economic growth 
FDI has a positive impact on economic growth. It helps: (1) decrease 
current account deficit, (2) improve productivity, (3) generate new 
investment, (4) enhance competitiveness and (5) improve labour skills 
(Domanski 2003, 105). 
29. Ďurčová and 
Mirdala 2011 
4 countries from Central Europe;347 the 
observed period is 2001–2009 
 
the impact of FDI on 
economic growth 
The impact of FDI on economic growth is mainly positive. Positive 
effects were not so confirmative where unemployment rate was low, 
as in Hungary, as well as where it (unemployment) was relatively low 
(5–6 %) at the time when the countries, such as Lithuania, Estonia 
and Slovenia, started to implement measures to attract FDI. Negative 
long-term effects occurred only in Bulgaria and Romania, and related 
to trade balance (Ďurčová and Mirdala 2011, 36). 
30. Eller et al. 2005 11 countries from Central and Eastern 
Europe;348 the observed period is 1996–2003 
 
the impact of FDI in the 
financial sector on 
economic growth 
Inward FDI in the financial sector of a host country has a positive 
impact on economic growth (of a host country) (Eller et al. 2005, 28). 
The beneficiary effect of the financial sector FDI is contingent on the 
minimum level of human capital available (in the host country) (Eller 
et al. 2005, 29). In line with the findings of Carkovic and Levine in 
Moran et al. (2005) and Campos and Kinoshita (2002), the authors 
also found that the financial sector FDI contributes to growth only 
where the level of capital is low (Eller et al. 2005, 30). 
31. Eller et al. 2006 11 Central and Eastern European 
countries;349 the observed period is 1996–
2003 
the impact of financial 
sector FDI on economic 
growth 
A positive impact of the financial sector FDI on economic growth is 
contingent on the available level of human capital (in the host 
country) (Eller et al. 2006, 316). As beneficial effects of the financial 
sector FDI the authors note: better sector competition, higher 
productivity, lower operational cost, profit increase, better capital 
allocation, better monitoring system and risk management (Eller et al. 
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350 The authors also found that (1) the countries not rich in natural resources and the ones with a low share of revenues from agriculture in GDP are more likely to attract FDI 
than the other way around (Farkas 2012, 18), (2) FDI does not exert significant positive effect in oil abundant countries (Farkas 2012 ,3). In addition, most studies 
investigating whether there is the linkage between FDI and economic growth point to the fact that positive effect of FDI on economic growth in mainly contingent on the 
absorptive capacity of host countries (Farkas 2012, 4). 
351 Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Croatia, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia. 
352 In this regard, the authors argue that FDI would givethe best growth-enhancing effect in industries that are labour and resource intensive. Hence, the policy- makers should 
equally concentrate on creating favourable conditions for enhancing domestic, inasmuch as foreign investment (Fillat and Woerz 2011, 321–322). 
 
2006, 302). 
32. Farkas 2012 
 
69 countries (not specified); the observed 
period is 1975–2000  
 
the impact of FDI on 
economic growth 
The beneficiary spill-over effect of FDI is contingent on the existence 
of developed financial market and the minimum level of human 
capital available (in the host country) (Farkas 2012 ,18).350 
33. Fidrmuc and 
Martin 2011 
11 countries from Central and South East 
Europe;351 the observed period is 1995–2009 
 
the impact of FDI and 
trade on economic growth 
FDI has a positive effect on industrial output and economic growth 
(especially in Poland, Lithuania, Romania and Slovakia) (Fidrmuc 
and Martin 2011, 78). In terms of attracting FDI, the authors stress the 
importance of creating the investment-friendly and export-promoting 
business environment (Fidrmuc and Martin 2011, 79). 
34. Fillat and Woerz 
2011 
 
28–35 countries (OECD members, ASEAN 
members, countries of Asiaand Central and 
South-East Europe); the observed period is 
1987–2000 (data for 28 countries cover the 
period 1987–1997, and data for 35 countries 
cover the period 1998–2000; data for Central 
and South-East European countries are taken 
only since 1993) 
the impact of FDI on 
economic growth 
FDI has a positive impact on productivity and hence economic 
growth. The beneficial effect does not so depend on the volume of 
attracted FDI alone, as on which specific industrial sectors receive 
FDI. The authors also stress the importance of economic openness 
and domestic investment in drawing benefits from inward FDI (Fillat 
and Woerz 2011, 321–322).352 
35. Fons-Rosen et al. 
2013 
25 countries (12 developed and 13 
emerging); the observed period is 1999–
the impact of FDI on 
economic growth 
FDI does not exert an important growth-enhancing effect. Examples 
of positive spillover effects (for domestic firms of a host country) 
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353 Positive effects of FDI are reflected through: (1) raising employment,(2) providing new capital, (3) enhancing internal competition, and (4)creating indirect positive effect 
on structural policies of a host country (Fons-Rosen et al. 2013, 29).  
354 22 developed: Australia, Austria, Belgium and Luxembourg, Canada, Cyprus, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, New 
Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, United States; 15 from Africa and the Middle East: Cote d'Ivoire, Egypt, Ghana, Iran, Israel, 
Kenya, Mauritius, Morocco, Nigeria, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Tanzania, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, Zimbabwe; 11 from Asia: China, Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, 
Korea, Malaysia, Pakistan, Philippines, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Thailand; 9 Eastern Europe: Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Russia, Slovak Republic, 
Slovenia, Ukraine; 14 Latin America: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Mexico, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, 
Venezuela; six source countries: Germany, France, Japan, Netherlands, United Kingdom, United States. 
355 Effects of FDI from the United States on host countries vastly differ from those from other major investing countries, such as the United Kingdom, Japan, France, 
Germany and the Netherlands (Fortanier 2007, 69–70). 
2008 (350,000 firms) 
 
 created by FDI occur only in developed countries (Fons-Rosen et al. 
2013, 28–29), when domestic firms are no competition for them 
(foreign firms) (Fons-Rosen et al. 2013, 6); in emerging economies 
the spill-over effects are mainly negative, except for the (domestic) 
supplier firms. The authors point that even 100 % increase of inward 
FDI volume creates only 1 % of new output value in developed, and 
in emerging economies even decreases output by the same amount 
(Fons-Rosen et al. 2013, 28–29). The volume of attracted FDI is 
dependent on the state of a conducive regulatory environment created 
in the host country (Fons-Rosen et al. 2013, 3).353 
36. Fortanier 2007 71 recipient countries (22 developed, 15 
from Africa and the Middle East, 11 from 
Asia, 9 from Eastern Europe and 14 from 
Latin America) and six source countries;354 
the observed period is 1989–2002 
the impact of the financial 
sector FDI on economic 
growth 
The impact of FDI on economic growth (of the host country) is 
contingent on the characteristics of the host country, primarily the 
quality of institutions and education, and openness to trade (Fortanier 
2007, 69–70).355 
37. Forte and Moura 
2013 
N/A the impact of FDI on 
economic growth 
The authors analysed the available literature on the impact of FDI on 
economic growth, and concluded that the beneficiary effect of FDI on 
economic growth of a host country in contingent on the existence of 
certain conditions (in the host country), such as the level of human 
capital and technological development, and economic openness (Forte 
and Moura 2013, 1) 
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356 Exporting has a positive impact on GDP growth (Gallova and Stavárek 2010, 497). 
357 The successfulness of attracting FDI to a large extent depends on the host country characteristics, primarily the quality of infrastructure and communication systems, 
situation in the labour market, and trade and macroeconomic policies (Görg and Greenaway 2004, 189–190). It does also depend onthe absorptive capacity of the host 
country and its geographical proximity to the country of FDI origin (Görg and Greenaway 2004, 186). 
358 Foreign investing firms are more export-oriented and offer higher wages than their domestic counterparts, have better productivity (especially through joint ventures) and 
enable transfer of know-how to the host country (Haddad and Harrison 1993, 70). 
38. Gallova and 
Stavárek 2010 
 
Slovenia; the observed period is 1996–2007 
 
the impact of FDI and 
export on economic 
growth 
FDI has a positive impact on export, i.e., it contributes to its increase 
(Gallova and Stavárek 2010, 497).356 
 
39. Gocer et al. 2012 Turkey; the observed period is 2000–2010 
 
the impact of FDI on 
export growth 
FDI has a positive impact on export growth (Gocer et al. 2012, 21). 
40. Görg and 
Greenaway 2004 
N/A the impact of FDI on 
economic growth 
FDI has a positive impact on economic growth, especially of 
developing and transition countries. The beneficial effect of FDI is 
mainly achieved through the spill-over effect comprising transfer of 
advanced technology, know-how and management skills (Görg and 
Greenaway 2004, 189–190), as well as improved productivity and 
higherlabour cost, i.e. improved living standard of domestic 
population (Görg and Greenaway 2004, 182).357 
41. Haddad and 
Harrison 1993 
Morocco; the observed period is 1985–‘89, 
(manufacturing firms with 10+ employees) 
the impact of FDI on 
economic growth 
FDI has a positive impact on economic growth (Haddad and Harrison 
1993, 70).358 
42. Hunya and 
Geishecker 2005 
 the impact of FDI on 
raising employment (in the 
host country) 
 
FDI has a positive impact onraising employment by means of 
cooperation with the host country supplier firms (Hunya and 
Geishecker 2005, 25) and industrial restructuring (Hunya and 
Geishecker 2005, 4). This opens up prospects for creating new 
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359 As factors which foreign investors especially take into account in the early stage, the authors note: functional market economy, efficacy of government institutions and the 
level of corruption, whereas cost and skills of labour force, level of productivity, exchange rate and the level of regional connectedness get important in later stage (Hunya 
and Geishecker 2005, 1). Negative effect of FDI, in the sense of job losses, may occur in the process of privatisation of the host country state-owned firms (Hunya and 
Geishecker 2005, 25). 
360 Asia: India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Hong Kong, Indonesia, South Korea, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand; Latin America: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, 
Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Guatemala, Mexico, Peru, Venezuela; Africa: Egypt, Morocco, Tunisia, Cameroon, Cote D'Ivoire, Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria, South 
Africa, Zambia. 
business opportunities, what in turn may lead to more foreign 
investment (Hunya and Geishecker 2005, 25), enhancing the private 
entrepreneurship in the host country in general (Hunya and 
Geishecker 2005, 4).359 
43. Hansen and Rand 
2006  
31 developing countries from Asia, Latin 
America and Africa;360 the observed period 
is 1970–2000 
the impact of FDI on 
economic growth 
(1) There is uni-directional positive causality from FDI to GDP 
growth in the long-term; (2) FDI exerts equally positive impact on 
economic growth as domestic investment; (3) FDI positively 
contributes to the increase of gross capital accumulation; (4) the 
effect FDI has on economic growth does not differ among regions, 
and (5) the impact FDI has on economic growth is not contingent on 
the level of development of the host country (Hansen and Rand 2006, 
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361 AFRICA: Algeria, Benin, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Gabon, Gambia, Guinea-Bissau, Cote d'Ivoire, Kenya, 
Lesotho, Madagascar, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Togo, Zimbabwe, Egypt, Ghana, Morocco, Swaziland, Tunisia, 
Zambia; LATIN AMERICA: Guatemala, Haiti, Barbados, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Trinidad and 
Tobago, Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela; ASIA AND OTHER COUNTRIES: Nepal, Papua New Guinea, 
Bangladesh, China, India, Malaysia, Pakistan, Philippines, Sri Lanka, Syria, Thailand, Hungary, Malta and Fiji. 
37–38) 
44. Hermes and 
Lensink 2003 
67 countries (32 from Africa, 21 from Latin 
America and 14 from Asia and other 
countries)361 
 
the impact of FDI on 
economic growth 
The beneficiary effect of FDI is contingent on the existence of 
developed financial system. Its level of development is positively 
correlated with the transfer of technology enabled by FDI (Hermes 
and Lensink 2003, 21). This implies that in order to be successful in 
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362 Romania, Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, Moldavia, Czech Republic, Slovakia. 
363 The authors also emphasise the quality and infrastructure and education as important factors which foreign investors take into account when deciding where to invest 
(Hudea and Stancu 2012, 100). 
364 Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. 
attracting FDI, less developed countries need to reform and improve 
their financial system (Hermes and Lensink 2003, 22). 
45. Hudea and Stancu 
2012 
 
7 countries from Eastern Europe;362 the 
observed period is 1993–2009 
 
the impact of FDI on 
economic growth 
There is bi-directional positive causality between FDI and economic 
growth. FDI enables positive spill-overs, such as transfer of 
technology (Hudea and Stancu 2012, 100).363 
46. Hunya 2004 
 
3 Baltic countries;364 the observed period is 
1995–2002  
 
the impact of FDI on 
economic growth 
FDI has a positive impact on economic growth. It helps stimulate 
industrial restructuring and enhancement of competitiveness, both 
directly by injecting new capital and bringing in techology, and 
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365 Having recognised the full potential of intensification of economic cooperation with the fast-growing emerging economies, especially those of Asia, Africa and Latin 
America, and given a relatively low volume of trade with the mentioned economies at the time, the Slovenian authorities developed economic policies to reorient towards 
these prosperous markets which were not hardly affected by the global economic crisis (Jaklič 2011, 6). 
366 DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: Algeria, Argentina, Bangladesh, Benin, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chile, 
Colombia, Democratic Republic of Congo, Republic of Congo, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guatemala, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, 
Honduras, Indonesia, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Mali, Mauritania, Mexico, Morocco, Nepal, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, 
Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Rwanda, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Sri Lanka, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Swaziland, Syrian 
Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uruguay, Venezuela, Zambia, Zimbabwe; DEVELOPED COUNTRIES: Australia, Austria, Canada, 
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United 
Kingdom, United States. 
indirectly through the spill-over effect (Hunya 2004, 109). 
47. Jaklič 2011 Slovenia 
 
the impact of outward FDI 
on economic growth 
Outward FDI has a positive impact on economic growth. It has 
proven to produce a strong beneficial effect on industrial restructuring 
(of both large (Slovenian) firms, and the SMEs alike) (Jaklič 2011, 
6).365 
48. Johnson 2006 90 economies (68 developing and 22 
developed);366 the observed period is 1980–
1992 
the impact of FDI on 
economic growth 
FDI has a positive impact on economic growth in developing, but not 
in developed countries. The authors note that this may be because in 
developed economies the positive impact that domestic investment 
has on economic growth is strong enough, so that foreign investment 
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367 Furthermore, the study also revealed that domestic investment positively affects growth in developing countries too (Johnson 2006, 44). 
368 Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Lithuania, Latvia, Poland, Slovakia, Romania, Slovenia. Western Balkans countries: Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
Croatia, Macedonia and Serbia. 
369 Hence, prospects of EU membership seem to have had a positive impact on economic growth of the acceding countries. The EU integration process brings about greater 
economic openness, which is an important factor for foreign investors (Josifidis et al. 2012, 173–174). In general terms, FDI is a generator of economic growth. It enables 
transfer of technology and improves balance of payment of the host country. Factors which foreign investors take into account are: stability of the political system, quality of 
legislation and infrastructure and macroeconomic stability (Josifidis et al. 2012, 170). 
370 Albania, Algeria, Angola, Argentina, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, Belarus, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Chile, China, Colombia, 
Congo Democratic Republic, Congo, Costa Rica, Cote d'Ivoire, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guatemala, 
Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Jamaica, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Korea Democratic Republic, Latvia, Lebanon, Liberia, 
Libya, Lithuania, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Mali, Mexico, Moldova, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Pakistan, 
Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Romania, Russia, Senegal, Serbia, Sierra Leone, Somalia, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Syrian Arab 
Republic, Tanzania, Thailand, Togo, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukraine, Uruguay, Venezuela, Vietnam, Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe. 
371 Possibility of an outbreak of a military confict, ethnical tensions or a notable influence of the military in politics are the factors that dissuade potential foreign investors 
from investing (Jude and Levieuge 2013, 16–17). 
can hardly make a difference. They also argue that there is evidence 
to believe that the causality between FDI and economic growth could 
be bi-directional. However, due to relatively low income in 
developing countries, it is more likely that the causality would go 
from FDI to economic growth. Moreover, FDI enables transfer of 
technology and accumulation of capital (Johnson 2006, 44).367 
49. Josifidis et al. 2012 15 Emerging European countries (10  from 
Central and Eastern Europe and the Baltics 
and 5 from the Western Balkans);368 the 
observed period is 1997–2009 
 
the impact of FDI and 
prospects of an eventual 
EU membership on 
economic growth 
FDI had a positive impact on economic growth in the „emerging 
European countries“ after they became member states of the EU 
(Josifidis et al. 2012, 174).369 
 
50. Jude and Levieuge 
2013 
94 developing countries;370 the observed 
period is 1984–2009 
the impact of FDI on 
economic growth 
FDI, independent of other growth factors, does not exert a positive 
impact on economic growth in developing countries. The authors 
stress the quality of institutions and democratic governance as 
determining factors for enabling positive spill-overs of FDI, such as 
transfer of technology and improved productivity (Jude and Levieuge 
2013, 16–17).371 
 
51. King 2000 Hungary (firm-level study) the impact of FDI on FDI has a positive impact on economic growth of the host country 
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372 Poland, Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovakia, Slovenia. 
373 (1) high income countries: Hong Kong, Japan, Korea, Singapore and Taiwan, (2) middle income countries: China, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines and Thailand, 
and (3) low income countries: Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and Vietnam. 
374 Low volume of FDI in Russia and consequently its insignificant impact on economic growth is mainly due to structural reasons in relation to the Russian economy 
(ineffective industrial sector). Export and domestic investment have the most significant effect on economic growth in Russia (Ledyaeva and Linden 2006, 29). 
economic growth (King 2000). 
52. Kornecki and 
Raghavan 2011 
5 countries from Central and Eastern 
Europe;372 the observed period is 1960–2006 
the impact of (inward) FDI 
on economic growth 
(Inward) FDI has a positive impact on economic growth and its 
sustainability (Kornecki and Raghavan 2011, 553–554). 
53. Kotrajaras et al. 
2011 
15 Asian countries (3 groups: with high 
income, middle income and low income);373 
the observed period is 1990–2010 
 
the impact of (inward) FDI 
on economic growth 
FDI has a positive impact on economic growth in high- and middle-
income countries, due to high investment in education, infrastructure 
and a high level of financial development and openness to trade, the 
factors of immense importance for attracting foreign investors. The 
authors also stress index of corruption as another factor in terms of 
attracting FDI – middle-income countries with relatively high 
prevalence of corruption, despite a satisfying level of financial 
development and openness to trade, will not attract as much FDI as 
they otherwise would have. On the other side, low-income countries 
are likely to benefit less from FDI, as they have a low level of 
openness to trade and investment in education, weak financial 
development, in addition to prevalent corruption. As such, they (low-
income countries) are not able to attract enough FDI and to take 
advantage of its spill-over benefits (Kotrajaras et al. 2011, 198). 
54. Ledyaeva and 
Linden 2006 
74 Russian regions; the observed period is 
1996–2003 
the impact of (inward) FDI 
on economic growth 
FDI does not have a significant impact on economic growth. Only the 
higher-income regions benefit from FDI, though not significantly 
(Ledyaeva and Linden 2006, 29).374 
55. Leitão and Rasekhi 
2013 
Portugal; the observed period is 1995–2008 the impact of FDI on 
economic growth 
FDI has a positive impact on economic growth. The beneficial effect 
is mainly achieved by means ofthe transfer of technology, 
management and know-how and by enhancing competition (Leitão 
and Rasekhi 2013, 59). 
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375 The authors further argue that not all types of FDI equally response to political or economic instability (Lensink and Morrissey 2001, 24). For instance, FDI in 
manufacturing sector is more crisis-sensitive than in natural resource extraction sector (Lensink and Morrissey 2001, 25). 
376 Taiwan, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Vietnam. 
377 Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Macedonia, Georgia, Hungary, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, 
Poland, Romania, Russia, Slovenia, Slovakia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia and Montenegro (Serbia and Montenegro then 
as one country). 
378 Reform policies include: price liberalisation, foreign exchange and trade liberalisation, privatisation of small state-owned enterprises, privatisation of large state-owned 
enterprises, enterprise reform, competition policy, bank reform, and reform of non-bank financial institutions (Malesky 2009, 62) 
56. Lensink and 
Morrissey 2001 
88 countries(not listed); the observed period 
is 1975–1998  
the impact of FDI on 
economic growth 
FDI has a positive impact on economic growth. The beneficial effect 
of FDI on economic growth is not contingent on the level of human 
capital (in the host country) (Lensink and Morrissey 2001, 24).375 
57. Lipsey and 
Sjöholm 2010 
8 countries of South-East Asia;376 the 
observed period is 1980–2009  
the impact of FDI on 
economic growth 
FDI has a positive impact on economic growth; the beneficial effect is 
mostly achieved via the transfer of technology enabled by FDI 
(Lipsey and Sjöholm 2010, 30). 
58. Liu et al. 2002 
 
China; the observed period is 1981–1997 
 
the impact of FDI and 
trade on economic growth 
 
There is bi-directional positive causality between FDI, export, and 
economic growth in the long-term. The authors also found uni-
directional positive causality from FDI, export and GDP, and import 
in the short-term (Liu et al. 2002, 1439). 
59. Malesky 2009 27 transition countries;377 the observed 
period is 1992–2004 
 
the impact of FDI on 
reforms 
FDI exerts a positive impact on economic reform. 1 % increase in the 
volume of inward FDI exerts a positive effect on intensity of 
economic reform by 6.3 % in the year after (Malesky 2009, 62).378 
60. Mani 2013 
 
Turkey, Morocco and Egypt; the observed 
period is 1980–2011 
 
the impact of FDI on 
economic growth 
(1) FDI has a positive impact on economic growth in Turkey, and (2) 
FDI does not have a positive impact on economic growth in Morocco 
and Egypt. The author concludes that the less developed the 
countries, the less benefit they are likely to have from FDI (Mani 
2013, 104). 
61. Marasco 2007 51 countries of Latin America, East Asia and 
Pacific, South Asia, Africa, Middle East, 
the impact of FDI on 
economic growth, and 
(1) FDI does not exert a strong positive impact on economic growth; 
its beneficial impact is not significant, and (2) economic integration is 
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379 Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Columbia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Mexico, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, Venezuela, Bangladesh, China, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, 
Pakistan, Philippines, Republic of Korea, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Egypt, Nigeria, South Africa, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Russia, Turkey, Australia, Austria, 
Belgium and Luxembourg, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, 
Switzerland, United Kingdom, United States. 
380 Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Macedonia, Romania, Serbia. 
381 Domestic investment does have a positive, but still not significant, impact on economic growth (Mehic et al. 2013, 15).  
382 Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovenia, Slovakia 
383 Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, 
Montenegro, Serbia, Turkey; Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Russia, Tajikistan, Ukraine, Uzbekistan. 
Eastern Europe, as well as the OECD 
countries;379 the observed period is 1990–
2004 
economic integration on 
FDI 
a significant determinant of FDI, in the sense that the higher level of 
economic integration, the more likely it is that FDI will have a 
positive impact on economic growth (of a host country) (Marasco 
2007, 10). 
62. Mehic et al. 2013 7 countries from South-Eastern Europe;380 
the observed period is 1998–2007 
the impact of FDI on 
economic growth 
FDI has a positive effect on economic growth (Mehic et al. 2013, 15). 
Absorption capacity of a host country (such as level of technological 
development and financial capacity), as well as the level of openness 
to trade, degree of inflation and the overall macroeconomic stability, 
determine whether its economy will take advantage of the spill-over 
effects from FDI (Mehic et al. 2013, 16, 17).381 
63. Mencinger 2009 8 countries from Central Europe and the 
Baltics;382 the observed period is 1996–2008 
the impact of FDI on 
current account balance 
Foreign investment has produced a positive effect on current account 
balance of a host country via improving trade account, and a negative 
effect via worsening investment account (Mencinger 2009, 15). 
64. Misztal 2010 Romania; the observed period is 2000–2009 the impact of FDI on 
economic growth 
FDI has a positive impact on economic growth. It was one of the 
main generators of economic growth (of Romania) in the given period 
(Misztal 2010, 48). 
65. Monastiriotis 2014 28 transition countries;383 the observed 
period is 2002–2009 
the impact of FDI on 
productivity and economic 
growth 
(1) EU-originated FDI seems to be more productive than FDI 
originating from outside the EU, in the sense that the first offers more 
beneficial effects for domestic firms of the host country. In part, this 
may be explained by the process of EU integration, which grants 
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384 Foreign investors rather choose to invest in firms and sectors characterised by high productivity (Monastiriotis and Jordaan 2011, 33). 
385 Asia: Philippines, Jordan, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Vietnam, Pakistan, Thailand, Indonesia, India, China, Bhutan, Nepal, Lao PDR, Iran, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyz 
Republic, Mongolia, Sri Lanka, Georgia, Bangladesh; Africa: Tunisia, Algeria, Congo Republic, Morocco, Nigeria, Egypt, Angola, Burundi, Malawi, Rwanda, Cameroon, 
Benin, Sierra Leone, Lesotho, Kenya, Madagascar, Togo, Senegal, Guinea, Zimbabwe, Mozambique, Mauritania, Ghana, Mali, Cote d’Ivoire, Ethiopia, Uganda, Zambia, 
Namibia, Chad; Latin America: Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Peru, Colombia, Bolivia, Guatemala, Paraguay, Nicaragua, Honduras, El Salvador) (*countries in bold 
have received the biggest volume of FDI). 
386 In general, FDI enables positive spill-over effects (transfer of technology and advanced management) (Mottaleb 2007, 1). 
387 Austria, Belgium/Luxembourg, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom. 
388 EU group: Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Malta, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom; ASEAN 
group: Indonesia, Singapore, Philippines, Thailand. 
firms from the EU a preferential status in the acceding countries over 
the others, non-EU firms, and (2) FDI spill-over effects seem to be 
more welfare-enhancing in areas centering around the capital cities of 
the host countries (Monastiriotis 2014, 30). 
66. Monastiriotis and 
Jordaan 2011 
Greece; the observed period is 2002–2006 the impact of FDI on 
economic growth 
FDI has a positive impact on economic growth in peripheral areas, 
and a negative impact in urban areas (Monastiriotis and Jordaan 2011, 
34–35). The authors note that FDI does not improve productivity of 
the host country domestic firms (Monastiriotis and Jordaan 2011, 
33).384  
67. Mottaleb 2007 60 developing countries from Asia, Africa 
and Latin America;385 the observed period is 
2003–2005 
the impact of FDI on 
economic growth 
FDI has a positive impact on economic growth. It (FDI) helps 
stimulate industrial development. The market size and quality of 
infrastructure are among the main determinants of FDI - the bigger 
the domestic market, and the better infrastructure of the host country, 
the more FDI it is likely to receive (Mottaleb 2007, 9–10).386 
68. Moudatsou 2003 14 countries;387 the observed period is 1980–
1996 
the impact of FDI on 
economic growth 
FDI has a positive impact on economic growth (both directly and 
indirectly). The beneficial effect of FDI on economic growth in the 
EU economies under survey is not contingent on the level of human 
capital, as is the case in developing countries. This is explained by the 
fact that the level of human capital in the sample countries is above 
the necessary sufficient level to enable positive (spill-over) effect of 
FDI to occur (Moudatsou 2003, 705). 
69. Moudatsou and 
Kyrkilis 2011 
16 EU and 4 ASEAN countries;388 the 
observed period is 1970–2003 
the impact of FDI on 
economic growth 
There is evidence that economic growth positively affects the inflow 
of FDI in developed and developing countries, but not vice versa. In 
other words, there is weak evidence that FDI has a positive impact on 
economic growth. More specifically, of the surveyed EU countries, 
the FDI-induced economic growth was found only in Finland, while 
bi-directional link was not found in any; in ASEAN countries group, 
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389 Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Lithuania, Latvia, Poland, Slovenia, Slovakia. 
bi-directional causality is present only in Indonesia, while in none 
was found uni-directional link from FDI to economic growth 
(Moudatsou and Kyrkilis 2011, 573). 
70. Neuhaus 2006 13 transition countries of Central and 
Eastern Europe (not listed) 
the impact of FDI on 
economic growth 
(1) FDI exerts a substantially stronger positive impact on economic 
growth than domestic investment; (2) FDI enables technological 
transfer from the investing to the host country (Neuhaus 2006, 154); 
(3) Market size and investment environment have an impact on 
foreign investors’ decisions, in the sense that the larger the market 
and the better investment-friendly environment, the more likely the 
foreign investors will come to invest; (4) The authors did not find that 
the distance between the investing country and the targeted country 
matters for prospective foreign investors; (5) Cost of labourdoes have 
an impact of foreign investors’ decisions, in the sense that the higher 
the labour cost, the less attractive it becomes for foreign investors; (6) 
Political and macroeconomic stability, fiscal and monetary policy are 
also the factors which matter for foreign investors, and (7) FDI 
positively influence the overall transition process (Neuhaus 2006, 
151).  
71. Ozturk and 
Acaravci 2010 
Turkey; the observed period is 1998–2009 the impact of FDI on 
economic growth 
(1) There is a strong uni-directional positive causality from FDI to 
import-led economic growth, and both strong and weak uni-
directional positive causality from FDI to GDP growth; (2) There is a 
long-term uni-directional positive causality from FDI and GDP to 
import-led economic growth, and (3) There is a long-term uni-
directional positive causality from import-led economic growth and 
FDI to GDP growth (Ozturk and Acaravci 2010, 112–113). 
72. Pelinescu and 
Râdulescu 2009 
8 countries from Central and Eastern 
Europe;389 the observed period is 1992–2004 
the impact of FDI on 
economic and export 
growth 
FDI has a positive impact on economic growth. It also positively 
influences growth of export and enhances its structure, whereat 
adding more high-added value to it, making it more technologically 
advanced and therefore competitive. In addition, FDI stimulates 
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390 Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovenia, Slovakia. 
391 Diversification of FDI in the host country positively correlates with the volume of attracted (inward) FDI and the share of export in GDP; this implies that the higher the 
volume of inward FDI (attracted by the host country), and the more export-oriented the host countries, the more diversified FDI is likely to become (Radosevic et al. 2003, 
83–86). 
392 Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Georgia, Hungary, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, 
Moldova, Poland, Romania, Russia, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Tajikistan, Turkey, Ukraine, Uzbekistan. 
393 Domestic investment and export also positively affect economic growth (Sapienza 2010, 133) 
development of the supplier firms (from the host country) and their 
international engagement (Pelinescu and Râdulescu 2009, 160). 
73. Radosevic et al. 
2003 
5 countries from Central Europe;390 the 
observed period is 1993–1999 
the impact of FDI on 
employment 
FDI has a positive impact on the increase of employment in all 
sample countries, and has been generally important for international 
integration of the transition economies (Radosevic et al. 2003, 83–
86).391 
74. Sapienza 2010 25 transition countries;392 the observed 
period is 1990–2005 
the impact of FDI on 
economic growth 
Initially, FDI had a positive effect on economic growth in the 
transition countries, whereas that is not the case with current FDI 
inflow (Sapienza 2010, 133).393 
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394 Tunisia, Morocco, Algeria and Egypt. 
395 Bahrain, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Kuwait. 
75. Sen 2011 India; the observed period is 1970–2008 
 
the impact of FDI on 
economic growth and the 
service sector 
There is bi-directional causality between GDP and FDI, and FDI and 
the service sector (Sen 2011, 153, 154). 
76. Sghaier and Abida 
2013 
4 North African countries;394 the observed 
period is 1980–2011 
the impact of FDI on 
economic growth 
The positive impact of FDI on economic growth of the host country is 
contingent on the level of development of its financial system 
(Sghaier and Abida 2013, 8). 
77. Singh 2013 India; the observed period is 1970–2012 the impact of FDI on 
economic growth 
FDI has a positive impact on economic growth in the long-term 
(Singh 2013, 11) 
 
78. Soleimani and 
Behname 2012 
5 countries from the Middle East;395 the 
observed period is 1980–2010 
the impact of FDI on 
economic growth 
FDI has a positive impact on economic growth. Human capital, stock 
capital, infrastructure and openness to trade are the most significant 
determinants of FDI (Soleimani and Behname 2012, 71, 72). 
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396 The authors also found a uni-directional causality from export to GDP and FDI (Stylianou 2014, 33–34). 
79. Svetlicic 2007 Slovenia; the observed period is 1996–2005 the impact of outward FDI 
on economic growth 
Outward FDI has a positive impact on economic growth. It has helped 
enhance domestic (Slovenian) firms’ competitiveness, diversify 
product line-up and generate employment both at home as well as in 
the host country (Svetlicic 2007, 80). 
80. Stylianou  2014 United States; the observed period is 1975–
2010 
the impact of FDI and 
trade on economic growth 
(1) There is uni-directional positive causality from GDP to FDI 
(Stylianou  2014, 33–34).396 
81. Temiz and Turkey the impact of FDI on FDI does not have a significant positive impact on GDP growth in the 
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397 Australia, Austria, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, 
Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States. 
398 Algeria, Argentina, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Benin, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, 
Congo Democratic Republic, Costa Rica, Cote D’Ivoire, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Gabon, Ghana, Guatemala, Guinea-Bissau, Haiti, Honduras, 
Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Iran, Israel, Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, South Korea, Kuwait, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Mali, Mauritius, Mexico, Morocco, Myanmar, 
Namibia, Nepal, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, South 
Africa, Sri Lanka, Syria, Taiwan, Tanzania, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, Uganda, Uruguay, Venezuela, Zambia, 
Zimbabwe. 
Gökmen 2013 economic growth short- and the long-term (Temiz and Gökmen 2013, 145)  
82. Türkcan and 
Yetkiner 2008 
23 OECD countries;397 the observed period 
is 1975–2004 
the impact of FDI on 
economic growth 
There is bi-directional causality between FDI and economic growth, 
whereat economic growth positively affects FDI more strongly than 
vice versa (Türkcan and Yetkiner 2008, 12). 
83. Vadlamannati and 
Tamazian 2009 
80 developing countries;398 the observed 
period is 1980–2006 
 
the impact of FDI and 
policy reform on economic 
growth 
FDI and institutional and policy reforms have a positive impact on 
economic growth (Vadlamannati and Tamazian 2009, 313–318). 
84. Wacker 2011 111 developing low-income and middle- the impact of FDI on FDI has a positive impact on trade development and hence economic 
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399 Low-income countries: Afghanistan, Armenia, Burundi, Benin, Burkina Faso, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Cambodia, Central African Republic, Chad, China, Comoros, Eritrea, 
Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea, Gambia, Guinea-Bissau, Equatorial Guinea, Guyana, Haiti, Indonesia, India, Kenya, Lao PDR, Liberia, Sri Lanka, Lesotho, Madagascar, Maldives, 
Mali, Myanmar, Mozambique, Mauritania, Malawi, Niger, Nigeria, Nepal, Pakistan, Rwanda, Sudan, Solomon Islands, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sao Tome and Principe, Togo, 
Timor-Leste, Tanzania, Uganda, Vietnam, Congo (Democratic Republic), Zambia; medium-low-income countries: Albania, Angola, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Belize, Bolivia, 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Chile, Colombia, Congo (Republic), Costa Rica, Cote d'Ivoire, Cuba, Djibouti, Dominica, Dominican Republic, 
Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Fiji, Geogria, Grenada, Guatemala, Honduras, Jamaica, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kiribati, Korea (Democratic Republic), Kyrgyz Republic, Lebanon, 
Macedonia, Malaysia, Mauritius, Mexico, Micronesia, Mongolia, Montenegro, Morocco, Namibia, Nicaragua, Northern Mariana Islands, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, 
The Philippines, Poland, Samoa, Senegal, Slovak Republic, South Africa, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Swaziland, Syrian Arab Republic, Tajikistan, Thailand, 
Tonga, Tunisia, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Vanuatu, Yemen and Zimbabwe. 
400 Bangladesh, Mainland China, Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Pakistan, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Taiwan. 
401 FDI exerts better growth-enhancing effect on the economy of the host country than domestic investment (Wang 2009, 996).  
402 Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Bolivia, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Finland, France, Greece, Germany, 
Guatemala, Honduras, Hong Kong, Hungary, Iceland, India, Israel, Italy, Japan, Mexico, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Paraguay, Peru, Poland, Russia, South Africa, Spain, 
Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, United Kingdom, Uruguay, United States, Venezuela. 
403 Openness to trade positively affects economic growth, while corruption negatively affects it (Wijeweera et al. 2010, 153–156). 
404 Canada, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Mexico, Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Columbia, Ecuador, Peru, Venezuela, Hong Kong, India, Israel, Japan, Korea, Malaysia, 
Philippines, Singapore, Taiwan, Thailand, Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, the Netherland, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, 
Switzerland, Turkey, United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand. 
low-income countries;399 the observed 
period is 1980-2008 
economic growth growth in developing countries (Wacker 2011). 
85. Wang 2009 
 
12 Asian economies;400 the observed period 
is 1987–1997 
the impact of FDI on 
economic growth 
FDI inflow in the manufacturing sector of the host country has a 
positive impact on economic growth, while it does not in the non-
manufacturing sector. Moreover, it might happen that FDI has a 
positive impact on the overall economic growth, and at the same time 
not to positively affect per capita income (Wang 2009, 1000). In order 
to benefit from FDI spill-over effects, the host country needs to have 
a sufficient level of technological development (Wang 2009, 996).401  
86. Wijeweera et al. 
2010 
45 countries;402 the observed period is 1997–
2004 
the impact of FDI on 
economic growth 
FDI has a positive impact on economic growth and enables transfer of 
technology only under the condition that a host country disposes of a 
sufficient level of skilled labour (Wijeweera et al. 2010, 153–156).403 
87. Xu 2000 40 countries;404 the observed period is 1966–
1994 
the impact of FDI on 
economic growth 
FDI has a positive impact on economic growth of the host country if 
it (the host country) disposes of a necessary sufficient level of human 
capital. Furthermore, developed recipient countries benefit far more 
from transfer of technology enabled by FDI spill-overs than 
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405 The authors also found a correlation between the increase of export and the increase of volume of inward FDI. Moreover, they argue that openness to trade and currency 
devaluation stimulated growth of export and that FDI and export have been the main drivers of economic growth in China (Yao 2006, 348–349). 
 
developing countries (Xu 2000, 491). 
88. Yao 2006 28 Chinese provinces; the observed period is 
1978–2001 
the impact of FDI on 
economic growth 
FDI has a positive impact on economic growth. It did also enable the 
spill-over effect via transfer of technology and business know-how 
(Yao 2006, 348–349).405 
89. Zhang 1999 10 Asian countries the impact of FDI on 
economic growth 
FDI has a positive impact on economic growth via the transfer of 
technology and know-how. It (FDI) has had a long-term 
growthenhancement effect in China, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Japan 
and Taiwan, and a short-term (growth-enhancement effect) in 
Singapore (Zhang 1999). 
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Appendix E 
Figure E.1: GDP growth rate for the selected countries, for the period 2000–2015406 
 
 
Source: World Bank – World Development Indicators 
 
Figure E.2: GDP per capita (current USD) for the selected countries, for the period 2000–2015407 
 
Source: World Bank – World Development Indicators 
 
  
                                                          
406 “Percentage change of real GDP compared to previous year. Real GDP is adjusted for inflation.” 
407 “GDP per capita is product divided by midyear population. GDP is the sum of gross value added by all 
resident producers in the economy plus any product taxes and minus any subsidies not included in the value of 
the products. It is calculated without making deductions for depreciation of fabricated assets or for depletion and 
degradation of natural resources. Data are in current U.S. dollars.” 
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Figure E.3: GDP per capita growth for the selected countries (annual %), for the period 2000–2015408 
 
 
Source: World Bank – World Development Indicators 
 
Table E.1: Export of goods and services (% of GDP) for the selected countries, for the period 2000–2015 
 
Year 
Country 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
Serbia 9.9 22.4 20.6 22 24.2 27.1 30.3 28.4 29.1 26.8 32.9 34 36.9 41.2 43.4 46.7 50.9 
Bulgaria 36.5 35 33.7 34.5 41.1 42.6 47.1 52 52.3 42.4 50.2 59.1 60.8 64.7 65 64.1 63.6 
Czech R. 48.3 49.1 45.2 47.1 57.4 62.3 65.3 66.6 63.4 58.8 66.2 71.3 76.2 76.9 82.5 83 80.3 
Estonia 61.6 61.3 58.3 57.4 61.5 65.9 63.5 63.2 66.8 60.8 75.1 86.5 86 84.5 83.1 79.3 79.6 
Hungary 66.8 64.9 58.1 56.4 59.7 62.8 74.3 78.3 79.6 74.8 82.2 87.2 86.8 86 88.7 90.7 92.5 
Latvia 36.9 38.1 36.6 36.1 39.1 43.2 40 38.5 39.5 42.6 53.7 57.9 61.4 60.3 59.6 59 58 
Lithuania 38.5 44 47.3 46.2 47.4 53.9 55.7 50.4 57.1 51.9 65.3 75 81.7 84.1 81.2 76.5 74.3 
Romania 32.7 33 35.2 34.5 35.6 32.9 32.1 29.1 26.9 27.4 32.3 36.8 37.5 39.7 41.2 41.1 41.4 
Poland 27.2 27.2 28.8 33.4 34.3 34.6 37.9 38.6 37.9 37.2 40.1 42.6 44.4 46.3 47.6 49.5 52.3 
Slovak 
R. 
54.1 57.8 57.5 62.2 68.7 72 81 83.3 80 67.6 76.3 85 91.4 93.8 91.8 93.5 
93.8 
Slovenia 50 51.7 52.2 50.9 55 59.6 64.7 67.6 66.1 57.2 64.3 70.4 73.3 75.2 76.4 77.9 79.1 
Source: World Bank – World Development Indicators 
 
 
  
                                                          
408 “Annual percentage growth rate of GDP per capita based on constant local currency. GDP per capita is 
product divided by midyear population. GDP at purchaser's prices is the sum of gross value added by all 
resident producers in the economy plus any product taxes and minus any subsidies not included in the value of 
the products. It is calculated without making deductions for depreciation of fabricated assets or for depletion and 
degradation of natural resources.” 
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Table E.2: Exports of goods and services (billion USD) for the selected countries, for the period 2000–2015 
 
Year 
Country 2000 2005 2010 2015 
Serbia 644.4* 7.1 13 17.3 
Bulgaria 3.5 9.2 14.6 17.8 
Czech R. 29.7 84.7 137 153.6 
Estonia 3.5 9.2 14.6 17.8 
Hungary 31.5 70.7 107.1 110.4 
Latvia 2.9 7.3 12.8 15.9 
Lithuania 12.2 32.8 54.3 73.1 
Poland 46.8 106 192 236.4 
Romania 4.8 12.7 25.4 32.2 
Slovak R. 15.7 45.2 68.3 81.6 
Slovenia 10.2 21.7 30.9 33.3 
Source: World Bank – World Development Indicators 
 
Figure E.4: Foreign direct investment for the selected countries, net inflows (% of GDP), for the period 2000–
2015409 
 
Source: World Bank – World Development Indicators 
 
  
                                                          
409 “Foreign direct investment are the net inflows of investment to acquire a lasting management interest (10 
percent or more of voting stock) in an enterprise operating in an economy other than that of the investor. It is the 
sum of equity capital, reinvestment of earnings, other long-term capital, and short-term capital as shown in the 
balance of payments. This series shows net inflows (new investment inflows less disinvestment) in the reporting 
economy from foreign investors, and is divided by GDP.” 
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Figure E.5: Foreign direct investment for the selected countries, net inflows (BoP, current USD), for the period 
2000–2015 
 
Source: World Bank – World Development Indicators 
 
Figure E.6: Current account balance for the selected countries (%), for the period 2000–2020 (forecast) 410 
 
Source: IMF – online database 
 
  
                                                          
410 “Current account is all transactions other than those in financial and capital items. The major classifications 
are goods and services, income and current transfers. The focus of the BOP is on transactions (between an 
economy and the rest of the world) in goods, services, and income.” 
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Figure E.7: Savings for the selected countries (% of GDP), for the period 2000–2015411 
 
Source: World Bank – World Development Indicators 
 
Figure E.8: Investment for the selected countries (% of GDP), for the period 2000–2020 (forecast) 412 
Source: World Bank – World Development Indicator 
                                                          
411 “Savings are calculated as GDP less final consumption expenditure (total consumption).” 
412 “Investment is measured by the total value of the gross fixed capital formation and changes in inventories 
and acquisitions less disposals of valuables for a unit or sector.” 
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Table E.3: Agriculture, value-added (% of GDP) for the selected countries, for the period 2000–2016 
 
Year 
Country 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
Serbia 19,9 20 15 13,4 13,9 12 11,4 10 10,3 9,6 10,2 10,7 9 9,4 9,3 8,2 N/A 
Bulgaria 12,6 12,1 10,9 10,4 9,8 8,5 7,2 5,4 7,0 4,9 4,8 5,3 5,3 5,3 5,3 4,8 4,4 
Czech R. 3,4 3,3 2,8 2,6 2,5 2,4 2,3 2,2 2,1 1,8 1,7 2,4 2,6 2,7 2,7 2,5 2,5 
Estonia 4,8 4,7 4,2 4,0 3,9 3,5 3,1 3,5 2,7 2,4 3,2 3,9 3,7 3,5 3,6 3,4 2,9 
Hungary 5,7 5,6 4,8 4,5 5,0 4,3 4,0 4,0 3,9 3,5 3,5 4,6 4,6 4,6 4,7 4,1 4,5 
Latvia 5,1 5,0 5,1 4,5 4,8 4,3 3,7 3,7 3,3 3,7 4,4 3,9 3,7 4,0 3,5 3,4 3,2 
Lithuania 6,3 5,5 5,4 4,9 4,6 4,8 4,3 3,9 3,7 2,8 3,3 3,9 4,4 3,9 3,8 3,6 3,3 
Poland 3,5 3,6 3,1 2,9 3,7 3,3 3,0 3,4 2,9 2,8 2,9 3,2 3,0 3,2 2,9 2,5 2,4 
Romania 12,0 14,5 12,6 12,9 14,0 9,5 8,7 5,5 6,6 6,0 6,3 7,3 5,3 6,1 5,3 4,7 4,3 
Slovak 
R. 
4,4 5,0 5,0 4,4 4,1 3,6 3,6 4,0 4,1 3,3 2,8 3,4 3,5 4,0 4,4 3,7 3,8 
Slovenia 3,3 3,0 3,2 2,4 2,6 2,6 2,3 2,1 1,9 1,9 2,0 2,3 2,1 2,1 2,4 2,4 2,3 
Source: Statistical Office of the Republic of Serbia 
 
Figure E.9: Research and development expenditure for the selected countries (% of GDP), for the period 2000–
2014413 
 
Source: World Bank – World Development Indicators 
 
  
                                                          
413 “Expenditures for research and development are current and capital expenditures (both public and private) on 
creative work undertaken systematically to increase knowledge, including knowledge of humanity, culture, and 
society, and the use of knowledge for new applications. R and D covers basic research, applied research, and 
experimental development.” 
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Figure E.10: High-technology exports for the selected countries (% of manufactured exports), for the period 
2000–2015414 
Source: World Bank – World Development Indicators 
 
Figure E.11: Inflation-consumer prices for the selected countries, for the period 2000–2015415 
 
Source: World Bank – World Development Indicators 
 
  
                                                          
414 “High-technology exports are products with high R and D intensity, such as in aerospace, computers, 
pharmaceuticals, scientific instruments, and electrical machinery.” 
415 “Inflation as measured by the consumer price index reflects the annual percentage change in the cost to the 
average consumer of acquiring a basket of goods and services that may be fixed or changed at specified 
intervals, such as yearly.” 
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Figure E.12: Unemployment rate for the selected countries (%), for the period 2000–2020 (forecast) 416 
 
Source: IMF – online database 
Table E.4: Ease of doing business rank for the selected countries, for the year 2016 
 
Year 
Country 2016 
Serbia 54/190 
Bulgaria 37/190 
Czech Republic 26/190 
Estonia 11/190 
Hungary 40/190 
Latvia 17/190 
Lithuania 21/190 
Poland 25/190 
Romania 35/190 
Slovak Republic 30/190 
Slovenia 30/190 
Source: Own elaboration based on data of the Statistical office of the Republic of Serbia - online database 
 
  
                                                          
416 “The International Labour Organization (ILO) defines the unemployed as members of the economically 
active population who are without work but available for and seeking work, including people who have lost 
their jobs or who have voluntarily left who have lost their jobs or who have voluntarily left work.” 
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Table E.5: Rank and score (by perceived level of corruption in the public sector) for the selected countries, for 
the year 2016 
Country Rank Score* 
Serbia 72/176 42/100 
Bulgaria 75/176 41/100 
Czech Republic 47/176 55/100 
Estonia 22/176 70/100 
Hungary 57/176 48/100 
Latvia 44/176 57/100 
Lithuania 38/176 59/100 
Poland 29/176 62/100 
Romania 57/176 48/100 
Slovakia 54/176 51/100 
Slovenia 31/176 61/100 
*Perceived level of corruption in the public sector 
Note: 0 indicates the most corrupt and 100 indicates the least corrupt. 
Source: Own elaboration based on data of Transparency International - online database 
Table E.6: Global competitiveness position of Serbia vis-a-vis the selected countries, for the period 2000–
2016/’17 
 
Year 
Country 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
Serbia 90/138 94/140 94/144 101/148 95/144 95/142 96/139 93/133 85/134 91/131 87/125 85/117 89/104 77/102 N/A N/A N/A 
Bulgaria 50/138 54/140 54/144 57/148 62/144 74/142 71/139 76/133 76/134 79/131 72/125 61/117 59/104 64/102 58/80 59/75 57/59 
Czech R. 31/138 37/140 37/144 46/148 39/144 38/142 36/139 31/133 33/134 33/131 29/125 29/117 40/104 39/102 36/80 37/75 31/59 
Estonia 30/138 30/140 29/144 32/148 34/144 33/142 33/139 35/133 32/134 27/131 25/125 26/117 20/104 22/102 27/80 29/75 N/A 
Hungary 69/138 63/140 60/144 63/148 60/144 48/142 52/139 58/133 62/134 47/131 41/125 35/117 39/104 33/102 29/80 28/75 25/59 
Latvia 49/138 44/140 42/144 52/148 55/144 64/142 70/139 68/133 54/134 45/131 36/125 39/117 44/104 37/102 43/80 47/75 N/A 
Lithuania 35/138 36/140 41/144 48/148 45/144 44/142 47/139 53/133 44/134 38/131 40/125 34/117 36/104 40/102 39/80 43/75 N/A 
Poland 36/138 41/140 43/144 42/148 41/144 41/142 39/139 46/133 53/134 51/131 48/125 43/117 60/104 45/102 50/80 41/75 34/59 
Romania 62/138 53/140 59/144 76/148 78/144 77/142 67/139 64/133 68/134 74/131 68/125 67/117 63/104 75/102 67/80 56/75 N/A 
Slovak R. 65/138 67/140 75/144 78/148 71/144 69/142 60/139 47/133 46/134 41/131 37/125 36/117 43/104 43/102 46/80 40/75 38/59 
Slovenia 56/138 59/140 70/144 62/148 56/144 57/142 45/139 37/133 42/134 39/131 33/125 30/117 33/104 31/102 26/80 31/75 N/A 
Note: Serbia and Montenegro from 2000-2006 
Note: Data for 2000 and 2002 are revised. 
Source: World Economic Forum - Global Competitiveness Reports 
Table E.7: Worldwide Governance Indicators for Serbia, for the period 2000–2015 
 
Year 
Indicator 2000 2005 2010 2015 
Voice and accountability 27 44 56 56 
Political stability and absence of violence/terrorism 7 25 31 56 
Government effectiveness 18 45 52 58 
Regulatory quality 18 30 53 57 
Rule of law 8 19 42 54 
Control of corruption 7 44 49 51 
Note: 0 indicates the lowest rank and 100 indicates the highest rank. 
Source: Own elaboration based on data of the World Bank Group’s Worldwide Governance Indicators – online 
database 
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Table E.4a: Worldwide Governance Indicators for Bulgaria, for the period 2000–2015 
 
Year 
Indicator 2000 2005 2010 2015 
Voice and accountability 60 65 64 61 
Political stability and absence of violence/terrorism 59 52 56 50 
Government effectiveness 54 61 59 62 
Regulatory quality 58 69 74 71 
Rule of law 44 48 52 53 
Control of corruption 52 57 52 49 
Note: 0 indicates the lowest rank and 100 indicates the highest rank. 
Source: Own elaboration based on data of the World Bank Group’s Worldwide Governance Indicators – online 
database 
Table E.7b:  Worldwide Governance Indicators for Czech Republic, for the period 2000–2015 
 
Year 
Indicator 2000 2005 2010 2015 
Voice and accountability 69 74 77 78 
Political stability and absence of violence/terrorism 56 77 82 81 
Government effectiveness 75 79 78 82 
Regulatory quality 75 82 86 81 
Rule of law 68 76 80 83 
Control of corruption 62 68 65 67 
Note: 0 indicates the lowest rank and 100 indicates the highest rank. 
Source: Own elaboration based on data of the World Bank Group’s Worldwide Governance Indicators – online database 
Table E.7c: Worldwide Governance Indicators for Estonia, for the period 2000–2015 
 
Year 
Indicator 2000 2005 2010 2015 
Voice and accountability 77 80 83 85 
Political stability and absence of violence/terrorism 73 65 68 66 
Government effectiveness 77 81 82 83 
Regulatory quality 90 89 90 93 
Rule of law 67 81 84 87 
Control of corruption 75 80 79 87 
Note: 0 indicates the lowest rank and 100 indicates the highest rank. 
Source: Own elaboration based on data of the World Bank Group’s Worldwide Governance Indicators – online 
database 
Table E.7d: Worldwide Governance Indicators for Hungary, for the period 2000–2015 
 
Year 
Indicator 2000 2005 2010 2015 
Voice and accountability 87 87 75 66 
Political stability and absence of violence/terrorism 75 80 69 70 
Government effectiveness 81 75 72 71 
Regulatory quality 83 83 81 74 
Rule of law 77 77 72 67 
Control of corruption 76 72 65 61 
Note: 0 indicates the lowest rank and 100 indicates the highest rank. 
Source: Own elaboration based on data of the World Bank Group’s Worldwide Governance Indicators – online 
database 
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Table E.7e: Worldwide Governance Indicators for Latvia, for the period 2000–2015 
 
Year 
Indicator 2000 2005 2010 2015 
Voice and accountability 68 72 70 73 
Political stability and absence of violence/terrorism 57 71 64 60 
Government effectiveness 63 71 74 84 
Regulatory quality 77 77 80 82 
Rule of law 56 67 73 76 
Control of corruption 48 64 62 68 
Note: 0 indicates the lowest rank and 100 indicates the highest rank. 
Source: Own elaboration based on data of the World Bank Group’s Worldwide Governance Indicators – online 
database 
Table E.7f: Worldwide Governance Indicators for Lithuania, for the period 2000–2015 
 
Year 
Indicator 2000 2005 2010 2015 
Voice and accountability 73 75 75 76 
Political stability and absence of violence/terrorism 57 68 68 69 
Government effectiveness 60 75 75 86 
Regulatory quality 78 78 79 88 
Rule of law 59 66 73 81 
Control of corruption 64 61 66 70 
Note: 0 indicates the lowest rank and 100 indicates the highest rank. 
Source: Own elaboration based on data of the World Bank Group’s Worldwide Governance Indicators – online 
database 
Table E.7g: Worldwide Governance Indicators for Poland, for the period 2000–2015 
 
Year 
Indicator 2000 2005 2010 2015 
Voice and accountability 81 76 80 80 
Political stability and absence of violence/terrorism 55 57 83 76 
Government effectiveness 73 69 71 75 
Regulatory quality 76 72 80 80 
Rule of law 70 62 68 76 
Control of corruption 72 61 70 71 
Note: 0 indicates the lowest rank and 100 indicates the highest rank. 
Source: Own elaboration based on data of the World Bank Group’s Worldwide Governance Indicators – online 
database 
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Table E.7h: Worldwide Governance Indicators for Romania, for the period 2000–2015 
 
Year 
Indicator 2000 2005 2010 2015 
Voice and accountability 62 62 60 62 
Political stability and absence of violence/terrorism 30 49 54 55 
Government effectiveness 39 46 46 52 
Regulatory quality 48 59 74 72 
Rule of law 46 47 56 61 
Control of corruption 40 50 52 58 
Note: 0 indicates the lowest rank and 100 indicates the highest rank. 
Source: Own elaboration based on data of the World Bank Group’s Worldwide Governance Indicators – online 
database 
Table E.7i: Worldwide Governance Indicators for Slovak Republic, for the period 2000–2015 
 
Year 
Indicator 2000 2005 2010 2015 
Voice and accountability 73 77 74 75 
Political stability and absence of violence/terrorism 66 73 85 80 
Government effectiveness 73 79 76 75 
Regulatory quality 69 85 81 75 
Rule of law 60 65 65 70 
Control of corruption 64 69 64 62 
Note: 0 indicates the lowest rank and 100 indicates the highest rank. 
Source: Own elaboration based on data of the World Bank Group’s Worldwide Governance Indicators – online 
database 
 
Table E.7j: Worldwide Governance Indicators for Slovenia, for the period 2000–2015 
 
Year 
Indicator 2000 2005 2010 2015 
Voice and accountability 84 84 82 74 
Political stability and absence of violence/terrorism 74 84 76 78 
Government effectiveness 77 78 81 77 
Regulatory quality 73 73 76 73 
Rule of law 83 77 81 80 
Control of corruption 80 80 78 76 
Note: 0 indicates the lowest rank and 100 indicates the highest rank. 
Source: Own elaboration based on data of the World Bank Group’s Worldwide Governance Indicators – online 
database 
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Appendix F 
Table F.1: Share of CEFTA and EU countries that belong to the top 10 Serbian export partners in Serbia's total 
export, for the year 2004, in thousand USD 
CEFTA 
 Bosnia and Herzegovina             625.807,8       
Macedonia, Rep.             256.992,7       
Croatia             148.625,0       
Sum CEFTA3          1.031.425,5       
EU 
 Italy             447.676,6       
Germany             352.882,5       
Slovenia             154.964,5       
France             134.637,0       
Romania             122.665,0       
Hungary             120.568,6       
Sum EU6       1.333.394,2       
Sum CEFTA3+EU6          2.364.819,7       
Share of CEFTA3+EU6 in total 
export 67,1% 
Source: Own elaboration based on data of the Statistical Office of the Republic of Serbia – online database 
 
Table F.2: Share of CEFTA and EU countries that belong to the top 10 Serbian export partners in Serbia's total 
export, for the year 2005, in thousand USD 
CEFTA 
 
Bosnia and Herzegovina             744.038,2       
Macedonia, Rep.             260.575,2       
Croatia             195.920,9       
Sum CEFTA3          1.200.534,3       
EU 
 Italy             653.680,4       
Germany             441.837,1       
Slovenia             188.817,4       
France             161.526,8       
Hungary             131.236,6       
Romania             130.069,5       
Sum EU6 
 
      1.707.167,8       
Sum CEFTA3+EU6          2.907.702,1       
Share of CEFTA3+EU6 in total 
export 64,9% 
Source: Own elaboration based on data of the Statistical Office of the Republic of Serbia – online database 
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Table F.3: Share of CEFTA and EU countries that belong to the top 10 Serbian export partners in Serbia's total 
export, for the year 2006, in thousand USD 
CEFTA 
 Bosnia and Herzegovina             749.257,9       
Montenegro, Rep.             619.405,9       
Macedonia, Rep.             300.277,7       
Croatia             251.142,8       
Sum CEFTA4          1.920.084,3       
EU 
 Italy             932.461,2       
Germany             660.003,7       
Slovenia             253.414,0       
France             235.686,2       
Austria             191.882,0       
Sum EU5 
 
         2.273.447,1       
Sum CEFTA4+EU5          4.193.531,4       
Share of CEFTA4+EU5 in total 
export 65,2% 
Source: Own elaboration based on data of the Statistical Office of the Republic of Serbia – online database 
 
Table F.4: Share of CEFTA and EU countries that belong to the top 10 Serbian export partners in Serbia's total 
export, for the year 2007, in thousand USD 
CEFTA 
 Bosnia and Herzegovina         1.042.291,6       
Montenegro, Rep.            950.927,7       
Macedonia, Rep.            437.216,1       
Croatia            330.867,5       
Sum CEFTA4         2.761.302,9       
EU 
 Italy         1.094.231,3       
Germany            937.501,4       
Slovenia            409.007,9       
Austria            301.451,0       
France            290.268,4       
Sum EU5 
 
        3.032.460,0       
Sum CEFTA4+EU5         5.793.762,9       
Share of CEFTA4+EU5 in total 
export 65,7% 
Source: Own elaboration based on data of the Statistical Office of the Republic of Serbia – online database 
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Table F.5: Share of CEFTA and EU countries that belong to the top 10 Serbian export partners in Serbia's total 
export, for the year 2008, in thousand USD 
CEFTA 
 Bosnia and Herzegovina           1.338.955,3       
Montenegro, Rep.           1.287.405,2       
Macedonia, Rep.              493.023,4       
Croatia              434.528,1       
Sum CEFTA4           3.553.912,0       
EU 
 Germany           1.142.006,3       
Italy           1.128.467,9       
Slovenia              502.000,8       
Austria              458.105,8       
Romania              397.822,6       
Sum EU5 
 
          3.628.403,4       
Sum CEFTA4+EU5           7.182.315,4       
Share of CEFTA4+EU5 in total 
export 65,4% 
Source: Own elaboration based on data of the Statistical Office of the Republic of Serbia – online database 
 
Table F.6: Share of CEFTA and EU countries that belong to the top 10 Serbian export partners in Serbia's total 
export, for the year 2009, in thousand USD 
CEFTA 
 Bosnia and Herzegovina           1.015.617,8       
Montenegro, Rep.              836.163,4       
Macedonia, Rep.              429.152,0       
Croatia              278.762,3       
Sum CEFTA4           2.559.695,5       
EU 
 Germany              870.734,0       
Italy              820.856,1       
Romania              482.308,2       
Slovenia              343.819,2       
Austria              290.753,1       
Sum EU5 
 
          2.808.470,6       
Sum CEFTA4+EU5           5.368.166,1       
Share of CEFTA4+EU5 in total 
export 64,3% 
Source: Own elaboration based on data of the Statistical Office of the Republic of Serbia – online database 
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Table F.7: Share of CEFTA and EU countries that belong to the top 10 Serbian export partners in Serbia's total 
export, for the year 2010, in thousand USD 
 
Source: Own elaboration based on data of the Statistical Office of the Republic of Serbia – online database 
 
Table F.8: Share of CEFTA and EU countries that belong to the top 10 Serbian export partners in Serbia's total 
export, for the year 2011, in thousand USD 
CEFTA 
 Bosnia and Herzegovina       1.191.425,1       
Montenegro, Rep.          890.954,1       
Macedonia, Rep.          524.651,4       
Croatia          468.072,1       
Sum CEFTA4       3.075.102,7       
EU 
 Germany       1.330.705,7       
Italy       1.306.210,3       
Romania          812.528,7       
Slovenia          526.117,0       
Austria          371.640,2       
Sum EU5 
 
      4.347.201,9       
Sum CEFTA4+EU5       7.422.304,6       
Share of CEFTA4+EU5 in total 
export 63,0% 
Source: Own elaboration based on data of the Statistical Office of the Republic of Serbia – online database 
  
CEFTA 
 Bosnia and Herzegovina           1.088.982,0       
Montenegro, Rep.              803.772,8       
Macedonia, Rep.              476.816,6       
Croatia              307.099,9       
Sum CEFTA4           2.676.671,3       
EU 
 Italy           1.118.493,1       
Germany           1.008.215,6       
Romania              650.721,6       
Slovenia              425.897,5       
Austria              338.417,4       
Sum EU5 
 
          3.541.745,2       
Sum CEFTA4+EU5           6.218.416,5       
Share of CEFTA4+EU5 in total export 63,5% 
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F.9: Share of CEFTA and EU countries that belong to the top 10 Serbian export partners in Serbia's total export, 
for the year 2012, in thousand USD 
CEFTA 
 Bosnia and Herzegovina       1.095.004,4       
Montenegro, Rep.          802.258,5       
Macedonia, Rep.          484.851,8       
Croatia          386.261,7       
Sum CEFTA4       2.768.376,4       
EU 
 Germany       1.310.228,2       
Italy       1.198.499,3       
Romania          904.409,8       
Slovenia          421.556,2       
Hungary          315.646,1       
Sum EU5 
 
      4.150.339,6       
Sum CEFTA4+EU5       6.918.716,0       
Share of CEFTA4+EU5 in total 
export 62,0% 
Source: Own elaboration based on data of the Statistical Office of the Republic of Serbia – online database 
 
Table F.10: Share of CEFTA and EU countries that belong to the top 10 Serbian export partners in Serbia's total 
export, for the year 2013, in thousand USD 
CEFTA 
 Bosnia and Herzegovina       1.201.135,1       
Montenegro, Rep.          851.454,3       
Macedonia, Rep.          576.077,5       
Croatia*          415.833,8       
Sum CEFTA4       3.044.500,7       
EU 
 Italy       2.379.329,7       
Germany       1.735.103,9       
Romania          785.508,1       
Slovenia          478.508,7       
Sum EU4 
 
      5.378.450,4       
Sum CEFTA4+EU4       8.422.951,1       
Share of CEFTA4+EU4 in total export 57,7% 
Source: Own elaboration based on data of the Statistical Office of the Republic of Serbia – online database 
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Table F.11: Share of CEFTA and EU countries that belong to the top 10 Serbian export partners in Serbia's total 
export, for the year 2014, in thousand USD 
CEFTA 
 Bosnia and Herzegovina         1.319.411,9       
Montenegro, Rep.            756.148,5       
Macedonia, Rep.            603.737,7       
Sum CEFTA3         2.679.298,1       
EU 
 Italy 2576937,8 
Germany         1.773.217,6       
Romania            829.987,4       
Slovenia            471.160,8       
Croatia            458.845,0       
France            417.659,6       
Sum EU6 
 
        6.527.808,2       
Sum CEFTA3+EU6       9.207.106,30       
Share of CEFTA3+EU6 in total export 62% 
Source: Own elaboration based on data of the Statistical Office of the Republic of Serbia – online database 
 
Table F.12: Share of CEFTA and EU countries that belong to the top 10 Serbian export partners in Serbia's total 
export, for the year 2015, in thousand USD 
CEFTA 
 Bosnia and Herzegovina         1.172.057,0       
Montenegro, Rep.             678.724,7       
Macedonia, Rep.             523.667,9       
Sum CEFTA3         2.374.449,6       
EU 
 Italy 2162973,6 
Germany         1.672.587,9       
Romania             745.626,6       
Croatia             443.108,9       
Slovenia             416.857,5       
France             409.626,3       
Sum EU6 
 
        5.850.780,8       
Sum CEFTA3+EU6       8.225.230,40       
Share of CEFTA3+EU6 in total 
export 61,5% 
Source: Own elaboration based on data of the Statistical Office of the Republic of Serbia – online database 
 
  
 390 
 
Table F.13: Share of CEFTA and EU countries that belong to the top 10 Serbian export partners in Serbia's total 
export, for the year 2016, in thousand USD 
CEFTA 
 Bosnia and Herzegovina         1.239.730,0       
Montenegro, Rep.             722.791,3       
Macedonia, Rep.             591.595,8       
Sum CEFTA3         2.554.117,1       
EU 
 Italy         2.168.804,2       
Germany         1.940.366,4       
Romania             851.454,0       
Croatia             517.583,2       
Hungary             506.172,8       
Slovenia             443.445,4       
Sum EU6 
 
        6.427.826,0       
Sum CEFTA3+EU6         8.981.943,1       
Share of CEFTA3+EU6 in total 
export 60,4% 
Source: Own elaboration based on data of the Statistical Office of the Republic of Serbia – online database
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Appendix G 
Figure G.1: GDP growth rate for the selected countries 
 
Source: World Bank – World Economic Indicators 
Figure G.2: GDP per capita growth for the selected countries (annual %) 
 
Source: World Bank – World Economic Indicators 
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Figure G.3: GDP per capita for the selected countries (current US$) 
Source: World Bank – World Economic Indicators 
Figure G.4: Household final consumption expenditure per capita for the selected countries (constant 2000 
US$)417 
Source: World Bank – World Economic Indicators 
  
                                                          
417 “Household final consumption expenditure per capita (private consumption per capita) is calculated using 
private consumption in constant 2000 prices and World Bank population estimates. Household final 
consumption expenditure is the market value of all goods and services, including durable products (such as cars, 
washing machines, and home computers), purchased by households. It excludes purchases of dwellings but 
includes imputed rent for owner-occupied dwellings. It also includes payments and fees to governments to 
obtain permits and licenses. Here, household consumption expenditure includes the expenditures of nonprofit 
institutions serving households, even when reported separately by the country. Data are in constant 2000 U.S. 
dollars.” 
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Figure G.5: FDI outward for Russia (% of GDP)418 
 
Source: Own elaboration based on the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development – online database 
 
Figure G.6: FDI outward for Russia, stock (in million) 
 
Source: Own elaboration based on the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development – online database 
 
  
                                                          
418 The World Bank has the following definition/explanation of FDI outflows (meaning outward FDI): “Foreign 
direct investment are the net inflows of investment to acquire a lasting management interest (10 percent or more 
of voting stock) in an enterprise operating in an economy other than that of the investor. It is the sum of equity 
capital, reinvestment of earnings, other long-term capital, and short-term capital as shown in the balance of 
payments. This series shows net outflows of investment from the reporting economy to the rest of the world and 
is divided by GDP.”  
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Figure G.7: Procedures to register property for the selected countries (number) 419 
Source: World Bank – World Economic Indicators 
Figure G.8: Time required to start a business for the selected countries (days) 420 
Source: World Bank – World Economic Indicators 
  
                                                          
419 “Number of procedures to register property is the number of procedures required for a businesses to secure 
rights to property.” 
420 “Time required to start a business is the number of calendar days needed to complete the procedures to 
legally operate a business. If a procedure can be speeded up at additional cost, the fastest procedure, 
independent of cost, is chosen.” 
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Figure G.9: Taxes on income, profits and capital gains for the selected countries (% of total taxes) 421 
Source: World Bank – World Economic Indicators 
Figure G.10: Inflation for Russia 
Source: IMF 2015 
 
 
  
                                                          
421 “Taxes on income, profits, and capital gains are levied on the actual or presumptive net income of 
individuals, on the profits of corporations and enterprises, and on capital gains, whether realized or not, on land, 
securities, and other assets. Intragovernmental payments are eliminated in consolidation.” 
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Figure G.11: Foreign direct investment for the selected countries, net inflows (% of GDP)  
 
Source: World Bank – World Development Indicators 
 
Figure G.12: Savings for the selected countries (% of GDP)  
 
Source: World Bank – World Development Indicators 
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Figure G.13: Savings for the selected countries (current US$)422 
Source: World Bank – World Development Indicators 
Figure G.14: Investment for the selected countries (% of GDP)  
 
Source: World Bank – World Development Indicators 
 
  
                                                          
422 “Savings are calculated as GDP less final consumption expenditure (total consumption). Data are in current 
U.S. dollars.” 
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Figure G.15: High-technology exports for the selected countries (% of manufactured exports)  
Source: World Bank – World Development Indicators 
Figure G.16: Current account balance for the selected countries (%) 
 
Source: IMF 2015 
Figure G.17: Current account balance for the selected countries (US$)423 
Source: IMF 2015 
 
                                                          
423 “Current account is all transactions other than those in financial and capital items. The major classifications 
are goods and services, income and current transfers. The focus of the BOP is on transactions (between an 
economy and the rest of the world) in goods, services, and income.” 
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Figure G.18: Unemployment for the selected countries (%) 
 
Source: World Bank – World Development Indicators
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Appendix H 
Table H.1: Export from Serbia to Russia by sectors, for the period 2004–2016, in thousand USD 
 
Year 
Sectors 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
Food and live animals 13.230,2 16.763,2 27.117,9 47.320,4 61.327,0 55.571,8 116.192,3 151.964,3 150.676,5 172.694,0 294.939,8 259.262,3 281.929,8 
Annual change   26,7% 61,8% 74,5% 29,6% -9,4% 109,1% 30,8% -0,8% 14,6% 70,8% -12,1% 8,7% 
Beverages and tobacco 410,2 434,0 2.594,3 4.204,0 9.447,8 3.308,6 3.568,8 6.603,7 5.152,5 7.570,8 7.996,3 6.130,5 7.080,0 
Annual change   5,8% 497,8% 62,0% 124,7% -65,0% 7,9% 85,0% -22,0% 46,9% 5,6% -23,3% 15,5% 
Crude materials, inedible, except fuels 2.370,2 2.648,1 2.911,4 2.909,9 6.967,5 5.393,1 6.030,8 6.342,7 8.604,2 8.979,2 8.181,8 4.893,2 9.612,8 
Annual change   11,7% 9,9% -0,1% 139,4% -22,6% 11,8% 5,2% 35,7% 4,4% -8,9% -40,2% 96,5% 
Mineral fuels, lubricants and related products 296,7 2.229,1 2.150,0 2.973,6 3.681,3 518,9 772,9 1.280,9 2.196,1 2.274,4 2.517,7 1.526,3 227,1 
Annual change   651,3% -3,5% 38,3% 23,8% -85,9% 48,9% 65,7% 71,4% 3,6% 10,7% -39,4% -85,1% 
Animal and plant oils, fats and waxes 127,6 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 2,0 0,0 92,3 40,7 68,9 1.424,4 145,4 360,4 
Annual change                 -55,9% 69,3% 1967,3% -89,8% 147,9% 
Chemical and similar product, not stipulated 36.033,8 49.201,6 54.393,3 69.642,8 81.167,7 59.993,7 68.062,2 67.172,1 90.528,3 93.018,6 75.212,5 75.644,3 85.888,1 
Annual change   36,5% 10,6% 28,0% 16,5% -26,1% 13,4% -1,3% 34,8% 2,8% -19,1% 0,6% 13,5% 
Manufactured goods classified by material 33.420,5 42.718,8 113.011,5 125.385,0 147.432,7 116.109,8 172.867,2 270.671,0 258.592,5 304.955,3 231.743,3 142.577,6 158.210,6 
Annual change   27,8% 164,5% 10,9% 17,6% -21,2% 48,9% 56,6% -4,5% 17,9% -24,0% -38,5% 11,0% 
Machines and transport equipment 26.897,2 59.212,2 55.501,9 138.698,1 166.809,3 58.112,8 101.826,9 202.950,5 201.782,1 222.450,4 218.164,7 122.447,2 120.542,1 
Annual change   120,1% -6,3% 149,9% 20,3% -65,2% 75,2% 99,3% -0,6% 10,2% -1,9% -43,9% -1,6% 
Miscellaneous manufactured products 39.925,0 52.031,0 53.350,4 59.410,2 74.084,0 50.385,9 65.388,1 85.215,9 149.382,2 250.669,3 188.935,2 112.194,6 131.267,3 
Annual change   30,3% 2,5% 11,4% 24,7% -32,0% 29,8% 30,3% 75,3% 67,8% -24,6% -40,6% 17,0% 
Products not stipulated in mentioned sectors 171,7 13,5 48,8 47,6 51,4 27,7 37,0 16,0 15,9 20,7 17,9 4,6 5,9 
Annual change   -92,1% 261,5% -2,5% 8,0% -46,1% 33,6% -56,8% -0,6% 30,2% -13,5% -74,3% 28,3% 
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Table H.1a: Overall sum and periodical changes 
Sum Change 
2004-2016 2004-2016 2008-2009 2008-2010 2008-2012 2008-2013 2008-2016 2013-2016 
1.648.989,5 2031,0% -9,4% 89,5% 145,7% 181,6% 359,7% 63,3% 
        
64.501,5 1626,0% -65,0% -62,2% -45,5% -19,9% -25,1% -6,5% 
        
75.844,9 305,6% -22,6% -13,4% 23,5% 28,9% 38,0% 7,1% 
        
22.645,0 -23,5% -85,9% -79,0% -40,3% -38,2% -93,8% -90,0% 
        
2.261,7 182,4% 
     
423,1% 
        
905.959,0 138,4% -26,1% -16,1% 11,5% 14,6% 5,8% -7,7% 
        
2.117.695,8 373,4% -21,2% 17,3% 75,4% 106,8% 7,3% -48,1% 
        
1.695.395,4 348,2% -65,2% -39,0% 21,0% 33,4% -27,7% -45,8% 
        
1.312.239,1 228,8% -32,0% -11,7% 101,6% 238,4% 77,2% -47,6% 
        
478,7 -96,6% -46,1% -28,0% -69,1% -59,7% -88,5% -71,5% 
Source: Own elaboration based on data of the Statistical Office of the Republic of Serbia – online database 
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Table H.2: Export from Serbia to Russia by sectors, for the period 2004–2016, in tons 
 
Year 
Sectors 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
Food and live animals 18.755,8 23.977,2 47.538,8 74.417,4 77.506,5 75.985,6 162.104,1 181.136,0 140.551,3 158.513,1 238.032,9 272.990,8 316.967,0 
Annual change   27,8% 98,3% 56,5% 4,2% -2,0% 113,3% 11,7% -22,4% 12,8% 50,2% 14,7% 16,1% 
Beverages and tobacco 245,2 251,3 819,8 1.993,9 4.279,7 3.364,5 4.175,2 5.148,4 4.707,5 6.320,2 7.464,5 5.768,7 6.021,0 
Annual change   2,5% 226,2% 143,2% 114,6% -21,4% 24,1% 23,3% -8,6% 34,3% 18,1% -22,7% 4,4% 
Crude materials, inedible, except fuels 980,2 941,1 1.282,4 1.672,8 2.155,3 2.691,3 2.594,2 2.378,2 2.903,8 2.485,8 2.110,4 1.232,6 1.669,4 
Annual change   -4,0% 36,3% 30,4% 28,8% 24,9% -3,6% -8,3% 22,1% -14,4% -15,1% -41,6% 35,4% 
Mineral fuels, lubricants and related products 597,8 3.419,7 2.871,7 3.698,4 3.237,4 790,6 977,6 1.182,2 2.085,4 2.124,4 2.396,5 2.043,9 211,0 
Annual change   472,0% -16,0% 28,8% -12,5% -75,6% 23,7% 20,9% 76,4% 1,9% 12,8% -14,7% -89,7% 
Animal and plant oils, fats and waxes 76,8 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,2 0,0 0,9 2,6 3,0 606,8 22,2 265,8 
Annual change   -100,0%         -100,0%   188,9% 15,4% 20126,7% -96,3% 1097,3% 
Chemical and similar product, not stipulated 3.828,5 4.837,1 4.842,6 5.876,4 5.939,6 6.220,1 7.390,7 7.869,6 24.467,4 22.401,0 10.285,8 11.509,4 13.806,2 
Annual change   26,3% 0,1% 21,3% 1,1% 4,7% 18,8% 6,5% 210,9% -8,4% -54,1% 11,9% 20,0% 
Manufactured goods classified by material 21.326,7 27.202,0 47.739,3 43.349,7 39.514,8 30.608,9 44.809,7 52.214,4 68.981,4 68.427,2 55.722,6 44.944,6 53.795,1 
Annual change   27,5% 75,5% -9,2% -8,8% -22,5% 46,4% 16,5% 32,1% -0,8% -18,6% -19,3% 19,7% 
Machines and transport equipment 6.559,6 9.571,2 10.497,7 14.708,6 20.429,2 9.108,4 25.352,0 38.330,3 36.869,7 31.205,1 26.947,8 16.502,7 17.960,0 
Annual change   45,9% 9,7% 40,1% 38,9% -55,4% 178,3% 51,2% -3,8% -15,4% -13,6% -38,8% 8,8% 
Miscellaneous manufactured products 16.552,9 22.511,2 24.348,8 24.371,0 26.727,8 18.378,7 22.857,2 24.267,7 31.248,3 43.140,0 30.678,9 19.581,8 17.635,4 
Annual change   36,0% 8,2% 0,1% 9,7% -31,2% 24,4% 6,2% 28,8% 38,1% -28,9% -36,2% -9,9% 
Products not stipulated in mentioned sectors 2,9 2,4 5,5 8,1 20,6 1,6 4,3 2,5 3,7 2,0 2,4 1,3 0,5 
Annual change   -17,2% 129,2% 47,3% 154,3% -92,2% 168,8% -41,9% 48,0% -45,9% 20,0% -45,8% -61,5% 
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Table H.2a:  Overall sum and periodical changes 
Sum Change 
2004-2016 2004-2016 2008-2009 2008-2010 2008-2012 2008-2013 2008-2016 2013-2016 
1.788.476,5 1590,0% -2,0% 109,1% 81,3% 104,5% 309,0% 100,0% 
        
50.559,9 2355,5% -21,4% -2,4% 10,0% 47,7% 40,7% -4,7% 
        
25.097,5 70,3% 24,9% 20,4% 34,7% 15,3% -22,5% -32,8% 
        
25.636,6 -64,7% -75,6% -69,8% -35,6% -34,4% -93,5% -90,1% 
        
978,3 246,1% 
     
8760,0% 
        
129.274,4 260,6% 4,7% 24,4% 311,9% 277,1% 132,4% -38,4% 
        
598.636,4 152,2% -22,5% 13,4% 74,6% 73,2% 36,1% -21,4% 
        
264.042,3 173,8% -55,4% 24,1% 80,5% 52,7% -12,1% -42,4% 
        
322.299,7 6,5% -31,2% -14,5% 16,9% 61,4% -34,0% -59,1% 
        
57,8 -82,8% -92,2% -79,1% -82,0% -90,3% -97,6% -75,0% 
Source: Own elaboration based on data of the Statistical Office of the Republic of Serbia – online database
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Table H.3: Top 30 export divisions from Serbia to Russia by value in 2016, in thousand USD 
  Year 
Divisions 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
Fruit and vegetables* 8.127,6 12.441,0 22.190,5 39.807,6 47.914,9 47.509,2 106.170,3 135.662,6 113.598,0 129.238,9 173.658,5 188.653,0 227.445,9 
Garments and clothing 
accessories 431,8 681,3 970,3 772,1 417,5 242,6 1.086,7 2.393,4 60.331,9 133.996,8 109.539,8 71.606,2 91.516,8 
Medical and 
pharmaceutical products 31.310,5 43.329,7 46.977,2 60.497,5 71.584,6 50.618,5 57.067,8 49.214,3 69.039,1 69.083,5 56.494,0 53.943,7 57.616,8 
Industrial machines for 
general use, not 
mentioned 7.009,7 24.077,0 19.232,2 56.440,6 50.917,9 21.267,9 23.121,2 61.802,7 53.060,0 66.507,8 75.028,4 59.984,7 53.737,3 
Electrical machines, 
apparatuses and 
appliances, not ment. 8.739,8 17.757,4 21.555,5 57.011,0 43.362,2 29.234,0 66.377,6 92.116,5 98.202,4 115.434,7 97.264,1 45.324,2 44.818,8 
Coloured metals 1.774,7 1.832,6 6.297,4 12.061,8 22.295,8 25.948,4 61.509,0 106.457,3 94.257,5 90.268,4 61.601,3 38.621,7 37.947,6 
Products made of 
rubber, not mentioned 3.076,5 3.032,6 4.657,4 7.196,7 10.318,3 12.518,5 20.265,3 43.044,6 40.046,0 52.246,7 38.049,5 25.413,9 33.778,6 
Products made of 
metals, not mentioned 8.478,8 9.350,5 12.327,3 18.478,9 24.893,0 15.812,9 19.626,1 31.481,6 39.585,4 60.764,7 53.508,6 29.919,4 29.297,0 
Dairy products and bird 
eggs* 0,0 0,0       0,0 112,0 4.180,9 13.373,5 20.093,7 30.700,5 25.001,2 25.722,9 
Paper, cardboard and 
products of pulp 11.983,6 12.873,2 43.083,1 44.029,1 39.775,9 11.763,0 6.448,0 6.604,9 7.025,1 11.374,8 8.141,8 7.832,4 20.937,0 
Miscellaneous products, 
not mentioned 37.639,5 50.343,5 49.809,6 54.762,1 70.096,5 42.005,2 47.179,3 54.942,4 51.046,1 59.771,3 50.611,0 22.113,6 18.114,7 
Textile yarn, fabrics and 
textile products 3.585,1 6.234,7 8.326,3 10.333,3 11.147,3 9.356,9 17.836,7 21.734,1 21.926,3 27.132,4 19.739,2 15.309,0 16.605,3 
Products of cork and 
wood (except furniture) 622,8 1.142,0 10.097,6 25.571,6 30.450,8 32.432,0 33.889,7 50.053,6 46.541,8 51.124,0 42.448,6 20.575,2 14.650,2 
Driving machines and 
power equipment 2.099,3 2.165,9 2.705,1 3.486,6 8.501,4 1.185,2 2.598,2 5.796,8 9.044,8 10.541,8 14.553,0 8.732,3 11.174,0 
Plastics in non-primary 
forms 2.414,7 5.140,3 6.349,2 7.327,6 7.525,5 6.165,9 6.360,6 7.752,5 8.586,4 9.251,2 8.345,1 8.158,9 9.832,0 
Essential oils, perfumes 
and toiletries 174,2 36,2 13,6 0,4 84,2 369,0 989,9 122,0 196,4 1.164,7 1.763,1 7.188,5 7.858,6 
Animal and plant raw 
materials, not 
mentioned* 571,7 652,9 953,1 1.751,0 4.180,3 2.741,8 3.822,7 4.633,0 4.312,5 5.514,3 4.439,5 3.483,2 7.554,9 
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Cereals and cereal-
based products* 2.276,6 2.130,8 2.127,4 4.594,4 8.430,7 3.672,5 3.111,2 3.991,0 5.450,0 7.442,8 10.787,7 6.572,4 7.513,4 
Miscellaneous products 
for food and related 
products* 2.352,9 2.073,6 2.512,3 2.379,0 3.765,9 2.816,3 4.663,1 4.363,3 6.333,7 6.268,7 7.334,1 4.367,7 7.164,1 
Shoes 149,5 144,7 164,2 97,0 154,5 39,8 2.157,2 4.079,0 3.657,6 5.174,5 5.079,9 5.654,3 6.959,0 
Meat and meat 
products* 0,0 52,9 287,7 536,5 1.058,6 1.462,4 2.038,4 3.492,7 10.410,5 4.713,2 67.938,2 29.418,1 6.820,9 
Animal food (except 
unmilled cereals)* 299,1 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 1.299,6 4.125,7 3.587,9 4.153,6 6.010,6 
Furniture and parts 
thereof; bedding, 
mattresses, pillows 493,8 781,1 834,3 2.316,7 1.281,3 4.182,9 12.290,5 19.088,2 26.628,0 37.907,5 11.923,8 8.035,6 5.584,8 
Prefabricated buildings; 
sanitary and other 
devices 0,3 15,5 296,6 187,5 1.140,1 2.320,6 1.850,2 3.517,9 6.578,3 13.316,5 11.094,1 3.901,0 5.300,3 
Beverages* 62,1 66,5 177,2 581,8 1.931,4 2.911,6 3.568,8 5.253,3 5.056,9 7.360,2 7.978,2 4.842,7 5.258,6 
Plastics in primary 
forms 66,4 0,1 99,8 205,2 180,4 482,8 704,7 2.910,0 5.596,6 7.969,4 2.945,9 2.081,5 5.245,3 
Products for dyeing and 
tanning 1.394,0 652,7 932,7 1.080,2 1.539,8 1.473,2 694,4 5.262,8 4.678,7 3.477,1 4.835,7 3.949,6 4.745,8 
Machines specialised 
for industry 3.009,1 8.506,2 5.216,8 4.596,7 13.540,1 1.576,7 6.436,9 4.863,8 5.031,0 9.642,2 7.029,1 3.141,5 4.521,7 
Machines for metal 
processing 202,3 1.539,2 2.644,1 4.002,1 6.578,6 3.189,0 1.320,0 2.551,4 3.077,1 3.504,5 6.122,8 2.575,2 4.093,4 
Iron and steel 124,1 109,9 415,5 3.175,3 6.983,0 2.565,5 8.716,3 7.143,2 3.058,6 3.494,3 2.972,6 2.069,1 3.216,3 
*Divisions related to the field of agriculture. 
Note: Certain goods belonging to the divisions coloured in green were on the lists of either the April 2009 or the July 2011 Protocols. 
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Table H.3a: Overall sum and periodical changes 
Sum Change 
2004-2016 2004-2016 2008-2009 2008-2010 2008-2012 2008-2013 2008-2016 2013-2016 
1.252.418,0 2698,4% -0,8% 121,6% 137,1% 169,7% 374,7% 76,0% 
473.987,2 21094,3% -41,9% 160,3% 14350,8% 31995,0% 21820,2% -31,7% 
716.777,2 84,0% -29,3% -20,3% -3,6% -3,5% -19,5% -16,6% 
572.187,4 666,6% -58,2% -54,6% 4,2% 30,6% 5,5% -19,2% 
737.198,2 412,8% -32,6% 53,1% 126,5% 166,2% 3,4% -61,2% 
560.873,5 2038,3% 16,4% 175,9% 322,8% 304,9% 70,2% -58,0% 
293.644,6 998,0% 21,3% 96,4% 288,1% 406,3% 227,4% -35,3% 
353.524,2 245,5% -36,5% -21,2% 59,0% 144,1% 17,7% -51,8% 
119.184,7 
      
28,0% 
231.871,9 74,7% -70,4% -83,8% -82,3% -71,4% -47,4% 84,1% 
608.434,8 -51,9% -40,1% -32,7% -27,2% -14,7% -74,2% -69,7% 
189.266,6 363,2% -16,1% 60,0% 96,7% 143,4% 49,0% -38,8% 
359.599,9 2252,3% 6,5% 11,3% 52,8% 67,9% -51,9% -71,3% 
82.584,4 432,3% -86,1% -69,4% 6,4% 24,0% 31,4% 6,0% 
93.209,9 307,2% -18,1% -15,5% 14,1% 22,9% 30,6% 6,3% 
19.960,8 4411,3% 338,2% 1075,7% 133,3% 1283,3% 9233,3% 574,7% 
44.610,9 1221,5% -34,4% -8,6% 3,2% 31,9% 80,7% 37,0% 
68.100,9 230,0% -56,4% -63,1% -35,4% -11,7% -10,9% 0,9% 
56.394,7 204,5% -25,2% 23,8% 68,2% 66,5% 90,2% 14,3% 
33.511,2 4554,8% -74,2% 1296,2% 2267,4% 3249,2% 4404,2% 34,5% 
128.230,1 
 
38,1% 92,6% 883,4% 345,2% 544,3% 44,7% 
19.476,5 1909,6% 
     
45,7% 
131.348,5 1031,0% 226,5% 859,2% 1978,2% 2858,5% 335,9% -85,3% 
49.518,9 1766666,7% 103,5% 62,3% 477,0% 1068,0% 364,9% -60,2% 
45.049,3 8368,0% 50,8% 84,8% 161,8% 281,1% 172,3% -28,6% 
28.488,1 7799,5% 167,6% 290,6% 3002,3% 4317,6% 2807,6% -34,2% 
34.716,7 240,4% -4,3% -54,9% 203,9% 125,8% 208,2% 36,5% 
77.111,8 50,3% -88,4% -52,5% -62,8% -28,8% -66,6% -53,1% 
41.399,7 1923,4% -51,5% -79,9% -53,2% -46,7% -37,8% 16,8% 
44.043,7 2491,7% -63,3% 24,8% -56,2% -50,0% -53,9% -8,0% 
Source: Own elaboration based on data of the Statistical Office of the Republic of Serbia – online database 
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Table H.4: Top 30 export divisions from Serbia to Russia by value in 2016, in tons 
 
Year 
Divisions 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
Fruit and vegetables* 12.764,2 19.623,8 42.821,7 67.899,7 69.491,4 71.117,7 156.276,3 173.531,7 125.624,8 143.349,0 204.242,2 245.020,5 294.572,1 
Paper, cardboard and products of pulp 11.645,5 11.362,9 23.472,3 19.376,6 15.721,6 6.326,0 5.155,4 4.630,5 5.987,3 8.342,3 6.838,3 9.070,7 18.733,8 
Electrical machines, apparatuses and appliances, not ment. 3.670,1 4.257,3 4.941,1 6.867,1 7.299,0 6.517,3 22.318,1 25.422,1 26.239,7 20.206,8 16.346,3 10.657,4 11.557,4 
Products made of rubber, not mentioned 630,0 494,1 750,5 1.433,1 1.944,5 2.580,2 4.447,5 7.168,7 7.276,8 9.232,9 7.853,6 7.524,4 10.006,6 
Miscellaneous products, not mentioned 16.369,0 22.289,2 23.894,5 23.870,9 26.357,3 17.258,4 19.854,7 19.805,8 21.593,4 24.637,2 21.234,4 12.303,1 9.426,0 
Coloured metals 950,1 398,9 805,2 1.576,7 2.645,7 4.270,2 8.890,5 13.520,7 14.927,9 14.951,1 10.645,4 8.285,4 9.098,6 
Dairy products and bird eggs* 0,0 0,0       0,0 17,3 1.017,9 3.558,8 4.704,7 7.400,7 7.524,2 7.873,5 
Garments and clothing accessories 18,5 31,0 34,7 38,2 10,2 12,6 42,2 133,6 2.327,6 5.421,6 4.965,5 4.629,1 5.911,7 
Beverages* 31,8 41,8 146,8 474,8 1.921,8 3.265,4 4.175,2 5.014,8 4.618,7 6.052,0 7.424,2 5.380,8 5.358,6 
Products of cork and wood (except furniture) 173,4 382,2 3.237,9 7.031,5 7.839,9 7.027,4 9.706,5 11.896,0 12.702,6 14.129,4 13.752,3 8.292,8 5.298,5 
Industrial machines for general use, not mentioned 787,7 2.919,4 3.361,6 4.800,0 5.103,8 2.021,6 1.679,7 5.772,5 4.164,4 4.054,8 4.542,6 4.468,7 4.913,4 
Medical and pharmaceutical products 2.283,8 3.553,1 3.094,5 2.771,6 2.406,7 2.138,5 2.763,5 2.583,2 3.232,9 3.183,2 2.675,9 4.142,7 4.652,6 
Cereals and cereal-based products* 1.876,8 1.580,9 1.702,1 3.476,4 4.175,5 1.562,0 1.384,6 1.637,0 2.173,7 2.817,9 3.265,3 2.719,0 4.652,0 
Textile yarn, fabrics and textile products 519,1 1.300,4 1.697,0 1.803,8 1.875,1 2.163,9 4.569,8 4.818,8 5.164,1 6.141,7 4.591,0 4.318,3 4.367,5 
Products made of metals, not mentioned 2.451,0 2.166,7 2.641,3 3.063,4 4.592,0 2.445,9 2.800,8 4.747,7 7.052,6 10.331,3 8.650,1 4.942,3 4.141,4 
Miscellaneous products for food and related products* 3.112,1 2.735,1 2.944,4 2.901,3 3.537,9 2.870,2 3.761,9 3.839,9 5.200,4 3.356,3 3.600,2 3.384,2 3.666,3 
Animal food (except unmilled cereals)* 967,6 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 1.012,9 3.117,7 1.866,3 2.050,0 2.992,5 
Meat and meat products* 0,0 16,5 70,6 139,9 285,6 403,0 645,9 1.050,3 2.940,8 975,2 17.449,9 12.014,9 2.893,7 
Products for dyeing and tanning 748,0 548,4 779,3 1.413,1 2.381,6 2.166,8 892,2 1.795,4 9.515,8 7.470,7 2.961,2 2.962,3 2.738,0 
Plastics in primary forms 56,1 0,3 118,6 171,8 75,4 138,3 266,4 964,1 2.267,4 3.940,2 1.041,8 974,8 2.315,9 
Plastics in non-primary forms 227,0 710,5 806,0 947,6 871,4 871,0 1.013,8 1.112,5 2.098,6 2.405,5 1.599,9 1.767,3 1.954,3 
Essential oils, perfumes and toiletries 32,2 15,2 19,7 0,0 14,5 142,4 408,0 41,6 125,4 278,9 453,8 1.487,0 1.934,8 
Iron and steel 78,8 45,4 383,1 2.698,7 4.560,5 1.904,0 6.786,3 4.144,9 1.993,6 2.141,6 1.866,2 1.573,0 1.656,5 
Animal and plant raw materials, not mentioned* 111,5 159,9 280,8 320,9 564,5 529,9 726,4 1.061,0 1.133,3 1.343,5 1.297,1 1.024,1 1.304,5 
Prefabricated buildings; sanitary and other devices 0,1 5,9 143,5 30,6 141,0 313,3 388,0 615,0 1.522,7 2.587,7 1.749,0 925,5 1.190,1 
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Furniture and parts thereof; bedding, mattresses, pillows 129,1 178,8 232,6 419,4 205,6 777,0 2.470,4 3.554,0 5.661,8 10.307,9 2.528,6 1.450,7 803,4 
Tobacco and tobacco products 213,4 209,5 673,0 1.519,1 2.357,9 99,1 0,0 133,6 88,9 268,2 40,3 387,8 662,4 
Driving machines and power equipment 273,0 239,5 214,0 209,9 324,7 82,7 213,9 408,4 679,6 708,4 973,3 521,8 646,6 
Products of non-metallic minerals 4.857,3 11.043,7 14.751,9 6.361,7 292,2 3.826,6 2.391,2 1.217,9 13.813,1 3.089,6 1.477,9 937,7 476,1 
Machines specialised for industry 612,6 1.516,5 1.336,9 1.052,0 1.968,4 281,2 870,6 715,7 757,7 1.249,0 1.028,2 401,4 468,3 
*Divisions related to the field of agriculture. 
Note: Certain goods belonging to the divisions coloured in green were on the lists of either the April 2009 or the July 2011 Protocols. 
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Table H.4a: Overall sum and periodical changes 
Sum Change 
2004-2016 2004-2016 2008-2009 2008-2010 2008-2012 2008-2013 2008-2016 2013-2016 
1.626.335,1 2207,8% 2,3% 124,9% 80,8% 106,3% 323,9% 105,5% 
146.663,2 60,9% -59,8% -67,2% -61,9% -46,9% 19,2% 124,6% 
166.299,7 214,9% -10,7% 205,8% 259,5% 176,8% 58,3% -42,8% 
61.342,9 1488,3% 32,7% 128,7% 274,2% 374,8% 414,6% 8,4% 
258.893,9 -42,4% -34,5% -24,7% -18,1% -6,5% -64,2% -61,7% 
90.966,4 857,6% 61,4% 236,0% 464,2% 465,1% 243,9% -39,1% 
32.097,1 
      
67,4% 
23.576,5 31855,1% 23,5% 313,7% 22719,6% 53052,9% 57857,8% 9,0% 
43.906,7 
      
-11,5% 
101.470,4 2955,7% -10,4% 23,8% 62,0% 80,2% -32,4% -62,5% 
48.590,2 523,8% -60,4% -67,1% -18,4% -20,6% -3,7% 21,2% 
39.482,2 103,7% -11,1% 14,8% 34,3% 32,3% 93,3% 46,2% 
33.023,2 147,9% -62,6% -66,8% -47,9% -32,5% 11,4% 65,1% 
43.330,5 741,4% 15,4% 143,7% 175,4% 227,5% 132,9% -28,9% 
60.026,5 69,0% -46,7% -39,0% 53,6% 125,0% -9,8% -59,9% 
44.910,2 17,8% -18,9% 6,3% 47,0% -5,1% 3,6% 9,2% 
12.007,0 209,3% 
     
-4,0% 
38.886,3 
 
41,1% 126,2% 929,7% 241,5% 913,2% 196,7% 
36.372,8 266,0% -9,0% -62,5% 299,6% 213,7% 15,0% -63,4% 
12.331,1 4028,2% 83,4% 253,3% 2907,2% 5125,7% 2971,5% -41,2% 
16.385,4 
 
0,0% 16,3% 140,8% 176,1% 124,3% -18,8% 
4.953,5 5908,7% 
     
593,7% 
29.832,6 2002,2% -58,3% 48,8% -56,3% -53,0% -63,7% -22,7% 
9.857,4 1070,0% -6,1% 28,7% 100,8% 138,0% 131,1% -2,9% 
9.612,4 1190000,0% 122,2% 175,2% 979,9% 1735,2% 744,0% -54,0% 
28.719,3 522,3% 277,9% 1101,6% 2653,8% 4913,6% 290,8% -92,2% 
6.653,2 210,4% -95,8% -100,0% -96,2% -88,6% -71,9% 147,0% 
5.495,8 136,8% -74,5% -34,1% 109,3% 118,2% 99,1% -8,7% 
64.536,9 -90,2% 1209,6% 718,3% 4627,3% 957,4% 62,9% -84,6% 
12.258,5 -23,6% -85,7% -55,8% -61,5% -36,5% -76,2% -62,5% 
Source: Own elaboration based on data of the Statistical Office of the Republic of Serbia – online database 
 
  
4
1
0
 
Table H.5: Agricultural goods which belong to the top 20 Serbian export goods to Russia, for the period 2004–2016, in tons 
 
Year Sum 
Goods 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2004-2016 
Other vegetables, canned, except in 
vinegar, not frozen 7.570,6 8.200,0 8.154,4 5.642,9     10.577,1             40.145,0 
Other products for nourishment 3.073,1                         3.073,1 
Maize seed, hybrid 1.846,0     3.192,7 3.903,9                 8.942,6 
Sweet corn, canned, except in 
vinegar, not frozen   4.594,2         8.423,9             13.018,1 
Apples, fresh     24.999,2 31.827,2 30.169,5 31.856,1 89.009,5 94.892,5 56.394,9 70.275,6 124.306,2 161.532,9 196.952,3 912.215,9 
Plums and sloes, fresh       16.142,0 12.292,3 14.851,3 16.822,8 17.715,5 15.283,0 18.276,4 15.806,3 11.853,5 8.274,5 147.317,6 
Tobacco, partly or wholly veinless         1.924,0                 1.924,0 
Sweet cherries and sour cherries, 
fresh           3.194,3           5.277,2 9.367,6 17.839,1 
Peaches (including nectarines), 
fresh           5.983,2 8.242,8 10.898,9 9.479,4 11.884,1   21.746,7 27.855,3 96.090,4 
Dried fruit, nor mentioned and 
mixtures of pome and dried fruit           1.564,5               1.564,5 
Fresh (immature) cheese, incl. also 
from whey and urd                   3.494,3 5.415,0 5.725,5 6.753,9 21.388,7 
Sour cherries, frozen, without sugar                     7.766,7     7.766,7 
Strawberries, fresh                     6.121,4 4.696,9 8.738,9 19.557,2 
Other vegetables and mixtures of 
vegetables, frozen                       8.179,4   8.179,4 
Pears and quinces, fresh                         11.980,6 11.980,6 
Sum for the period 2004-2016 by 
years 12.489,7 12.794,2 33.153,6 56.804,8 48.289,7 57.449,4 133.076,1 123.506,9 81.157,3 103.930,4 159.415,6 219.012,1 269.923,1 2061,2% 
Annual change   2,4% 159,1% 71,3% -15,0% 19,0% 131,6% -7,2% -34,3% 28,1% 53,4% 37,4% 23,2% 
 Note: Percentual value of 2061,2 % relates to the change for the period 2004-2016  
Source: Own elaboration based on data of the Statistical Office of the Republic of Serbia – online database 
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Table H.6: Agricultural goods which belong to the top 50 Serbian export goods to Russia, for the period 2004–2016, in tons 
  Year Sum 
Goods 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2004-2016 
Other vegetables, canned, except in vinegar, 
not frozen 7.570,6 8.200,0 8.154,4 5.642,9 5.237,8 4.642,9 10.577,1 8.586,2 10.725,5 5.300,7       74.638,1 
Other products for nourishment 3.073,1 2.655,5 2.616,3 2.682,3 3.530,7 2.833,2 3.721,1 3.767,7 4.539,7 3.095,8 3.066,9 2.983,6 2.320,7 40.886,6 
Maize seeds, hybrid 1.846,0 1.480,3 1.525,3 3.192,7 3.903,9 1.218,8 1.041,6   1.531,6 2.302,2 2.660,3 2.122,6 1.454,7 24.280,0 
Sunflower seeds, other 175,6                         175,6 
Sweet corn, canned, except in vinegar, not 
frozen 2.242,3 4.594,2 1.962,6 3.536,7   3.183,9 8.423,9 5.842,5 6.767,6         36.553,7 
Dried fruit, not mentioned and mixtures of 
pome and dried fruit 517,6 396,4     1.554,3 1.564,5 1.685,8     2.834,5 2.133,3     10.686,4 
Sunflower seeds, for sowing   234,3 255,5   274,6                 764,4 
Artificial casings for sausage products   187,8   358,9   246,9 439,9 508,5 455,5   589,2 633,7 823,7 4.244,1 
Apples, fresh   3.797,8 24.999,2 31.827,2 30.169,5 31.856,1 89.009,5 94.892,5 56.394,9 70.275,6 124.306,2 161.532,9 196.952,3 916.013,7 
Tobacco, partly and wholly veinless     673,0 1.099,1 1.924,0                 3.696,1 
Plums and sloes, fresh     3.967,7 16.142,0 12.292,3 14.851,3 16.822,8 17.715,5 15.283,0 18.276,4 15.806,3 11.853,5 8.274,5 151.285,3 
Sweet cherries and sour cherries, fresh       2.319,6 3.761,5 3.194,3 3.017,0 4.447,4 3.908,8 3.211,8 3.792,3 5.277,2 9.367,6 42.297,5 
Peaches (including nectarines), fresh       3.434,7 5.313,2 5.983,2 8.242,8 10.898,9 9.479,4 11.884,1 9.125,9 21.746,7 27.855,3 113.964,2 
Juice of other individual fruit or vegetables       451,8 813,8 545,1       1.138,6   1.031,7   3.981,0 
Edible fruit seedlings, grafted or not         287,6 140,7             781,9 1.210,2 
Wine of fresh grapes; must with stopped 
fermentation           2.469,8 3.319,8 3.670,6 3.617,5 4.786,8 5.890,7 3.787,3 4.084,7 31.627,2 
Strawberries, fresh           903,7 1.204,5 1.766,8 2.054,6 4.711,9 6.121,4 4.696,9 8.738,9 30.198,7 
Other cheese, not for treatment               714,0 1.104,9   1.042,7 1.206,9 894,7 4.963,2 
Fresh (immature) cheese, including also 
from whey and urd                 2.066,7 3.494,3 5.415,0 5.725,5 6.753,9 23.455,4 
Carcasses and half-carcasses of pork, frozen                 1.911,7   13.596,8 10.078,6 2.042,8 27.629,9 
Sour cherries, frozen, without sugar                     7.766,7 5.011,8 3.514,1 16.292,6 
Other vegetables and mixtures of 
vegetables, frozen                     5.785,0 8.179,4 4.683,7 18.648,1 
Pears and quinces, fresh                     6.020,8 6.138,8 11.980,6 24.140,2 
Other pork meat, frozen                     1.066,7     1.066,7 
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Raspberries, frozen, without sugar                     1.388,7 1.454,9   2.843,6 
Beans and green beans, frozen                       4.141,4 7.544,5 11.685,9 
Food for dogs and cats, for retail trade                         2.071,3 2.071,3 
Sum for the period 2004-2016 by years 15.425,2 21.546,3 44.154,0 70.687,9 69.063,2 73.634,4 147.505,8 152.810,6 119.841,4 131.312,7 215.574,9 257.603,4 300.139,9 1845,8% 
Annual change   39,7% 104,9% 60,1% -2,3% 6,6% 100,3% 3,6% -21,6% 9,6% 64,2% 19,5% 16,5% 
 Note: Percentual value of 1845,8 % relates to the change for the period 2004-2016  
Source: Own elaboration based on data of the Statistical Office of the Republic of Serbia – online database 
 
Table H.7: Export from Serbia to Russia by the divisions that contain goods that were either fully or additionally liberalised by the April 2009 and the July 2011 Protocols, 
for the period 2004-2016, in tons 
 
Year 
Divisions fully liberalised by the 2009 
protocol 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
Beverages 31,8 41,8 146,8 474,8 1.921,8 3.265,4 4.175,2 5.014,8 4.618,7 6.052,0 7.424,2 5.380,8 5.358,6 
Essential oils, perfumes and toiletries 32,2 15,2 19,7 0,0 14,5 142,4 408,0 41,6 125,4 278,9 453,8 1.487,0 1.934,8 
Textile yarn, fabrics and textile products 519,1 1.300,4 1.697,0 1.803,8 1.875,1 2.163,9 4.569,8 4.818,8 5.164,1 6.141,7 4.591,0 4.318,3 4.367,5 
Electrical machines, apparatuses and 
appliances, not ment. 3.670,1 4.257,3 4.941,1 6.867,1 7.299,0 6.517,3 22.318,1 25.422,1 26.239,7 20.206,8 16.346,3 10.657,4 11.557,4 
Furniture and parts thereof; bedding, 
mattresses, pillows 129,1 178,8 232,6 419,4 205,6 777,0 2.470,4 3.554,0 5.661,8 10.307,9 2.528,6 1.450,7 803,4 
Animal and plant raw materials, not 
mentioned 111,5 159,9 280,8 320,9 564,5 529,9 726,4 1.061,0 1.133,3 1.343,5 1.297,1 1.024,1 1.304,5 
Divisions additionally liberalised by 
the 2009 protocol 
             
Fruit and vegetables 
12.764,
2 
19.623,
8 
42.821,
7 
67.899,
7 
69.491,
4 
71.117,
7 
156.276,
3 
173.531,
7 
125.624,
8 
143.349,
0 
204.242,
2 
245.020,
5 
294.572,
1 
Medical and pharmaceutical products 2.283,8 3.553,1 3.094,5 2.771,6 2.406,7 2.138,5 2.763,5 2.583,2 3.232,9 3.183,2 2.675,9 4.142,7 4.652,6 
Meat and meat products 0,0 16,5 70,6 139,9 285,6 403,0 645,9 1.050,3 2.940,8 975,2 17.449,9 12.014,9 2.893,7 
Sugar, products made of sugar and 
honey* 0,0 2,8 0,0 0,0 1,0 16,3 0,7 17,1 13,9 109,1 106,2 82,2 54,5 
Beverages 31,8 41,8 146,8 474,8 1.921,8 3.265,4 4.175,2 5.014,8 4.618,7 6.052,0 7.424,2 5.380,8 5.358,6 
Divisions fully liberalised by the 2011 
protocol 
            
  
Textile yarn, fabrics and textile products 519,1 1.300,4 1.697,0 1.803,8 1.875,1 2.163,9 4.569,8 4.818,8 5.164,1 6.141,7 4.591,0 4.318,3 4.367,5 
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Furniture and parts thereof; bedding, 
mattresses, pillows 129,1 178,8 232,6 419,4 205,6 777,0 2.470,4 3.554,0 5.661,8 10.307,9 2.528,6 1.450,7 803,4 
Telecommunications and audio 
apparatuses and equipment* 0,1 1,7 0,4 0,6 5,8 0,0 0,1 0,2 0,5 0,9 0,7 0,5 1,1 
Miscellaneous products for food and 
related products 3.112,1 2.735,1 2.944,4 2.901,3 3.537,9 2.870,2 3.761,9 3.839,9 5.200,4 3.356,3 3.600,2 3.384,2 3.666,3 
*Divisions that do not belong to top 30 by value in 2016 (all others do). 
 
Table H.7a: Periodical changes 
Change 
2008-2009 2008-2010 2008-2013 2013-2014 2013-2016 
69,9% 117,3% 214,9% 22,7% -11,5% 
882,1% 2713,8% 1823,4% 62,7% 593,7% 
15,4% 143,7% 227,5% -25,2% -28,9% 
-10,7% 205,8% 176,8% -19,1% -42,8% 
277,9% 1101,6% 4913,6% -75,5% -92,2% 
-6,1% 28,7% 138,0% -3,5% -2,9% 
     
2,3% 124,9% 106,3% 42,5% 105,5% 
-11,1% 14,8% 32,3% -15,9% 46,2% 
41,1% 126,2% 241,5% 1689,4% 196,7% 
1530,0% -30,0% 10810,0% -2,7% -50,0% 
69,9% 117,3% 214,9% 22,7% -11,5% 
2010-2011 2010-2012 2010-2013 2013-2014 2013-2016 
5,4% 13,0% 34,4% -25,2% -28,9% 
43,9% 129,2% 317,3% -75,5% -92,2% 
100,0% 400,0% 800,0% -22,2% 22,2% 
2,1% 38,2% -10,8% 7,3% 9,2% 
Source: Own elaboration based on data of the Statistical Office of the Republic of Serbia – online database 
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Table H.8: Export from Serbia to Russia of 15 selected goods that were fully or additionally liberalised by the 
April 2009 Protocol, for the period 2004-2016, in tons 
 
Year 
Goods fully or additionally liberalised by 
the 2009 Protocol 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
Apple juice 0,0 17,4 3,7 2,7     58,0   2,3 4,4 49,2 10,4 41,7 
Fruit, fruit barks, other parts of plant, 
candied                   41,8 50,3 36,3 24,2 
Other products of sugar, with no cocoa   2,8 0,0 0,0 0,0 2,4 0,0 5,5 7,9 38,2 41,6 35,8 23,2 
Wines of all grapes, with stopped 
fermentation 17,7 36,6 36,6 229,3 1138,6 2469,8 3319,8 3670,6 3617,5 4786,8 5890,7 3787,3 4.084,7 
Beer of malt (incl. Light, strong and black 
beer)         0,0     22,4 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 9,7 
Medicines (other antibiotics), for retail  47,8 80,5 57,7 73,9 94,5 120,6 142,8 67,4 162,6 155,5 180,5 310,1 243,5 
Medicines (penicillin, streptomycin), for 
retail 120,2 283,1 177,5 258,0 272,9 246,6 297,9 194,2 346,4 296,5 232,8 283,1 356,5 
Soap in the form of a piece for other use       0,0       0,0 0,0 0,4 1,1 0,0 0,5 
Soap in the form of a piece for toilet use 0,0                 8,5 4,2 16,7 0,0 
Refrigerators for household 0,0 7,2 12,3 14,3 12,2 2,3 16,8 0,8 5,4 25,2 17,7 8,3 25,0 
Freezers in the shape of wardrobe, V> 250l 
<= 900l 0,0                 95,0 53,7 107,2 184,5 
Washing machines with capacity up to 
10kg 0,0 358,3 40,2 436,7 361,5 242,5 510,0 468,8 5.060,6 4.436,7 6.143,3 3.459,1 3.102,9 
Wooden office furniture, not ment. 34,2 7,1 3,6 8,8 2,0 5,9 15,0 29,9 52,2 46,3 54,2 27,1 58,3 
Mattresses of cellular rubber or plastics 21,2 7,0   0,3       143,6 395,8 193,6 4,9   0,0 
Mattresses of other materials 3,4 2,0 3,6 4,4 0,9 1,5 26,0 5,4 26,3 46,1 1,7 2,4 1,2 
 
Table H.8a: Periodical changes 
Change 
2008-2009 2008-2010 2008-2013 2013-2014 2013-2016 
   
1018,2% 847,7% 
   
20,3% -42,1% 
   
8,9% -39,3% 
116,9% 191,6% 320,4% 23,1% -14,7% 
     
27,6% 51,1% 64,6% 16,1% 56,6% 
-9,6% 9,2% 8,6% -21,5% 20,2% 
   
175,0% 25,0% 
   
-50,6% -100,0% 
-81,1% 37,7% 106,6% -29,8% -0,8% 
   
-43,5% 94,2% 
-32,9% 41,1% 1127,3% 38,5% -30,1% 
195,0% 650,0% 2215,0% 17,1% 25,9% 
   
-97,5% -100,0% 
66,7% 2788,9% 5022,2% -96,3% -97,4% 
Source: Own elaboration based on data of the Statistical Office of the Republic of Serbia – online database 
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Table H.9: Export from Serbia to Russia of 5 selected goods that were fully or additionally liberalised by the 
July 2011 Protocol, for the period 2004-2016, in tons 
 
Year 
Goods fully or additionally liberalised by the 2011 Protocol 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
Parts of furniture from 821.3, 821.5 and 821.7 0,2 4,3 26,8 17,2 13,1 42,9 39,6 32,9 92,6 136,4 110,7 56,1 167,6 
Wooden kitchen furniture, not ment.   1,8 1,9 9,2 2,9 12,5 14,1 17,6 54,0 58,7 102,1 395,5 100,9 
Wooden furniture, for dining rooms-living rooms, not ment. 8,4 8,3 54,3 99,1 50,3 140,8 160,8 178,9 539,5 1196,3 916,3 379,9 181,0 
Other furniture, of wood, not ment. 10,0 5,6 10,2 63,9 19,2 43,0 49,0 35,0 980,1 4753,5 468,3 109,4 24,9 
 
Table H.9a: Periodical changes 
Change 
2010-2011 2010-2012 2010-2013 2013-2014 2013-2016 
-16,9% 133,8% 244,4% -18,8% 22,9% 
24,8% 283,0% 316,3% 73,9% 71,9% 
11,3% 235,5% 644,0% -23,4% -84,9% 
-28,6% 1900,2% 9601,0% -90,1% -99,5% 
Source: Own elaboration based on data of the Statistical Office of the Republic of Serbia – online database 
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Table H.10: Export results of the top 10 Serbian exporting enterprises to Russia, for the period 2012–2016, in million USD 
  Year 
Company name Type of (economic) activity 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
Tarkettd.o.o, BačkaPalanka 
Production of plastic items for civil 
engineering 83.893.017 89.831.038 81.477.592 32.484.062 21.386.833 
Hemofarma.d, Vršac Production of pharmaceutical preparations 62.992.370 62.562.891 46.459.585 43.747.159 41.400.589 
Valyd.o.o, Valjevo 
Manufacture of knitted and crocheted 
hosiery 51.738.740 108.635.103 78.590.107 50.378.101 57.821.106 
ValjaonicaBakraSevojnoa.d, Sevojno Production of copper 28.434.967 20.269.753       
FBC a.d, Majdanpek Production of copper 28.309.105 33.848.255 30.269.363 15.989.701 16.066.328 
KoncernFarmakom Mb Šabac-
FabrikaAkumulatoraSombora.d, Sombor – in 
bankruptcy Production of accumulators 28.180.415         
TigarTyresd.o.o, Pirot Production of tyres for motor vehicles 26.581.514 30.562.523 21.087.239 15.163.436 22.056.860 
Lohrd.o.o, BačkaTopola 
Manufacture of bodies for motor vehicles, 
trailers and semi-trailers 24.951.096         
Novkabel a.d, Novi Sad 
Manufacture of other electronic and 
electric wires and cables 22.671.631   20.680.129     
ImpolSevala.d, Sevojno Production of aluminum 20.794.042 24.585.063   13.550.389 14.806.842 
Holding Kablovia.d, Jagodina 
Manufacture of other electronic and 
electric wires and cables   23.225.224       
Gorenje Home d.o.o, Zaječar 
Production of electrical household 
appliances   18.003.114 26.164.071 14.761.548   
Moskomercd.o.o, Belgrade 
Wholesale of electrical household 
appliances   17.400.269       
GrundfosSrbijad.o.o, Inđija 
Manufacture of other pumps and 
compressors     36.378.531 24.745.506 23.778.373 
Farmakom Finance d.o.o, Šabac – in 
bankruptcy 
Other financial service activities, except 
insurance and pension funding     23.501.258     
Real Knitting d.o.o, Gajdobra 
Manufacture of knitted and crocheted 
hosiery     23.427.982 16.335.409 27.249.861 
Delta Agrar d.o.o, Belgrade* 
Wholesale of grain, unmanufactured 
tobacco, seeds and animal feeds       14.463.062 15.291.193 
PDM Agro-Fruit d.o.o, Belgrade* 
Growing of cereals (except rice), legumes 
and oilseeds         14.417.166 
Number of enterprises: 18 
Sum of the value of the top 10 exporters on 
a yearly basis 378.546.897 428.923.233 388.035.857 241.618.373 254.275.151 
 
Annual change   13,3% -9,5% -37,7% 5,2% 
*Agricultural enterprises (coloured in light blue) 
Note: Obtained data are available only for given years. 
Source: Own elaboration based on data of the Chamber of Commerce and Industry of Serbia 2017b 
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Table H.11: Import of Serbia from Russia, by sectors, for the period 2004–2016, in tons 
 
Year Sum 
Sectors 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2004-2016 
Food and live 
animals 35.743,9 4.086,8 9.198,2 13.963,4 14.216,9 20.677,9 17.548,5 13.678,7 21.286,8 26.721,9 31.561,0 22.256,2 22.582,0 253.522,2 
Beverages and 
tobacco 80,0 821,8 1.795,7 38,0 121,6 135,3 1.161,2 2.658,7 2.536,9 2.993,3 3.463,1 4.120,5 5.658,0 25.584,1 
Crude materials, 
inedible, except 
fuels 32.255,3 41.529,6 659.009,6 431.258,9 131.902,6 34.791,0 43.556,7 18.605,8 52.270,5 157.581,2 213.627,5 155.719,1 177.632,0 2.149.739,8 
Mineral fuels, 
lubricants and 
related products 4.725.873,2 4.150.538,3 4.146.135,0 4.261.112,3 4.259.591,2 3.212.897,3 3.075.999,2 2.832.021,7 1.926.108,8 1.674.657,2 2.567.342,0 3.037.406,2 2.826.833,7 42.696.516,1 
Animal and plant 
oils, fats and 
waxes 19,4 19,8 14.781,3 3.854,6 1.309,1 1.910,4 2,0 20,0 11,6 3.819,6 1.741,2 964,3 1.881,6 30.334,9 
Chemical and 
similar product, 
not stipulated 238.655,4 238.520,6 335.070,2 549.429,5 516.044,7 563.350,8 274.177,3 239.694,1 390.684,2 459.640,9 387.784,7 383.084,7 622.686,6 5.198.823,7 
Manufactured 
goods classified 
by material 82.313,1 68.567,5 65.490,6 96.454,8 86.529,0 63.498,7 91.938,1 90.237,3 63.844,4 80.737,1 67.785,9 80.675,8 106.825,2 1.044.897,5 
Machines and 
transport 
equipment 7.092,0 5.995,3 5.153,4 5.352,4 4.526,4 3.716,4 3.849,3 4.926,2 3.950,6 3.866,7 5.600,6 3.290,9 7.726,1 65.046,3 
Miscellaneous 
manufactured 
products 473,5 703,1 467,4 578,7 598,9 622,0 852,6 620,1 503,2 395,2 359,6 529,1 833,8 7.537,2 
Products not 
stipulated in 
mentioned 
sectors 6.246,7 173,9 87,1 99.991,3 101.700,7 61.185,6 7.732,6 3.113,1 1.115,8 1.543,2 4.751,0 2.617,1 62.769,0 353.027,1 
*Sum of all sectors for the period 2004–2016 * 51.825.028,9 
**Sum of the sector - mineral fuels, lubricants and related products, for the period 2004-2016 ** 42.696.516,1 
***Percentual share of the sector - mineral fuels, lubricants and related products in the sum of all sectors *** 82,4% 
Source: Own elaboration based on data from the Statistical Office of the Republic of Serbia - online database 
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Table H.12: Import of Serbia from Russia, by divisions, for the period 2004–2016, in thousand USD 
  Year Sum 
Divisions 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2004-2016 
Live animals, except animals from section 03 0,0 9,6   0,5 0,0 2,6 0,4 1,2 2,5 0,1 1,0 2,9 0,3 21,1 
Meat and meat products 17,0 0,0 0,0 115,7 0,0 0,0 80,7 0,0 0,0 88,0 1.420,1 56,7 223,8 2.002,0 
Dairy products and bird eggs 687,8 47,5       0,0 50,8 0,0 355,1 391,3 351,3 101,6 45,2 2.030,6 
Fish, crustaceans, molluscs and products made of 
them 206,0 413,3 641,3 183,3 76,8 47,3 255,3 415,4 428,2 396,8 424,2 209,4 570,7 4.268,0 
Cereals and cereal-based products 6.789,9 327,6 3.086,7 10.056,2 9.987,3 8.512,0 7.165,3 3.212,8 620,3 564,2 645,9 440,1 994,6 52.402,9 
Fruit and vegetables 957,9 367,1 987,3 467,3 304,5 197,3 75,2 1.485,2 1.386,4 1.464,0 894,7 1.746,2 1.417,8 11.750,9 
Sugar, products made of sugar and honey 15,0 18,3 155,1 59,3 116,6 111,9 96,3 142,8 108,9 1.192,3 118,5 124,1 718,6 2.977,7 
Coffee, tea, cocoa, spices and related products 2,2 12,6 54,1 72,9 146,0 0,2 124,4 209,0 42,2 25,7 39,9 91,2 577,2 1.397,6 
Animal food (except unmilled cereals) 0,0 371,3 1.606,3 2.061,0 3.067,6 4.272,8 3.709,4 2.960,1 4.801,2 6.243,5 9.033,9 3.156,2 2.420,1 43.703,4 
Miscellaneous products for food and related 
products 1.477,2 1.265,3 2.164,7 2.605,0 3.255,2 3.544,8 2.692,1 4.584,0 5.260,6 6.571,6 6.687,0 5.436,9 5.849,6 51.394,0 
Beverages 36,5 28,0 4,5 36,1 78,5 28,8 30,9 62,7 91,4 97,5 94,2 163,2 201,8 954,1 
Tobacco and tobacco products 380,8 5.700,8 13.494,9 51,4 1.461,2 2.381,2 11.321 33.716,7 30.951,1 36.489 38.151,7 33.625,7 46.043,1 253.769,0 
Leather and fur, raw         48,2         2,5 0,4   42,1 93,2 
Oil seeds and oleaginous fruits 0,0 0,0 629,5 0,0 28,1 5,8 4,7 8,4 77,9 75,9 139,6 225,2 61,6 1.256,7 
Crude rubber, included synthetic and regenerated 7.316,9 9.445,0 10.975,5 14.008,7 17.205,9 11.728,6 23.657 34.149,2 36.007,3 26.745 25.099,5 24.760,8 25.030,5 266.131,2 
Cork and wood 1,0 40,2 80,5 3,6 52,8 123,8 224,7 141,4 127,4 334,3 347,2 472,2 774,0 2.723,1 
Pulp and waste paper 2.553,1 3.021,3 0,0 10,8 406,4 88,8     44,9 91,2       6.216,5 
Textile fibres and scraps 813,7 1.033,3 1.056,9 729,0   8,0 42,1 6,6 3,0   14,5 0,8 1,6 3.709,5 
Crude fertilizers (except from section 56) and 
minerals 2.069,2 2.222,9 2.092,9 577,5 2.247,0 1.449,6 5.094,3 1.977,4 4.086,8 3.394,4 13,4 1.106,6 2.803,3 29.135,3 
Metal ores and metal scraps 737,0 1.530,2 52.535,4 41.668,8 13.489,8 1.718,8 1.217,7 150,1 2.880,1 23.662 26.668,0 28.486,4 17.124,3 211.869,4 
Animal and plant raw materials, not mentioned 4,1 0,0 5,4 5,7 117,5 1,8 20,6 175,3 46,4 31,9 53,7 4,3 10,9 477,6 
Coal, coke and briquettes 85.038 49.743,9 18.375,9 23.346,1 42.688,9 8.973,1 18.948 23.132,9 20.302,5 6.941,3 16.386,9 25.367,5 16.652,2 355.897,2 
Oil, oil derivatives and related products 777.246 1.023.490 1.138.30 1.308.45 1.762.452 894.246 963.125 1.156.678 841.454 703.056 1.122.854 710.046 458.428 12.859.844 
Gas, natural and industrial 325.869 351.591,7 581.127,5 645.325,0 967.456,7 652.032 711.527 885.225,2 636.682 551.148 639.100,1 549.714 336.931 7.833.732,0 
Electricity                           0,0 
Animal oils and fats 31,7         0,0   0,0 0,0 0,0 342,2 0,0 19,6 393,5 
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Fixed plant fats and oils, raw, refined 0,3 17,7 10.325,5 3.787,6 2.094,3 2.001,6 2,3 0,9 0,3 4.642,6 1.566,7 891,3 1.756,6 27.087,7 
Animal and plant fats and oils, refined 4,0 5,7 7,5       4,1 49,8 17,1 54,7 71,3     214,2 
Organic chemical products 5.178,0 7.573,7 11.248,9 14.243,5 20.636,3 2.686,5 5.912,9 9.920,0 2.138,8 5.221,5 7.425,2 7.297,3 4.025,3 103.507,9 
Inorganic chemical products 4.245,5 6.415,7 9.652,7 12.820,1 24.699,7 18.046,5 27.431 38.031,0 40.588,4 47.601 47.999,6 37.169,8 31.024,5 345.726,4 
Products for dyeing and tanning 97,3 9,8 15,4 13,8 26,5 112,2 100,2 35,4 55,1 1.903,1 159,8 343,0 287,5 3.159,1 
Medical and pharmaceutical products 162,1 406,6 199,5 337,3 268,1 384,2 134,8 24,2 1.294,4 46,2 55,1 148,6 790,9 4.252,0 
Essential oils, perfumes and toiletries 151,0 129,0 261,3 980,1 460,9 390,2 463,2 662,0 907,5 714,3 873,0 989,4 1.543,5 8.525,4 
Fertilizers (other than crude) 44.316 51.232,8 68.597,7 149.363,7 240.422,9 147.675 77.003 88.815,9 164.244 173.720 110.625,2 95.921,7 143.930 1.555.870,5 
Plastics in primary forms 446,6 288,4 1.105,0 790,6 874,0 1.228,2 2.451,6 5.108,7 6.158,8 10.443 20.676,8 22.637,1 36.152,7 108.361,6 
Plastics in non-primary forms 175,0 273,4 310,0 23,0 123,1 279,4 292,7 421,0 320,6 293,2 957,5 1.764,7 2.185,9 7.419,5 
Chemical materials and products, not mentioned 1.656,3 241,5 241,0 173,9 329,1 444,9 1.428,0 641,5 474,3 518,1 1.171,2 4.344,9 2.969,1 14.633,8 
Leather, leather products, not mentioned, and 
processed furs 0,2 2,8 0,0 0,0 3,2 0,0 42,0 147,7 88,0 269,6 0,8 1,2 187,0 742,5 
Products made of rubber, not mentioned 5.021,9 4.561,3 5.956,5 6.613,8 4.097,8 3.806,8 4.138,4 4.911,9 4.188,7 4.251,1 5.232,4 6.529,2 6.501,3 65.811,1 
Products of cork and wood (except furniture) 124,4 129,7 456,7 1.715,6 416,1 704,1 817,8 1.044,5 832,6 954,3 1.417,1 1.641,6 5.994,5 16.249,0 
Paper, cardboard and products of pulp 5.390,6 8.370,2 6.775,3 8.875,9 11.717,4 13.276,6 11.278 15.079,0 11.535,9 9.971,5 15.158,6 18.122,8 19.619,2 155.171,7 
Textile yarn, fabrics and textile products 2.747,7 3.330,7 2.186,9 1.875,8 1.858,7 1.174,9 1.833,2 1.424,7 909,2 899,2 1.061,9 2.631,8 1.129,2 23.063,9 
Products of non-metallic minerals 1.775,3 592,7 1.011,7 1.160,9 1.600,9 2.198,2 969,3 707,3 1.511,0 2.657,9 3.286,7 2.776,0 6.074,5 26.322,4 
Iron and steel 17.645 12.706,6 14.148,2 18.238,0 14.889,7 7.522,4 12.858 13.219,1 12.769,0 15.848 7.325,6 7.447,7 6.083,4 160.701,9 
Coloured metals 56.535 81.373,5 140.020,4 214.701,9 159.616,0 75.836,2 183.362 241.284,7 148.708 173.014 133.641 113.784 120.221 1.842.101,3 
Products made of metals, not mentioned 1.856,4 1.083,2 996,5 1.745,9 1.867,6 2.448,0 1.840,4 21.129,2 20.208,2 19.891 12.448,2 3.456,0 2.112,2 91.083,3 
Driving machines and power equipment 3.324,3 1.666,1 7.978,0 2.895,3 1.891,4 18.044,9 13.770 14.206,2 11.715,8 11.102 15.936,2 1.336,6 10.676,6 114.543,7 
Machines specialised for industry 2.293,1 788,6 1.512,8 1.438,2 1.690,5 767,0 209,4 610,3 222,8 257,1 439,2 917,4 1.123,2 12.269,6 
Machines for metal processing 104,6 392,5 155,4 264,7 651,3 122,8 11,3 29,3 7,7 383,8 52,5 31,6 29,3 2.236,8 
Industrial machines for general use, not mentioned 2.637,3 3.169,7 5.723,8 3.306,9 7.929,3 3.167,8 3.428,8 12.462,7 5.011,7 17.151 4.608,3 3.414,0 2.653,0 74.665,1 
Office machines and machines for automatic data 
processing 210,4 131,7 44,1 72,9 971,2 103,6 62,2 568,5 1.518,3 136,0 109,5 89,8 12,0 4.030,2 
Telecommunications and audio apparatuses and 
equipment 97,8 391,6 1.645,6 193,9 352,8 42,8 5,2 2,8 32,7 224,2 73,5 269,3 154,4 3.486,6 
Electrical machines, apparatuses and appliances, not 
mentioned 1.898,5 2.517,9 4.427,3 4.098,3 4.068,1 3.590,1 6.410,6 3.363,6 5.035,2 6.531,9 6.607,1 6.303,3 8.956,8 63.808,7 
Road vehicles (including ACV vehicles) 19.399 25.182,9 13.331,0 14.005,2 9.446,5 5.386,9 5.660,7 12.962,6 7.157,4 8.391,7 13.269,7 10.151,7 5.494,9 149.840,8 
  
 
4
20 
Other transport vehicles and equipment 1.247,6 128,6 1.561,7 4.935,1 3.407,7 3.164,1 23.624 5.546,1 36.055,8 5.861,1 19.274,3 692,2 127.936 233.434,9 
Prefabricated buildings; sanitary and other devices 13,9 26,2 98,1 239,3 86,5 62,6 258,3 299,1 188,2 167,9 59,7 164,3 538,4 2.202,5 
Furniture and parts thereof; bedding, mattresses, 
pillows 122,8 89,5 54,4 90,1 49,1 375,0 182,2 33,3 36,1 152,5 116,2 177,6 391,4 1.870,2 
Travel goods, handbags and similar 0,2 0,0 0,4 0,4 0,8 0,5 249,4 0,2 0,5 1,0 0,4 3,5 0,2 257,5 
Garments and clothing accessories 32,8 63,2 63,7 309,4 55,6 33,5 120,3 60,8 18,7 204,4 38,6 29,3 82,8 1.113,1 
Shoes 26,1 53,1 70,5 86,5 91,4 24,7 69,0 40,2 21,0 29,1 46,7 14,8 23,0 596,1 
Professional, scientific and controlling instruments 772,8 1.158,1 1.587,4 919,9 9.863,5 2.595,2 1.766,4 1.946,6 2.144,6 1.124,0 776,0 724,0 732,1 26.110,6 
Cameras; optical products; clocks, watches 22,2 1,1 7,5 7,0 123,2 55,0 2,3 9,2 9,3 3,0 43,7 6,8 0,4 290,7 
Miscellaneous products, not mentioned 1.484,4 2.211,9 2.110,5 1.943,7 2.402,3 1.840,8 2.164,6 1.588,9 1.061,1 1.217,6 1.781,6 996,5 1.795,9 22.599,8 
Coins, which is not a means of payment                           0,0 
Gold (excluding gold ores and concentrates)                           0,0 
Unclassified goods 2.594,5 1.328,2 1.226,2 149.536,1 165.973,4 59.048,9 16.303 9.400,4 5.450,0 8.680,1 17.084,4 9.979,4 41.068,1 487.672,7 
*Sum of all divisions for the period 2004–2016 
 
* 27.759.185 
**Sum of the divisions - oil, oil derivatives and related products, and gas, natural and industrial, for the period 2004–2016 
 
** 20.693.576 
***Percentual share of the two above mentioned divisions in the sum of all divisions *** 74,5% 
Source: Own elaboration based on data from the Statistical Office of the Republic of Serbia - online database 
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Table H.13: Import of Serbia from Russia, by divisions, for the period 2004–2016, in tons 
 
Year Sum 
Divisions 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2004-2016 
Live animals, except animals from section 03 0,0 0,0   0,0 0,0 1,1 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,7 0,0 1,8 
Meat and meat products 5,0 0,0 0,0 35,7 0,0 0,0 16,3 0,0 0,0 14,4 227,1 22,8 77,7 399,0 
Dairy products and bird eggs 240,7 17,5       0,0 5,2 0,0 80,1 93,7 78,3 26,1 12,9 554,5 
Fish, crustaceans, molluscs and products made of 
them 145,1 243,4 250,5 75,8 35,6 26,8 39,3 110,1 145,1 135,1 138,5 104,5 283,9 1.733,7 
Cereals and cereal-based products 32.777,5 183,2 1.180,1 4.973,5 2.985,5 2.893,3 2.411,1 1.076,7 506,7 540,1 916,9 748,5 2.090,9 53.284,0 
Fruit and vegetables 377,8 108,8 234,8 122,6 212,3 196,5 76,1 612,9 581,4 848,6 943,5 1.256,1 1.205,2 6.776,6 
Sugar, products made of sugar and honey 1,0 0,2 35,1 13,7 21,4 21,3 20,7 21,6 23,8 1.548,4 27,8 22,9 1.099,8 2.857,7 
Coffee, tea, cocoa, spices and related products 3,0 4,6 4,5 5,9 10,7 0,0 21,3 20,3 3,8 2,3 5,3 12,9 177,7 272,3 
Animal food (except unmilled cereals) 0,0 1.481,5 5.576,6 6.287,0 8.302,6 14.038,0 12.926,4 8.782,0 15.506,0 16.889,4 23.037,2 14.000,5 11.660,5 138.487,7 
Miscellaneous products for food and related 
products 2.193,8 2.047,6 1.916,6 2.449,2 2.648,8 3.500,9 2.032,1 3.055,1 4.439,7 6.649,9 6.186,4 6.061,2 5.973,3 49.154,6 
Beverages 20,8 17,4 2,4 18,9 33,5 1,8 18,6 47,6 73,2 73,3 94,8 113,6 114,8 630,7 
Tobacco and tobacco products 59,2 804,4 1.793,3 19,1 88,1 133,5 1.142,6 2.611,1 2.463,7 2.920,0 3.368,4 4.006,9 5.543,2 24.953,5 
Leather and fur, raw         37,7         0,0 0,0   19,7 57,4 
Oil seeds and oleaginous fruits 0,0 0,0 2.552,8 0,0 40,0 2,5 2,1 3,8 43,3 65,7 191,0 344,4 119,4 3.365,0 
Crude rubber, included synthetic and regenerated 5.212,0 5.820,5 6.376,5 7.400,6 6.492,9 6.124,6 8.878,9 9.395,6 10.304,0 9.036,6 11.012,9 16.253,8 16.670,1 118.979,0 
Cork and wood 0,5 24,4 94,7 1,5 47,3 228,9 338,5 168,8 142,8 470,6 418,8 973,0 1.932,8 4.842,6 
Pulp and waste paper 5.014,0 5.532,5 0,0 15,3 537,8 171,8     45,8 103,3       11.420,5 
Textile fibres and scraps 611,6 749,9 791,1 520,3   4,0 11,7 3,7 3,8   6,4 1,5 0,3 2.704,3 
Crude fertilizers (except from section 56) and 
minerals 12.066,0 12.685,7 11.345,0 2.687,7 9.258,2 6.380,0 25.315,0 9.000,4 20.884,8 16.773,7 21,2 6.994,4 18.652,4 152.064,5 
Metal ores and metal scraps 9.351,0 16.716,6 637.848,5 420.630,7 115.476,2 21.879,1 9.000,0 21,2 20.827,8 131.111,4 201.965,3 131.151,8 140.236,6 1.856.216,2 
Animal and plant raw materials, not mentioned 0,2 0,0 1,0 2,8 12,5 0,1 10,5 12,3 18,3 19,9 12,0 0,3 0,8 90,7 
Coal, coke and briquettes 346.850,4 305.915,3 210.759,2 237.738,3 312.191,8 61.406,4 144.157,3 150.357,9 132.127,4 51.067,6 116.276,3 201.407,0 149.778,5 2.420.033,4 
Oil, oil derivatives and related products 2.950.797,6 2.661.002,4 2.477.452,1 2.553.588,2 2.384.609,1 2.057.716,7 1.663.797,4 1.430.309,8 997.496,9 862.079,8 1.438.204,7 1.652.883,8 1.441.535,3 24.571.473,8 
Gas, natural and industrial 1.428.225,2 1.183.620,6 1.457.923,7 1.469.785,8 1.562.790,3 1.093.774,2 1.268.044,5 1.251.354,0 796.484,6 761.509,8 1.012.861,0 1.183.115,5 1.235.519,9 15.705.009,1 
Electricity                           0,0 
Animal oils and fats 19,2         0,0   0,0 0,0 0,0 112,7 0,0 21,5 153,4 
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Fixed plant fats and oils, raw, refined 0,0 19,6 14.773,5 3.854,6 1.309,1 1.910,4 0,0 0,0 0,0 3.775,6 1.575,5 964,3 1.860,2 30.042,8 
Animal and plant fats and oils, refined 0,2 0,2 7,8       2,0 20,0 11,6 44,0 53,0     138,8 
Organic chemical products 4.828,5 6.714,7 9.889,2 13.759,0 17.153,7 3.531,8 7.593,5 6.781,8 1.170,4 4.972,3 8.324,2 13.199,9 7.789,6 105.708,6 
Inorganic chemical products 7.203,1 13.771,3 17.296,6 14.177,8 21.456,5 22.014,8 33.511,5 44.673,2 34.109,3 40.263,7 57.180,4 54.712,1 51.910,0 412.280,3 
Products for dyeing and tanning 19,2 1,5 2,4 0,9 2,2 2,5 60,7 1,4 6,3 73,4 8,1 157,3 180,3 516,2 
Medical and pharmaceutical products 7,2 11,7 13,2 7,2 10,2 18,9 6,7 0,5 9,9 1,2 2,4 2,8 10,4 102,3 
Essential oils, perfumes and toiletries 45,9 40,1 44,9 1.013,3 51,3 28,9 32,0 37,2 53,5 50,9 143,8 84,0 254,6 1.880,4 
Fertilizers (other than crude) 225.932,0 217.683,2 306.986,0 519.972,0 476.802,2 536.648,9 230.958,0 185.358,5 351.203,7 407.625,7 307.889,3 292.340,9 523.074,4 4.582.474,8 
Plastics in primary forms 379,0 197,6 727,6 469,9 427,4 864,5 1.582,5 2.598,5 3.918,0 6.495,0 13.428,3 20.870,0 37.248,3 89.206,6 
Plastics in non-primary forms 13,2 18,7 22,9 3,9 9,7 14,2 20,6 36,6 45,4 21,3 334,7 776,1 1.039,7 2.357,0 
Chemical materials and products, not mentioned 227,3 81,8 87,4 25,5 131,5 226,3 411,8 206,4 167,6 137,4 473,5 941,6 1.179,4 4.297,5 
Leather, leather products, not mentioned, and 
processed furs 0,0 0,2 0,0 0,0 0,2 0,0 4,4 12,3 4,1 14,0 0,0 0,0 9,0 44,2 
Products made of rubber, not mentioned 3.528,6 2.603,9 2.762,1 2.170,8 1.201,8 1.397,7 1.174,2 1.141,5 958,8 1.103,8 1.708,3 2.939,6 2.750,7 25.441,8 
Products of cork and wood (except furniture) 178,9 173,1 739,2 2.707,3 368,4 774,6 1.123,6 1.007,3 850,4 828,6 1.214,2 2.104,1 10.136,2 22.205,9 
Paper, cardboard and products of pulp 9.842,3 13.882,6 10.069,1 10.461,3 10.784,1 14.397,2 11.813,8 13.893,8 11.509,0 10.113,0 18.041,0 24.704,5 28.298,9 187.810,6 
Textile yarn, fabrics and textile products 783,6 815,6 558,3 514,6 386,7 323,4 436,5 199,6 171,5 179,4 119,2 727,1 400,7 5.616,2 
Products of non-metallic minerals 14.622,2 839,9 2.367,2 2.307,8 2.808,0 8.122,3 2.207,3 576,9 1.021,4 1.486,3 2.158,3 2.584,8 8.293,0 49.395,4 
Iron and steel 28.152,1 13.749,9 12.448,6 16.257,6 16.110,7 7.585,2 15.022,0 8.622,1 11.872,3 19.051,4 6.724,9 9.265,2 8.598,8 173.460,8 
Coloured metals 24.545,8 36.293,1 36.405,0 61.756,9 54.397,6 30.518,3 59.898,7 61.939,9 34.358,7 45.272,9 35.822,3 37.237,6 47.534,1 565.980,9 
Products made of metals, not mentioned 659,6 209,2 141,1 278,5 471,5 380,0 257,6 2.843,9 3.098,2 2.687,7 1.997,8 1.112,9 803,7 14.941,7 
Driving machines and power equipment 362,3 105,9 417,7 161,2 56,5 1.494,0 696,0 647,6 386,1 398,1 529,1 62,5 355,5 5.672,5 
Machines specialised for industry 586,5 246,5 405,2 514,7 276,0 99,6 91,0 189,2 46,7 15,4 97,0 126,5 309,5 3.003,8 
Machines for metal processing 91,4 141,7 110,9 105,8 265,3 136,0 16,0 20,4 4,9 87,0 32,4 74,5 39,7 1.126,0 
Industrial machines for general use, not mentioned 1.192,4 374,1 636,7 269,7 1.013,4 386,6 450,8 1.479,0 607,5 311,9 212,3 495,7 542,7 7.972,8 
Office machines and machines for automatic data 
processing 1,0 24,8 0,4 7,6 19,0 0,5 0,3 17,5 9,1 0,1 0,1 1,2 0,1 81,7 
Telecommunications and audio apparatuses and 
equipment 6,7 20,0 373,0 39,4 6,2 0,4 0,0 0,0 0,1 0,7 0,3 2,4 1,4 450,6 
Electrical machines, apparatuses and appliances, not 
mentioned 182,7 143,1 175,9 313,3 587,2 475,4 1.072,1 515,4 794,5 1.308,7 410,2 1.019,7 2.798,8 9.797,0 
Road vehicles (including ACV vehicles) 4.379,7 4.714,4 2.616,1 2.311,1 1.412,1 886,5 907,9 1.386,2 938,4 956,2 1.080,3 1.188,8 959,4 23.737,1 
  
 
4
2
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Other transport vehicles and equipment 289,3 224,8 417,5 1.629,6 890,7 237,4 615,2 670,9 1.163,3 788,6 3.238,9 319,7 2.719,0 13.204,9 
Prefabricated buildings; sanitary and other devices 25,0 5,2 34,1 43,5 58,4 30,7 72,0 127,6 118,2 7,8 2,8 41,3 263,7 830,3 
Furniture and parts thereof; bedding, mattresses, 
pillows 28,3 72,7 16,1 44,3 15,8 138,5 84,0 5,7 8,3 26,7 15,0 113,6 269,6 838,6 
Travel goods, handbags and similar 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 9,7 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 9,7 
Garments and clothing accessories 0,3 0,5 0,8 3,7 0,5 0,3 68,7 0,3 0,4 3,8 5,9 17,0 1,0 103,2 
Shoes 1,6 6,3 1,2 1,0 7,9 0,2 25,4 0,3 0,3 0,3 1,6 0,2 0,3 46,6 
Professional, scientific and controlling instruments 58,7 76,9 46,4 29,7 24,9 11,5 108,7 98,4 103,7 10,6 26,0 12,4 6,9 614,8 
Cameras; optical products; clocks, watches 2,4 0,2 0,5 0,0 0,0 0,1 0,6 2,9 0,8 0,4 1,1 1,4 0,1 10,5 
Miscellaneous products, not mentioned 357,2 541,2 368,3 456,5 491,4 440,7 483,5 384,9 271,4 345,5 307,2 343,0 292,1 5.082,9 
Coins, which is not a means of payment                           0,0 
Gold (excluding gold ores and concentrates)                           0,0 
Unclassified goods 6.246,7 173,9 87,1 99.991,3 101.700,7 61.185,6 7.732,6 3.113,1 1.115,8 1.543,2 4.751,0 2.617,1 62.769,0 353.027,1 
*Sum of all divisions for the period 2004–2016                                                                                                                                                                           51.825.028,9 
**Sum of the divisions - oil, oil derivatives and related products, and gas, natural and industrial, for the period 2004–2016                             40.276.482,9 
***Percentual share of the two above mentioned divisions in the sum of all divisions                                                                                               77,7% 
Source: Own elaboration based on data from the Statistical Office of the Republic of Serbia - online database 
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Appendix I 
Figure I.1: GDP growth rate for Turkey 
 
Source: World Bank – World Economic Indicators 
Figure I.2: GDP per capita growth for the selected countries (annual %) 
 
Source: World Bank – World Economic Indicators 
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Figure I.3: GDP per capita for the selected countries (current US$) 
 
Source: World Bank – World Economic Indicators 
Figure I.4: Household final consumption expenditure per capita growth for the selected countries (annual %)424 
Source: World Bank – World Economic Indicators 
 
  
                                                          
424 “Annual percentage growth of household final consumption expenditure per capita, which is calculated using 
household final consumption expenditure in constant 2000 prices and World Bank population estimates. 
Household final consumption expenditure (private consumption) is the market value of all goods and services, 
including durable products (such as cars, washing machines, and home computers), purchased by households. It 
excludes purchases of dwellings but includes imputed rent for owner-occupied dwellings. It also includes 
payments and fees to governments to obtain permits and licenses. Here, household consumption expenditure 
includes the expenditures of nonprofit institutions serving households, even when reported separately by the 
country.” 
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Figure I.5: Household final consumption expenditure per capita for the selected countries (constant 2000 US$) 
 
Source: World Bank – World Economic Indicators 
 
Figure I.6: FDI outward for Turkey (% of GDP) 
 
Source: Own elaboration based on the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development – online database 
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Figure I.7: FDI outward for Turkey, stock (in million) 
 
Source: Own elaboration based on the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development – online database 
Figure I.8: Procedures to register property for the selected countries (number) 
Source: World Bank – World Economic Indicators 
Figure I.9: Time required to start a business for the selected countries (days) 
 
Source: World Bank – World Economic Indicators 
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Figure I.10: Taxes on income, profits and capital gains for the selected countries (% of total taxes) 
 
Source: World Bank – World Economic Indicators 
Figure I.11: Inflation– consumer prices for Turkey 
Source: World Bank – World Economic Indicators 
Figure I.12: Foreign direct investment for Turkey, net inflows (% of GDP) 
 
Source: World Bank – World Economic Indicators 
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Figure I.13: Savings for the selected countries (% of GDP) 
 
Source: World Bank – World Economic Indicators 
Figure I.14: Investment for the selected countries (% of GDP) 
Source: World Bank – World Economic Indicators 
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Appendix J 
Table J.1: Export from Serbia to Turkey by sectors, for the period 2004–2016, in thousand USD 
 
Year 
Sectors 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
Food and live animals 1.709,9 2.055,6 2.583,6 2.628,4 1.967,8 4.317,4 9.785,3 7.631,1 5.337,9 4.477,1 4.981,1 5.554,4 3.988,7 
Annual change   20,2% 25,7% 1,7% -25,1% 119,4% 126,6% -22,0% -30,1% -16,1% 11,3% 11,5% -28,2% 
Beverages and tobacco 0,0 0,0 7,4 0,1 644,8 350,2 76,5 261,1 120,2 386,1 14.315,3 36.537,1 26.467,3 
Annual change       -98,6% 
644700,0
% -45,7% -78,2% 241,3% -54,0% 221,2% 3607,7% 155,2% -27,6% 
Crude materials, inedible, except 
fuels 7.221,0 2.499,2 3.658,5 8.054,3 10.965,4 7.114,8 14.787,4 26.296,7 57.148,7 65.657,5 41.114,8 29.431,3 15.691,3 
Annual change   -65,4% 46,4% 120,2% 36,1% -35,1% 107,8% 77,8% 117,3% 14,9% -37,4% -28,4% -46,7% 
Mineral fuels, lubricants and 
related products 1,5 0,8 242,8 425,7 479,2 699,0 3.598,7 53.468,2 44.940,8 2.990,8 3.410,1 2.386,6 1.053,9 
Annual change   -46,7% 30250% 75,3% 12,6% 45,9% 414,8% 1385,8% -15,9% -93,3% 14,0% -30,0% -55,8% 
Animal and plant oils, fats and 
waxes 0,0 11,5 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 11,9 4,4 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 
Annual change     -100,0%         -63,0% -100,0%         
Chemical and similar product, 
not stipulated 6.496,0 435,5 1.152,8 4.723,4 3.256,9 2.302,9 4.506,3 5.894,1 8.515,7 42.233,4 17.213,8 21.059,6 17.473,9 
Annual change   -93,3% 164,7% 309,7% -31,0% -29,3% 95,7% 30,8% 44,5% 395,9% -59,2% 22,3% -17,0% 
Manufactured goods classified 
by material 44.589,8 43.249,1 28.874,7 39.666,1 21.529,0 25.705,4 41.030,4 67.915,0 58.025,0 74.188,8 121.355 116.533 167.650 
Annual change   -3,0% -33,2% 37,4% -45,7% 19,4% 59,6% 65,5% -14,6% 27,9% 63,6% -4,0% 43,9% 
Machines and transport 
equipment 2.124,2 1.742,4 1.798,8 2.468,7 4.801,7 3.079,6 13.043,6 14.885,5 8.980,1 22.420,8 14.709,7 25.002,7 22.793,9 
Annual change   -18,0% 3,2% 37,2% 94,5% -35,9% 323,5% 14,1% -39,7% 149,7% -34,4% 70,0% -8,8% 
Miscellaneous manufactured 
products 420,9 302,4 435,9 551,7 1.673,3 1.479,2 1.127,6 6.804,7 2.909,8 3.421,8 4.757,5 6.115,0 7.280,3 
Annual change   -28,2% 44,1% 26,6% 203,3% -11,6% -23,8% 503,5% -57,2% 17,6% 39,0% 28,5% 19,1% 
Products not stipulated in 
mentioned sectors 52,0 19,1 8,4 12,9 18,7 73,8 18,6 17,7 383,0 3.233,3 8.995,5 6.295,0 7.067,8 
Annual change   -63,3% -56,0% 53,6% 45,0% 294,7% -74,8% -4,8% 2063,8% 744,2% 178,2% -30,0% 12,3% 
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Table J.2a: Overall sum and periodical changes 
Sum Change 
2004-2016 2004-2016 2004-2009 2009-2010 2009-2011 2009-2016 
57.018,3 133,3% 152,5% 126,6% 76,8% -7,6% 
      
79.166,1 
  
-78,2% -25,4% 7457,8% 
      
289.640,9 117,3% -1,5% 107,8% 269,6% 120,5% 
      
113.698,1 70160,0% 46500,0% 414,8% 7549,2% 50,8% 
      
27,8 
     
      
135.264,3 169,0% -64,5% 95,7% 155,9% 658,8% 
      
850.311,5 276,0% -42,4% 59,6% 164,2% 552,2% 
      
137.851,7 973,1% 45,0% 323,5% 383,4% 640,2% 
      
37.280,1 1629,7% 251,4% -23,8% 360,0% 392,2% 
      
26.195,8 13491,9% 41,9% -74,8% -76,0% 9477,0% 
Source: Own elaboration based on data of the Statistical Office of the Republic of Serbia – online database 
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Table J.2: Export from Serbia to Turkey by sectors, for the period 2004–2016, in tons 
 
Year 
Sectors 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
Food and live animals 2.162,0 11.544,0 20.640,7 6.236,4 3.367,4 5.458,7 12.593,8 6.961,7 6.414,3 8.220,1 3.859,0 4.424,5 3.379,3 
Annual change   434,0% 78,8% -69,8% -46,0% 62,1% 130,7% -44,7% -7,9% 28,2% -53,1% 14,7% -23,6% 
Beverages and tobacco 0,0 0,0 5,0 0,6 153,6 111,6 140,2 17,6 27,3 92,9 1.002,6 3.127,2 2.636,7 
Annual change       -88,0% 25500,0% -27,3% 25,6% -87,4% 55,1% 240,3% 979,2% 211,9% -15,7% 
Crude materials, inedible, except fuels 7.820,9 1.907,0 3.400,8 5.231,2 6.308,3 8.399,8 19.080,9 30.753,2 130.972,1 163.389,1 103.760,3 89.352,9 53.099,8 
Annual change   -75,6% 78,3% 53,8% 20,6% 33,2% 127,2% 61,2% 325,9% 24,8% -36,5% -13,9% -40,6% 
Mineral fuels, lubricants and related 
products 3,7 1,0 309,0 562,6 416,7 1.062,4 4.483,0 53.659,7 52.712,0 2.812,5 3.837,1 3.858,0 2.166,7 
Annual change   -73,0% 30800,0% 82,1% -25,9% 155,0% 322,0% 1097,0% -1,8% -94,7% 36,4% 0,5% -43,8% 
Animal and plant oils, fats and waxes 0,0 44,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 2,2 48,3 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 
Annual change     -100,0%         2095,5% -100,0%         
Chemical and similar product, not 
stipulated 8.218,9 444,4 907,9 5.838,7 3.895,3 2.253,2 7.566,3 12.740,5 5.737,5 27.109,9 8.265,9 11.881,7 23.672,0 
Annual change   -94,6% 104,3% 543,1% -33,3% -42,2% 235,8% 68,4% -55,0% 372,5% -69,5% 43,7% 99,2% 
Manufactured goods classified by 
material 93.178,1 72.288,7 28.198,2 31.265,0 10.635,3 29.134,7 41.192,7 64.463,1 64.021,4 80.101,2 119.288,5 86.289,0 77.395,7 
Annual change   -22,4% -61,0% 10,9% -66,0% 173,9% 41,4% 56,5% -0,7% 25,1% 48,9% -27,7% -10,3% 
Machines and transport equipment 1.452,5 512,8 158,5 164,8 427,8 376,2 2.553,2 2.940,2 1.449,2 2.559,3 1.935,0 2.484,0 2.187,1 
Annual change   -64,7% -69,1% 4,0% 159,6% -12,1% 578,7% 15,2% -50,7% 76,6% -24,4% 28,4% -12,0% 
Miscellaneous manufactured products 115,9 158,8 95,0 161,5 196,6 187,9 178,5 557,5 409,2 521,5 1.148,0 2.112,6 1.925,5 
Annual change   37,0% -40,2% 70,0% 21,7% -4,4% -5,0% 212,3% -26,6% 27,4% 120,1% 84,0% -8,9% 
Products not stipulated in mentioned 
sectors 2,5 5,0 1,1 8,1 0,9 1,9 0,9 0,6 1,4 0,5 2,8 4,9 0,6 
Annual change   100,0% -78,0% 636,4% -88,9% 111,1% -52,6% -33,3% 133,3% -64,3% 460,0% 75,0% -87,8% 
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Table J.2a: Overall sum and periodical changes 
Sum Change 
2004–2016 2004–2016 2004–2009 2009–2010 2009–2011 2009–2016 
95.261,9 56,3% 152,5% 130,7% 27,5% -38,1% 
      
7.315,3 
  
25,6% -84,2% 2262,6% 
      
623.476,3 578,9% 7,4% 127,2% 266,1% 532,2% 
      
125.884,4 58459,5% 28613,5% 322,0% 4950,8% 103,9% 
      
94,5 
     
      
118.532,2 188,0% -72,6% 235,8% 465,4% 950,6% 
      
797.451,6 -16,9% -68,7% 41,4% 121,3% 165,6% 
      
19.200,6 50,6% -74,1% 578,7% 681,6% 481,4% 
      
7.768,5 1561,3% 62,1% -5,0% 196,7% 924,7% 
      
31,2 -76,0% -24,0% -52,6% -68,4% -68,4% 
Source: Own elaboration based on data of the Statistical Office of the Republic of Serbia – online database 
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Table J.3: Top 30 export divisions from Serbia to Turkey by value in the period 2004–2016, in thousand USD 
  Year 
Divisions 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
Iron and steel 40.975,0 33.390,4 10.372,2 14.180,3 3.113,2 12.358,2 18.476,2 45.583,7 20.169,1 26.138,3 45.650,9 33.803,5 20.468,4 
Coloured metals 12,7 1.202,9 8.536,3 15.266,3 8.314,1 6.111,2 9.027,3 2.651,0 8.645,3 8.670,2 41.753,3 48.513,8 102.117,2 
Metal ores and metal scraps 519,6 25,9 0,0 0,0 231,5 631,4 4.674,9 10.133,8 42.619,4 52.584,3 31.788,8 8.508,8 5.769,5 
Products made of rubber, not mentioned 2.233,7 6.996,1 8.511,0 8.802,2 7.150,8 1.328,9 5.689,7 9.805,9 12.688,0 20.065,9 12.536,9 15.679,4 23.283,4 
Oil, oil derivatives and related products 1,5 0,8 242,8 425,7 479,2 699,0 3.598,7 53.468,2 44.940,8 2.990,8 3.410,1 2.386,6 1.053,9 
Tobacco and tobacco products 0,0 0,0 7,4 0,1 644,8 182,9 76,5 261,1 120,2 334,7 14.315,3 36.537,1 26.467,3 
Industrial machines for general use, not mentioned 622,8 546,5 1.054,1 1.904,6 2.124,7 1.426,3 8.205,8 4.015,7 3.875,4 4.757,1 8.581,8 12.848,4 16.935,1 
Crude rubber, included synthetic and regenerated 1.382,7 1.845,2 3.014,3 6.147,2 8.159,4 5.302,5 6.805,3 9.108,5 8.331,1 5.610,3 3.763,6 1.407,5 4.931,3 
Paper, cardboard and products of pulp 465,6 107,5 466,6 173,7 2.249,5 5.115,8 4.926,3 6.130,0 8.970,7 11.182,6 11.908,6 5.776,7 3.992,9 
Plastics in primary forms 3.663,1 158,7 44,1 202,2 242,6 72,2 481,7 2.167,6 955,5 30.559,5 8.727,2 10.356,8 3.716,9 
Fruit and vegetables 1.044,7 893,3 185,0 853,3 805,0 2.677,8 6.032,3 4.684,5 2.380,2 2.302,5 2.814,0 3.458,0 1.315,3 
Leather and fur, raw 135,1 36,2 188,7 1.066,7 1.539,8 1.089,9 2.475,1 5.936,7 5.220,5 6.469,2 2.934,4 838,2 609,3 
Products made of metals, not mentioned 274,6 957,7 362,7 621,7 297,2 289,0 839,6 1.165,9 1.084,3 2.348,3 5.562,8 6.278,4 7.609,5 
Road vehicles (including ACV vehicles) 458,2 400,5 347,2 243,8 145,1 39,6 144,4 373,3 159,7 11.299,4 1.475,1 7.895,0 2.112,0 
Gold (excluding gold ores and concentrates)                 239,4 3.064,5 7.344,6 6.150,0 7.065,1 
Miscellaneous products, not mentioned 121,6 26,5 237,8 328,9 1.251,7 728,1 323,5 1.643,0 1.141,7 2.523,2 3.435,2 4.188,6 5.085,5 
Organic chemical products 1.366,3 70,0 27,3 3.552,4 978,9 168,3 2.300,2 276,3 207,7 4.099,0 630,3 821,3 5.293,2 
Oil seeds and oleaginous fruits 0,0 78,1 34,7 11,6 6,4 1,9 88,6 489,9 415,2 2,4 221,3 15.275,4 127,7 
Plastics in non-primary forms 71,0 4,6 68,2 120,7 278,7 330,1 223,8 372,3 1.896,5 3.109,2 3.273,5 3.445,2 2.210,3 
Products of cork and wood (except furniture) 0,0 5,3 7,5 15,2 7,3 4,3 1.711,4 1.580,6 4.105,4 1.907,0 559,7 1.673,5 2.435,0 
Products of non-metallic minerals 53,5 1,6 185,8 146,0 104,8 255,2 136,6 640,7 2.240,8 3.015,3 1.822,3 3.534,6 1.522,0 
Electrical machines, apparatuses and appliances, not ment. 152,2 18,5 92,8 80,7 523,8 900,6 1.647,2 5.228,2 2.182,0 877,1 331,7 578,9 349,3 
Garments and clothing accessories 293,2 223,7 94,0 84,3 215,5 653,1 480,6 4.530,3 1.447,0 562,9 418,6 1.502,9 1.844,7 
Animal food (except unmilled cereals)   824,0 2.011,9 1.040,9 456,3 111,9 314,4 479,7 838,4 1.795,8 550,3 885,9 1.684,0 
Essential oils, perfumes and toiletries 111,4 78,2 124,2 113,0 376,4 171,4 252,0 274,1 134,7 393,5 1.932,8 3.317,3 3.701,1 
Machines specialised for industry 85,9 137,1 125,4 43,4 1.401,7 428,8 2.074,8 579,7 133,3 983,0 1.977,2 2.066,5 849,0 
  
 
4
3
5
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Inorganic chemical products 17,2 112,5 272,4 547,5 705,1 1.118,9 591,0 831,7 1.582,2 1.919,6 487,7 596,9 682,8 
Medical and pharmaceutical products 1.267,0 0,0 538,5 3,3 7,4 127,6 369,7 1.136,7 2.516,9 249,5 849,8 1.412,9 977,3 
Chemical materials and products, not mentioned 0,0 11,5 77,3 170,3 667,2 313,8 275,2 835,1 1.222,2 1.825,0 1.296,4 1.029,9 883,2 
Driving machines and power equipment 311,9 116,8 103,6 131,2 351,9 101,2 242,4 2.530,7 1.032,9 1.503,8 494,0 739,6 666,3 
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Table J.3a: Overall sum and periodical changes 
Sum Change 
2004–2016 2004–2016 2004–2009 2009–2010 2009–2011 2009–2016 
324.679,4 -50,0% -69,8% 49,5% 268,9% 65,6% 
260.821,6 803972,4% 48019,7% 47,7% -56,6% 1571,0% 
157.487,9 1010,4% 21,5% 640,4% 1505,0% 813,8% 
134.771,9 942,4% -40,5% 328,2% 637,9% 1652,1% 
113.698,1 70160,0% 46500,0% 414,8% 7549,2% 50,8% 
78.947,4 
  
-58,2% 42,8% 14370,9% 
66.898,3 2619,2% 129,0% 475,3% 181,5% 1087,3% 
65.808,9 256,6% 283,5% 28,3% 71,8% -7,0% 
61.466,5 757,6% 998,8% -3,7% 19,8% -21,9% 
61.348,1 1,5% -98,0% 567,2% 2902,2% 5048,1% 
29.445,9 25,9% 156,3% 125,3% 74,9% -50,9% 
28.539,8 351,0% 706,7% 127,1% 444,7% -44,1% 
27.691,7 2671,1% 5,2% 190,5% 303,4% 2533,0% 
25.093,3 360,9% -91,4% 264,6% 842,7% 5233,3% 
23.863,6 
     
21.035,3 4082,2% 498,8% -55,6% 125,7% 598,5% 
19.791,2 287,4% -87,7% 1266,7% 64,2% 3045,1% 
16.753,2 
  
4563,2% 25684,2% 6621,1% 
15.404,1 3013,1% 364,9% -32,2% 12,8% 569,6% 
14.012,2 
  
39700,0% 36658,1% 56527,9% 
13.659,2 2744,9% 377,0% -46,5% 151,1% 496,4% 
12.963,0 129,5% 491,7% 82,9% 480,5% -61,2% 
12.350,8 529,2% 122,7% -26,4% 593,7% 182,5% 
10.993,5 
  
181,0% 328,7% 1404,9% 
10.980,1 3222,4% 53,9% 47,0% 59,9% 2059,3% 
10.885,8 888,4% 399,2% 383,9% 35,2% 98,0% 
9.465,5 3869,8% 6405,2% -47,2% -25,7% -39,0% 
9.456,6 -22,9% -89,9% 189,7% 790,8% 665,9% 
8.607,1 
  
-12,3% 166,1% 181,5% 
8.326,3 113,6% -67,6% 139,5% 2400,7% 558,4% 
Source: Own elaboration based on data of the Statistical Office of the Republic of Serbia – online database 
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Table J.4: Top 30 export divisions from Serbia to Turkey by value in the period 2004–2016, in tons 
  Year 
Divisions 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
Iron and steel 90.321,2 67.439,2 21.320,3 25.040,7 3.273,8 16.603,0 19.400,6 44.312,9 23.119,2 42.903,5 82.782,2 55.290,2 33.711,8 
Metal ores and metal scraps 2.931,2 56,6 0,0 0,1 900,3 2.528,5 12.811,4 24.489,8 125.158,6 156.139,6 96.214,2 39.386,7 30.333,2 
Oil, oil derivatives and related products 3,7 1,0 309,0 562,6 416,7 1.062,4 4.483,0 53.659,7 52.712,0 2.812,5 3.837,1 3.858,0 2.166,7 
Paper, cardboard and products of pulp 1.401,9 155,6 1.043,6 199,2 3.559,2 10.705,7 8.997,1 9.782,2 15.909,0 20.104,3 22.718,0 12.218,2 9.829,5 
Animal food (except unmilled cereals)   9.959,6 20.035,4 4.934,1 2.183,1 715,7 1.012,7 691,7 2.388,0 6.451,3 722,1 386,5 854,1 
Coloured metals 50,4 518,5 1.797,6 2.604,1 1.385,5 1.046,0 1.253,2 250,7 1.060,0 1.094,0 5.945,3 9.353,1 21.135,1 
Plastics in primary forms 4.327,5 135,0 42,7 93,3 170,3 52,6 331,2 1.395,5 680,9 20.479,2 5.382,8 8.529,7 3.335,2 
Products of cork and wood (except furniture) 0,0 2,0 18,8 32,4 11,2 7,4 9.569,0 6.991,4 16.804,5 5.506,5 731,8 1.080,8 2.079,0 
Oil seeds and oleaginous fruits 0,0 23,2 4,6 4,7 1,5 0,2 130,5 626,1 604,8 0,5 86,3 38.000,5 26,0 
Organic chemical products 3.751,4 14,7 0,3 4.358,5 1.048,6 12,7 5.083,0 129,3 55,1 3.998,1 362,3 524,7 17.382,4 
Products made of rubber, not mentioned 964,3 2.918,5 3.203,9 2.913,3 2.022,0 369,5 1.566,1 2.146,5 2.966,2 4.436,3 2.650,8 4.100,9 6.345,6 
Crude rubber, included synthetic and regenerated 1.089,0 1.385,0 2.177,1 3.742,8 3.826,5 4.381,2 3.446,7 2.733,5 2.496,8 2.637,7 1.978,5 1.077,4 3.959,4 
Fruit and vegetables 1.918,3 1.474,0 245,0 977,6 905,0 4.076,9 9.610,2 4.006,1 2.259,4 1.649,3 1.744,4 2.459,8 811,5 
Inorganic chemical products 30,0 208,3 679,9 1.181,8 2.092,2 1.899,3 1.909,2 10.774,9 4.012,6 1.056,6 350,6 290,8 377,1 
Cork and wood 0,0 39,0 521,4 519,5 431,1 114,4 845,2 543,2 613,3 1.695,6 1.849,6 5.599,4 6.812,0 
Products of non-metallic minerals 24,7 0,2 549,3 234,8 285,6 312,2 290,7 720,5 3.697,5 5.253,8 3.338,9 2.378,3 1.924,2 
Pulp and waste paper                     891,8 3.446,8 10.394,8 
Leather and fur, raw 127,8 46,1 183,5 768,1 1.045,8 1.327,3 1.672,4 2.030,6 1.936,3 2.597,0 1.562,8 687,1 704,0 
Tobacco and tobacco products 0,0 0,0 5,0 0,6 153,6 48,0 140,2 17,6 27,3 31,0 1.002,6 3.127,2 2.636,7 
Products made of metals, not mentioned 44,1 748,8 62,8 113,0 62,9 28,4 62,8 210,8 416,9 696,0 971,0 1.582,1 2.077,8 
Miscellaneous products, not mentioned 55,8 5,3 57,2 76,3 135,2 153,1 74,7 319,0 282,4 473,4 1.084,7 1.958,4 1.757,8 
Cereals and cereal-based products 243,7 96,4 194,8 266,2 129,4 352,6 129,1 335,9 325,6 50,1 1.162,6 1.352,9 1.670,5 
Industrial machines for general use, not mentioned 59,5 36,0 69,4 93,0 101,9 74,7 1.243,3 460,8 214,0 293,6 740,5 1.164,3 1.639,5 
Chemical materials and products, not mentioned 0,0 5,8 53,9 121,7 288,9 149,7 95,0 238,9 809,3 994,4 696,3 1.273,3 725,3 
Miscellaneous products for food and related products 0,0 13,7 4,2 7,0 6,1 268,3 1.411,6 1.765,5 1.320,1 0,0 73,8 8,7 0,7 
Essential oils, perfumes and toiletries 88,7 79,0 107,1 64,2 248,2 80,8 110,0 135,5 52,2 169,1 1.282,5 749,7 1.511,3 
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Textile fibres and scraps 3.179,3 322,3 80,8 73,2 62,5 47,7 136,9 141,8 14,2 13,7 0,0 425,6 16,8 
Animal and plant raw materials, not mentioned 493,6 34,8 433,4 122,3 40,1 0,0 4,3 59,8 131,1 304,8 1.175,8 705,3 853,3 
Other transport vehicles and equipment 384,7 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,1 28,6 260,2 718,8 383,9 768,0 728,0 132,9 41,1 
Electrical machines, apparatuses and appliances, not ment. 4,3 2,3 9,6 16,6 23,9 196,8 406,0 1.136,1 681,1 227,5 48,3 87,0 51,4 
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Table J.4a: Overall sum and periodical changes 
Sum Change 
2004–2016 2004–2016 2004–2009 2009–2010 2009–2011 2009–2016 
525.518,6 -62,7% -81,6% 16,8% 166,9% 103,0% 
490.950,2 934,8% -13,7% 406,7% 868,6% 1099,7% 
125.884,4 58459,5% 28613,5% 322,0% 4950,8% 103,9% 
116.623,5 601,2% 663,7% -16,0% -8,6% -8,2% 
50.334,3 
  
41,5% -3,4% 19,3% 
47.493,5 
  
19,8% -76,0% 1920,6% 
44.955,9 -22,9% -98,8% 529,7% 2553,0% 6240,7% 
42.834,8 
  
129210,8% 94378,4% 27994,6% 
39.508,9 
  
65150,0% 312950,0% 12900,0% 
36.721,1 363,4% -99,7% 39923,6% 918,1% 136769,3% 
36.603,9 558,1% -61,7% 323,8% 480,9% 1617,3% 
34.931,6 263,6% 302,3% -21,3% -37,6% -9,6% 
32.137,5 -57,7% 112,5% 135,7% -1,7% -80,1% 
24.863,3 1157,0% 6231,0% 0,5% 467,3% -80,1% 
19.583,7 
     
19.010,7 7690,3% 1164,0% -6,9% 130,8% 516,3% 
14.733,4 
     
14.688,8 
  
26,0% 53,0% -47,0% 
7.189,8 
  
192,1% -63,3% 5393,1% 
7.077,4 
  
121,1% 642,3% 7216,2% 
6.433,3 3050,2% 174,4% -51,2% 108,4% 1048,1% 
6.309,8 585,5% 44,7% -63,4% -4,7% 373,8% 
6.190,5 2655,5% 25,5% 1564,4% 516,9% 2094,8% 
5.452,5 
  
-36,5% 59,6% 384,5% 
4.879,7 
  
426,1% 558,0% -99,7% 
4.678,3 1603,8% -8,9% 36,1% 67,7% 1770,4% 
4.514,8 -99,5% -98,5% 187,0% 197,3% -64,8% 
4.358,6 72,9% -100,0% 
   
3.446,3 
  
809,8% 2413,3% 43,7% 
2.890,9 1095,3% 4476,7% 106,3% 477,3% -73,9% 
Source: Own elaboration based on data of the Statistical Office of the Republic of Serbia – online database 
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Table J.5: Import of Serbia from Turkey of selected divisions related to leather and textile industries, in tons 
 
Year 
Divisions 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
Leather and 
fur, raw 0,1 0,2 0,0 0,0 0,0 1,1 0,0 0,3 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 
Textile fibers 
and their scraps 432,2 702,8 43,4 568,9 55,0 283,1 499,8 584,7 762,0 587,3 733,2 623,9 738,5 
Products for 
dyeing and 
tanning 125,5 229,3 208,5 518,4 583,8 696,5 1.088,9 1.211,0 1.451,6 1.450,8 1.902,7 2.040,3 2.122,1 
Leather, 
products of 
leather, not 
ment., and 
processed furs 149,7 110,9 211,6 214,0 194,3 139,0 129,5 136,2 128,3 162,5 194,4 169,0 167,4 
Textile yarn, 
fabrics and 
textile products 16.014,3 14.731,6 19.098,2 22.378,9 21.244,3 15.789,8 16.114,4 17.887,0 19.237,6 21.858,9 25.027,5 28.661,3 29.780,2 
Garments and 
clothing 
accessories 3.459,3 2.567,5 2.521,2 3.770,6 1.908,2 1.528,7 1.819,9 2.362,7 2.022,6 2.183,0 3.458,6 3.765,0 5.651,6 
Footware/shoes 566,8 427,8 513,1 550,8 364,4 286,9 339,6 410,7 458,7 587,9 684,4 586,8 717,9 
Source: Own elaboration based on data of the Statistical Office of the Republic of Serbia – online database 
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Table J.6: Export results of the top 10 Serbian exporting enterprises to Turkey, for the period 2012–2016, in million USD 
  Year 
Company name Type of (economic) activity 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
NIS a.d Novi Sad** Exploitation of crude oil 44.519.926         
CE-ZA-R d.o.o Belgrade*** Recovery of sorted materials 19.814.130 20.560.535 9.891.359     
Železara d.o.o Smederevo Wholesale of waste and scrap 15.226.706 9.997.484 13.581.367 15.207.833 9.915.851 
TigarTyresd.o.oPirot 
Manufacture of rubber tires and tubes; retreading tires 
for vehicles 9.719.446 14.410.689 9.457.751 12.038.935 20.514.135 
Umkad.o.o. Umka Manufacture of paper and paperboard 7.846.171 9.163.598 10.038.160     
Cooper Tire & Rubber Company Serbia 
d.o.oKruševac 
Manufacture of rubber tires and tubes; retreading tires 
for vehicles 7.283.034 6.995.949       
HIP-petrohemijaa.dPančevo Manufacture of plastics in primary forms 5.630.943 23.333.280 8.369.920   5.704.171 
RTB Invest d.o.oBor Wholesale of metals and metal ores 5.426.126   26.918.603     
Sirmium Steel d.o.oSremskaMitrovica – in 
bankruptcy Production of pig iron, steel and ferroalloys 4.882.660 16.037.485 31.780.327 18.487.602   
Scrap Metal Traders d.o.o Stari Banovci Wholesale of waste and scrap 4.457.824         
Metalosrb d.o.o Belgrade Recovery of sorted materials   17.290.892 7.689.651   50.024.917 
FCA Srbijad.o.oKragujevac Manufacture of motor vehicles   13.632.207   8.979.145   
Hipola.dOdžaci - in bankruptcy Manufacture of plastics in primary forms   10.821.079       
Philip Morris Operations a.d.Niš* Manufacture of tobacco products     13.981.863 36.890.170 27.049.507 
FBC a.dMajdanpek Copper production     9.277.363 7.496.012   
Rudarsko-topioničarskibasenBor Copper production       19.680.152   
RTB Borgrupa - RTB Bord.o.oBor Holding companies       15.620.329 47.337.992 
Konzul d.o.o Novi Sad* Manufacture of prepared feeds for farm animals       11.931.188   
GrundfosSrbijad.o.oInđija Manufacture of other pumps and compressors       9.886.652 12.165.524 
HBIS Group Serbia Iron & Steel d.o.o 
Belgrade Production of pig iron, steel and ferroalloys         9.641.197 
Ball pakovanjaEvropa Beograd d.o.o 
Belgrade Production of light metal packaging         5.839.511 
MSK a.d.Kikinda**** Manufacture of other basic organic chemicals         4.454.375 
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Number of enterprises: 22 
Sum of the value of the top 10 exporters on a yearly 
basis 124.806.966 142.243.198 140.986.364 156.218.018 192.647.180 
 
Annual change   14,0% -0,9% 10,8% 23,3% 
*Agricultural enterprises (coloured in light blue) 
**Company for Exploitation, Production, Processing, Distribution and Sale of Oil and Oil Derivatives and Exploitation and Production of Natural Gas Oil Industry of Serbia 
a.d. Novi Sad 
***Limited Liability Company for Metal Recycling Centre for Recycling, Belgrade 
****Joint Stock Company Methanol & Acetic Acid Complex Kikinda 
Note: Obtained data are available only for given years. 
Source: Own elaboration based on data of the Chamber of Commerce and Industry of Serbia 2017b 
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Table J.7: Planned Turkish investments in Serbia 
Investor Value of investment Type of investment Type of activity 
Number of 
new working 
places 
opened 
Number of new 
working places 
planned 
Location of investment Additional notes 
"CCModa" N/A Brownfield Textile industry   
500 (in two phases) in 
the first two years; 
1000 in total in 
medium-term 
Kruševac 
  
"Kardem" N/A N/A Textile industry   2500 in total Smederevo The production would be fully 
export-oriented. 
"Soylemez" N/A N/A N/A   
300 in total (in several 
phases) 
Žitoradja Start of production planned for 
second half of 2018. 
"Weibo Group" 20 mil. EUR N/A Textile industry   
2500 in total (in three 
phases) 
Vranje 
In December 2015 the investor 
signed an agreement on 
stimulus with the Government 
of Serbia. 
"Itimat" 4 mil. EUR Greenfield Dairy farm   100 
Šabac (Free Industrial 
zone)   
"Pamirko" 1 mil. EUR N/A Wood processing   
40 (in the first phase) 
and 400 in the next 
two years 
Šabac (Free Industrial 
zone) 
  
"Dogus Group" N/A Greenfield Hotel construction   N/A Belgrade   
Consortium of 
Turkish firms 
Few dozens of 
million of EUR 
Greenfield Goat farming   N/A Zlatibor county 
  
"Enprode" 18,6 mil. EUR Greenfield Renewable energy   N/A N/A   
"Enprode" 5 mil. EUR Brownfield Brimming briquettes   98 StaraPazova   
Note: In addition, the Serbian Government – Ministry of Agriculture and Environmental Protection has announced that one Turkish juice producer is interested in opening a 
fruit-processing factory in Serbia. 
Note: The Chamber of Commerce and Industry of Serbia has announced that between 45-50 Turkish companies have opened business facilities in Serbia 
Source: Ministry of Trade, Tourism and Telecommunications of the Republic of Serbia 2017b
 444 
 
Appendix K 
Figure K.1: GDP growth rate for the selected countries 
Source: World Bank – World Economic Indicators 
Figure K.2: GDP per capita growth for the selected countries (annual %) 
Source: World Bank – World Economic Indicators 
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Figure K.3: GDP per capita for the selected countries (current US$) 
 
Source: World Bank – World Economic Indicators 
 
Figure K.4: Household final consumption expenditure per capita growth for the selected countries (annual %) 
Source: 
World Bank – World Economic Indicators 
 
Figure K.5: Household final consumption expenditure per capita for the selected countries (constant 2000 US$) 
 
Source: World Bank – World Economic Indicators 
Figure K.6: Household savings for the selected countries, total (% of household disposable income) 
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Source: Own elaboration based on the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development - online 
database 
Figure K.7: FDI outward for China (% of GDP) 
 
Source: Own elaboration based on the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development – online database 
Figure K.8: FDI stock for China (in million USD) 
 
Source: Own elaboration based on the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development – online database 
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Figure K.9: Procedures to register property for the selected countries (number) 
 
Source: World Bank – World Economic Indicators 
Figure K.10: Time required to start a business for the selected countries (days) 
 
Source: World Bank – World Economic Indicators 
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Figure K.11: Taxes on income, profits and capital gains for the selected countries (% of total taxes) 
Source: World Bank – World Economic Indicators 
Figure K.12: Inflation-consumer prices for the selected countries 
Source: World Bank – World Economic Indicators 
Figure K.13: Foreign direct investment for the selected countries, net inflows (% of GDP) 
Source: World Bank – World Economic Indicators 
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Figure K.14: Savings for the selected countries (% of GDP) 
 
Source: World Bank – World Economic Indicators 
Figure K.15: Savings for the selected countries (Current US$) 
 
Source: World Bank – World Economic Indicators 
Figure K.16: Investment for the selected countries (% of GDP) 
 
Source: World Bank – World Economic Indicators 
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Figure K.17: Research and development expenditure for the selected countries (% of GDP)  
Source: World Bank – World Economic Indicators 
K.18: High-technology exports for the selected countries (% of manufactured exports) 
Source: World Bank – World Economic Indicators 
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Figure K.19: High-technology exports for the selected countries (current US$) 
Source: World Bank – World Economic Indicators 
Figure K.20: Current account balance for the selected countries (%) 
 
Source: World Bank – World Economic Indicators 
Figure K.21: Current account balance for the selected countries (US$) 
 
Source: International Monetary Fund – online database 
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Figure K.22: Unemployment for the selected countries 
 
Source: World Bank – World Economic Indicators 
Figure K.23: International tourism for the selected countries, expenditures (current US$)425 
 
Source: World Bank – World Economic Indicators 
                                                          
425 “International tourism expenditures are expenditures of international outbound visitors in other countries, 
including payments to foreign carriers for international transport. These expenditures may include those by 
residents traveling abroad as same-day visitors, except in cases where these are important enough to justify 
separate classification. For some countries they do not include expenditures for passenger transport items. Data 
are in current U.S. dollars.” 
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Appendix L 
Table L.1: Export from Serbia to China by sectors, for the period 2004–2016, in thousand USD 
 
Year Sum Change 
Sectors 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2004–2016 2004–2016 
Food and live animals 3,4 43,8 136,9 371,7 257,3 65,5 645,3 526,3 313,9 412,4 479,4 888,9 604,5 4.749,3 17679,4% 
Annual change   1188,2% 212,6% 171,5% -30,8% -74,5% 885,2% -18,4% -40,4% 31,4% 16,2% 85,4% -32,0% 
  
Beverages and tobacco 7,8 0,1 58,9 0,4 7,7 17,4 35,5 111,0 1.761,2 477,5 125,8 247,8 634,8 3.485,9 8038,5% 
Annual change   -98,7% 58800,0% -99,3% 1825,0% 126,0% 104,0% 212,7% 1486,7% -72,9% -73,7% 97,0% 156,2% 
  
Crude materials, inedible, except fuels 0,0 0,0 876,7 53,4 327,6 93,3 1.131,3 331,5 905,7 2.145,7 5.586,9 7.998,8 11.213,8 30.664,7 1179,1% 
Annual change       -93,9% 513,5% -71,5% 1112,5% -70,7% 173,2% 136,9% 160,4% 43,2% 40,2% 
  
Mineral fuels, lubricants and related prod. 0,0 0,0 0,1 0,0 0,0 0,0 19,7 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,1 0,0 0,3 20,2 200,0% 
Annual change                           
  
Animal and plant oils, fats and waxes 0,0 0,0 0,3 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 1,3 86,3 411,3 499,2 137000,0% 
Annual change                       6538,5% 376,6% 
  
Chemical and similar product, not sti, 0,0 31,8 198,9 151,1 172,9 239,9 518,4 115,1 285,8 1.274,3 1.186,0 1.156,4 998,8 6.329,4 3040,9% 
Annual change     525,5% -24,0% 14,4% 38,8% 116,1% -77,8% 148,3% 345,9% -6,9% -2,5% -13,6% 
  
Manufactured goods classified by material 126,0 925,1 517,7 1.279,6 611,9 403,6 250,2 962,2 262,1 638,0 681,9 1.027,2 1.140,5 8.826,0 805,2% 
Annual change   634,2% -44,0% 147,2% -52,2% -34,0% -38,0% 284,6% -72,8% 143,4% 6,9% 50,6% 11,0% 
  
Machines and transport equipment 448,8 1.244,5 3.225,3 1.437,2 2.369,0 762,5 1.219,7 954,2 1.214,7 2.969,5 4.951,4 6.177,8 8.050,9 35.025,5 1693,9% 
Annual change   177,3% 159,2% -55,4% 64,8% -67,8% 60,0% -21,8% 27,3% 144,5% 66,7% 24,8% 30,3% 
  
Miscellaneous manufactured products 128,1 25,7 1.228,7 2.613,1 2.018,5 7.357,7 3.423,1 12.235,2 1.566,3 1.073,8 1.096,6 2.660,1 2.192,5 37.619,4 1611,6% 
Annual change   -79,9% 4680,9% 112,7% -22,8% 264,5% -53,5% 257,4% -87,2% -31,4% 2,1% 142,6% -17,6% 
  
Products not stipulated in mentioned sectors 0,0 16,6 20,0 0,0 12,8 15,0 14,5 21,7 18,8 5,0 16,1 2,0 17,1 159,6 3,0% 
Annual change     20,5%     17,2% -3,3% 49,7% -13,4% -73,4% 222,0% -87,6% 755,0% 
  Source: Own elaboration based on data of the Statistical Office of the Republic of Serbia – online database 
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Table L.2: Export from Serbia to China by sectors, for the period 2004-2016, in tons 
 
Year Sum Change 
Sectors 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2004–2016 2004–2016 
Food and live animals 0,1 46,8 123,7 209,5 109,1 22,1 213,6 534,4 279,1 215,6 406,5 2.255,5 409,5 4.825,5 409400% 
Annual change 
 
46700,0% 164,3% 69,4% -47,9% -79,7% 866,5% 150,2% -47,8% -22,8% 88,5% 454,9% -81,8% 
  
Beverages and tobacco 2,4 0,2 82,4 0,3 22,7 1,6 2,3 31,2 181,8 108,9 99,8 146,3 343,7 1.023,6 14220,8% 
Annual change 
 
-91,7% 41100% -99,6% 7466,7% -93,0% 43,8% 1256% 482,7% -40,1% -8,4% 46,6% 134,9% 
  
Crude materials, inedible, except fuels 0,0 0,0 750,7 106,2 817,6 23,6 568,3 445,7 1.425,3 3.266,4 10.259,4 19.631,2 31.135,8 68.430,2 4047,6% 
Annual change 
   
-85,9% 669,9% -97,1% 2308,1% -21,6% 219,8% 129,2% 214,1% 91,3% 58,6% 
  
Mineral fuels, lubricants and related products 0,0 0,0 0,1 0,0 0,0 0,0 16,9 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,1 0,6 17,7 500,0% 
Annual change 
       
-100,0% 
    
500,0% 
  
Animal and plant oils, fats and waxes 0,0 0,0 0,1 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 76,1 511,0 587,2 510900% 
Annual change 
            
571,5% 
  
Chemical and similar product, not stipulated 0,0 20,4 49,7 39,7 45,0 115,1 854,4 138,6 949,4 3.103,2 1.580,4 1.303,0 1.314,9 9.513,8 6345,6% 
Annual change 
  
143,6% -20,1% 13,4% 155,8% 642,3% -83,8% 585,0% 226,9% -49,1% -17,6% 0,9% 
  
Manufactured goods classified by material 68,4 2.240,4 614,6 345,2 133,8 101,1 54,3 650,7 303,7 218,9 194,0 587,1 188,8 5.701,0 176,0% 
Annual change 
 
3175,4% -72,6% -43,8% -61,2% -24,4% -46,3% 1098% -53,3% -27,9% -11,4% 202,6% -67,8% 
  
Machines and transport equipment 189,1 267,3 181,5 293,8 117,1 37,4 75,5 33,5 46,5 237,7 378,0 322,3 535,6 2.715,3 183,2% 
Annual change 
 
41,4% -32,1% 61,9% -60,1% -68,1% 101,9% -55,6% 38,8% 411,2% 59,0% -14,7% 66,2% 
  
Miscellaneous manufactured products 8,4 0,3 89,4 131,3 117,7 184,3 139,0 363,3 76,0 60,8 167,2 201,6 204,7 1.744,0 2336,9% 
Annual change 
 
-96,4% 29700% 46,9% -10,4% 56,6% -24,6% 161,4% -79,1% -20,0% 175,0% 20,6% 1,5% 
  
Products not stipulated in mentioned sectors 0,0 1,1 1,3 0,1 0,4 0,3 1,5 1,3 1,4 0,2 1,4 0,1 1,2 10,3 9,1% 
Annual change 
  
18,2% -92,3% 300,0% -25,0% 400,0% -13,3% 7,7% -85,7% 600,0% -92,9% 1100,0% 
  Source: Own elaboration based on data of the Statistical Office of the Republic of Serbia – online database 
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Table L.3: Top 30 divisions by value in the period 2004–2016, in thousand USD 
     
Year Sum Change 
Divisions 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2004–2016 2004–2016 
Cork and wood 0,0 0,0 0,0 35,0 296,7 0,0 37,9 264,1 688,1 1.973,7 4.918,8 7.757,3 11.183,0 27.154,6 31851,4% 
Shoes 0,1 0,0 142,3 697,0 156,7 2.981,8 1.384,7 6.716,7 1.166,0 580,0 341,8 1.250,5 893,7 16.311,3 893600,0% 
Industrial machines for general use, not mentioned 45,3 126,0 191,7 39,6 85,0 39,7 181,5 160,5 229,2 1.216,8 2.189,7 2.430,6 3.604,6 10.540,2 7857,2% 
Garments and clothing accessories 0,1 9,5 391,5 1.023,3 856,4 3.067,1 1.189,4 3.390,1 42,0 166,4 114,9 0,0 2,5 10.253,2 2400,0% 
Driving machines and power equipment 0,0 0,0 0,3 241,3 3,7 7,5 14,2 52,9 0,0 431,3 1.556,7 2.671,2 2.819,2 7.798,3 939633,3% 
Miscellaneous products, not mentioned 12,8 10,5 402,9 398,9 568,3 647,8 390,7 771,1 46,5 60,6 204,9 913,9 771,1 5.200,0 5924,2% 
Telecommunications and audio apparatuses and equipment 4,2 348,4 1.443,0 498,8 349,0 266,2 172,1 172,8 251,8 319,5 190,5 152,5 325,4 4.494,2 7647,6% 
Electrical machines, apparatuses and appliances, not mentioned 1,2 316,4 249,4 189,3 394,9 159,0 632,9 274,9 296,6 754,8 164,9 272,1 573,3 4.279,7 47675,0% 
Plastics in non-primary forms 0,0 0,0 87,6 77,1 44,9 165,4 41,7 25,2 185,2 558,9 750,4 814,5 702,8 3.453,7 702,3% 
Fruit and vegetables 0,0 43,3 119,7 301,3 251,7 51,6 601,0 347,3 92,4 344,2 381,8 375,2 455,3 3.364,8 951,5% 
Machines specialised for industry 378,9 423,3 164,2 28,9 82,6 60,6 110,1 3,9 365,9 183,3 800,1 260,8 490,0 3.352,6 29,3% 
Metal ores and metal scraps 0,0 0,0 858,8 0,0 0,1 80,0 697,3 0,0 43,0 99,2 667,5 200,9 21,5 2.668,3 -97,5% 
Products made of metals, not mentioned 60,5 0,0 97,7 716,2 290,0 186,1 167,4 297,2 39,5 443,5 101,7 7,2 63,7 2.470,7 5,3% 
Beverages 7,8 0,1 58,9 0,4 7,7 17,4 35,5 111,0 377,4 477,5 114,4 247,8 634,8 2.090,7 8038,5% 
Office machines and machines for automatic data processing 5,4 0,0 756,0 395,3 431,2 117,2 65,1 40,4 49,9 1,0 8,5 0,2 106,1 1.976,3 1864,8% 
Plastics in primary forms 0,0 2,7 0,2 3,3 24,0 14,9 425,4 78,2 84,6 422,2 366,0 277,8 248,0 1.947,3 9085,2% 
Furniture and parts thereof; bedding, mattresses, pillows 0,0 0,0 59,8 75,3 28,9 49,2 61,9 157,2 63,3 210,7 337,0 425,8 438,8 1.907,9 633,8% 
Machines for metal processing 0,0 0,0 220,7 12,5 907,4 4,2 13,5 151,2 21,2 48,5 26,1 361,8 10,9 1.778,0 -95,1% 
Professional, scientific and controlling instruments 114,1 3,1 31,4 56,9 118,1 283,8 235,3 411,0 235,9 37,0 54,5 59,7 68,1 1.708,9 -40,3% 
Paper, cardboard and products of pulp 50,9 69,6 77,0 96,7 75,0 19,9 9,7 48,7 0,0 41,0 507,7 392,4 181,6 1.570,2 256,8% 
Tobacco and tobacco products   0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0   0,0 0,0 1.383,8 0,0 11,4 0,0 0,0 1.395,2   
Products of non-metallic minerals 8,7 31,3 134,7 205,1 162,7 123,6 30,2 444,5 219,2 1,2 0,1 0,0 0,1 1.361,4 -98,9% 
Products made of rubber, not mentioned 5,9 16,0 10,4 45,1 5,6 3,5 6,7 12,0 1,2 5,0 32,3 411,9 759,7 1.315,3 12776,3% 
Iron and steel 0,0 802,8 145,7 158,3 5,1 4,4 4,2 38,4 0,0 52,6 0,4 3,8 0,3 1.216,0 -100,0% 
Travel goods, handbags and similar 0,0 0,0 99,0 176,4 158,2 203,1 104,4 337,6 0,7 0,0 0,0 0,0 3,7 1.083,1 -96,3% 
Cameras; optical products; clocks, watches 0,3 2,6 91,8 158,0 33,4 119,2 7,9 345,9 11,9 19,2 43,4 10,0 14,6 858,2 4766,7% 
Road vehicles (including ACV vehicles) 13,8 30,4 199,8 31,5 115,2 108,1 30,3 97,6 0,0 14,3 14,1 28,6 91,4 775,1 562,3% 
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Animal food (except unmilled cereals) 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 29,3 0,0 0,0 0,0 54,3 499,1 27,3 610,0 -6,8% 
Fixed plant fats and oils, raw, refined 0,0 0,0 0,3 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 86,3 411,3 497,9 137000,0% 
Organic chemical products 0,0 29,1 41,0 32,0 1,9 0,0 0,0 0,0 12,1 257,9 18,0 52,2 0,0 444,2 79,4% 
Source: Own elaboration based on data of the Statistical Office of the Republic of Serbia – online database 
 
Table L.4: Top 30 divisions by value in the period 2004–2016, in tons 
  
Year Sum Change 
Divisions 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2004–2016 2004–2016 
Cork and wood 0,0 0,0 0,0 86,7 795,8 0,0 65,9 364,6 972,0 2.972,6 10.202,8 19.600,9 31.066,8 66.128,1 35732,5% 
Plastics in primary forms 0,0 19,7 0,0 3,0 19,7 80,7 838,7 133,0 932,9 1.664,7 1.556,2 1.277,2 1.289,8 7.815,6 6447,2% 
Iron and steel 0,0 2.191,5 477,0 98,6 1,1 0,8 3,8 2,5 0,0 21,9 0,0 20,2 0,0 2.817,4   
Animal food (except unmilled cereals) 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 28,5 0,0 0,0 0,0 254,6 2.079,4 68,0 2.430,5 138,6% 
Fruit and vegetables 0,0 46,1 120,7 126,8 108,7 22,0 184,0 328,0 61,5 143,5 142,0 176,0 237,6 1.696,9 96,9% 
Inorganic chemical products 0,0 0,0 0,0 6,8 0,0 8,5 0,0 0,0 0,0 1.422,8 0,0 0,0 0,0 1.438,1   
Metal ores and metal scraps 0,0 0,0 746,6 0,0 0,4 22,5 268,0 0,2 207,5 6,9 56,4 19,2 2,8 1.330,5 -99,6% 
Products of non-metallic minerals 21,2 18,0 77,7 67,7 47,1 38,0 9,9 578,5 295,9 3,6 0,0 0,0 0,1 1.157,7 -99,5% 
Beverages 2,4 0,2 82,4 0,3 22,7 1,6 2,3 31,2 42,7 108,9 99,1 146,3 343,7 883,8 317,1% 
Machines specialised for industry 174,3 178,4 40,6 2,3 6,2 7,6 47,6 0,2 9,6 22,1 134,9 0,5 127,1 751,4 -28,8% 
Driving machines and power equipment 0,0 0,0 0,0 251,3 0,2 0,9 2,3 0,9 0,0 30,3 93,0 155,5 167,6 702,0 -33,3% 
Industrial machines for general use, not mentioned 2,7 21,7 33,1 3,9 18,4 4,3 10,1 10,0 12,3 111,1 145,8 129,4 185,4 688,2 460,1% 
Fixed plant fats and oils, raw, refined 0,0 0,0 0,1 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 76,1 511,0 587,2 510900,0% 
Meat and meat products       20,5       196,3 196,5 70,9     99,8 584,0 386,8% 
Products made of metals, not mentioned 35,3 0,0 20,9 127,0 49,0 47,2 31,3 40,1 7,7 163,2 4,1 3,2 10,0 539,0 -71,7% 
Paper, cardboard and products of pulp 9,0 17,0 24,0 19,8 12,1 3,7 2,5 9,2 0,0 6,0 171,3 164,2 78,0 516,8 358,8% 
Furniture and parts thereof; bedding, mattresses, pillows 0,0 0,0 25,9 17,8 5,4 7,9 25,0 48,4 10,6 35,7 71,6 126,1 107,4 481,8 314,7% 
Products of cork and wood (except furniture) 0,0 0,0 5,6 7,0 12,5 8,0 1,5 2,9 0,0 3,3 16,1 373,3 36,7 466,9 555,4% 
Textile fibres and scraps 0,0 0,0 1,1 0,1 1,9 0,9 0,0 80,7 236,0 132,6 0,0 9,3 0,0 462,6   
Shoes 0,0 0,0 6,3 28,0 6,1 53,4 41,8 135,8 33,6 17,2 12,2 48,5 41,2 424,1 554,0% 
Miscellaneous products, not mentioned 0,0 0,2 32,4 44,3 48,8 48,1 36,2 79,0 7,4 6,7 2,7 10,7 38,1 354,6 18950,0% 
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Electrical machines, apparatuses and appliances, not ment. 0,0 64,9 22,0 9,4 24,1 7,3 8,7 8,8 22,8 67,9 1,7 10,1 27,7 275,4 -57,3% 
Garments and clothing accessories 0,0 0,1 17,7 24,3 31,5 61,3 24,5 74,2 0,3 0,6 1,2 0,0 0,0 235,7   
Crude rubber, included synthetic and regenerated 0,0 0,0 1,8 0,0 0,0 0,0 194,5 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 1,1 20,0 217,4 1011,1% 
Crude fertilizers (except from section 56) and minerals 0,0 0,0 0,5 0,4 0,5 0,0 0,0 0,1 0,0 154,2 0,2 0,6 46,2 202,7 9140,0% 
Plastics in non-primary forms 0,0 0,0 20,6 11,1 5,3 17,2 7,9 3,9 4,3 15,0 22,1 24,8 22,8 155,0 10,7% 
Tobacco and tobacco products   0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0   0,0 0,0 139,1 0,0 0,6 0,0 0,0 139,7   
Cameras; optical products; clocks, watches 0,1 0,0 1,2 4,8 0,8 1,8 0,1 8,7 0,7 0,5 78,9 16,2 17,6 131,4 17500,0% 
Machines for metal processing 0,0 0,0 29,6 6,1 49,4 0,2 0,1 1,3 0,5 1,0 0,0 23,9 0,0 112,1 -100,0% 
Products made of rubber, not mentioned 2,9 5,6 3,4 8,0 2,2 0,4 1,1 3,6 0,1 0,0 1,8 25,2 54,8 109,1 350,0% 
Source: Own elaboration based on data of the Statistical Office of the Republic of Serbia – online database 
 
Table L.5: Number of Serbian export goods to China, for the period 2007–2016  
Year Number 
of goods 
Annual 
change 
2007 791   
2008 911 15,2% 
2009 479 -47,4% 
2010 732 52,8% 
2011 901 23,1% 
2012 168 -81,4% 
2013 172 2,4% 
2014 208 20,9% 
2015 245 17,8% 
2016 326 33,1% 
Change* -58,8% 
 Source: Own elaboration based on data from the Statistical Office of the Republic of Serbia (data are not available at online database nor are available in documents, but 
obtained upon request. 
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Table L.6: Top 20 import divisions by value in the period 2004-2016, in thousand USD 
   
Year 
Sum Change 
Divisions 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2004–2016 2004–2016 
Telecommunications and audio apparatuses and 
equipment 42.693 57.693 88.678 163.414 180.009 150.412 160.218 219.234 200.721 232.429 213.575 259.586 246.896 2.215.557 5 
Office machines and machines for automatic data 
processing 123.270 91.284 128.702 196.463 168.475 121.068 142.131 154.626 135.857 146.375 138.838 118.604 99.807 1.765.500 0 
Unclassified goods 1.019 68 81 186.620 244.143 150.085 97.815 86.844 94.705 116.591 142.879 151.360 348.259 1.620.468 341 
Electrical machines, apparatuses and appliances, 
not ment. 40.101 43.138 58.143 88.753 94.643 74.727 85.294 104.280 113.254 120.791 123.006 105.572 118.002 1.169.704 2 
Garments and clothing accessories 51.001 34.674 60.242 92.100 132.785 92.785 86.089 99.639 82.707 88.582 90.002 74.694 79.970 1.065.272 1 
Industrial machines for general use, not 
mentioned 25.546 29.350 40.503 69.176 107.313 41.463 57.265 78.003 88.827 101.730 106.181 156.468 92.537 994.362 3 
Miscellaneous products, not mentioned 41.357 48.849 63.851 85.270 115.631 76.157 74.680 89.022 82.280 82.887 84.351 73.075 68.411 985.821 1 
Shoes 52.480 36.870 58.782 59.612 66.976 48.142 58.525 80.888 60.913 52.590 43.079 39.025 40.924 698.806 0 
Products made of metals, not mentioned 18.847 23.294 34.233 49.166 59.242 41.592 56.467 63.485 53.757 54.491 53.355 47.080 50.289 605.295 2 
Plastics in primary forms 2.434 14.198 40.225 73.429 71.468 26.632 26.829 56.009 57.574 58.318 59.901 37.881 36.301 561.198 14 
Textile yarn, fabrics and textile products 11.141 12.965 20.777 30.571 37.290 27.957 32.852 51.469 51.218 52.988 56.378 56.845 57.781 500.231 4 
Organic chemical products 9.523 10.326 15.614 17.363 22.912 19.103 21.957 29.560 36.902 31.927 34.742 38.226 39.894 328.048 3 
Products of non-metallic minerals 8.847 11.244 18.840 28.985 29.397 21.119 23.923 32.458 35.062 26.126 26.687 29.781 21.782 314.251 1 
Road vehicles (including ACV vehicles) 7.001 7.713 11.517 16.405 21.691 12.537 12.409 46.500 22.436 30.752 25.566 26.950 22.893 264.372 2 
Machines specialised for industry 5.278 4.776 9.102 19.709 27.975 11.753 12.013 27.557 19.013 24.173 27.359 26.630 31.569 246.908 5 
Travel goods, handbags and similar 9.195 7.371 10.256 17.932 26.211 19.929 19.256 23.169 22.342 23.460 23.651 20.026 21.519 244.317 1 
Furniture and parts thereof; bedding, mattresses, 
pillows 3.492 5.546 10.974 18.307 25.964 19.416 18.767 21.966 26.535 25.927 24.311 19.544 20.642 241.390 5 
Coloured metals 1.311 2.243 4.145 25.414 9.922 4.137 7.149 10.174 9.680 40.131 55.265 34.838 19.519 223.929 14 
Chemical materials and products, not mentioned 2.888 3.397 6.867 11.781 12.034 13.994 14.800 18.597 24.703 27.604 23.410 28.000 13.371 201.446 4 
Prefabricated buildings; sanitary and other 
devices 4.441 5.055 9.573 15.326 20.018 13.780 16.590 17.252 18.011 17.830 19.420 17.988 19.602 194.885 3 
Source: Own elaboration based on data from the Statistical Office of the Republic of Serbia 
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P O V Z E T E K 
 
Doktorska disertacija se ukvarja z vprašanjem gospodarske diplomacije in njenim pomenom 
za države v tranziciji in v razvoju. Pri tem širi teorijo gospodarske diplomacije, ki se je 
razvila na modelih razvitih držav. 
Gospodarska diplomacija je postala aktualna predvsem po zlomu dvopolnega sistema, najprej 
kot instrument zunanje politike, nato pa se je počasi vse bolj prelivala tudi v teoretske 
modele. Četudi se je njeno preučevanje začelo po drugi svetovni vojni, pa je slednje doživelo 
razmah v zadnjih dveh desetletjih. Obstoječe teorije so do sedaj obravnavale vprašanja vpliva 
gospodarske diplomacije na internacionalizacijo nacionalnih gospodarstev, pri čemer je bil 
fokus teh pristopov usmerjen predvsem v preučevanje promocije trgovine in investicij, tj. 
podpora poslovanju podjetij na tujih trgih (kar vključuje tudi podporo v pogajanjih), iskanje 
poslovnih partnerjev (kar pomeni vzpostavitev kontaktov in/ali podporo v vzdrževanju le-
teh), zbiranje informacij, organiziranje obiskov in seminarjev, predstavljanje na sejmih, 
analiza trgov in podobno. Širitev delovanja gospodarske diplomacije v praksi se je odrazila 
tudi v teoriji. Posledično so se avtorji začeli ukvarjati z vprašanjem odnosa in učinkov 
aktivnosti gospodarske diplomacije in mednarodnega razvojnega sodelovanja, vprašanji 
lobiranja in/ali zbiranja obveščevalnih podatkov, zaščito pravic do intelektualne lastnine, 
reševanjem konfliktov, promocijo turizma, spodbujanjem sodelovanja na področju znanosti 
in  tehnologije, kot tudi  z vprašanjem prenosa tehnologije. V večini navedenih primerov so 
študije pokazale pozitiven vpliv gospodarske diplomacije na nacionalna gospodarstva, pa tudi 
na pospeševanje internacionalizacije, ki služi kot orodje za razvoj nacionalnih gospodarstev. 
V tem okviru smo določili namen doktorske disertacije, in sicer je bil ta ugotoviti, ali je, in v 
kolikšni meri, delovanje gospodarske diplomacije tranzicijskih držav na trgih t. i. vznikajočih 
držav (emerging markets) prispevalo h krepitvi internacionalizacije (spodbujanje izvoza, 
geografska diverzifikacija trgov in turizma, pritegovanje neposrednih tujih investicij, 
promocija domačih investicij zunaj meja države, zagotavljanje ugodnih investicijskih 
kreditov idr.) gospodarstev teh tranzicijskih držav. Kot empirični primer smo izbrali 
Republiko Srbijo, ki je tranzicijska država (kot ostale nekdanje komunistične države Srednje 
in Jugovzhodne Evrope), s podrazvitim tržnim gospodarstvom, odvisnim predvsem od trgov 
držav Evropske unije in centralnoevropskega prostotrgovinskega območja (CEFTA). Ta 
geografska odvisnost pa seveda Srbijo kot državo, tudi zato, ker je država v tranziciji, dela 
zelo ranljivo in občutljivo na ekonomske šoke. To je bilo še posebej vidno v času velike 
ekonomske in finančne krize 2007/2008, ko je postalo jasno, da je še posebej za ranljive 
države v tranziciji nujno, da svojo gospodarsko aktivnost diverzificirajo, še najlažje na 
vzhodne, vznikajoče trge (Ruska federacija, Turčija, Ljudska republika Kitajska). Za Srbijo je 
to še večja dodana vrednost, saj ima s temi državami dobre kulturne in politične odnose, kar 
lahko pospeši medsebojno gospodarsko sodelovanje. A obrat proti tem trgom ni pomemben 
samo zaradi geografske diverzifikacije in premagovanja ekonomskih kriz, ampak tudi za to, 
ker v teoriji velja, da je gospodarska diplomacija učinkovitejša v tistih državah/trgih, v 
katerih ima država močan vpliv na gospodarstvo, v primerjavi s tistimi, kjer vladajo pravila 
tržnega gospodarstva. Omenjene ugodne okoliščine so pomagale Srbiji, da sklene sporazume 
o prosti trgovini z Rusijo in Turčijo, kot tudi strateški sporazum s Kitajsko. Ti sporazumi 
predstavljajo izreden dosežek njene gospodarske diplomacije. Poleg tega sta dva omenjena 
sporazuma o prosti trgovini prav tako pomembna tudi v smislu pritegnitve tujih neposrednih 
investicij, posebno iz EU, ker nudita podjetjem, registriranim v Srbiji, možnost 
brezcarinskega izvoza na ta dva velika trga. 
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Na primeru treh poglobljenih empiričnih študij primera: Srbija–Rusija, Srbija–Turčija in 
Srbija–Kitajska ugotavljamo, da je Srbija z angažiranjem gospodarske diplomacije uspela 
okrepiti internacionalizacijo svojega gospodarstva. To se je v primerjalni perspektivi 
pokazalo v naraščanju dvostranske menjave, predvsem s povečanjem izvoza Srbije v 
omenjene tri države; s porastom vhodnih tujih neposrednih investicij, pa tudi z večjim 
številom turistov, ki so Srbijo izbrali za svojo destinacijo. Končno, Srbija je s pomočjo svoje 
gospodarske diplomacije pridobila tudi relativno ugodne investicijske kredite. Poleg 
navedenih, neposrednih učinkov, so aktivnosti gospodarske diplomacije Srbije ustvarile tudi 
številne posredne pozitivne učinke. Tu velja izpostaviti Sporazum o prosti trgovini z Rusko 
federacijo (in njemu pripadajoče protokole), ki spodbuja investitorje iz evropskih držav, da 
prenesejo svojo proizvodnjo v Srbijo, saj se s tem ognejo carinam, sočasno pa ceneje 
dostopajo do ruskega, beloruskega in kazahstanskega trga. Na drugi strani pa je Sporazum o 
gospodarskem in tehničnem sodelovanju s Kitajsko, ki omogoča Srbiji pridobivanje ugodnih 
kreditov s strani kitajske izvozne banke ter financiranje velikih infrastrukturnih projektov po 
vsej državi, zlasti investicij v transportno infrastrukturo. Poleg naštetega velja omeniti še eno 
zadevo, ki se je pokazala pri raziskovanju, in sicer da deluje gospodarska diplomacija veliko 
učinkoviteje med državami, ki imajo dobre družbeno-politično-kulturne odnose kot med 
tistimi državami, ki teh odnosov nimajo tako razvitih. To velja še posebej poudariti, saj do 
sedaj v literaturi, ki o gospodarski diplomaciji obstaja, to še ni bilo dokazano.  
Navedeno, pa tudi pripravljena priporočila srbskim oblastem, je osnova za nadaljnje 
raziskovanje predvsem o tem, kako lahko državne oblasti uporabljajo gospodarsko 
diplomacijo za diverzifikacijo izvoza/uvoza, investicij, investicijskih sporazumov, pa tudi za 
izboljševanje gospodarskega razvoja držav v tranziciji nasploh. Glede na to, da je teorija 
delovanja gospodarske diplomacije tranzicijskih držav še podrazvita predstavlja pričujoča 
doktorska disertacija prispevek k znanosti na področju gospodarske diplomacije in 
diplomacije nasploh, pa tudi k udejanjanju gospodarske diplomacije v praksi. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
